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Abstract 
 
Background 
This thesis examines the origins and early development of UK Biobank. This is a 
resource funded in 2002 by the Medical Research Council, the Wellcome Trust, the 
Department of Health and the Scottish Executive to gather genetic and lifestyle 
information from half a million participants aged 40-69 years old in the UK and 
monitor their health for up to thirty years in order to improve the prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of major diseases. UK Biobank was set up following the 
completion of the Human Genome Project in 2001, and was one of many established 
at around the same time with the goal of translating the knowledge of the human 
genome sequence into practical benefits for human health. (National genetic databases 
were also set up or proposed in Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Singapore, Tonga, 
Spain, and the United States). They, and the Human Genome Project, had raised a 
number of important issues about access to and ownership of genetic information. 
 
Aims 
The original aim of my PhD was to examine lay and professional understandings and 
responses to Biobank in the light of this background. However, UK Biobank took 
longer than expected to reach the stage of data collection, in part because of 
negotiations about its organisational structure. The aim therefore changed to address 
the question of how and why was UK Biobank initially configured in the manner it 
was.   
 
Organisational structure 
UK Biobank was originally set up by the funders with a ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ model, 
with calls for bids from UK Universities for a central ‘hub’ charged with financial 
management and overall control of data and samples, and ‘spokes’ who were 
responsible for recruitment and data collection through primary care. The selection of 
both was made through the procurement rules of the EU.  The hub (Manchester), six 
regional spokes, and the CEO (from Oxford) were all appointed simultaneously in 
2003 and subsequently a Board of Directors and a number of committees were 
appointed. The CEO resigned in late 2004, and a new CEO and Principal Investigator 
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was appointed in 2005, after which there were significant changes to the 
organisational structure. 
 
Methods 
I conducted 76 oral history interviews with academic scientists directly and indirectly 
involved in UK Biobank, representatives of all four funding bodies, and 
representatives of UK Biobank Limited (the company set up to manage UK Biobank). 
I also conducted archival analysis of the MRC’s official documents concerning the 
origins and development of UK Biobank.  
 
Findings 
From its beginning UK Biobank was marked by tension between academic scientists 
on the one hand and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited 
on the other. Academic scientists criticised the funding bodies for establishing UK 
Biobank in a way that departed from what I have termed ‘standard academic scientific 
practice’. Spokes felt they should receive some privileged access to data they would 
contribute to collecting, and felt that the set up did not recognise the performance 
indicators driving scientists and universities. Lack of clarity over who was in control 
of UK Biobank contributed to these tensions as both spokes and funders felt that the 
other exerted undue influence. Some mistrust developed between academic scientists 
and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited.  
 
Discussion 
The configuration of UK Biobank was difficult for academic scientists and 
representatives of both the funding bodies and UK Biobank alike. Organisational 
issues, typical of those confronting Big Science initiatives, were largely responsible 
for this difficult legacy. Issues of leadership, the hub and spoke model, the sequencing 
of funding decisions, appointment of groups and committees and protocol 
development, uncertainties about who was in control, and ambiguities within the 
organisational structure as a whole were the most significant issues in the origins and 
development of UK Biobank, as the organisational changes in 2005 testify.  
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Preface 
 
Background to my PhD studentship 
In May 2003 Professor Sally Macintyre and Professor Kate Hunt at the MRC Social 
and Public Health Sciences Unit1 at the University of Glasgow advertised a PhD 
Studentship on ‘Lay and professionals’ experiences and views of the MRC/Wellcome 
Biobank Project’. The topic reflected their research interests and that of the Unit, and 
emerged from the Unit’s long standing interest in public engagement with science, 
particularly epidemiological science. MRC Head Office was not involved in the 
selection of the topic nor did they have any role in approving the title.   
 
I was a Wellcome Trust funded masters’ student at the Centre for the History of 
Medicine also at the University of Glasgow,
2
 completing my MPhil in the History of 
Medicine in 2003, including a dissertation topic on ‘Infanticide in Scotland, 1830-
1840’ using justiciary court records from the National Archives of Scotland and 
doctors’ tracts of the period as sources.  
 
My application for the PhD Studentship at the MRC Social and Public Health 
Sciences Unit supervised by Professor Sally Macintyre and Professor Kate Hunt was 
successful. Once I took up the studentship, my supervisors and I changed the title to 
‘A contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank’ to reflect 
my background as a medical historian and in response to factors relating to UK 
Biobank itself: by September 2003 UK Biobank’s implementation was delayed 
making it impossible to examine perceptions of the endeavour. This shift of focus 
prompted us to seek a co-supervisor with a historical background. We contacted the 
                                                
1 The MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit (MRC SPHSU) receives core funding from the UK 
MRC and the Chief Scientist Office at the Scottish Executive Health Department. It is located at the 
University of Glasgow and is an affiliated member of the University’s Division of Community Based 
Sciences. It aims to ‘promote human health via the study of social and environmental influences on 
health’ (http://www.msoc-mrc.gla.ac.uk 2007) (accessed 16/02/07).  
2 The Centre for the History of Medicine was established in the University of Glasgow in 1985. It is 
now part of the Department of Economic and Social History and a member of the School of Historical 
Studies. Its research interests and activities cover the history of medicine from the early modern period 
to the twentieth century (http://www.gla.arts.ac.uk/History/Medicine/about%20the%20centre.html 
2007) (accessed 16/02/07).  
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Centre for the History of Medicine at the University of Glasgow,
 
and Dr. Marguerite 
Dupree agreed to be a third supervisor.  
 
Background to UK Biobank 
The Human Genome Project (HGP) was a crucial antecedent to UK Biobank, and 
paved the way for research into the role of genes and lifestyle factors in the 
development of disease. The HGP, an international effort to map
3
 and sequence
4
 the 
human genome, took place between the mid-1980s and the first few years of the 
twenty-first century. Completion of the first draft of the human genome in 2001 
heralded the beginning of the ‘post-genome challenge’, which was seen by some 
scientists as an opportunity to utilise the knowledge gained from the HGP to create 
practical benefits for human health, for example through improved drug treatments 
and personalised medicine.  
 
UK Biobank originated as an endeavour to construct a national database of health and 
lifestyle data, and blood and urine samples, from half a million healthy volunteers 
aged between 40 and 69 years old. It was borne out of the opportunities presented by 
the HGP, and is an example of one response to the ‘post-genome challenge’. UK 
Biobank was funded by the Medical Research Council (MRC),5 the Wellcome Trust,6 
the Department of Health (DoH),7 and the Scottish Executive.8 It officially began with 
                                                
3
 Determination of the relative positions of genes on a DNA molecule (chromosome or plasmid) and of 
the distance, in linkage units or physical units, between them  (http://www.doegenomes.org 2007) 
(accessed 16/02/07). 
4
 Determination of the order of nucleotides (base sequences) in a DNA or RNA molecule or the order 
of amino acids in a protein (http://www.doegenomes.org 2007) (accessed 16/02/07).  
5 The MRC is a national organisation established in 1913 and funded by the government through an 
annual Grant from parliament via the Office of Science and Technology (OST), part of the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI). It promotes research into all areas of medical and related science with the 
aims of ‘improving the health and quality of life of the UK public and contributing to the wealth of the 
nation’. It is an independent organisation regarding the types of research it decides to support but works 
closely with Health Departments, Research Councils, industry and others in identifying and reacting to 
current and future health needs (http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/about.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06) 
6 The Wellcome Trust is an independent charity established in 1936 to fund research to improve human 
and animal health. It is the largest non-governmental source of funds for biomedical research in the UK 
and is privately endowed, thus independent from governments, industry and donors. It was founded by 
Sir Henry Wellcome who established a pharmaceutical company and, when he died, this charity 
(http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/aboutus 2006) (accessed 14/02/06). 
7 The Department of Health aims to ‘improve the health and wellbeing of people in England’ 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/AboutUs/fs.en 2006) (accessed 14/02/06). It is not responsible for the running 
of the NHS or social services but instead works with health and social care organisations, arm’s length 
bodies and public and private sector organisations in delivery of health and social care. It is 
accountable to the public and government for the overall performance of the NHS, personal social 
services and the operation of the Department. Its ministers are led by the Secretary of State and 
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the formal commitment of funds in 2002. The MRC
9
 and the Wellcome Trust
10
 also 
funded a number of case-control studies following a call for proposals in 2000 in 
response to the ‘post-genome challenge’.   
 
UK Biobank was just one example of a national genetics database established in 
response to the ‘post-challenge challenge’. A further national genetics database was 
planned in Britain in response to the post-genome challenge: Generation Scotland was 
proposed in 1999 and received initial funding from the Scottish Executive in 2003.11 
National genetic databases were set up or proposed in a number of countries across 
the world, including Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Singapore, Tonga, Spain and 
the United States. UK Biobank was therefore part of an international set of studies, 
which took place in the late nineteen-nineties. These proposals used the ‘post-genome 
challenge’ language of a ‘new era in medicine’ and ‘personalised treatment’. The 
international context of genetic database proposals added a further dimension to such 
expressions and infused them with greater potency. It is the aim of this thesis to 
provide a contemporary historical account of this one British response to the ‘post-
genome challenge’.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Background and Aim 
 
1.1.1 ‘The UK Biobank gets funding go-ahead’  
 
Funding for the world's largest study of the role of nature and nurture in health 
and disease was announced today … the study will capitalise on the knowledge 
from the Human Genome Project … The combination of volunteers' genetic, 
medical and lifestyle information will position the biobank study as a powerful 
resource to help researchers unravel the origins of … important diseases 
(http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002895.html 2002) (accessed 19/12/06). 
This press release issued on the 29 April 2002 announced the joint decision of the 
MRC, Wellcome Trust and the DoH to fund UK Biobank, and heralded the official 
beginning of the endeavour. The announcement followed several years of planning by 
the MRC and Wellcome Trust, which formally began with an official meeting 
between them in May 1999. The press release illustrates the significance of the ‘post-
genome challenge’ for the development of UK Biobank by positioning it as a 
response to the opportunities presented by the HGP. It points to the potential benefits 
to human health to be gained from utilising the knowledge from the HGP, specifically 
in assessing the role of genes and lifestyle in the development of disease. It also 
demonstrates the international context of genetic databases by describing UK Biobank 
as the ‘world’s largest’.   
 
The funding bodies’ comments that accompanied this press release reinforced the 
position of UK Biobank as a response to the ‘post-genome challenge’. The then 
leaders of the MRC and Wellcome Trust, Sir George Radda and Dr Mike Dexter, 
justified UK Biobank in terms of its ability to capitalise on the opportunities presented 
by the HGP. For example, Dr Dexter remarked that ‘[t]he UK biobank is a natural 
progression of the Wellcome Trust's involvement in the Human Genome Project’, and 
Sir George Radda commented that ‘[t]his exciting project may one day herald a new 
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era of medicine. In 20 years time, we may see individualised approaches to disease 
prevention and treatment’ (http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002895.html 2002) 
(accessed 19/12/06). The then Minister of Health, Lord Hunt, commenting on behalf 
of the DoH, focussed on the international context of genetic databases: ‘The UK is 
leading the world with this exciting project … It under-scores the Government's 
current investment for a better patient-focused health service’ 
(http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002895.html 2002) (accessed 19/12/06). The 
funding bodies’ comments reflect a common theme associated with the promise of the 
‘post-genome challenge’, that of personalised healthcare where drugs and treatment 
are tailored toward a particular person’s constitution.  
 
1.1.2 The ‘post-genome challenge’ and UK Biobank     
 
UK Biobank emerged amidst a climate of great promise regarding the opportunities 
presented by the HGP to improve human health. For example, the then Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of UK Biobank Limited, John Newton, commented in a 
speech at a Parliamentary event in April 2003:  
the last few years of the last century saw biomedical science transformed by 
the Human Genome Project. The new genetics provides a stunning 
opportunity to move ahead in our understanding of variability in human health  
(http://www.wellcome.ac.uk_WTD002871.html 2003) (accessed 16/02/07).   
The HGP not only presented new opportunities for gene research but opened up new 
avenues for the whole of biological research. Such was the promise that the HGP was 
seen to represent that it was described as the ‘Holy Grail of biological science’ 
(Glasner 2002) (p. 267). Similarly John Sulston (leader of the UK part of the HGP) 
described it as ‘a work of reference as indispensable to biologists as a dictionary to a 
writer’ (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 247). Much of the excitement surrounding the 
mapping and sequencing of the human genome was attributed to its association with 
‘Big Science’ (Glasner 2002). The HGP represented biologists’ first claim to Big 
Science, previously the reserve of physical scientists. Scientists responded to the 
‘post-genome challenge’ by developing ways to transform the abstract knowledge 
collected in the HGP into practical benefits for healthcare, thus justifying the Project. 
It set scientists ‘scrambling to develop new techniques that exploit genome data to ask 
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entirely new questions’ (Glasner 2002) (p.269). The way in which UK Biobank was 
announced stressed that it would use the knowledge gained from the HGP to explore 
the role of genes and lifestyle factors in the development of disease.  
 
Funding bodies played a decisive role in getting both the HGP and UK Biobank 
underway. In the HGP, the United States group (the largest group involved) was led 
by the National Institutes of Health
12
 (NIH) and the Department of Energy
13
 (DOE), 
and the UK effort was funded by the Wellcome Trust and the MRC. The HGP, like 
UK Biobank, was a collaborative venture and brought scientists, social scientists and 
funding bodies together nationally and internationally. The effort to map and 
sequence the human genome also included groups from France, Italy, Germany and 
Japan.  I will examine the origins and development of the HGP in detail later in this 
chapter. The significant involvement of funding bodies and collaboration between 
different groups of researchers are characteristic of Big Science. I will explore the 
concept of Big Science and the origins and development of Big Science projects in the 
literature review below.  
 
1.1.3 Why a contemporary history?  
 
Considerable optimism surrounded the promise of the ‘post-genome challenge’ to 
improve human health. Biologists spoke of dramatic changes in healthcare that would 
be wrought by the completion of the human genome map and the opportunity to 
utilise the information gained for practical benefit. UK Biobank was a product of this 
promise and the funding bodies utilised the language associated with the ‘post-
genome challenge’ to support it. They stressed UK Biobank’s potential to initiate 
powerful changes in disease prevention, treatment, and the practice of medicine in the 
twenty-first century. UK Biobank’s emergence amidst this excitement renders it an 
important subject for study. National genetic databases were a relatively common 
                                                
12The National Institutes of Health (NIH), a part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, is the ‘primary Federal agency for conducting and supporting medical research’ 
(http://nih.gov/about 2007) (accessed 16/02/07).  
13The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is a national security agency that develops innovations in 
science and technology as one of its missions (http://www.energy.gov/organization/index.html 2007) 
(accessed 16/02/07).  
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response to the completion of the HGP and resources were allocated for these across 
the world, including Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Singapore, Tonga, Spain and 
the United States (Austin, Harding et al. 2003). Advocates of national genetic 
databases stressed their potential to transform healthcare through personalised 
medicine.14 Given the potential benefits predicted to flow from such national genetic 
databases, my study of the origins and development of UK Biobank, a leading 
example of the field, is particularly timely. 
 
1.1.4 Aim   
 
The aim of my thesis is to document and analyse the origins and development of UK 
Biobank in its contemporary historical context. I define ‘origins’ here as the period 
from the first official meetings within the MRC during 1998 that led to the first 
official joint meeting between the MRC and the Wellcome Trust in 1999 regarding 
what became UK Biobank, through formation of the initial protocol and up to the 
funding decision in April 2002.  By ‘development’ I mean the period from the 
funding decision, through implementation of the original organisational structure, 
until key organisational changes occurred in August 2005. I chose the funding 
decision as representative of the change from ‘origins’ to ‘development’ as it 
signalled the funding bodies’ formal commitment to UK Biobank, and allowed 
implementation of an organisational structure. I have investigated the origins and 
development of UK Biobank from its inception in 1998 until the organisational 
changes in August 2005.  
 
The original research question was: how and why was UK Biobank established at this 
time and in this manner? I intended to examine the particular ways in which the idea 
for UK Biobank emerged, when and from whom. I sought to explore explanations for 
the establishment of a national genetics database in the UK. However, the focus of my 
research shifted following the first period of fieldwork. Interviewees tended to focus 
on the practical set up of the UK Biobank, rather than the origins of the idea itself, 
which they largely ignored. Therefore following initial interviews, the research 
                                                
14For further discussion of the international context of national genetic database proposals see: (Berger 
1999), (Chadwick 1999), (Metspalu 2002), (Merz, McGee et al. 2004), (Bosch 2004), (Burton 2002), 
(Burton 2002) 
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question focussed more on how and why UK Biobank was configured the way it was, 
and less on how and why the concept of UK Biobank originated.   
 
UK Biobank was formally established with the funding decision in April 2002. I 
began my study of its origins and development in October 2003, just one and a half 
years later. I therefore had the opportunity to witness the development of this new 
scientific endeavour as it went through the initial period of development. Conducting 
research into the origins and development of UK Biobank at this early stage had 
advantages and disadvantages. The merits of conducting such contemporary history 
will be addressed in chapter three.  
 
UK Biobank underwent significant changes during the period of my research both in 
terms of scientific design and organisational structure. This evolving nature strongly 
influenced the development of my research and accounted for a further change to the 
title of the PhD. UK Biobank had planned to have begun recruiting participants prior 
to the commencement of my PhD, but it had not developed to that extent when my 
research began in October 2003 nor indeed several years later. UK Biobank had not 
therefore developed sufficiently to allow analysis of its implementation within the 
time frame of my PhD research. Therefore, the title of the thesis changed from ‘A 
contemporary history of UK Biobank’ to ‘A contemporary history of the origins and 
development of UK Biobank’.  
 
The focus of my research is on organisational aspects of the establishment of UK 
Biobank rather than the scientific merits of its design. My lack of scientific training 
and the evolving nature of UK Biobank (the protocol was still not finalised at the 
completion of fieldwork) would have made a scientific evaluation of UK Biobank 
difficult. Instead, I focus on organisational issues; for example, I investigated 
explanations for the particular organisational model chosen rather than justifications 
for the sample size, age range or prospective design. Scientific issues were 
considered, but only insofar as they illustrated themes in the origins and development 
of the resource.  
 
My research was exploratory in nature and was not undertaken in response to a 
particular problem defined in the literature. I did not therefore research the origins and 
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development of UK Biobank with a hypothesis in mind, rather analysis of the 
literature served to inform the exploration. Since national genetic databases were a 
new and evolving phenomenon there was not a considerable body of research on them 
when I started my study.  
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1.2 Description of the Human Genome Project  
 
Origins 
The HGP was an international effort to map and sequence the human genome.  It 
started in the mid-1980s and was completed in February 2001 with the publication of 
a working draft of the human genome sequence (Glasner 2002). The largest group in 
the HGP was from the United States, led by the NIH and the DOE. James Watson (co-
discoverer of the structure of DNA) initially led the US effort from 1988 to 1996 and 
was replaced by Francis Collins (Cook-Deegan 1994). The second-largest group was 
from the UK, led by Sir John Sulston of the Sanger Centre (the largest genome 
sequencing centre outside the US), and was largely funded by the Wellcome Trust, 
but also by the MRC.  
 
The potential of biology to be ‘Big Science’ inspired the molecular biologist and 
chancellor at the University of California, Robert Sinsheimer, to try to set up an 
Institute to Sequence the Human Genome at Santa Cruz in 1984. The idea occurred to 
him after a failed attempt to secure a contract to build an astronomical telescope at his 
facility (Wilkie 1993). Sinsheimer organised a meeting of America’s leading 
molecular biologists in May 1985 to discuss the idea. Their reaction was however 
negative and doubts were raised over the ability of such a project to yield enough 
knowledge to justify the cost and magnitude (Roberts 2001). An Institute to Sequence 
the Human Genome was never established but the idea remained. Independently, 
similar ideas were taking shape in other research laboratories. For example, in 1985 
the Nobel prize winning molecular biologist, Renato Dulbecco, gave a speech on the 
possibility of mapping the human genome and published extensively on the subject 
(Cook-Deegan 1994). The US DOE was also involved in proposals for a HGP. Its 
involvement developed from advances in nuclear technology and attempts to 
understand the effects of radiation on humans and their genes (Wilkie 1993). The 
Director of the Office of Health and Environmental Research at the DOE, Charles 
DeLisi, was inspired by a report from the 1984 Alta Summit (sponsored by the DOE 
and the International Commission for Protection against Environmental Mutagens and 
Carcinogens to discuss the ability of new DNA analytical methods to detect 
mutations) to propose the idea for a human genome project (Cook-Deegan 1989). In 
1986 the DOE supported his plans to sequence the human genome at a meeting in 
 23  
Santa Fe. The costs of such an endeavour, declared prohibitively expensive by the 
group at Santa Cruz, were manageable with the DOE’s extensive budget (Wilkie 
1993). 
 
The origins of the HGP in the United States were marked by tension between the NIH 
and the DOE. Many molecular biologists looked toward the NIH for leadership as it 
funded most biomedical research. Biologists were comfortable with the NIH peer-
review system and questioned DOE involvement. For example, David Botstein (a 
genetic mapper at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) criticised DOE 
proposals as ‘a scheme for unemployed bombmakers’  (Roberts 2001) (p.1184). 
James Wyngaarden (head of NIH at the time) described the DOE’s efforts as ‘like the 
National Bureau of Standards proposing to build the B-2 bomber’ (Cook-Deegan 
1994) (p.139). However, the NIH was not initially as committed to the Project as the 
DOE. For example, in October 1986 the NIH Director’s Advisory Committee 
concluded that the NIH should avoid Big Science (Cook-Deegan 1994). Some 
molecular biologists feared that if the NIH funded the Project it would be detrimental 
to the funding of other research activities. The Project was also criticised on the 
grounds that it was contrary to the traditional way biology was practised, a large co-
operative effort as opposed to small scale individual led studies (Roberts 2001). 
Similarly the Project departed from the accepted notion that the best biological 
practice ensued from hypothesis driven research (Collins, Green et al. 2003). An 
advisory panel to the DOE in 1987 suggested that it take control of the Project 
because the DOE was more suited to hosting large scale scientific studies than the 
NIH (Roberts 2001). However, following the departure of DeLisi (their biggest 
advocate of genome research) from his position as Director of health and 
environmental research in December 1987, the DOE’s involvement in the HGP 
diminished (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
On October 1 1988, the NIH and the DOE signed a memorandum of understanding 
regarding the co-operation of the two agencies over genome research (Cook-Deegan 
1994). This heralded the beginning of the US HGP, under the control of the NIH as 
opposed to the DOE. The appointment of James Watson as Associate Director for 
Human Genome Research, also on October 1 1988, lent the project considerable 
credibility. In 1989, the Project became independent of the National Institute for 
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General Medical Sciences and moved into the National Center for Human Genome 
Research and controlled its own budget. By 1989 the budget had increased to almost 
$60 million (double the DOE allocation of $28 million). By 1991 it reached $108 
million compared to the DOE’s $46 million budget, which further cemented the 
NIH’s control of the Project (Wilkie 1993).  
 
Research into Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI) began in the early stages of 
HGP in October 1989. The American ELSI programme was funded with 3-5% of NIH 
HGP funds and began with a broad scope. Its first announcement included five 
general questions: 
What are the concerns to society and to individuals arising from the HGP?  
What specific questions in the broad areas of ethics and law need to be 
addressed?  What can we learn from precedents?  What are the possible policy 
alternatives and the pros and cons of each?  How can we inform and involve 
the public and stimulate broad discussion? (Cook-Deegan 1994) (p. 239).  
 
The UK was involved from the beginning in debates about a co-ordinated HGP. For 
example, John Sulston represented the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in 
Cambridge (LMB) at the Santa Cruz meeting (the first meeting held on human 
genome sequencing at the University of California) in 1985 and Sydney Brenner 
(Director of the LMB) had a seat on the National Academy of Science panel that 
constructed the framework for the HGP.  In 1986 Sydney Brenner began the UK 
genome project with his own private funds until the UK Department for Education 
and Science awarded an £11 million grant to the MRC to fund the project in 1989. By 
1992, the budget was £5.9 million per year, and when combined with other grants 
from within the MRC, the total was £20 million (Wilkie 1993). In 1994, the Sanger 
Centre was built with a grant of £40-£50 million from the Wellcome Trust, alongside 
the new European Bioinformatics Unit and the relocated Human Genome Mapping 
Project Resource Centre, to begin work on the HGP at Hinxton, Cambridge. In May 
1997, following a successful application to the Wellcome Trust, the Sanger Centre’s 
funding was doubled to complete a third of the human genome (Sulston and Ferry 
2002).  
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Development  
Controversial issues accompanied the development of the HGP. In the United States 
in 1991, the NIH applied for patents on several hundred fragments of genes called 
Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs).  It claimed the right to the ESTs, the genes that 
they represented and the proteins encoded by these genes. This move reflected the 
wish of Bernadine Healy (the then head of the NIH) to advance the commercial 
development of scientific discoveries. James Watson criticised the plans and argued 
that automation of sequence did not represent an invention. The scientific advisory 
committee on the HGP also criticised the plans. Scientists feared that it would fuel a 
competition for patents and end the collaborative nature of the Project. The issue 
continued and in August 1992 the US patent office received further applications for 
patents on 4448 ESTs (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 90). Following the election of 
President Clinton in November 1992, Healy (a Republican) resigned and her 
successor Harold Varmus (Nobel Prize winning cancer researcher) withdrew all of the 
outstanding patent applications in 1994 (Sulston and Ferry 2002).  
 
James Watson resigned in April 1992 amidst a controversial enquiry launched by 
Healy into his financial position because of a potential conflict of interest. This 
enquiry was partly prompted by Watson’s efforts to secure funding for John Sulston 
and Bob Waterston to complete their work on the worm genome and thereby remain 
with the Project after they were approached by private industry (Sulston and Ferry 
2002). Members of the scientific community criticised the enquiry as a mechanism to 
remove Watson (Wilkie 1993).  
 
Access to the human genome sequence remained a sensitive issue. For example, in 
1995 the Wellcome Trust sponsored a meeting in Bermuda to broker a commitment 
from the international sequencing community into making the information gathered 
publicly available. The meeting produced the following ‘Bermuda Principles’:  
Automatic release of sequenced assemblies … (preferably daily), Immediate 
submission of finished annotated sequence, Aim to have all sequence freely 
available and in the public domain for both research and development, in order 
to maximise its benefit to society  (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p.146).  
International collaboration was however threatened by the formation of the ‘G5’ 
composed of the leading five labs (Baylor College of Medicine, Washington 
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University, DOE’s Joint Genome Institute, Whitehead Institute, and the Sanger 
Centre). Sulston described its existence as ‘a slap in the face’ to partners who had 
considered themselves equal in the consortium and taken part in Bermuda meetings  
(Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p.193).  
 
The most controversial episode in the origins and development of the HGP came in 
1996 when a private company, Celera Genomics, was established to sequence the 
human genome faster than the public effort by using a different method. Celera, led 
by Craig Venter, was formed when Venter acquired private support to form a 
commercial company with Mike Hunkapiller of Applied Biosystems (ABI) (the 
company who made the sequencers used by most of the genome labs) to sequence the 
entire human genome in three years (Sulston and Ferry 2002). They proposed using a 
highly controversial method that involved a new sequencing machine (produced by 
ABI) that could sequence much faster than other models.  Celera proposed to further 
increase the speed of the process by employing the whole-genome shotgun method 
that Venter had previously used to sequence bacteria. This meant that Celera proposed 
to shotgun the whole genome at once, rather than map the clones first and then 
shotgun-sequence them individually (the method used by the public effort). The 
public effort discarded this approach (known as the whole-genome shotgun method) 
because the bacterial genome differed greatly from that of the human (Sulston and 
Ferry 2002). Venter’s announcement lent potency to the Sanger Centre’s funding 
application in May 1997 to double their funds and complete a third of the human 
genome. They argued that their position as a leading group would be threatened if 
output was not doubled, and that if there was no strong international force then the 
Project could be taken over by Celera and access to the genome would not be freely 
available (Sulston and Ferry 2002).  
 
The different approaches employed led the HGP to be viewed in the media as a ‘race’ 
between the privately funded Celera genomics and the international public effort. 
These efforts were further distinguished in terms of their access agreements. The 
public effort, comprised of 16 groups in the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan and 
China, made their results publicly available, whereas Celera restricted the availability 
of their results within commercial limitations (Glasner 2002). Disagreements between 
the two efforts over methods and access agreements were increasingly voiced in the 
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media. In June 2000, Nature magazine described it as the ‘scientific rivalry to end all 
scientific rivalries’ (Macilwain 2000) (p.983). This media battle involved several 
bitter exchanges between Celera and the international public effort. For example, a 
letter from Francis Collins to Craig Venter that detailed key differences between the 
groups and criticised Celera for refusing to restart communication was released to the 
press in February 2000. In response, Celera accused the public effort of trying to end 
attempts at co-operation, as it was holding out to strike a deal with another private 
company  (Sulston and Ferry 2002). Also, following Bill Clinton’s and Tony Blair’s 
declaration that the sequence should be freely available to all researchers, CBS Radio 
News reported that the President and Prime Minister had agreed to stop the patenting 
of genes, which caused a considerable stock market fall (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 
219). President Clinton was keen to end the dispute between Celera and the public 
effort.  Most Republicans supported Celera and sought support from the 
biotechnology industry that had suffered in the markets whereas most Democrats 
backed the publicly funded effort. Ari Patrinos of the DOE brokered the peace, and 
his efforts resulted in an agreement to have a joint announcement of completion of the 
draft sequence on the 26 June 2000 (that featured the then President Bill Clinton and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair), a simultaneous publication of the results, and an end to 
the competition in the media (Sulston and Ferry 2002). Following these negotiations, 
Collins and Venter agreed to an interview with Time magazine entitled ‘The race is 
over’ (featuring a picture of them in their lab coats standing next to each other, 
smiling) (Roberts 2001) (p.1190).  
 
Controversy remained however as Celera refused to display their data in the public 
databases, which had ramifications for publication of the draft sequences. The 
agreement reached between Science (the usual choice for joint publications) and 
Celera regarding access included a number of terms. Commercial companies and 
academics would have to sign a material transfer agreement, under which academic 
users could download 1 megabase per week via Celera’s website (subject to a non-
distribution clause). If academic researchers wanted further access a signature from a 
senior member of their department would be required to guarantee that data would not 
be redistributed. Commercial companies would have to pay to use the data and were 
restricted by agreements not to redistribute them (Sulston and Ferry 2002). As a result 
of these terms, the public effort changed publishers to Nature magazine. In publishing 
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its paper, the international group stressed the collaborative nature of their effort by 
naming the author as the ‘International Human Genome Sequence Consortium’ rather 
than individual names. They included twenty centres as members of the consortium: 
twelve from the US, five from Europe (one from UK, one from France and three from 
Germany), two from Japan and one from China. Countries that had made smaller 
contributions were listed in the acknowledgements. Publication of the two papers took 
place simultaneously in different outlets on the 12 February 2001 (Sulston and Ferry 
2002).  
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1.3 International Context of National Genetic Databases 
 
Once the human genome had been sequenced, a number of countries and groups of 
scientists wanted to use the new knowledge to help them understand the genetic basis 
of human diseases and response to the environment. The development of this more 
applied study required large population samples in order to have enough genetic and 
environmental variation and the statistical power to establish genetic linkages even 
with common diseases since these tend to be multifactorial and multiple gene based. 
The completion of the HGP thus heralded proposals for many national genetic 
databases worldwide. For example, national genetic databases were set up or 
proposed in Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Singapore, Tonga, Spain and the United States 
(Austin, Harding et al. 2003). By far, the most controversial of these projects was set 
up in Iceland.15 I will describe the origins of the Icelandic database and assess how the 
controversy over its consent procedures affected the origins and development of other 
national genetic databases.  
 
In December 1998, the Icelandic government passed the Health Sector Database Act 
(HSD Act) that permitted the Ministry of Health and Social Security to contract out 
the construction of a national genetic database (HSD). In 1999, the government 
granted deCODE Genetics (who proposed the HSD Act) an exclusive license to 
produce and manage the database. Under the Act, deCODE incorporated the HSD in 
its Genealogy Genotype Phenotype Resource (GGPR) programme, which links 
together three databases: a genetics database, a genealogical database and the HSD 
(Merz, McGee et al. 2004). DeCODE would be the only company able to use the data 
commercially for twelve years (Martin and Kaye 2004). DeCODE genetics is a 
private biotechnology company in Reykjavik, Iceland.  It was established in 1996 to 
do population genomics research into common diseases. They set up research 
programmes on the genetics of 35 common conditions such as cancer, heart disease, 
diabetes and Alzheimer’s. DeCODE works closely with the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company Hoffman La Roche who are collaborating on twelve of the above 
programmes, and pay $200 million over 5 years to access the results (Martin and 
Kaye 2004).  
                                                
15For further discussion of the ethical issues involved in the Icelandic database see: (Coghlan 1998), 
(McInnis 1999) 
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DeCODE have unique resources with which to do such a study, including Iceland’s 
comprehensive genealogical records, a well-developed health care system, medical 
records of the entire country since the First World War, and a large collection of 
tissue samples stored since World War Two. Due to the genetic homogeneity of the 
population, the task of detecting disease-related gene variants is significantly less 
complicated (Martin and Kaye 2004). The lack of immigration to Iceland has led to 
the virtual genetic isolation of the population (Berger 1999). It is proposed that the 
Icelandic database will hold medical, genealogical and genotype data, and data on 
diagnoses, treatment response and costs, length and place of treatment. It aims to 
discover the genetic causes of disease by using genealogical data to group together 
individuals with a particular disease into large extended families  
(http://www.decode.com 2003) (accessed 29/10/03). It proposes to use such 
knowledge to develop drugs and diagnostic tools.  
 
Controversy has accompanied the development of the Icelandic database largely 
because of its commercial nature, ethical procedures, and identifiable health 
information from citizens’ medical records. For example: ‘DeCODE’s proposal to 
build the HSD and use it in its GGPR has been one of the most thoroughly debated 
and analyzed biotechnology ventures in history’ (Merz, McGee et al. 2004) (p. 1). Its 
opt-out consent procedure is however the single most inflammatory issue (Martin and 
Kaye 2004). DeCODE are not required to obtain Icelanders’ informed consent before 
their medical records are included in the database: rather, they can opt out by 
completing a form that records their wish not to participate. By completing this form 
Icelanders can prevent any new information on them being added to the database 
(Greely 2001). Following an agreement in August 2001 between deCODE, the 
Icelandic Medical Association (IMA), and the Director General of Public Health, 
deCODE permitted citizens to have their data removed from the HSD after collection. 
This agreement thereby removed one of the most controversial aspects of the HSD 
Act that allowed citizens to only stop future data collection by opting out. The IMA 
withdrew its opposition to the GGPR project as part of this agreement (Merz, McGee 
et al. 2004). This aspect accounted for some of the most serious international 
criticism; for example the initial draft of the bill was criticised internationally by the 
European Union’s Data Protection Commissioners for not complying with 
 31  
internationally recognised safeguards protecting the rights of participants (Coghlan 
1998).  
 
Observers have also criticised the private nature of its funding and commercial 
influence on the project. Scientists especially criticised the monopoly held by 
deCODE and Hoffman-La Roche as those who do not work for those companies 
would be excluded (Berger 1999). Mannvernd, an organisation on research ethics set 
up in response to the Health Sector Database Law, were especially critical of the 
ethical procedures and the opt-out consent policy in particular (Greely 2001).  
 
Proponents of other national genetics databases paid particular attention to ethical, 
legal and social issues, particularly consent, to avoid the controversy that 
accompanied the early stages of the Icelandic database. For example, these proponents 
have stressed the importance of informed consent to their initiatives. They have gone 
to considerable lengths to develop sound ethical procedures, such as extensive 
consultation exercises with the public, to disassociate themselves from the Icelandic 
example. Such was the controversy surrounding the ethical procedures adopted in the 
Icelandic database that no other resource emulated their approach (Greely 2001). As 
Jon Merz et al state: ‘While it has yet to be followed elsewhere, the Iceland model 
provides an informative counterexample that must be critically examined by others 
considering similar ventures’ (Merz, McGee et al. 2004) (p. 7).  
 
UK Biobank therefore emerged in the context of two scientific enterprises, the HGP 
and Icelandic database, that aroused considerable controversy focussing on the role of 
commercial companies in large scale genetic research. This needs to be taken into 
account when trying to understand some elements of the proposed organisation of UK 
Biobank (in particular the strong emphasis on ethics and public consultation, and the 
stress on an ‘equal playing field’ in terms of access to the data). 
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1.4 Description of UK Biobank 
  
I will now give a brief overview of UK Biobank in order to contextualise the literature 
review below. I provide a detailed account of the origins and development of UK 
Biobank in chapter two. The overview at this point is largely based on information 
from the UK Biobank website in 2006,16 and thus mostly represents recent 
descriptions of UK Biobank. However, it is also based on data from previous versions 
of the website from 2004-200517 and information regarding the organisational 
changes is partly based on interviewees’ accounts.18  
 
UK Biobank is an endeavour to construct a national UK genetic database of health 
and lifestyle data, including blood and urine samples, of half a million volunteers 
aged between 40 and 69 years old (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/overview.php 
2006) (accessed 19/12/06). Their health will be monitored through their medical 
records for up to thirty years. The age group was chosen as individuals within this age 
range are at risk from the types of diseases that UK Biobank would investigate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The premise is that, over the next twenty to thirty years, UK Biobank will allow 
researchers to study the development of diseases such as cancer, heart disease and 
Alzheimer’s to improve methods of prevention, diagnosis and treatment. It is 
suggested that UK Biobank will be in a better position than previous, smaller-scale 
attempts to discover why some people develop particular diseases and others do not, 
and assess the contribution of genes, lifestyle and environment to the development of 
                                                
16 www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 
17 The UK Biobank website underwent significant alterations in terms of presentation and content 
during the period of my research.  
18 Detailed information regarding the nature of the organisational changes was not available on the UK 
Biobank website.  
‘This age group is being studied because it involves people at risk of 
developing serious diseases – including cancer, heart disease, stroke, 
diabetes, dementia – over the next few decades’ 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/why.php 2006) (accessed 19/12/06) 
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different diseases (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/why.php 2006) (accessed 
19/12/06). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is proposed that access to the data and the samples will be available in anonymised 
form only to scientifically and ethically approved researchers, national and 
international, public and private. UK Biobank is funded by the MRC, the Wellcome 
Trust, the DoH and the Scottish Executive. The initial funding figure was £45million 
but it increased in 2004 and the funding committed to date is approximately £62 
million (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 2005) (accessed 10/04/05).  
 
According to the website in 2006, the half-million sample will be identified from 
central registries, from which UK Biobank has confidential access to name, address, 
sex, date of birth and general practice details. Those selected will be sent an invitation 
letter directly from UK Biobank, and general practitioners will be informed that their 
patients may be invited to participate in UK Biobank. Participation in UK Biobank 
will involve attending a local study assessment centre for an hour and a half to answer 
questions, give blood and urine samples, and have some standard measurements 
taken. Participants will be required to consent to their health being monitored for 
many years by UK Biobank directly though routine medical and other records, and to 
being re-contacted by UK Biobank to answer additional questions and/or attend 
another assessment visit, which would be optional 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/why.php 2006) (accessed 19/12/06). 
‘Scientists have known for many years that our risks of developing 
different diseases are due to the complex combination of different factors: 
our lifestyle and environment; our personal susceptibility (genes); and the 
play of chance (luck). Because UK Biobank will involve thousands of 
people who develop any particular disease, it will be able to show more 
reliably than ever before why some people develop that disease while 
others do not. This should help to find new ways to prevent death and 
disability from many different conditions’ 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/why.php 2006) (accessed 19/12/06) 
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I provide a detailed chronology of events in the development of UK Biobank in 
chapter two. In brief, the first official meeting between the MRC and the Wellcome 
Trust regarding UK Biobank was in 1999. After international peer review of an initial 
scientific protocol and various consultation exercises with the public and professional 
groups, the funding bodies made the decision to fund UK Biobank in 2002. Following 
the funding decision an organisational structure was put in place and the first pilot 
study began in February 2005. The original CEO of UK Biobank Limited, John 
Newton, who was appointed in March 2003, resigned in December 2004; Rory 
Collins was appointed as the new CEO and Principal Investigator (PI) in August 
2005. After the appointment of Rory Collins, significant changes were made to the 
organisational structure.  
 
I describe the organisational structure and the changes made to it in chapter two but I 
will briefly introduce one important aspect now. Before the changes, the 
organisational structure was based on a ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ model. In this model, the 
hub was to have overall responsibility for delivering UK Biobank including financial 
management and storage of the data and samples, and it was to co-ordinate the 
activities of six spokes. The spokes were to be responsible for recruitment and initial 
data and sample collection from primary care 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/organisation.html 2004) (accessed 23/04/04). Following 
the organisational changes, initial data and sample collection were to be managed 
centrally via the hub, and spokes were given the opportunity to compete for contracts 
to carry out operational tasks. Additionally, the hub was no longer responsible for 
‘People to invite into UK Biobank are identified from central registries. The 
only information provided, in confidence, to UK Biobank is name, address, sex, 
date of birth, and general practice. These details are processed centrally (in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act) and an invitation letter sent directly 
by UK Biobank. General practitioners are advised that people registered with 
their practices may be invited to take part’  
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/why.php 2006) (accessed 19/12/06) 
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overall delivery of the resource, which was given to a newly created Implementation 
Group (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/news/pr/8aug05.php 2005) (accessed 10/11/05).  
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1.5 Literature Review 
 
Introduction  
As my study is an example of the history of contemporary science, and UK Biobank 
can be regarded as a ‘Big Science’ project (this issue is explored in the conclusion), 
my literature review concerns the development of the history of contemporary science 
as an academic field, the concept of Big Science, and the origins and development of 
Big Science projects. The history of contemporary science is a contested discipline. 
As such I felt that it was important to seek understandings of the field in the literature 
to aid analysis of the issues involved in my study of UK Biobank. The relationship 
between UK Biobank and the HGP, and the latter’s association with the beginning of 
Big Science for biology renders a review of Big Science projects and the term itself 
useful. Hence, analysis of the origins and development of Big Science projects should 
enable a better understanding of the history of UK Biobank.  
 
To explore the history of the HGP and of Big Science more broadly, I selected articles 
using the search engine JSTOR and the following journal groupings: sociology, 
philosophy, history and history of science and technology. I used the following 
keywords: ‘Histor* of contemporary science’, ‘Big Science’, ‘Human Genome 
Project’. Although these searches were broad, my focus on the historiography of 
contemporary science, Big Science and Big Science projects allowed me to narrow 
the results. I searched the bibliographies of particularly useful articles to identify 
further relevant literature. The advice of colleagues and contacts in relevant 
disciplines also furnished me with additional literature.  
 
Given the evolving nature of UK Biobank and its international counterparts, there is 
not a body of literature that concerns the origins and development of national genetic 
databases. What literature is available on national genetic databases tends to 
concentrate on the ethical19 issues involved or the scientific20 merits of the research. 
                                                
19For discussion of ethical issues see: (Johnston and Kaye 2004), (Greely 2001), (Martin 2001), 
(Anderlik and Rothstein 2001), (Kaye and Martin 2000), (McHale 2004), (Tutton, Kaye et al. 2004), 
(Macintyre 1997), (Lowrance 2001), (Tutton and Corrigan 2004), (Corrigan 2004), (Hoeyer 2004), 
(Kaye 2004), (Weldon 2004), (Lewis 2004), (Tancredi 1994), (Glasner and Rothman 2004), (Gottweis 
2005), (Willis 2005), (Williams and Schroeder 2004), (Berg 2004), (Corrigan 2003) 
20 For discussion of scientific issues see: (Black and Payne 2002), (Black 1999), (Watson, Shickle et al. 
1999), (Bayat 2002), (Kinmonth, Reinhard et al. 1998), (Collins, Green et al. 2003), (Collins and 
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There is however a substantial amount of literature on the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge (SSK)21, which emerged in the 1970s and focussed on the technical and 
cognitive as well as the social organisation of science. Proponents stressed the social 
nature of science and thereby studied its content rather than its context (Nicolson 
1993). The Cancer Mission by Kenneth Studer and Daryl Chubin is cited as an 
important example of this field: ‘[it] drew attention to the way in which the social 
organisation of science in its turn impacted on the organisation and hence the content 
of biomedical science’ (Berridge 2005) (p. 17). This approach was not however 
relevant to my research as UK Biobank had not begun recruitment when I started my 
research, and hence there was no scientific activity that I could have studied.   
 
I have divided the literature review into two parts; the first explores the historiography 
of contemporary science, and the second investigates the concept of Big Science and 
the origins and development of Big Science projects.  
 
1.5.1 Historiography of Contemporary Science  
 
1.5.1 (a) The history of contemporary science 
 
Imbalance toward pre-twentieth century science  
The history of science is weighted toward periods prior to the twentieth century. 
Traditionally, historians of science avoided recent science and believed that scientists 
were the most appropriate people to undertake such research. As Thomas Soderqvist 
stated:  
Only one or two decades ago most historians of science considered recent 
science – the scientific culture created, lived and remembered by 
contemporary scientists – an area of study best left to the historical actors 
themselves  (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 1). 
Despite the fact that most scientific activity has taken place in recent times, the 
majority of historians of science concentrate on scientific activity pre-1945, which 
Soderqvist described as a ‘paradoxical temporal imbalance’  (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 3).  
                                                                                                                                       
McKusick 2001), (Bumol and Watanabe 2001), (Clayton and McKeigue 2001), (Barbour 2003), (Bell 
1998) 
21See the following for examples of SSK: (Studer and Chubin 1980), (Latour and Woolgar 1979) 
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Historians of science have identified a number of explanations for this imbalance. 
One explanation is insecurity regarding the professional status of the history of 
science as an emerging discipline. It has been suggested that historians of science 
studied pre-twentieth century science to avoid accusations of partisanship and 
presentism and feared ‘inviting the bias which is said to accompany a lack of 
historical distance’  (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 1). However, historians of contemporary 
science have increasingly challenged this argument that objectivity is not attainable in 
researching recent events. For example, Margaret Gowing, the historian of British 
Atomic Energy, stated that ‘the argument that truth is proportional to distance in 
historical perspective has seemed increasingly fallacious’  (Gowing 1964) (p. xiii).  
 
A second explanation is the relationship between the history of contemporary science 
and science, specifically the latter’s attachment to the natural sciences rather than the 
arts or social science. For example, history of science was traditionally part of the 
undergraduate natural sciences syllabus rather than of the social sciences or history 
syllabi (Gowing 1975) (p. 9). Such a close relationship between the history of 
contemporary science and the natural sciences accounted for a lack of focus on its 
social and political context. Gowing criticised this aspect of the development of the 
history of science:  
It has been predominantly, though by no means exclusively, an internalist 
subject concerned with pure science, and as some historians have looked 
increasingly at science in relation to society, they have been called externalists  
(Gowing 1975) (p. 24).  
 
Methodological issues are a third explanation for the lack of historical study of recent 
science, specifically the question of scientific training and the relationship between 
historian and scientist in undertaking research. Some historians of science argue that 
historians should undertake scientific training in the discipline researched and 
attribute the lack of historical research on contemporary science to its increasing 
complexity. For example, Soderqvist stated: ‘One of the main reasons why historians 
have hesitated to deal with recent and contemporary science is probably that such 
familiarity is very difficult to obtain without systematic and professional scientific 
training’ (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 9). Others argue that scientific training is not necessary 
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to research contemporary science and point to the requirement of all historians to 
understand various complicated concepts and theories, such as aspects of theology or 
economics (Gowing 1975). Gowing has criticised suggestions that contemporary 
historians require a science degree to undertake research on contemporary science: 
‘[s]uch suggestions are dangerous and should not be offered as alibis to reluctant 
historians, for science can be studied in many areas, from many aspects and from 
different levels’(Gowing 1975) (p. 10).  
 
A further explanation for the lack of history of contemporary science is the difficulty 
of establishing an appropriate relationship between historian and scientist, particularly 
in conducting oral history interviews. Soderqvist argued that scientists’ respect for 
historians of earlier historical periods does not extend to historians of contemporary 
science: 
When it comes to recent and contemporary science, however, scientists often 
find it difficult to acknowledge the need for specific historical skills. Scientists 
sometimes find it hard to realize that the problems addressed by historians are 
of a different kind than those asked by the scientist (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 10).   
These comments reflect historians’ and scientists’ different understandings of the 
nature of historical research, which is discussed in the next sub-section. Critics of the 
history of contemporary science largely refer to the influence of the historian on the 
research: ‘History can only be written about periods in which the historian does not 
have a stake in what happens because the issues of greatest concern to the historical 
agents no longer have the same relevance’ (Fuller 1997) (p. 245). These critics 
therefore conceived of the role of the historian of contemporary science narrowly in 
terms of preserving data for future historians.  
 
Historians of contemporary science have criticised the imbalance between history of 
recent events and earlier periods. They have stressed the significance of recent events 
and argued that they should be researched just as much as earlier periods: ‘it has 
seemed increasingly absurd that the events of the last thirty years which have so 
powerfully shaped our lives should be the least recorded by historians and the most 
obscure to the younger generation’ (Gowing 1964) (p. xiii). Historians of 
contemporary science argue that recent science should be studied because of the 
significant growth of scientific activity in the latter part of the twentieth century. For 
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example, more than 90% of all scientists who ever existed in world history have been 
active since the end of the Second World War (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 2). Historians of 
contemporary science stress the contemporary nature of all history and the relevance 
of the present in analysis of the past (Lindee 1997). This position is particularly 
prevalent in the United States where historians continue to ‘expect history to shed 
light on contemporary concerns’ (Lindee 1997) (p. 40).  
 
The history of contemporary science has however begun to receive more attention. 
For example the percentage of publications listed in ISIS Critical Bibliography 
concerning the twentieth century (i.e., since 1914) as a percentage of all 
chronologically arranged publications rose from about 10% in the early 1970s to 
about 30% in the late 1980s (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 3). Historians of contemporary 
science attribute this increase to the growing security of the field. The increasing 
focus on recent science in the history of science has been accompanied by an even 
greater shift towards recent science in the field of science studies, such as the 
sociology of science, sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science policy 
studies (Soderqvist 1997).22  
 
1.5.1 (b) Relationship between historian and scientist 
 
Contested Territory  
The relationship between historian and scientist is complicated in the history of 
contemporary science as the field represents a contested territory between active 
scientists and historians, as well as competition from a range of professional 
disciplines including science journalists and sociologists of science (Soderqvist 1997). 
Competition between historians of contemporary science and active scientists is 
problematic on account of different articulations of the nature of the history of 
science, which have characterised its development as a professional discipline. For 
example, Soderqvist describes ‘professional conflicts and mutual accusations of 
‘naïve realism’ and ‘higher superstition’’ (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 11).  
 
                                                
22For example: (Jasanoff 2000)   
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The development of the history of science was shaped by different articulations of the 
field as either scientific or historical. Scientists, rather than historians, were the main 
proponents of the discipline, and the researcher often assumed the identity of 
scientist-historian. Scientists’ understandings of the nature of the history of science 
were therefore dominant. As the discipline developed, attitudes towards the history of 
science changed, and historians’ articulations of the field became influential. This 
shift was accompanied by greater interest in the influence of social and political 
factors in the constitution of knowledge, reflecting adoption of a more relativist 
approach (Hughes 1997). The shift resulted in professional conflicts between those 
historians who adhered to the new attitudes, and those scientists who did not. Some 
scientists felt that the new approach adopted by historians of science threatened the 
legitimacy of science itself, and its theoretical grounding in positivism. For example, 
Jeff Hughes stated:  
In recent years, a relatively small number of scientists, suspicious of 
historians’ non-whiggish and non-celebratory histories and of their increasing 
independence from science, see historians and those with whom they 
intellectually associate as somehow attacking the “moral stature”, 
“epistemological authority”, and therefore the legitimacy of science  (Hughes 
1997) (p. 22).  
Scientists attribute such an ‘attack’ on science to many historians’ departure from 
empirical understandings of a universal ‘truth’. For example, Joseph Tatarewicz 
commented: ‘Historians…have largely abandoned the hope for a single, definitive, 
true account. Actors, however, can be decidedly uncomfortable with the notion of 
multiple and superseded histories’ (Tatarewicz 1997) (p. 77). Given historians’ 
dependence on scientists for source material, these tensions between them represent a 
distinguishing feature of discipline.  
 
The question of whether the history of science should serve to legitimise scientific 
activity represents a key difference between scientists’ and historians’ articulations of 
the field. For example, Hughes describes a 
conflict emerging between those who seek to preserve the history of science as 
a grand narrative of progress and utility and those who seek to write a more 
critical, differently engaged and, so it could be argued, more relevant kind of 
history of science (Hughes 1997) (his emphasis) (p. 31).     
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Scientists tend to believe that history should serve such a legitimising function in an 
existing or emerging field whereas historians tend to disagree. Hughes does not 
believe that history should serve to legitimise science:   
While attention to the technical content of science is, and must remain a 
centrally important part of the history of science, however, this notion of 
history as somehow adjudicating over past science should not go 
unchallenged, for it seems to me to raise important questions about the role of 
the historian and of historical writing about the sciences (Hughes 1997) (p. 
25).  
Historians of science question the validity of scientists’ motives in producing 
accounts that seek to legitimise scientific activity: ‘For reasons we (and, one suspects, 
they) understand perfectly well, for example, scientists tend to write largely 
celebratory, teleological and/or anecdotal accounts of the past’ (Hughes 1997) (p. 
26).23  
 
Some scientists go as far as claiming that historical accounts that do not evaluate 
science should not be described as history of science:  
For some scientists, moreover, history is so valuable a resource that to write 
history which doesn’t legitimate science in some way is actually seen as 
positively delegitimating – in other words, as ‘undermining’ science in some 
sense – which can generate a profound hostility towards professional 
historians of science and their writings  (Hughes 1997) (p. 28).  
The scientist Lewis Wolpert has criticised sociologists, philosophers and historians of 
science for not adhering to the values of scientific rationality, and for studying the 
processes by which knowledge is created and constituted rather than ‘what 
institutional structures most favour scientific advance, what determines choice of 
science as a career, how science should best be funded, how interdisciplinary research 
can be encouraged’(Wolpert 1992) (p. 122). Although these sentiments are not 
indicative of the majority of scientists, the debate is highly relevant. For example, 
scientists at a conference on ‘The Social Standing of Science’ at Durham University 
in 1994 rejected the sociology of scientific knowledge and sociologically-informed 
                                                
23For a wider discussion of these issues see: (Forman 1991) 
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history of science for not contributing to science or understanding of science as a 
social phenomenon (Hughes 1997) (p. 29).  
 
Scientists’ expectations of the history of science as legitimising scientific activity are 
particularly problematic in contemporary science when scientific studies do not 
develop as intended. For example, Ilana Löwy was granted access to the clinical trial 
of interleukin-2 (IL-2) because the scientists wanted a reliable witness to a successful 
trial, but her presence was less welcome when the trial did not develop as expected. 
As Löwy found:  
The presence of ‘our historian’ was seen as an asset in the early stages of the 
IL-2 trial when a straightforward triumph was expected, but became 
problematic when this clinical experiment turned out to be a much more 
complicated enterprise (Löwy 1997) (p. 98).  
 
The ‘official’ historian  
The relationship between scientists and historians of contemporary science is 
particularly complicated in the case of commissioned histories, which are more 
common in the history of science. The historian’s autonomy is under scrutiny when 
they are funded by the same scientists they are researching. Commissioned research 
therefore presents the historian with specific challenges. Given their proximity to the 
events they are researching, historians of contemporary science can find it particularly 
difficult to distance themselves from their patrons. As David Cantor stated: 'Critical 
distance is difficult enough to achieve when writing twentieth-century history, a 
distance shortened by the purse-strings and obligations of contract work' (Cantor 
1992) (p. 132). Historians must carefully negotiate their role with the patrons or they 
may find themselves ‘constrained by the real and imagined needs and wishes of their 
patron, often pull their punches and produce pseudo-celebratory histories which toe 
the patron’s line’(Hughes 1997) (p. 30). Gowing acknowledged these challenges but 
reported that she did not experience them and did not distinguish them from those 
facing the non-official historian (Gowing 1964). Scientists can exert considerable 
influence in defining the scope of the history of contemporary science by funding 
official historians. The type of studies they choose to support reflects their perception 
of the legitimising role of the history of science. For example, Tatarewicz 
commented: ‘with rare exceptions the historical work will be focussed only on 
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‘successful’ or ‘significant’ projects, those so defined by the actors themselves and for 
which they are willing to provide the money’ (Tatarewicz 1997) (p. 72). In 
commissioning historical studies scientists encounter advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, they avoid accusations of bias by appointing a historian rather than a 
scientist. On the other hand, the appointed historian may not share their perception of 
the legitimising role of the history of science. In short, ‘they [scientists] relinquish 
some of their control over history but may be repaid by gaining credibility’ (de 
Chadarevian 1997) (p. 63). The role of the official historian can be the only role 
available to the historian of science, not just because of scarce financial support but 
because of the nature of the research. For example, it would be very difficult to get 
access to official documents that are not available to the public if the research is 
particularly sensitive, unless the historian undertook an official role. Gowing reported 
that the documents she accessed in researching British Atomic Energy were such that 
a non-official role would have been inappropriate:   
It would be extremely difficult to give to someone without any official 
standing the freedom to roam among these records, some of which still contain 
very sensitive material … The official historian’s official standing, his ties 
with a Government organisation, his signature of a declaration under the 
Official Secrets Act, make it possible for Government servants to speak freely 
to him and give him access to their papers (Gowing 1964) (p. xiii). 
 
Methodological Issues  
Methodological issues regarding the relationship between historian and scientist are 
an important feature of the history of contemporary science, which set it apart from 
the history of earlier scientific activity. These issues primarily concern scientists’ 
expectations of their role as interviewees, and issues of confidentiality. The historian 
of contemporary science must carefully manage social relationships with the scientists 
on whom they rely for source material. Scientists’ understandings of their role as an 
interviewee can differ from that of historians, which complicates research when 
divergent understandings collide. For example, Soderqvist stated: 
Scientists are often unwilling to take the time and effort to try to understand 
the aims of historians, and often tend to believe that their main contribution to 
the co-operative effort is to ‘set the historical record right’ instead of seeing 
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themselves in the role of witnesses and scientific experts (Soderqvist 1997) (p. 
10). 
 
Historians of contemporary science also bear significant social responsibilities to the 
scientist, which further complicates the relationship between scientist and historian. 
The historian must consider what information to include and what to omit from 
published findings and assess the ramifications for the scientist, professionally or 
personally, of these decisions. For example, the historian must assess whether or not 
particular information could influence the renewal of grants (Lindee 1997). These 
issues are particularly significant in the history of contemporary science given the 
historians’ reliance on scientists for source material. It is argued that the issue of 
confidentiality is particularly complicated in the history of contemporary science as 
the tools employed by other researchers, mainly the use of anonymity, are not 
appropriate for the historian.  For example, Susan Lindee stated:  
 Historians by disciplinary agreement do not (cannot) employ the  
methodological buffering mechanisms of the journalist, anthropologist, or 
sociologist. A historical account is specific rather than universalizing; actors in 
a historical account are so important they must be named; and the historical 
account depends on long-term, intimate knowledge24 (Lindee 1997) (p. 42).  
 
1.5.2 ‘Big Science’   
 
Introduction 
I will now review the literature concerning the term Big Science and the origins and 
development of Big Science projects. As discussed in the introduction of 1.5, such a 
review is both relevant and useful given perceptions of UK Biobank as a Big Science 
project, and the association of the HGP with the beginning of Big Science for biology 
(given the relationship between UK Biobank and the HGP). The Manhattan Project, 
set up during the Second World War to design and produce atomic bombs, is often 
regarded as the beginning of Big Science and representing a turning point in twentieth 
century science from pre-war 'little science' to post-war Big Science. It involved 
                                                
24 My contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank differs from traditional 
accounts of contemporary history of science in that I maintained the anonymity of my sources, which 
will be discussed in the methods chapter. 
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American and British scientists from a variety of professional backgrounds including 
engineers and technicians, 130,000 people were employed at its height and its total 
cost was $2 billion (Hughes 2002) (p. 9). The Project involved powerful alliances 
between military, academic and industrial scientists and a strongly hierarchical and 
complex organisational structure. Historians of science have however debated the 
extent to which the Manhattan Project caused the transition from little science to big 
science (this is discussed in 1.5.2 (d)). To place my analysis of Big Science in context, 
I begin by describing three examples of Big Science projects, the MRC AIDS 
Directed Programme, the Centre Européen de Recherche Nucléaire (CERN), and the 
Space Telescope. I selected these projects, as well as the HGP (described earlier), as 
their origins and development resonate with those of UK Biobank in that they 
experienced organisational difficulties and involved establishing a resource, be it the 
human genome sequence, funding research into finding an AIDS vaccine, a Space 
Telescope or a high-energy physics laboratory (in the case of CERN). Second, I will 
explore the origins and contemporary understandings of the term Big Science. Third, I 
examine four key characteristics of Big Science Projects: scale, social and political 
context, sponsorship and organisational issues largely in relation to these projects. 
Last, I will address criticisms of Big Science.  
 
1.5.2 (a) MRC AIDS Directed Programme 
 
Following the production of a document that called for a large MRC programme in 
AIDS by a ‘ginger group’ of Royal Society fellows, the then Secretary of the MRC, 
Sir James Gowans (with the support of the then Chairman, Earl Jellicoe) produced 
plans for an MRC AIDS Directed Programme to fund research into finding an AIDS 
vaccine and develop viral chemotherapy. Gowans presented these plans with David 
Tyrrell (Chairman of the AIDS Working Party) and Ian Weller (from the Middlesex 
Hospital, London) to the Cabinet Committee on AIDS in December 1986. The 
document suggested that Britain might lead the world in the search for a vaccine and 
that results would be available within five years (Berridge 1996). The Cabinet 
committee granted Gowans (who became the first director of the programme) an 
initial £1m, and in February 1987 further proposals for a £14.5 million research 
programme were successful. The majority of the funds were allocated to an MRC 
Directed Programme on AIDS that would focus on the basic science required to 
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discover an AIDS vaccine. By 1991, the MRC AIDS Directed Programme was 
costing £9-10m per year (7-10% of the MRC’s total budget) (Berridge 1996) (p. 118). 
In 1993 the then Secretary of the MRC, Dai Rees appointed and chaired a review 
committee into the Programme. The review was partly prompted by the DoH’s 
decision to gradually remove ring-fenced funding on AIDS to the MRC and the issue 
of whether AIDS should have separate budget within the MRC (Berridge 1996).  
 
The Programme had a significant public profile and represented an elaborate 
organisational structure with a central secretariat and scientific working groups on 
different topics:  
It was based on a model of closely linked, directed research, with regular 
working group meetings between scientists, monitoring of progress, special 
arrangements for collaboration with industry and specialised centralised 
facilities (Berridge 1994) (p. 136).  
As Virginia Berridge reported, a scientist involved in the MRC AIDS Directed 
Programme described it in the following terms: ‘The level of integration is unique. 
It’s a mini-Manhattan’ (Berridge 1996) (p. 177). The Programme had a considerable 
training element, for example there were twenty PhD awards in virology and 
immunology and post-doctoral funding for study abroad. Category-3 laboratories (for 
growing the virus) were established at Cambridge, Glasgow, the Chester Beatty in 
London, and the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC). 
Critics of the Programme referred to its focus on basic science and lack of activity in 
clinical science. Gay activists argued that the focus on basic science in developing a 
vaccine had more political clout than a clinical focus on treatment of those already 
infected (Berridge 1996).   
 
Industrial links were an important part of the AIDS Directed Programme, which 
brought scientists and industry to far greater levels of collaboration and strengthened 
existing relationships. Efforts to develop a vaccine prompted the MRC, via the 
Programme, to sign co-operative agreements with industrial companies, such as 
Celltech and British Biotechnology (Berridge 1996). General collaborative research 
agreements were also signed with various companies. Both types of agreement 
contained stipulations that industrial companies would contribute to the research 
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project. Contracts detailed procedures regarding intellectual property, commercial 
exploitation rights and publication of results (Berridge 1994).  
 
The MRC’s AIDS Directed Programme represented a considerable shift in MRC 
policy from responsive research funding (evident in the MRC AIDS working party set 
up in 1983) to proactive research funding. Prior to the establishment of the AIDS 
Directed Programme, the MRC AIDS epidemiology committee set up in October 
1985 represented the only departure from this responsive mode in the early role of the 
MRC (Berridge 1996). The departure from the responsive mode represented by the 
AIDS Directed Programme was however temporary and only the HGP reflected 
proactive research funding (Berridge 1994).  
 
1.5.2 (b) Centre Européen de Recherche Nucléaire (CERN)  
 
In 1949, the notion of multinational cooperation in nuclear science across Europe 
began to be considered by several figures involved in nuclear science, including 
Raoul Dautry, Administrator-General of the French Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique (CEA) and Isidor I. Rabi (part of the American delegation to UNESCO). In 
December 1949, Dautry had a resolution passed at a European Cultural Conference in 
Switzerland that recommended a series of studies for the establishment of a European 
institute for nuclear science. Rabi (partly prompted by the establishment of the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory in the United States) put forward a resolution to the 
annual conference of UNESCO in Florence in 1950 that encouraged states to set up 
one or more regional European laboratories (including one in nuclear science), which 
was adopted by UNESCO’s General Assembly on 7 June 1950 (Pestre and Krige 
1992). Specialists in classical nuclear physics and cosmic rays and a group of three 
important administrators of science, including Dautry, took up these proposals in 
1950. In December 1950, Pierre Auger, a specialist in cosmic rays and director of 
UNESCO’s Department of Exact and Natural Sciences, organised a meeting of 
scientists and administrators in Geneva in which Dautry proposed the construction of 
the biggest accelerator in the world (Pestre and Krige 1992).  Throughout 1951, 
Auger and scientific consultants refined the proposal and forwarded their 
recommendations to a European intergovernmental conference in December 1951. 
The conference recommended the establishment of a temporary organisation that it 
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granted $200,000 to develop the technical, organisational and financial details 
involved and present them to potential member-states within eighteen months. On 
February 15 1952, all of the nations represented, except the UK, signed an agreement 
reflecting these arrangements, which came into force in May 1952 (Pestre and Krige 
1992).  
 
On May 5 1952, the provisional CERN Council first met and established the technical 
groups to design the accelerators and plan the laboratory. Geneva was selected as the 
site for the laboratory and construction of a 25- to 30-billion-electron-volt proton 
synchrotron was selected. In January 1953, discussion of the convention that would 
set up the permanent organisation began, and the British government was represented 
officially on the Council for the first time. Eight of the eleven member-states of the 
provisional CERN Council and the United Kingdom signed the convention on July 1, 
1953, which came into force officially in October 1954. The permanent CERN 
Council met for the first time on October 7 1954 (Pestre and Krige 1992).  
 
The origins of CERN are to some degree contested. On the one hand, senior figures 
involved in the origins of CERN have presented its genesis as ‘inevitable’ because of 
the political environment of the time and the considerable resources involved in the 
project. For example, they refer to the political popularity of collaborative European 
bodies, such as the European Economic Community and the impossibility of a single 
European country having the resources required to establish such a resource. On the 
other hand, the historians Dominique Pestre and John Krige, argue that ‘no historical 
“necessity” imbued the birth of CERN, that this laboratory “might not have been” or 
might have emerged with a very different shape from the one it has’ (Pestre and Krige 
1992) (p. 81). Hence, in writing the history of CERN they focussed on the process by 
which it evolved as well as socio-political factors. Pestre and Krige argue that 
accounts presenting the birth of CERN as ‘inevitable’ are inaccurate as they present 
the nature of CERN in 1954 as the original aim:  
as if the outcome were the simple, logical, and necessary response to an 
immutable and unambiguously posed question: how to equip Europe with a 
prestigious collaborative institute in fundamental nuclear physics (Pestre and 
Krige 1992) (p. 82) (their emphasis).  
 50  
They further criticise these accounts by arguing that the European spirit was not as 
powerful as they portray, as some states were anxious about becoming involved in an 
initiative that they would not control (Pestre and Krige 1992).  
 
As post-war European countries tended to lack clearly defined science policies or 
government institutions responsible for scientific research, scientists involved in 
CERN could act independently of national governments. Indeed, scientists and 
science administrators were not heavily influenced by the scientific establishment and 
member states (who funded CERN) and enjoyed considerable independence from 
them (Pestre and Krige 1992). This autonomy is most clearly illustrated in the CERN 
Council, its central group composed of scientists and political figures, which was an 
important part of its origins and development. The Council operated independently 
from member states even though their representatives sat on it. They controlled the 
project and were responsible for appointing the CERN Director-General who held a 
powerful position of leadership. A group of men heavily involved in CERN’s origins 
were at the centre of the Council and exchanged dominant posts between them. 
Known as the ‘founding fathers’, they were ‘Welded together through a struggle that 
had lasted for years, determined to see their child prodigy succeed completely’ (Pestre 
and Krige 1992) (p. 85).  By maintaining a position of unity, this group prevented 
direct government intervention. The Council fostered a very close relationship with 
the European high-energy physics establishment (Pestre and Krige 1992).  
 
The Council’s response to a member state’s challenge to their authority illustrates 
their control of the project. In 1961 the British tried to unite other governments who 
objected to budget increases and decide the upper limit for the CERN budgets for the 
following three years (Hermann, Krige et al. 1990). In response, the Chairman of the 
Council at a meeting on December 19 1961 (half of which was devoted to the subject) 
presented the issue as a political one (rather than financial or scientific) that 
threatened collaboration. Members pointed to the Convention and stressed the 
sovereign nature of the Council. Armin Hermann et al described this episode as 
evidence of  
‘the jealously guarded autonomy of the Council and the functioning of the pro-
CERN lobby at its heart, it shows that the Council regarded itself as the only 
possible decision-making nucleus, the nucleus which history itself had 
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established and on which it had bestowed legitimacy, and it makes it clear that 
the Council members were apparently sufficiently powerful when dealing with 
their domestic authorities to neutralize any initiative aimed at bypassing them’ 
(Hermann, Krige et al. 1990) (p. 364)  
The Council was united by clear goals and competition with the United States lent the 
project greater significance:  
‘its cohesion lying in the novelty and importance of what was at stake  - to be 
part of a collaborative scheme in nuclear science encompassing no less than a 
dozen states which aimed to beat the American monolith by building the 
biggest accelerator in the world’  (Hermann, Krige et al. 1990) (p. 362) (their 
emphasis).  
 
The establishment of CERN has been widely attributed to the leading role taken by 
scientists in the project, especially the CERN Council. Given the considerable role 
played by politicians, diplomats and state officials in setting up CERN, Hermann et al 
point to the difficulties of this argument. They argue that the Big Science nature of the 
project demands the considerable support from these groups: ‘this was a big science 
project. And where there is ‘big science’ there is inclusion in a budget, and so the 
involvement of politicians, or at least of administrators from the higher echelons of 
politics’ (Hermann, Krige et al. 1989) ( p. 199). However, because of the lack of 
governmental involvement in the conception of CERN, its goals and governance 
Hermann et al acknowledge the importance of scientists in driving the project:  
‘The initiators of the project were thus not to be found in the world of politics 
and diplomacy, nor were the initial roots and motivations, in spite of the 
existence of an active European ideal. It is in the scientific need felt by 
scientists and scientific administrators, the need to equip Europe with 
machines beyond the means of individual countries, that the foundation of the 
CERN project is to be found’ (Hermann, Krige et al. 1989) (p. 200) (their 
emphasis). 
 
1.5.2 (c) The Space Telescope  
 
The Space Telescope is a large space observatory with a 2.4 metre primary mirror at 
is centre.  It was originally known as the Large Space Telescope from 1965-1975, 
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renamed the Space Telescope in 1975, and renamed again in 1983 as the Hubble 
Space Telescope. NASA, with the support of the European Space Agency (ESA) as a 
minor partner, managed the Space Telescope’s design and development. Following a 
three-year process, White House and Congress approved the project in 1977. 
Construction of the telescope began in 1977 and it was launched in 1990 (Smith 
1992). Designed to be the most ‘powerful optical telescope ever constructed’, the 
project involved considerable resources that rendered the involvement of industrial 
contractors crucial (Smith 1992) ( p. 187). The design and construction of the Space 
Telescope thus represented a collaboration of government, industry and academe 
(Smith 1992). 
 
The process of gaining funding from the federal government was a considerable part 
of the history of the Space Telescope that reflects significant issues, such as gaining 
astronomers’ support for the project. In the mid 1960s NASA sought to extend the 
pursuit of space astronomy to a wider group of astronomers (especially ground-based 
astronomers who were generally critical of the project) to justify the costs and thereby 
gain political support. As Robert Smith stated: ‘securing more potential users would 
win wider support for optical space astronomy’ (Smith 1992) (p. 193). Attracting 
ground-based astronomers to space astronomy was complicated as each represented 
different styles of science: ground-based astronomy meant ‘little science’ whereas 
space astronomy meant ‘Big Science’ entailing large teamwork and collaboration with 
engineers and technicians and working under NASA who led and directed the project 
(Smith 1992). The relationship between NASA and the astronomers was marked by 
tension over control of the project (Smith 1989). Given that the telescope was 
constructed to allow astronomers to conduct research and did not perform any 
research in itself, control of its scientific operations and the relationship between the 
telescope and its users were particularly significant issues. Concerns over control 
prompted astronomers to advocate for the establishment of the Space Telescope 
Science Institution (Smith 1989).  
 
Ground-based astronomers’ criticisms of the Space Telescope, namely that it was 
connected to the much maligned US Space Program and would be funded at the 
expense of ground-based astronomy, made the task of gaining their support all the 
more difficult. Despite their criticism, some ground-based astronomers argued that it 
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was better to be involved and try to change it from the inside than criticise it from the 
sidelines. Smith quoted one such astronomer who came to that conclusion:  
“You had to accept that if there was going to be space science, and if it was 
going to be supported no matter what you did, then you had to ride that wild 
horse, instead of letting people with only half-baked ideas claim the 
leadership” (Smith 1992) (p. 195).  
A committee of astronomers formed in the late 1960s to report on the scientific uses 
of the Large Space Telescope to the National Academy of Sciences aimed to foster 
support for the project. The chairman of this group, Lyman Spitzer, a leading 
astronomer from Princeton, key advocate and public champion of the Telescope, 
played a crucial role in this task (Smith 1992).  In justifying the project and garnering 
support for it, this group did not examine potential scientific questions that it could 
address: ‘At this stage, the Space Telescope was essentially “all things to all people” 
as its advocates sought to bundle as many interests as possible into the proposed 
instrument’ (Smith 1992) (p. 196). Given the reluctance of some astronomers to 
become involved in politics and the lack of a lobbying group for the Space Telescope, 
Lyman Spitzer’s role was especially significant following the House of 
Representatives appropriations subcommittee’s decision in June 1974 to remove all 
planning funds for the telescope from the NASA’s budget for the fiscal year 1975 
(Smith 1992). Spitzer was very well respected among ground-based and space 
astronomers and his political experience in lobbying Congress was valuable. Such 
was his role that the telescope became known by many as the ‘Lyman Spitzer 
Telescope’(Smith 1992) (p. 200).  
 
Following the completion of a revised National Academy’s Space Science Board 
report that supported the Space Telescope as a high priority and the activities of 
leading advocates, Congress reinstated the telescope to the budget in August 1974 
albeit with half the planning funds and a number of other concessions, including the 
involvement of other countries (Smith 1992). The reduction in funds meant a smaller 
primary mirror (reduced from 3 metres to 2.4 metres) and a number of other changes 
(Smith 1992) (p. 202). One particularly telling concession was the name change from 
the ‘Large Space Telescope’ to the ‘Space Telescope’ as ‘large’ suggested a certain 
grandiosity (Smith 1992) (p. 191). The telescope was therefore redesigned for a range 
of reasons that extended beyond the scientific and technical:  
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The redesigned telescope must therefore be interpreted not as a product of 
technical and scientific considerations alone but as the result of complicated 
interaction and interpenetration of technical, scientific, political, economic, 
institutional, and social forces (Smith 1989) (p. 143). 
Congressional difficulties united astronomers and increased their awareness of the 
importance of political activities, which alongside the role of product champions, 
particularly Lyman Spitzer, was instrumental in obtaining funding:  
Without such entrepreneurism, the telescope could not have been made 
salable; moreover, for the kind of costly big science that the telescope 
represented, its advocates came to accept that the mobilization of an entire 
scientific community was necessary to make it politically feasible (Seidel 
1992) (p. 202).  
In making congressional concessions the telescope became politically acceptable but 
at considerable cost to its design, which impacted upon its subsequent development: 
‘the course of the telescope’s design and development has to be interpreted to a large 
degree in terms of a program trapped by its own history’ (Smith 1989) (p. 186).  
 
1.5.2 (d) The term ‘Big Science’ 
 
The origins of the term Big Science are unclear but it was in circulation in the late 
1950s and increasingly used in the 1960s (Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 4). Big 
Science is difficult to define and has qualitative and quantitative connotations, which 
are reflected in early proponents’ use of the term. Derek J de Solla Price argued that 
each generation defined Big Science in comparison to previous scientific activity 
(Price 1963), whereas Alvin Weinberg defined Big Science in quantitative terms as a 
scientific project that consumed a noticeable portion of the gross national product 
(Weinberg 1967). 
 
Weinberg, credited with coining the term, was critical of the phenomenon, 
specifically its effect on the professional status of scientists and non-governmental 
sponsorship. He argued that competition for funds compromised scientists’ 
professional integrity and cast them in a role akin to journalism (Weinberg 1967). A 
science policymaker, he feared that the development of Big Science would be to the 
detriment of science in general on account of its costs, reliance on public finance, and 
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the increasing role of scientist-administrators (Capshew and Radar 1992). Yet he 
stressed the inevitability of Big Science as a stage in the development of science and 
defended its place:  
Big Science, with all its dangers, does have a real place in the scheme of 
things. When the end to be achieved is important enough, and when the state 
of the science suggests that more support will lead to more results…then we 
are justified in going all out in our plea for public support (Weinberg 1967) (p. 
114). 
He argued that resources for Big Science should be distributed according to the 
project’s ‘social merit or relevance to human affairs and the values of man’ (Weinberg 
1967) (p. 76). Price, a physicist turned historian, increased usage of the term Big 
Science with the publication of Little Science, Big Science in 1963. He focused on the 
issue of scientific growth and interpreted Big Science as ‘an uncomfortable brief 
interlude between the traditional centuries of Little Science and the impending period 
following transition’ (Price 1963) (p. 32). Although he argued that the transition 
occurred in the 1940s or 1950s, he did not believe that the Second World War was a 
major factor in it. In focusing on the issue of scientific growth, Price rejected firm 
distinctions between little science and Big Science, and pointed to historical examples 
of Big Science such as the huge electrical machines in Holland in the eighteenth 
century (Price 1963) (p. 4). He argued that the transition from Little Science to Big 
Science was less dramatic and more gradual than appears at first: 
For one thing, it is clear that Little Science contained many elements of the 
grandiose. And, tucked away in some academic corners, modern Big Science 
probably contains shoestring operations by unknown pioneers who are starting 
lines of research that will be of decisive interest by 1975 (Price 1963) (p. 3). 
 
Contemporary proponents stress the limitations of fixed and singular definitions of 
Big Science, such as a quantitative definition in terms of technological capacity. For 
example, Bruce Hevly argued that: ‘Big Science is not simply science carried out with 
big or expensive instruments…such instruments, despite their size, may be used in a 
manner consistent with traditional, little science’ (Hevly 1992) (p. 356). Similarly, 
Peter Galison pointed to the influence of different cultures on Big Science (such as 
academic, military and corporate) as evidence of the many different types of Big 
Science, and criticised the tendency to apply a singular definition: ‘Perhaps because 
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of its sheer size, historians, sociologists, and scientists have all tended to think of 
large-scale research as being all of a single type’ (Galison 1992) (p. 2). James 
Capshew and Karen Radar reflected on how the same aspects of Big Science could be 
interpreted differently, for example it is perceived as an instrument in literal and 
metaphorical terms:  
some studies have emphasized the instrumental dimensions of Big Science, 
either in the literal sense of its technological components or in the 
metaphorical sense of its use to serve conjoined political and cognitive goals  
(Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 8).  
 
Contemporary proponents of the term also stress the significance of the growth of 
scientific activity and the relativity of the term ‘big’. For example, Capshew and 
Radar criticised the lack of analysis of how ‘Big Science’ is ‘big’: ‘this contrast is 
almost always implicit; small scale or ‘Little Science’ is usually defined as lacking 
one or another characteristic of Big Science, or as some vague historical predecessor’  
(Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 3). Similarly, Robert Seidel commented:  
The mobilization of science in World War II has often been taken as the 
origins of modern Big Science. This rests on the notion of ‘Big Science’ as a 
well-defined entity. An alternative view might be that Big Science, as we 
know it today, evolved more gradually over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Seidel 1992) (p. 38). 
 
1.5.2 (e) Characteristics of Big Science  
 
Four key characteristics are associated with Big Science: scale, social and political 
context, sponsorship and organisational issues.  
 
Scale  
Scale is a defining characteristic of Big Science: ‘The drama of scale lies at the heart 
of our intuitions about Big Science, and, more generally, at the heart of scientific 
understanding and of our understanding of science’ (Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 
18). The significance of scale extends beyond scientific necessity, and social and 
political issues can dictate the size of Big Science projects. For example, at the 
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Radiation Laboratory at the University of California in Berkeley,
25
 the size of the 
cyclotron (a type of particle accelerator) was based on social and political issues 
rather than scientific ones: ‘the 60-inch cyclotron was oversized, a monument to 
megavolts and money’ (Seidel 1992) (p. 36). The significance of size is often related 
to the political importance of being the ‘biggest’:  
The Crockfer Laboratory, which housed the 60 inch cyclotron, like the Lick 
Observatory, which housed the University’s [University of California in 
Berkeley] largest telescope, immortalized its patron, who was flattered by 
having the ‘world’s largest’ scientific instrument of this kind named after him  
(Seidel 1992) (p. 36). 
Capshew and Radar have attributed the influence of Weinberg’s thesis to its focus on 
the scale of Big Science, highlighting the importance of scale as a characteristic. They 
claim that Weinberg’s thesis 
entails a drama of scale that juxtaposes the huge machines, large 
organisations, and massive expenditures found in some contemporary research 
projects with the stereotyped lone investigator of the past, working with the 
proverbial sealing wax and string in a private laboratory (Capshew and Radar 
1992) (p. 19).  
 
Social and political context  
Big Science projects represent a convergence of politicians, journalists and scientists. 
The social and political context is reflected in demands placed upon scientists 
involved in Big Science to address a range of audiences in securing social and 
political support:  
he must serve on committees that recommend who should receive support, 
who should not; he must travel to Washington either to advise a government 
agency or to cajole a reluctant contract administrator. In short, the research 
professor must be an operator as well as a scientist (Weinberg 1967) (p. 40). 
Big Science projects rely on significant political and financial support, and as such 
depend on ‘the attachment of social and political significance … whether for their 
                                                
25Later known as the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the Radiation Laboratory was founded in 1931 at 
the University of California, Berkeley by Ernest Lawrence to develop physics research and was a 
national and international centre of nuclear science (Seidel 1992).  
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contribution to national health, military power, industrial potential, or prestige’ 
(Hevly 1992) (p. 357).      
 
The social and political context of Big Science is reflected in the changing position of 
the scientist and Galison has argued that Big Science entails ‘a change in the very 
nature of a life in science’ (Galison 1992) (p. 1). As their social and political 
responsibilities grew, scientists evolved into political instruments responsible for 
issues of national significance, such as defence or disease prevention. Price stressed 
the change to the role of scientists wrought by Big Science:  
In the old days of Little Science there was tremendous reaction against 
political action by scientists. They were lone wolves; they valued their 
independence…Their pay-off was the approbation of peers, and they were not 
supposed to crave any sort of admiration from the man in the street or any 
social status within society. Whether they like it or not, they now have such 
status and an increasing degree of affluence (Price 1963) (p. 113). 
Scientists’ involved in Big Science projects bear such social and political 
responsibilities on account of the significance and potential benefits for society of 
their projects: 
Society is supporting this structure and paying for it more and more because 
the results of his [the scientist’s] work are vital for the strength, security, and 
public welfare of all. With everything said to be depending on him, from 
freedom from military attack to freedom from disease, the scientist now holds 
the purse-strings of the entire state (Price 1963) (p. 111). 
 
Big Science projects also rendered scientists more accountable. This change was 
partly prompted by the perception that Big Science represented an ethical problem for 
society and science, following the bombing of Japan in the Second World War. 
Changes to institutional norms wrought by Big Science, such as scale and multiple 
authorship of scientific papers, challenged scientists’ accountability. Capshew and 
Radar point to the difficulty of laying blame in the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster 
as evidence of the lack of accountability in Big Science projects (Capshew and Radar 
1992).  
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Political support is a significant factor in the viability of Big Science projects and an 
intrinsic part of the wider context of Big Science. Scientists involved in Big Science 
projects must achieve political as well as scientific approval. For example, political 
acceptance was at the forefront of scientific decisions in the development of the Space 
Telescope: ‘the telescope’s designs, the program to build it, and the claims made on 
its behalf continually had to be revised and refashioned as part of the effort to come 
up with a telescope that would be politically feasible’ (Smith 1989) (p. 374). 
Scientific interests were however just as carefully balanced to retain astronomers’ 
support: ‘if the agency went too far in making cuts and thereby reduced scientific 
performance to a level the astronomers judged unacceptable, the telescope would be 
just as dead as if it had died at the hands of Congress’ (Smith 1989) (p. 374). Such is 
the political significance of Big Science that some scientists align their projects with 
the term to secure political support. However it must be carefully adopted, as Big 
Science is politically sensitive and can divide opinion. For example, the notion of Big 
Science was used and then rejected in justifying the HGP:  
James Watson, the former head of the Human Genome Initiative, first argued 
that the project to map the human genetic structure was an appropriate 
extension of Big Science into the realm of biology…Recently, however, 
Watson has recognized the political liabilities in the analogy and has begun to 
speak of the genome project as taking a “Little Science” approach, partly 
because only the management and not the work itself will be centralized 
(Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 14). 
 
The HGP represented a politically sensitive Big Science project because of its cost, 
the issue of access to the information, and public concern about the field. As a 
commercial company, Celera Genomics, rivalled the publicly funded effort to map 
and sequence the human genome, access to the human genome sequence was the most 
politically sensitive issue. It has been argued that the fear of a commercial company 
controlling access to the human genome sequence motivated the Wellcome Trust to 
double the funding for the British group to complete one third of the human genome:  
Once the governors understood that Craig Venter’s [head of Celera Genomics] 
initiative was essentially a privatization of the genome, Michael Morgan [a 
representative of the Wellcome Trust] felt there was no risk that they would 
pull out on us (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 163).  
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The political significance of the HGP was such that the completion of the first draft 
was announced in a press release involving the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
President Bill Clinton, a presentation perceived as a political gesture:  
Of course, the 26 June announcement was a political gesture…It didn’t matter 
that it was founded on the White House desire to get Al Gore elected. What 
mattered was that people were not talking about ‘the race’ anything like so 
much (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 225). 
 
Criticism of publicly funded science resulted in questionable Congressional support 
for the publicly funded HGP in the United States, which reflects the significance of 
political support for Big Science projects. For example, Sulston recalled how   
[a]t the Sanger Centre [genome sequencing centre at Hinxton, Cambridge] we 
had the luxury of knowing that we had a politically independent body, the 
Wellcome Trust, behind us all the way. But in the US, with a Republican 
Congress, Francis [Replaced Jim Watson as Head of NIH Genome Program] 
feared that any suggestion that the private sector could do a better job than 
government-funded labs was going to find a receptive audience (Sulston and 
Ferry 2002) (p. 161). 
 
Sponsorship  
Some regard the financial support required for Big Science projects as a definitive 
characteristic, setting it apart from other scientific projects. For example, Price said 
‘[w]ithout doubt, the most abnormal thing in this age of Big Science is money. The 
finances of science seem highly irregular…they dominate most of the social and 
political implications’ (Price 1963) (p. 92). Weinberg also regarded the cost involved 
in Big Science as highly influential on the nature of scientific studies: ‘to what extent 
are the directions of science influenced by the availability of money rather than 
interest and promise of a field’ (Weinberg 1967) (p. 40). Price argued that scientists’ 
greater financial and social status, because of the costs involved in Big Science, 
changed the way in which scientists were judged by peers (Price 1963). Scientists’ 
increased involvement in social and political issues is also attributed to the financial 
support required from government, industry or the military: ‘Whether Big Science 
derives its support from designing patents, working for industry, contracting to the 
federal government, or building weapons, the demands of the wider society cannot be 
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ignored’ (Galison 1992) (p. 2). Government, industrial and military sponsorship 
thereby reflect the wider social and political context of Big Science. This is evident in 
sponsors’ motivations to support Big Science projects that extend beyond scientific 
validity. For example, economic and international factors motivated the White House 
and Congress to fund the Space Telescope:  
to promote international ties, to strengthen the scientific/technological base of 
the United States, to help maintain the capability of the Marshall Space Flight 
Center, to provide employment in the districts and states of many congressmen 
and senators, and as part of a major initiative in the Ford presidency to 
promote the development of basic research (Smith 1989) (p. 387).      
 
Given the considerable support required for Big Science projects, the relationships 
between scientists and their sponsors are significant, such that they ‘became part of 
the intellectual and social context of Big Science’ (Hevly 1992) (p. 359). Hevly 
parallels the influence of sponsors in Big Science projects to the increasing amount of 
sponsored research in the history of science:  
the teams of historians may come to resemble, in miniature at least, the teams 
of scientists under study … Scholars engaged in such projects should remain 
sensitive to the impact of these arrangements on our own work – arrangements 
that could influence the choice of topics, modes of presentation, and training 
of students (Hevly 1992) (p. 363). 
 
Government is a significant sponsor of Big Science and their response to Big Science 
projects reflects wider issues surrounding scientific research funding. These issues 
were reflected in the U.K. in the MRC’s approach to coordinating research on AIDS, 
and in the U.S. in attitudes to the publicly funded effort to sequence the human 
genome. Within the MRC, the traditional, responsive mode of research funding was 
changed in 1986 by the MRC Directed Programme on AIDS, which reflected 
increasing adoption of the ‘customer/contractor’ principle:  
AIDS thus exemplified a tendency established in government funding of 
research with the Rothschild customer/contractor reforms of the 1970s, which 
stressed the production of research ‘useful’ to policy rather than the reactive 
mode of funded research which had previously prevailed (Berridge 1994) (p. 
139).  
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Although this change was temporary, its influence is reflected in the adoption of the 
customer/contractor principle in the HGP: ‘The responsive mode of MRC funding 
was not, so it was argued, fundamentally altered by AIDS; only the human genome 
programme adopted some aspects of the AIDS Directed Programme model’ (Berridge 
1994) (p. 144).  
 
In the US, the HGP reflected tension between commercial and federal funded 
research. Lack of political support for publicly funded science meant that the NIH was 
under pressure to justify its involvement:   
Healy’s [Director of NIH] gaze fixed on the commercial promise of genome 
research and the increasingly strong mandate to NIH from Congress and the 
administration to make science into technology and economic power. Watson 
[Head of NIH Genome Program] was determined to prevent a genetic gold 
rush that could undermine collaboration among research groups (Cook-
Deegan 1994) (p. 326). 
Such was the lack of Congressional support for publicly funded science that the 
NIH’s role was under threat, which rendered British involvement, free from private 
sponsorship, significant. For example, Sulston remarked that ‘[i]f the HGP had been 
just an internal US matter, then, with enough support for Celera in Congress I feared 
that the role and views of the National Institutes of Health might have been 
suppressed’ (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 188). 
 
Industry is also a prolific sponsor of Big Science, further reflecting its wider social 
and political context. The significant role of industry in Big Science is evident in the 
involvement of the commercial company, Celera Genomics, in the HGP. Venter’s 
attempt to sequence the human genome faster threatened scientists within the publicly 
funded effort as they feared that their public sponsors would not continue to fund an 
initiative that had private support (Sulston and Ferry 2002). The tension surrounding 
the involvement of Celera Genomics largely concerned access, specifically the idea 
that the human genome sequence would not be freely available public information. It 
is argued that involvement of a commercial company in the HGP and their restrictions 
on access were indicative of shifts in the ‘prevailing ethos in the world of science’ 
regarding access and data sharing: 
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What was once a collective enterprise, in which discoveries were 
acknowledged but their results freely shared, is now frequently constrained by 
the demands of commercial competition. Motivated by financial gain, 
hamstrung by sponsorship deals, or simply out of self-defence, many 
researchers trade their discoveries with the rest of the community only under 
the protection of patent law or commercial secrecy (Sulston and Ferry 2002) 
(p. ix). 
 
Given the resources involved, scientists increasingly accept the role of industry in 
sponsoring Big Science projects. However, some scientists reject the assumption that 
industry involvement is essential in Big Science projects. For example, Sulston 
commented that ‘[t]he success of the Sanger Centre and the other big genome labs 
have shown that size is not an issue: the often-heard notion that only industry can 
handle large-scale science is incorrect’ (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 273). Scientists 
warn of the pressures placed on academics from industry: ‘all universities now hold 
contracts with industrial sponsors out of sheer necessity; the question is to what extent 
the sponsors thereby gain control over what is and what is not discovered’ (Sulston 
and Ferry 2002) (p. 273). Industry involvement in Big Science can therefore result in 
tension between academic scientists and industrial sponsors. This tension is evident in 
the HGP in Sulston’s criticism of Craig Venter’s behaviour as unscientific and 
business-like:   
He had certainly opened up a huge public relations advantage…it’s a skill that 
most scientists never learn and rarely have to practice. The convention is that 
you don’t announce anything until the work is completed and accepted for 
publication in a peer-reviewed journal … But Craig was no longer in science, 
he was in business. And the priority for a business is not scientific credibility 
but share price and market penetration (Sulston and Ferry 2002) (p. 159). 
 
Organisational Issues   
Big Science projects are characterised by large, multidisciplinary teams and 
hierarchical organisations. They involve the establishment of specialist research 
groups with particular goals in mind (Hevly 1992). Increasing specialisation is not 
however restricted to scientific enterprise and is reflected in organisational structures: 
‘Laboratories have been divided not only into groups of theoreticians, experimenters, 
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and instrument builders, but also into hierarchies of group leaders, laboratory 
managers, and business coordinators’ (Hevly 1992) (p. 357). Such centralised 
organisational structures, typical of Big Science, are at odds with those traditionally 
favoured by scientists. It is argued that criticism of Big Science represents criticism of 
centralisation: ‘Many scientists dislike Big Science because it can mean a loss of 
autonomy through a centralization of decision making’ (Smith 1989) (p. 379). Smith 
referred to astronomers’ experience of a centralised structure in the development of 
the Space Telescope in demonstrating criticism of centralisation: ‘For some 
astronomers, immersion in the highly ordered and hierarchical world of the Space 
Telescope was, on occasion, an uncomfortable and demoralizing experience’ (Smith 
1989) (p. 380).  
 
The role of scientific champion is a significant aspect of the organisational structure 
of Big Science. Increased scrutiny from sponsors in Big Science projects, such as 
government, renders the role of scientific champion especially important: ‘any 
proposed project must have advocates in the scientific community who are willing to 
work to mobilize its supporters, argue with doubters, and spend much time on 
advisory committees’ (Smith 1989) (p. 375). The responsibility for garnering political 
and financial support rests with the scientific champion, which is significant given the 
social and political context of Big Science.  
 
Given the involvement of multiple stakeholders in Big Science, control can be a 
significant issue in organisational structures, which is reflected in tension between 
scientists and the funding bodies. Such tensions are evident in the development of the 
Space Telescope (Smith 1989). Doubting NASA’s long term commitment, 
astronomers outside of NASA supported the establishment of the Space Telescope 
Science Institute as they perceived it as a means to increase their control over the 
telescope. Following astronomers’ complaints that the Science Working Group was 
‘toothless’ on account of its role, infrequency of meetings and large size, NASA 
established The Space Telescope Observatory Performance and Assessment Team 
(STOPAT) (Smith 1989) (p. 318).  
 
The origins of CERN further illustrate tensions over control, in this case between 
European states and CERN officials. European states’ reluctance to become involved 
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in CERN was attributed to their lack of control over it: ‘many states hesitated about 
getting involved in a business whose long-term development was difficult to foresee 
and which they did not control’ (Pestre and Krige 1992) (p. 82). Tension persisted 
between the CERN Council and state authorities, resulting in the Council adopting a 
powerful position of control, supported by a close relationship with the European 
high-energy physics community. Such was their control that the Council ‘was not 
only the organ representing the states and responsible for controlling CERN, but also 
the body expected to advise the same states on matters concerning CERN and high-
energy physics’ (Pestre and Krige 1992) (p. 86).  
 
Different organisational styles can also result in tension in Big Science projects, such 
as perceptions of organisational approaches as academic and non-academic. Gowing 
associated academic or university principles in organisational structures with debate 
and scientific autonomy. For example, she described how the British Atomic Energy 
institution at Harwell [a research establishment led by John Cockroft] represented 
academic practice:   
all work, whatever its purpose, was done in accordance with academic 
traditions – that is, endless debate without closure motions, the reopening of 
decisions that had been taken, and the absence of coercion on staff to change 
their approach or their work (Gowing 1974) (p. 14). 
Gowing distinguished this academic approach undertaken at Harwell from those of 
the two other institutions and their executives in the British Atomic Energy Project, 
which were described as non-academic: 
Penny [responsible for making and testing an atomic bomb at the Ministry of 
Supply’s Armament Research Department] and Hinton [responsible for the 
design, construction and operation of four large plants to produce fissile 
material] on the other hand had to organise the whole work of their 
establishments to meet very tight deadlines; there had to be strong command 
and pyramid-shaped hierarchies. There could not be perpetual debate or a 
refusal to regard any issue as finally decided (Gowing 1974) (p. 16).  
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1.5.2 (f) Criticisms of Big Science  
 
Scientists criticise Big Science on various grounds, including its social and political 
context, cost and organisational structure. Weinberg’s comments reflect this range of 
criticism directed at Big Science projects:  
I have inveighed against the dangers of Big Science: its too-frequent 
preoccupation with the big announcement rather than the big discovery, its 
tendency to substitute money for thought, its overabundance of administrators, 
its incompatibility with the educational process, even its inefficiency 
(Weinberg 1967) (p. 113). 
The following analysis of criticisms of Big Science reflects many of those directed at 
UK Biobank, which will be addressed in the findings chapters.  
 
Criticisms of the cost of Big Science not only concern the sums of money involved 
but the effect on other research activities of committing significant sums to a single 
project. For example, astronomers felt that the costs involved in operating, 
maintaining and refurbishing the Space Telescope threatened other space science 
programs: ‘NASA was driven to siphon money away from potential new space 
science programs to shore up the Space Telescope’s budget. One mission to suffer 
was the Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF)’ (Smith 1989) (p. 395). 
Similarly, scientists argued that the funding of the HGP would be to the detriment of 
biological research funding: ‘The new band of dissidents were troubled, even angered, 
by the fact that, while the genome project had been prospering, general basic research 
in the biological sciences had been financially squeezed’ (Kevles and Hood 1992) (p. 
301).  
 
Industrial sponsorship attracted further criticism for Big Science, and some scientists, 
such as Paul Zilsel in 1964, argued that it denoted ‘the triumph of the values of big 
business in science’ and portrayed Big Science as ‘a market-conscious, product-
orientated, and capital-intensive activity’ (Capshew and Radar 1992) (p. 10). 
Criticism of the costs involved in the HGP reflected fears that its funding was 
indicative of the lack of funds for small, independent grants: 
scientists supported by small independent grants felt squeezed…dissension 
was palpable among the reviewers… the central issue was not the genome 
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project per se, but the paucity of investigator-initiated project grants (Cook-
Deegan 1994) (p. 171). 
 
Organisational issues are a further source of criticism of Big Science, specifically 
distrust of large centralised operations. Weinberg criticized group activity as less 
conducive to creative science and problem solving than individual effort: ‘Growth and 
fragmentation impair the efficiency of science by forcing science to become a team 
activity …The act of scientific creation, no less than any intellectual creation, is 
largely an individual act’ (Weinberg 1967) (p. 43). In the HGP, scientists were 
suspicious of overt state control: ‘In France, molecular biologists were particularly 
resistant to bigness and centralization … Most preferred the model of the Institut 
Pasteur, a private institution that had long insulated itself from state control’ (Kevles 
1992) (p. 29).  
 
Big Science therefore represents a highly emotive phenomenon, which incurs strong 
reactions from scientists. This emotive nature is reflected in perceptions of the HGP 
as a Big Science project. Some scientists’ criticised the Project simply for 
representing Big Science. They feared that it signalled the beginning of ‘big biology’: 
‘the renewed criticism of the project echoed, in part, the main animadversion cast 
upon it in 1987 – that it represented the subjugation of biology to the directed, 
hierarchical mode of Big Science’ (Kevles and Hood 1992) (p. 301). Criticism of the 
HGP also concerned its lack of hypothesis, which can be a characteristic of Big 
Science: provision of resources for as yet unspecified future research. Martin 
Rechsteiner, a Professor of biochemistry, criticised the project on these grounds:  
Rechsteiner held that ascertaining the sequence even of coding regions would 
not necessarily advance biological science: the effort would obtain DNA data 
for the sake of acquiring the information, independent of hypotheses that the 
data might address (Kevles and Hood 1992) (p. 301). 
 
Such was the potency of criticism of the HGP for representing Big Science that it 
partly overshadowed criticism of other aspects of the project, such as access and data 
sharing (Kevles 1992). In the US, descriptions of the HGP as a Big Science project 
were both detrimental and beneficial to perceptions of the Project. It is argued that the 
association between the HGP and Big Science was made selectively to foster criticism 
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and reflects singular definitions of Big Science that are detrimental to understandings 
of it:  
Unfortunately, the way that the genome project has been identified with Big 
Science in scientific journals and the press has tended to cloud matters. The 
distinction has been selective … the genome project is a type of Big Science, 
but it is not the type that its critics deplore (Kevles and Hood 1992) (p. 306).  
However in the US, the association of the HGP with Big Science partly accounted for 
the DOE’s support, which helped prompt the NIH to become involved (Kevles 1992). 
Some biomedical scientists were so suspicious of the DOE that they urged the NIH to 
get involved in the HGP simply to limit their power. Despite the NIH’s increasing 
commitment to the genome project, biomedical scientists continued to object to the 
endeavour on account of its Big Science status: 
The project might now be largely in the friendly hands of NIH, but it suffered 
from the image that Walter Gilbert [an early proponent of the project] had 
given it – a three-billion-dollar Big Science crash program, built around a few 
large, bureaucratized centers that would be given over to DNA sequencing and 
accomplish their task within several years. The work would be tedious, 
routinized, and intellectually unrewarding, the critics contended. In their view, 
sequencing the entire human genome would amount to bad and wasteful 
science (Kevles 1992) (p. 24).     
 
1.5.3 Concluding Remarks  
 
This literature review has enabled a greater understanding of the origins and 
development of UK Biobank. First, analysis of the historiography of contemporary 
science fostered my awareness of the methodological issues involved in undertaking a 
contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank. It allowed me 
to understand interviewees’ reactions to my research more fully, and increased my 
awareness of the meaning behind them. Second, in reviewing the term Big Science 
and the origins and development of such projects, I increased my understanding of the 
phenomenon, which will enable a more full consideration of the extent to which UK 
Biobank represents Big Science in the conclusion.   
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The issues raised throughout the literature review are reflected in my research. For 
example, I encountered difficulties in handling scientists’ perceptions of the role of 
contemporary history, which are addressed in chapter three. The organisational issues, 
characteristic of Big Science and a source of criticism, are especially relevant to my 
study. For example, I found that the role of scientific champion and the issue of 
centralisation that are considered in the findings chapters four and five were 
significant in the origins and development of UK Biobank. For the remainder of this 
chapter, I will provide a brief outline of the thesis.  
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1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
In Chapter two I discuss the methods adopted in researching the origins and 
development of UK Biobank, including the theoretical and practical issues 
encountered in employing oral history interviews and archival research. I address the 
advantages and disadvantages of the methods and describe how I analysed the data 
from the oral history interviews and archival research. Chapter three therefore 
represents a reflexive account of my experience of gathering the data that supported 
my findings and informed my conclusions. It allows the reader to understand how I 
conducted my study, analysed the data and subsequently formed findings and 
conclusions. 
 
Chapter three presents a detailed chronology of UK Biobank, largely based on 
information gathered from archival research and the UK Biobank website. The 
chapter is descriptive in nature rather than analytical, and serves to familiarise the 
reader with the evolution of UK Biobank and the terminology surrounding it.  
 
I present my findings in chapters four, five and six. Chapter four discusses the issue of 
‘standard academic scientific practice’. Specifically this chapter details how members 
of the academic scientific community saw the way in which UK Biobank was 
established as representing a departure from standard academic scientific practice. It 
also examines understandings of standard academic scientific practice, the nature of 
the meanings attached to it, and the perceived consequences of departure from this 
model of science. Chapter five concerns the confusion surrounding control of UK 
Biobank, which was responsible for much tension between academic scientists on the 
one hand and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited on the 
other. It focuses on perceptions of where control of UK Biobank lay, explanations for 
the confusion regarding control, and perceptions of the organisational changes as 
resolving confusion over control. Chapter six examines the lack of trust between 
academic scientists, representatives of UK Biobank Limited and the funding bodies in 
the origins and development of UK Biobank. It described how members of the 
academic scientific community felt that the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited 
did not trust them to develop the resource. In turn, academic scientists felt that they 
could not then trust the funding bodies to develop UK Biobank. This chapter analyses 
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such perceptions of a lack of trust and explanations for it, focusing on the ways in 
which the lack of trust manifested.  
 
Chapter seven is an evaluation of my study that begins with a summary of the thesis. I 
discuss my findings in the wider context of Big Science, specifically by examining 
how UK Biobank could be regarded as a Big Science initiative and comparing its 
origins and development to that of other Big Science projects. This chapter also 
includes discussion of possible explanations for the selection of some of the most 
controversial aspects of the organisational structure that were not documented. I 
present my conclusions regarding the organisational issues that shaped the 
configuration of UK Biobank and reflect upon the strengths and limitations of my 
research, before finally considering potential future directions of this research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Methods 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the methods I employed in researching the origins and 
development of UK Biobank from its inception until the organisational changes in 
August 2005. However, because of the organisational changes that occurred 
unexpectedly toward the end of my fieldwork period, I had to extend my period of 
fieldwork until March 2006. First of all, I address issues surrounding the terminology 
I use. Second, I will discuss the theoretical issues involved in conducting a historical 
study, focussing particularly on oral history. Third, I describe my experience in 
conducting oral history interviews and archival research, reflecting on the pros and 
cons of the methods. Last, I will report on how I analysed the data from the oral 
history interviews and archival research.  
 
Terminology  
Throughout my fieldwork, the terminology relating to UK Biobank was an important 
issue although I was not aware of the sensitivities surrounding the terminology when I 
began my fieldwork. This sometimes led to confusion in my questioning, and 
annoyance from interviewees, particularly current committee members and 
representatives of the funding bodies.  Sensitivities regarding terminology concerned 
reference to UK Biobank as a ‘project’ or a ‘study’, description of UK Biobank as a 
‘genetic study’, and reference to the ‘spokes’ and ‘hub’ as ‘Regional Collaborating 
Centres’ (RCCs) and the ‘Central Coordinating Centre’ (CCC).   
 
Description of UK Biobank as a ‘project’ or a ‘study’ rather than a ‘resource’ was a 
key issue. For example, a member of the IAG in response to the question ‘Where do 
you think the initial idea for the study came from?’ remarked:  
I sermonise everybody that Biobank is not a study, it should not be referred to 
as a study….it is not going to do any studies…’Resource’ is probably the best 
word for it…Studies are research, have research protocol and they have an 
objective to study a particular thing and Biobank is going to be a multi-
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purpose resource…I’m sorry for saying that to you but it’s just something for 
you to think about [090; p. 123; p. 3]. 
Thereafter, I made a conscious effort to refer to UK Biobank as a ‘resource’, 
‘endeavour’ or ‘initiative’. Throughout this thesis, I only refer to UK Biobank in these 
terms. Such sensitivities reflected underlying tensions surrounding the nature of UK 
Biobank itself. For example, some members of the academic scientific community 
criticised the initiative for a lack of hypothesis, and representatives of the funding 
bodies and UK Biobank Limited defended UK Biobank against this criticism by 
arguing that it was not a study, but a resource that would address a range of 
hypotheses.  
 
I also encountered adverse reactions to my description in the information sheet of UK 
Biobank as a ‘genetic study’. Representatives of UK Biobank Limited and the funding 
bodies were sensitive to such a description and stressed that it was not solely a study 
that involved genetics. For example, when asked if he had any questions, a 
representative of UK Biobank Limited remarked:  
I noticed in your information sheet you call it a big genetic study or whatever 
but, you know, just to highlight that so many people refer to it as that but it is 
so much more than that and in fact, it has probably been pointed out to you 
already, but DNA might well not be looked at from all participants and 
certainly not everybody could have their DNA analysed and not every bit of 
their DNA is going to be analysed even if it was … People find it ‘sexy’ to say 
‘It’s the biggest genetic project’ or it is DNA focussed but it is not just that 
and we are keen to emphasise that that it not just what it is about because 
people get the wrong impression of us [0602; p. 186; p. 4]. 
His concerns revealed the controversy surrounding genetic research, and UK Biobank 
Limited’s efforts to avoid it. For example, he continued:  
Not everybody is going to have DNA analysis done and when you talk about 
DNA and genetics for some people it seems scary, you know, genetics equals 
scary and all that sort of thing, slippery slope, genetic underclass and all that 
sort of business…there are some ethical concerns around about that but people 
seem to conflate our project, UK Biobank, with other projects like the 
National DNA Database and the Forensic DNA Database [0602; p. 186; p. 7].  
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As these concerns came from a minority of interviewees who represented just two 
groups in the sample, I did not amend my information sheet in accordance with their 
views.  
 
During the earlier stages of my research the terminology regarding the organisational 
structure was changed. For example, the ‘spokes’ became ‘RCCs’ and the ‘hub’ 
became the ‘CCC’. The extent to which these terms were adopted varied across the 
sample and within constituent groups. In general, representatives of UK Biobank 
Limited and the funding bodies consciously adopted the latter terms, but those 
associated with the origins of the initiative continued using the former terms.  Some 
representatives of the academic scientific community used the terms whereas others 
did not adopt them. Often interviewees from all constituencies would use the terms 
interchangeably. To avoid confusion and as my research concerned the origins and 
development of UK Biobank, I use the terms ‘spokes’ and ‘hub’ rather than ‘RCCs’ 
and ‘CCC’ throughout the thesis except in direct quotations from interviewees or 
archival documents.  
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2.2 Historical Theory  
 
Introduction  
Historical theory is surrounded by a number of debates;
26
 I will provide a brief 
overview of these beginning with discussion of empiricism, relativism and 
postmodernism in relation to historical methodology. I will then focus on the 
theoretical issues involved in oral history, as the chief method employed in my 
research. Last, I address why I selected oral history interviews and archival research 
in my study of the origins and development of UK Biobank.  
 
Empiricism is understood as representing the ‘search for objective truth’. It was the 
most important theoretical position in historical study. For example, Anna Green and 
Kathleen Troup describe it as ‘without doubt the most influential school of historical 
thought over the course of the century’ (Green and Troup 1999) ( p. 1). Empiricism 
was related to the theory of positivism, which was influential across the social 
sciences. Its influence was responsible for the dominance of archival research as a 
historical method to the detriment of other methods and sources, such as oral sources, 
personal memoirs and accounts written after the event. Historians considered analysis 
of written documents as the only reliable means to gather factual evidence and access 
objective truth. Empiricism was challenged by the theory of relativism and 
postmodernism. According to the relativist tradition, it is not possible to attain 
absolute truth, and the position of the historian is relative to any statements about 
history. The relativist position stresses the role of the historian in interpreting data and 
hence the importance of assessing his or her influence on the research. For example, 
Edward Carr remarked that ‘when we take up a work of history, our first concern 
should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it (Carr 
1988) (p. 22). Postmodernists also stress the significance of the historian’s role in 
research and argue that historical research is the product of the historian’s perspective 
rather than any fixed truth. Postmodernism challenges traditional understandings of 
archival research as it argues that historical documents only represent one 
understanding of reality, further rejecting the idea of a single truth.  
 
                                                
26For an introduction to these debates see (Green and Troup 1999)  
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Given the various notions of truth that emerged from these traditions, the reliability of 
archival research was questioned and attention focussed on the construction and 
preservation of documents (Thompson 2000) (p. 97). Relativist and postmodernist 
challenges to empiricism also led to a new emphasis on other historical methods, 
particularly oral history. I will now focus on the implications of the trend towards 
relativism and postmodernism on oral history, including a comparison of the 
theoretical issues facing oral history and archival research as they relate to my 
research.  
  
2.2.1 Oral History  
 
Oral history underwent a revival of interest in the 1960s characterised by the politics 
of the New Left, civil rights and feminism. Historians sought to access the 
experiences and opinions of underrepresented groups, such as women, working 
classes and ethnic minorities. They felt that these groups were underrepresented due 
to reliance on archival research and perceived oral history as a ‘means to empower’ 
them (Green and Troup 1999) (p. 231). 
Oral history was criticised by advocates of the empiricist tradition for being unreliable 
and subjective due to its reliance on memory. It was perceived as an inadequate 
method for gathering factual evidence. For example, Eric Hobsbawm described oral 
history as ‘a remarkably slippery medium for preserving facts’ (Hobsbawm 1997) (p. 
206). As relativism and postmodernism became more influential, this subjectivity 
began to be perceived as a strength of the method, rather than a weakness. Oral 
historians argued that understanding of the meanings behind subjective evidence in 
oral sources resulted in richer understandings. For example, Luisa Passerini concluded 
that oral testimonies are ‘pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture, 
and therefore include not only literal narrations but also the dimensions of memory, 
ideology and subconscious desires’ (Passerini 1979) (p. 84). This emphasis on the 
credibility of subjective evidence was accompanied by a focus on the role of the 
historian to understand representations of the ‘truth’ in oral testimonies, specifically 
how and for what purpose the data are true (Green and Troup 1999) ( 236). This 
period was described by Michael Roper as ‘oral history in the interpretive 
model’(Roper 1996) (p. 347).   
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Oral History and Memory  
As discussed, the key criticism of oral history is its reliance on memory in 
constructing accounts. Oral historians argue that these problems are lessened when the 
topic is of interest or relevance to the interviewee. For example, Paul Thompson 
remarked that ‘[t]he memory process thus depends, not only upon individual 
comprehension, but also upon interest. Accurate memory is thus much more likely 
when it meets a social interest and need’ (Thompson 2000) (p. 103).  
 
Oral historians argue that understanding of the process of memory making can not 
only overcome the problems associated with memory, but can offer fuller insight into 
issues. In constructing accounts of the past, it is believed that people alter the way in 
which events occurred to comply with an overall narrative. Oral historians relate this 
need to construct a coherent account to the concept of ‘composure’ (Green and Troup 
1999) (p. 234). Composure describes the process of memory making and is the theory 
that memories are constructed in accordance with the language and meanings of our 
culture, and personal accounts are constructed to correspond with our personal 
identity and make us feel comfortable with our lives. For example, Alistair Thomson 
states:  
[w]e compose our memories so that they will fit with what is publicly 
acceptable, or, if we have been excluded from general public acceptance, we 
seek out particular publics which affirm our identities and the way we want to 
remember our lives (Thomson 1999) (p. 241).  
It is believed that the influence of present identity in constructing accounts of the past 
is greater the further back in time the interview goes. For example, Thompson states 
that 
[t]he information provided by interview evidence of relatively recent events, 
or current situations, can be assumed to lie somewhere between the actual 
social behaviour and the social expectations or norms of the time. With 
interviews which go back much further, there is the added possibility of 
distortions influenced by subsequent changes in values and norms, which may 
perhaps quite unconsciously alter perceptions (Thompson 2000) (p.100). 
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Oral historians argue that oral sources offer a rich understanding as they allow 
historians to access the effect of present identity on memory making and perceptions 
of the past. Oral sources are therefore useful for offering greater insight into the past 
through evaluation of the influence of the present. The effect of societal changes in 
accepted norms of behaviour and opinions on the construction of personal accounts of 
the past can also be revealed in what interviewees do not say. As Alessandro Portelli 
states ‘the specific utility of oral sources for the historian lies, not so much in their 
ability to preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory’ (Portelli 
2003) (p. 69).  
 
Critics point to discrepancies between what is recorded in written documents and 
what is said in an oral history interview as a result of how memories are constructed. 
Some oral historians interpret these discrepancies positively, and argue that 
investigation into why there is a discrepancy offers greater insight into a particular 
issue. For example, Portelli interprets factually incorrect accounts (in his example, the 
date of the death of a famous protestor) ‘not as the product of faulty memory, but as 
an active creation which gives us insight into the way in which experience is 
symbolically and psychologically incorporated into memory’ (Green and Troup 1999) 
(p. 234). Oral historians also point to the fact that oral accounts are constructed in the 
present to further explain the reasons for discrepancies between written documents 
and oral sources. I encountered discrepancies between archival research and oral 
history interviews in my research, and would agree that investigation into their nature 
offered greater understanding and reflected the importance of present identity in 
constructing accounts of the past.  
 
The Role of the Oral Historian in the Interview 
Oral historians stress the importance of assessing the influence of the historian on the 
content of the interview. An interesting part of this debate, which is relevant to my 
research, is the significance of a historian representing an insider or an outsider. 
Qualitative literature offers valuable insights into the effect of the researcher on the 
interview interaction, which I will briefly explore. The historian’s position as an 
insider or an outsider and his or her professional and personal characteristics were 
especially important issues in my research as I interviewed elite groups (see 2.3.9).  
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On the one hand, some argue that being an insider or a member of the group is a 
privileged position as you have a greater knowledge of the issue and people involved. 
It is believed that group membership allows the researcher to access information 
unobtainable to those not familiar with the culture of the group, especially regarding 
sensitive or controversial issues. On the other hand, in being an insider there is the 
danger of conformity, as Thompson states: ‘If the social relationship in an interview 
becomes, or is from the start, a social bond, the danger towards social conformity in 
replies is increased. Nor does increased intimacy always bring less inhibition’ 
(Thompson 2000) (p. 116). An outsider is less familiar with the group and the issue at 
stake, but this can be advantageous as the researcher may be less inhibited and less 
afraid to ask ‘obvious’ questions, whereas the insider could be guilty of assuming 
answers (Thompson 2000). It is argued that an outsider can adopt a more neutral 
position and perhaps achieve a fuller understanding than a group member. As each 
interview is different and each position has its merits, it is argued that as long as the 
influence of the historian is assessed and neither position is assumed to be privileged 
the issue is not critical.  For example, Akemi Kikamura states  
[s]ince both perspectives have the possibility of distortions and preconceptions 
of social reality, it is the role of the researcher to evaluate the distinctive 
advantages and limitations of each perspective in relationship to the problem 
of research at hand’ (Kikumura 2003) (p. 141). 
In my research, I occupied the position of an outsider in conducting oral history 
interviews and found that it had advantages and disadvantages, which I will address in 
2.3.9.   
 
The influence of the researcher’s professional background and personal characteristics 
on the interview is a key debate in sociological literature.27 One interesting example 
of this debate is provided by Helen Richards and Carol Emslie who found that the 
respondent’s perceptions of the researcher, in their case as a general practitioner and 
sociologist respectively, influenced their response and therefore the interview 
interaction. For example,  
Doctors have a more clearly defined role and higher social status than 
sociologists. This difference in status led to the more frequent observation by 
                                                
27 For a discussion of this debate see:  (Altheide and Johnson 1994), (Ambert, Adler et al. 1995), 
(Hoddinott and Pill 1997), (Morgan 1986)
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HR [Helen Richards] than CE [Carol Emslie] of deference amongst working-
class respondents and social alignment amongst middle-class respondents 
(Richards and Emslie 2000) ( p. 6).      
Social scientists argue that researchers must be aware of the significance of an 
interviewee’s preconceptions of their professional background. They stress that 
researchers must address these preconceptions regardless of whether or not their 
professional roles are clearly defined. For example: 
[GP researchers] should be aware of respondents’ possible preconceptions and 
take care to explain their current role as researcher. Sociologists and other 
social scientists, who have less a clearly defined professional role and status, 
face the similar challenge of making their professional background and 
interests clear’ (Richards and Emslie 2000) (p. 7).  
The effect of the researcher’s personal characteristics (such as gender and age) as well 
as professional background on the interview can be significant: ‘The GP’s perceived 
higher status led to obscuring of her personal characteristics. The sociologist was 
often perceived as a ‘young woman’ rather than defined by her professional role’ 
(Richards and Emslie 2000) (p. 2). I will explore the effect of my professional and 
personal characteristics on the interview interaction, particularly in relation to 
researching elites, in 2.3.9.   
 
Oral History and Archival Research  
Oral historians argue that archival research and oral history share similar 
characteristics and in terms of reliability they should each be treated with caution. In 
exploring these characteristics, I will focus on the following issues that are relevant to 
my research: the accuracy of oral sources compared to written documents and the role 
of the historian in oral history and archival research.   
 
Some oral historians argue that a key difference between written and oral sources is 
the way that they are presented. They point to how oral sources present themselves in 
an oral form, and in a recorded form represent the words used exactly and offer other 
insights by way of pauses and humour. By contrast some written documents, such as 
the official minutes of meetings, record what the scriber believed happened or wished 
to record, rather that exactly what happened (Thompson 2000) (p. 98). For example, 
the historian David Edge, in conducting research into the development of radio 
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astronomy, found that the records preserved by the scientists involved were not 
indicative of the issues that marked the history of radio astronomy. He knew that the 
records did not represent the full story as he was also involved, and following oral 
history interviews with the scientists involved he gained understanding of these 
issues. Thompson argues that through oral history interviews  
he [David Edge] has been able to show that the true picture is very different: a 
story of dead-ends, of misunderstandings, and of discoveries by accident, 
within a social setting of acute rivalries, partly handled by group 
specialization, but sometimes leading to the deliberate concealment of 
information  (Thompson 2000) (p. 69).  
Oral historians stress the extent to which oral sources share the same problems as 
written documents in terms of accuracy. For example, oral history is criticised for 
being distant from the events to which it refers. Oral historians point out that written 
documents tend to be written after the event and by people who did not take part in 
them directly; hence accuracy is as much a problem for the written source as the oral  
(Portelli 2003) (p. 68).  
 
A feature distinguishing oral history and archival research is the role of the historian, 
which is more significant in oral history. It is argued that the written source is 
independent of the historian’s hypothesis and can only be interpreted, whereas the 
content of oral source depends on the historian’s role in the interview and their 
relationship with the interviewee (Portelli 2003) (p. 70). For example, the historian 
decides that he or she would like to conduct an interview with a particular person. The 
historian’s age, gender or background can influence the interviewee and the content of 
the interview. For example, Portelli states how ‘[r]esearchers often introduce specific 
distortions: informants tell them what they believe they want to be told and thus 
reveal who they think the researcher is (Portelli 2003) (p. 71). Oral historians stress 
the importance of assessing this influence rather than trying to remove it to create 
neutrality.  
 
2.2.2 Why oral history interviews and archival research?  
 
My research aim was to understand the origins and development of UK Biobank and 
answer the following question: how and why was UK Biobank initially configured in 
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the manner it was? I sought to answer this question by gathering the opinions and 
experiences of those involved in the origins and development of the resource, 
specifically academic scientists, representatives of the funding bodies and 
representatives of UK Biobank Limited. I also choose archival analysis to address the 
question, thereby accessing different perspectives regarding the origins and 
development of UK Biobank.  
 
I employed oral history interviews as I felt they were the most appropriate method for 
gathering the opinions and experiences of those involved in the origins and 
development of UK Biobank. The main reasons for conducting oral history interviews 
as opposed to using other qualitative methods such as focus groups28 were the 
sensitivity of the research, the importance of confidentiality and the timing of the 
research. The controversy surrounding the timing and organisational structure of UK 
Biobank meant that my research into its origins and development was a sensitive 
project. It was therefore critical that respondents felt comfortable to share their 
opinions freely and the interview context provided a sufficiently safe environment. 
Interviewees’ position within UK Biobank, particularly representatives of the funding 
bodies and senior members of the BoD, the Science Committee and spokes meant that 
they may have felt that involvement in my research could have been to the detriment 
of their career and involvement in UK Biobank, depending on their views. It was 
important that their involvement and responses were treated in the utmost confidence 
and this would have been impossible in a focus group setting. The timing of the 
research further contributed to the importance of confidentiality. As interviewees were 
commenting on recent and evolving events as well as past events, their position was 
particularly difficult, which further underlined the need for confidentiality. Although I 
was unable to conduct focus groups in my research primarily on account of the 
importance of protecting respondents’ identities, the interaction between group 
participants would have been a useful addition to in-depth oral history interviews. 
Also, it would have been helpful to witness the ways in which participants refined 
their contributions in relation to each other, which is a key feature of focus groups 
(Lewis 2004).  
 
                                                
28For a discussion of focus groups see:  (Barbour and Kitzinger 1999), (Bloor, Frankland et al. 2001), 
(Casey and Kleuger 2000), (Morgan 1997) 
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I adopted semi-structured, rather than structured or unstructured, interviews.
29
 Semi-
structured interviews were the most useful in my research as they involve pre-selected 
open-ended questions yet allow the interviewer and respondent to diverge from the 
schedule to explore issues further. Conducting semi-structured interviews allowed me 
to ask similar questions to every interviewee, and afforded me a certain amount of 
flexibility to tailor the interview to the respondent’s specific experience and seek 
further explanation (Arskey and Knight 1999). 
 
I choose archival research because I felt it would be a useful way to complement 
understanding of the themes that emerged from oral history interviews. I felt that the 
same episodes and issues documented in archival research, such as protocol 
development, would emerge in the oral history interviews. Archival research would 
thereby aid my understanding of such themes by supporting the data gathered in oral 
history interviews or offering different perspectives to it. I did however hope that the 
content of the official documents would correspond with the content of the interviews, 
and thereby validate the data generated in the oral history interview. I felt that 
correspondence between what respondents said in an interview and what they were 
reported to have said in a meeting regarding a particular issue (as documented in the 
minutes) would reinforce the validity of my methods. I consider the extent to which 
archival research corresponded with the data generated in oral history interviews in 
2.4.3. I initially endeavoured to complete archival research prior to commencing oral 
history interviews, thereby using it to inform the interview schedule and find focus. 
Archival research was also selected to allow me to access different insights into the 
origins and development of UK Biobank that were not available through conducting 
oral history interviews. I felt that as the official documents were produced at the time, 
especially emails and written correspondence, they would offer a different 
understanding of the origins and development of UK Biobank than oral history 
interviews conducted after the events. I felt that access to official documents would 
allow me to gain access to a wider range of opinions, such as those of people who 
would not wish to interviewed, or who occupied temporary but significant positions. 
As it would have been impossible to interview every person connected to the origins 
and development of UK Biobank, archival research gave me the opportunity to access 
                                                
29For a discussion of the different types of in-depth qualitative interviews see: (Fielding 2003), (Arksey 
and Knight 1999), (Bryman 2001), (Denzin and Lincoln 2000)  
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a wider range of opinions and experiences. I also felt that it would offer different 
insights in terms of the sensitivity of the issues; interviewees may have been reluctant 
to discuss controversial episodes but these may have been documented. Access to 
official documents enriched my overall understanding of the origins and development 
of UK Biobank as it allowed investigation of issues that were not part of my research 
and not explored in oral history interviews. Although these aspects were not 
investigated further they served to aid understanding of the wider issues.  I also 
choose archival research as it allowed me to produce a meaningful chronology of 
events that was not connected to memory. This not only aided understanding of the 
origins and development of UK Biobank, but assisted greatly in understanding the 
interviewees’ experiences and opinions. 
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2.3 Oral History Interviews 
 
2.3.1 Sampling 
 
Sample Composition  
I conducted 76 oral history interviews; 64 were part of my main study and 12 were 
follow-up interviews (see table 1). I approached and interviewed representatives of 
the academic scientific community directly and indirectly involved in UK Biobank, 
representatives of all four funding bodies and representatives of UK Biobank Limited 
(also known as the hub)
30
. Interviews with representatives of the academic scientific 
community directly involved in UK Biobank included spoke members and current 
and previous committee members (specifically the Science Committee, the BoD, the 
EGC and the EWG, the PDC, and the IAG) (see table 1). Within these groups I 
targeted those representing a range of academic backgrounds, for example general 
practice, epidemiology, psychiatry, genetics and statistics. Interviews with 
representatives of the academic scientific community indirectly involved in UK 
Biobank included unsuccessful spoke bidders and members of the academic scientific 
community outside UK Biobank (critics and former spoke members). The 12 follow-
up interviews were conducted with a sub-sample of the original participants in 
response to the organisational changes; specifically spoke members (a representative 
from each of the six spokes), representatives of the funding bodies, UK Biobank 
Limited and committee members (see table 1 ‘no. re-interviewed’).  
 
For the main study, oral history interviews were conducted between October 2004 and 
September 2005 (see table 2). During this period of fieldwork, the hub and the spokes 
were still undergoing contract negotiation, the EGC was established (November 
2004), the former CEO, John Newton, resigned (December 2004), the phase one pilot 
study was undertaken (February 2005), and Rory Collins was appointed as CEO and 
PI (August 2005). The follow-up interviews were conducted between January and 
March 2006 as the organisational changes that followed the appointment of Rory 
Collins unfolded. UK Biobank was therefore an evolving initiative, which created 
                                                
30 See Appendix B9 for a list of the transcripts referred to in the thesis  
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particular methodological issues in researching its origins and development that are 
addressed in the following sub-sections. 
  
Table 1: Sample Composition
31
  
 
 Hub Spokes Science 
Comm. 
EGC BoD IAG PDC EWG Funders Indirectly 
Involved 
Male Female Total 
No. 
Approached 
 
6 
 
43 
 
9 
 
5 
 
5 
 
4 
 
9 
 
8 
 
10 
 
11 
 
64 
 
25 
 
89 
No. 
Agreed 
 
6 
 
40 
 
7 
 
3 
 
5 
 
3 
 
8 
 
5 
 
6 
 
5 
 
54 
 
15 
 
69 
No. 
Interviewed 
 
5 
 
37 
 
6 
 
3 
 
5 
 
3 
 
7 
 
5 
 
6 
 
5 
 
50 
 
14 
 
64 
No. 
Taped 
 
4 
 
33 
 
5 
 
3 
 
5 
 
3 
 
7 
 
5 
 
6 
 
5 
 
49 
 
9 
 
58 
No. 
In-Person 
 
5 
 
23 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
32 
 
10 
 
42 
No. 
Telephone 
 
0 
 
14 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
3 
 
18 
 
4 
 
22 
No. 
Re-
interviewed 
 
1 
 
7 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
9 
 
3 
 
12 
 
Table 2: Timing of Interviews 
 
 Hub Spokes Science 
Comm. 
EGC BoD IAG PDC EWG Funders Indirectly 
Involved 
Total 
Oct-Dec 
2004 
 
1 
 
11 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
14 
Jan-Mar 
2005 
 
0 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
0 
 
15 
April-June 
2005 
 
4 
 
15 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
29 
July-Sept 
2005 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
6 
Re-
interviewed 
Jan-Mar 
2006 
 
1 
 
7 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
12 
 
 
                                                
31 I double-counted individuals who had more than one role within the origins and development of UK 
Biobank. For example a member of the science committee and a spoke member was counted in both 
categories.   
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Rationale for Sample Composition 
I conducted 76 oral history interviews to gain a representative sample of those 
involved in origins and development of UK Biobank and to protect interviewees’ 
identities. I wanted to interview a range of interviewees within each group involved in 
UK Biobank, such as several members of each of the current and previous 
committees, several members of each of the six spokes, a senior representative of 
each of the funding bodies, and several representatives of the hub. Given the 
sensitivities surrounding the origins and development of UK Biobank, interviewing a 
substantial number of representatives from each group reassured respondents that 
their identities would be protected and thereby encouraged participation in my 
research.   
 
I interviewed these groups as their opinions and experiences were the most relevant to 
my research question of how and why was UK Biobank initially configured in the 
manner it was? As I was researching the origins and development of UK Biobank, I 
felt that it was appropriate to interview those formerly involved in the resource as well 
as those currently involved. I targeted those representing a range of academic 
backgrounds to minimise the potential for bias involved focussing on one particular 
sub-group. For the follow-up interviews, I approached a selection of the original 
interviewees as I felt that it would be beneficial to speak to the same people and gain 
their reactions to the changes. From a practical point of view, it was also easier to 
arrange and speak to people familiar with me and my research. I interviewed a 
representative from each spoke and a representative from each of the main groupings 
including the hub, the funding bodies and the current committees to gain a balanced 
view and access a range of perspectives on the changes.  
 
For the main sample, I initially intended to interview equal numbers of individuals 
directly and indirectly involved in UK Biobank, the latter including academic 
scientists in the wider scientific community not involved in the resource and science 
journalists. I felt that interviewing equal numbers in these distinct groups would offer 
fuller understanding of the issues involved in the origins and development of UK 
Biobank. It would also partly address the issue of bias that may emerge as a result of 
just speaking to academic scientists directly involved in UK Biobank. However, I 
soon realised that this was neither practical nor appropriate. Given the number of 
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interviews with people directly involved in UK Biobank needed to protect 
interviewees’ identities, there was simply not enough time to interview equal numbers 
of individuals in each group. I also realised that awareness of the initiative was 
heavily biased towards those directly involved in UK Biobank. It would have been 
very difficult to find equivalent numbers of interviewees who were aware of UK 
Biobank, but were not directly involved in its origins and development. Hence given 
the nature of my research, it would not have been worthwhile to conduct many 
interviews with those indirectly involved. I did however interview a small selection of 
this group to address this issue of bias and gain a fuller understanding. I therefore 
approached unsuccessful spoke members and senior members of the academic 
scientific community who were no longer involved or indirectly involved, which 
meant that they were not formally involved in the initiative yet still had knowledge of 
it.  
 
Sample Selection  
I largely selected interviewees using publicly available information on the UK 
Biobank website, such as membership of current committees. I selected interviewees 
on the basis of those representing different professional backgrounds (for example, 
epidemiology and general practice) and senior figures heavily associated with the 
origins of UK Biobank. However, as certain information was not publicly available, 
such as membership of the spokes and some previous committees, I relied to some 
degree on snowball sampling.  
 
Snowball sampling was successful and interviewees were generally forthcoming 
when asked who else they thought I should interview. There were however 
complications. For example, there was one case of mistaken identity. Several 
interviewees recommended that I interview a member of a previous committee, whom 
I approached. Unfortunately he shared the same name, worked in the same institution 
and in the same field as the person I actually contacted, but had recently moved to 
another university. To complicate matters further the person I contacted did have 
some previous experience with UK Biobank, the nature of which I still do not know. 
He demanded to know how I came across his name and on what basis I had selected 
him. He implied that if the MRC had given me his name, then confidentiality rules 
may have been breached. It was only after a number of awkward emails that we 
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realised the mistake and worked out that he had not in fact served on the committee 
but his namesake had. Snowball sampling elicited further interesting responses, such 
as an interviewee who recommended an individual whom they thought I should not 
interview. Having had already undertaken this interview the previous week it was 
clear why this person did not want me to approach this senior figure. These reactions 
are indicative of the difficulty of conducting research on an evolving and 
controversial resource. They point to the existing tensions between colleagues 
working together on an ongoing project and reflect the attempts of interviewees to 
influence the direction of my research.   
 
The membership of the six spokes was not publicly available information and as 
requests to the hub for details of spoke membership to the hub were unsuccessful, I 
had to make a formal enquiry to senior members of each spoke whom I had already 
interviewed (and whose names were publicly available). This elicited a mixed 
response. Some gave me the full list of members as requested, others the names of 
members that they had the permission to pass on, and others the names of those who 
agreed to an interview. These restrictions were problematic. First of all it meant that I 
could not easily select my sample on the basis of representing different professional 
backgrounds. It meant that agreement to the interviews had not been solicited directly 
through me but via another interviewee. Although they were then contacted by me in 
the standard way their motivations for taking part were coloured by their relationship 
with their colleague. Their understanding of the research was often flawed, as it had 
not been initially mediated through me. In being provided with the names of people 
who had agreed to an interview, I felt beholden to carry out interviews with all of 
them, which on one notable occasion led to me interviewing a far larger number of 
one spoke’s members than I had intended.  
 
2.3.2 Access 
 
I contacted potential interviewees directly via a letter to their place of work inviting 
them to take part in my research (see appendix B1). I enclosed an information sheet 
(see appendix B2) and a consent form (see appendix B3). I considered using 
gatekeepers rather than approaching interviewees directly but decided that it was 
inappropriate. Although it may have reassured some interviewees that it was okay to 
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participate in my research, it was difficult to identify a relevant figure given the 
structure of UK Biobank and the senior position of the interviewees. Also, I decided 
that it may actually deter people from taking part; such was the sensitivity of the 
research I felt that interviewees might not want colleagues to know whether they had 
participated.  
 
The tone of the invitation letter was formal but friendly. I used MRC headed 
notepaper to gain a sense of formality, and referred to my supervisors to reassure 
interviews that I was conducting bona-fide research. In the invitation letter, I stressed 
that I was flexible regarding the date, time, location and duration of the interview. I 
also gave interviewees the option of a half hour telephone interview if they could not 
afford to meet in person for an hour. I felt that it was important to give interviewees 
options regarding the practicalities of the interview to increase participation, given 
their time pressures. In the information sheet, I detailed the aims of my research and 
the nature of my methods. I detailed the types of people I was contacting and 
explained why these groups had been chosen. Again, given the schedules of the 
interviewees, I kept the information sheet concise whilst emphasising the steps I 
would take to ensure that the interview caused them minimum inconvenience. I 
stressed that my research was ethically approved and that the interview would be 
conducted appropriately. I will detail these procedures more fully later in the chapter. 
When there was no reply to my invitation letter, I resent the letter after one month. If 
the second invitation letter yielded no response I made no further attempts. Following 
a positive response, arrangements for the interview were made via email, often 
through their Personal Assistants.  
 
2.3.3 Response  
 
Positive Responses  
Despite the sensitivity of the research and the status of interviewees, the response to 
requests for an interview was generally positive. For the main study, 69 of the 89 
approached for an interview agreed, and 64 interviews took place (see table 1). 
Interviewees were generally eager to share their experiences and opinions, whatever 
their stance. There are a number of explanations for the positive response. Some were 
simply interested in the research and as a result genuinely wished to contribute. 
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Others had an axe to grind and saw participation as an opportunity to do so, and 
others saw it as a chance to set the record straight. Interviewees with serious 
grievances especially welcomed the opportunity to talk about the resource in a 
confidential manner, and some expressed gratitude at being given the opportunity to 
do so. Given the numbers approached, the particularly positive response from spoke 
members (40 of the 43 approached agreed to an interview) perhaps reflects their 
concerns with the organisational structure, which are addressed throughout the 
findings chapters. The comparatively low response from those indirectly involved (5 
of the 11 approached) in the resource reflects the difficulties I experienced in 
engaging such individuals in the interview context, which was an unexpected 
outcome. The response to the follow-up interviews was also positive and all twelve of 
those approached agreed to the interview. This favourable response may have been 
because of their familiarity with me and my research, but interviewees were also 
eager to revisit issues particularly because of the organisational changes.  
 
Negative Responses  
The controversy surrounding UK Biobank and the time pressures on interviewees did 
however affect the response to requests for an interview. Those individuals who 
declined to be interviewed mostly cited time pressure, although two senior figures 
who said they were too busy suggested another representative of their particular 
group. This was however complicated as the alternative peoples’ motivations for 
taking part in the research could have been coloured by their relationship with the 
individual who put them forward for the interview. Also, one of the alternative people 
suggested was relatively junior and new to UK Biobank and hence the interview was 
of limited worth. I also encountered animosity in requesting an interview because of 
the sensitivity of my research.  For example, a current committee member replied to 
my invitation letter by questioning the merits and motivations for my research and 
stated that he would actively deter others from participating. Some who agreed, albeit 
reluctantly, and some who disagreed, reported on how they had contacted MRC Head 
Office to check that I was legitimate. These responses contributed to a power 
imbalance in the interviews and were difficult to overcome.  
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2.3.4 Ethics 
 
My research was approved by the University of Glasgow’s Faculty of Law, Business 
and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Staff or students are required to seek 
such approval if their research involves human participants. I was required to detail 
the purpose of my research, the methods employed and the procedures adopted.  
 
The ethical considerations for my research concerned the issue of confidentiality. 
Given the controversy surrounding UK Biobank, and the extent to which interviewees 
were involved in its origins, and continued to be involved in its development, it was 
imperative that I took the appropriate steps to ensure the protection of their identities. 
 
2.3.5 Confidentiality 
 
The issue of confidentiality was paramount in conducting the oral history interviews. 
Many respondents were extremely concerned that their identity would not be 
disclosed and sought reassurance that I would take appropriate measures to prevent 
this happening. This concern manifested in various ways. For example, one 
interviewee requested a confidentiality agreement made through legal representation, 
some requested that the recording be destroyed immediately following transcription 
and others (6 of the 64) did not agree to the interview being recorded at all (see table 
1). I adopted a series of procedures to protect interviewees’ identities, which I will 
discuss. These procedures were however complicated by unforeseen issues, such as 
the possibility of deductive disclosure and the behaviour of some interviewees, which 
made the protection of interviewees’ identities a significant challenge. I will now 
discuss the procedures adopted to protect interviewees’ identities and the issues faced 
in implementing them. These procedures are unusual in historical research and most 
contemporary historians do not conceal interviewees’ identities (see 1.3.1 (b) for a 
discussion of the methodological issues facing the contemporary historian). However, 
I felt that the controversy surrounding the timing and organisational structure of UK 
Biobank, exacerbated by its evolving nature, justified my decision to depart from 
standard historical practice.   
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Confidentiality Procedures  
The procedures I adopted to protect identities largely concerned the appropriate 
descriptors for interviewees. Each interviewee completed two consent forms. The first 
consent form (see appendix B3) checked that they were aware of the nature of the 
research, happy for it to go ahead and sought their permission for the interview to be 
recorded. This was sent out with the invitation letter and information sheet. The 
second consent form (see appendix B4) concerned the protection of their identity, 
whether they wanted to be identified or how their comments were to be anonymised, 
and if they would like to see a copy of the transcript. This form was discussed at the 
beginning of the interview and completed at the end, allowing a more informed 
choice. If they opted for their identity not to be disclosed, I sought their permission to 
refer to them by the nature of their involvement, for example ‘member of the science 
committee’, or by using a professional descriptor such as ‘epidemiologist’. If they 
choose to be sent a copy of the transcript, upon its return I included a letter explaining 
how I would anonymise it and use the information in it (see appendix B5). I requested 
that if they wished to make any changes they would have to return it to me within 
three months. In the returned transcript all identifying information that would need to 
be changed, such as place of work, was identified with square brackets. This gave 
interviewees the opportunity to check they were satisfied with the level of 
anonymisation, correct any errors and make any clarifications. These procedures 
alone proved to be insufficient to protect every interviewee’s identity and had to be 
adjusted in response to a number of issues.  
 
The exceptionally large number of interviews carried out, particularly with multiple 
members of each committee, meant that reference to nature of involvement (for 
example, ‘member of the science committee’) was generally an acceptable measure 
and did not identify people. However, there were limitations to the extent that 
involvement could be described. For example, it was inappropriate to refer to 
positions within committees such as chair, spoke lead or co-ordinator. It was 
inappropriate to distinguish between the spokes (for example, member of the Scottish 
spoke), as deductive disclosure could reveal the identity of respondents. Also, this 
procedure was not acceptable for every interviewee and the nature of the response had 
implications on the extent to which involvement could be described. For example, one 
respondent, involved at a senior level, was particularly candid and as such it was not 
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appropriate to describe his involvement in UK Biobank as it could identify him. He 
indicated during the interview the parts of the recording which he did not wish to be 
attributed to his involvement and suggested an alternative descriptor that referred to 
his professional position. 
 
As only a small proportion of my sample were women (14 of the 64 interviewees), 
reference to an interviewee as a woman made her potentially identifiable. This was 
exacerbated by the distribution of females in the organisational structure. For example 
there was only one woman on the EWG and three on the PDC. I therefore decided to 
adopt the generic ‘he’ pronoun throughout the thesis to refer to men and women. I 
considered randomly assigning ‘he’ or ‘she’ or gendered pronouns to quotations but 
felt that even with explanation to the contrary the reader may have assumed the usage 
to be correct. This decision was contrary to British Sociological Association (BSA) 
Equality and Diversity Sex and Gender Guidelines (2004) that advise against the use 
of the generic ‘he’ but I argue that it is justified in this particular case given the 
likelihood that respondents’ gender could render an interviewee identifiable. It was 
therefore an empirical decision adopted to protect interviewees’ identities, which was 
supported by the fact that gender did not emerge as a factor in my research (see 2.3.9). 
 
I included the professional descriptor (for example, ‘epidemiologist’) as well as the 
description of the nature of involvement in UK Biobank to enable comment on any 
pattern from the responses of different professional backgrounds. This procedure was, 
however, complicated as if I wanted to comment on responses common to a 
professional background within a group it could have identified respondents. For 
example, there was only one representative from general practice on one of the 
committees. In order for me to use specific professional descriptors the group had to 
be sufficiently large and varied, such as a pattern in the responses given by GP spoke 
members. On occasion, it was not appropriate at all to refer to professional 
background, either in the context of the sample as a whole or within a group. For 
example, there were only two lawyers involved, one on the IAG and the other on the 
EGC. Interviewees often required reassurance on the matter of professional 
descriptors and I had to make clear that I would only refer to their professional 
descriptor in a way that would not identify them. In retrospect, as patterns did not 
emerge according to profession this issue did not materialise in writing-up.   
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Issues that complicated confidentiality procedures  
These procedures to protect identities were further complicated by unforeseen issues, 
for example potential deductive disclosure and the behaviour of interviewees. In some 
cases the procedures were altered as a result of these issues, whereas in other cases 
these issues caused me to adapt my personal approach to the interviewees.   
 
Potential deductive disclosure was a serious issue in ensuring the protection of 
people’s identity. The large number of interviewees addressed this problem 
effectively in most cases but identification procedures had to be modified with it in 
mind. For example, the number of respondents, albeit small, who opted to be 
identified proved an issue. It became clear that by identifying them, the process of 
deductive disclosure could reveal the identity of others who did not wish to be 
identified. I decided that it was inappropriate to identify anyone at all. Deductive 
disclosure was also an issue when the identity of an interviewee was strongly implied 
in their response, for example if they had a particular viewpoint or experience well 
known in their professional community. In these circumstances there was a certain 
inevitability regarding the disclosure of identity if the responses were used in the 
intended manner. Some interviewees to whom this applied conceded this inevitability 
and were happy for the implication to be made. Others requested that all such 
information which implicated them in this manner not be used at all. This often meant 
that key information was lost and I had to handle their transcript extremely carefully 
and not use it to its full potential. As a hypothetical example, suppose one respondent 
was a key figure in the discussions of the potential for UK Biobank to address 
cardiovascular disease. The mere mention of cardiovascular disease in connection 
with his involvement would have revealed his identity; therefore none of this 
information could be used. Others requested special measures that allowed me to use 
the information but only by prior consultation with them.  In these circumstances, I 
agreed that if I heavily referred to their transcript in a particular section, I would send 
them a draft of that section to ensure they were comfortable with it. Certain 
interviewees requested this as a condition of their participation, given the likelihood 
that the comments would identify them. Fortunately, few requested this measure as it 
would have been difficult to implement on a large scale. However, given that I 
generally did not refer heavily on any single interview throughout an entire section 
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this did not prove to be too much of a concern and this only applied to one 
interviewee.    
 
The behaviour of certain interviewees complicated the procedures adopted to protect 
respondents’ identities, specifically the procedures concerning transcript return. The 
decision to offer interviewees the opportunity to see a copy of the transcript was 
advantageous in allaying fears and encouraging participation but it was a complicated 
procedure to implement.  Practically, there was a potential for delay in responding to 
any concerns that interviewees had with the transcript and in the process of checking 
and returning transcripts promptly. A further issue was the danger that interviewees 
would substantially alter the content of the transcript, limiting the value of the 
interview. This issue was particularly worrying regarding the more controversial 
interviews. As much of the concern surrounding the use of the transcript came from 
misconceptions regarding qualitative research, I included in the letter accompanying 
the transcript an explanation of how I would use any quotations (see appendix B5). 
For example, some believed that their interview would form the basis of a whole 
chapter and would be presented in its entirety. I stressed in the letter how their 
comments would not be used in isolation and would be illustrative of general themes.  
 
Overall, however, the process of transcript return proved successful. A large minority, 
26 of the 64 interviewees in the main study, did not opt to see a copy of the transcript 
(see table 3). The response to this offer was highly polarised, with some making it 
clear that in no circumstance would they like to see the transcript and others eager to 
get a copy as soon as possible. As far as any pattern was discernible, generally senior 
respondents did not wish to see a copy while junior respondents were far keener to see 
the transcript, with some notable exceptions. The majority of interviewees in the 
follow-up study did opt to see a copy of the transcript (9 of the 12), several of whom 
had not requested to see it in the main study. This may reflect the caution felt by some 
interviewees who took part in the follow-up study as a result of the sensitivities 
surrounding the organisational changes. The process of transcript return had 
unforeseen advantages in keeping the channels of communication open with 
interviewees, and obtaining useful information regarding the development of UK 
Biobank before it was made public. Interviewees who requested a copy of the 
transcript returned it promptly and with minor changes. Surprisingly, these changes 
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largely concerned grammatical issues, such as one respondent who requested that all 
‘it’s’ be replaced with ‘it is’ and another that all ‘I means’ be removed. This in itself 
was interesting: the importance that some scientists placed upon removing 
colloquialisms betrayed misunderstandings about the purpose of the transcripts. It was 
as if they viewed their transcripts as akin to an official press release, and wished to 
retain an air of professionalism within their written opinions. 
 
Table 3: Transcript Return 
 
 Hub Spoke Science 
Comm. 
EGC BoD IAG PDC EWG Funders Indirectly 
Involved 
Male Female Total 
No. 
requested 
transcript 
 
4 
 
24 
 
4 
 
2 
 
 
4 
 
2 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
27 
 
11 
 
38 
No. re-
interviewed 
requested 
transcript 
 
1 
 
6 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2 
 
- 
 
6 
 
3 
 
9 
 
There was however a notable exception to the reaction of interviewees to the 
transcript; one interviewee made substantial changes to the content of the interview. 
He deleted several passages and replaced them with alternative responses, explaining 
that following the changes to the organisational structure these alterations made the 
transcript more relevant. The interview took place in the last stage of my initial period 
of fieldwork prior to the changes, but the transcript was returned to me after the 
changes. His alterations to the transcript revealed misunderstandings regarding the 
nature of my research. He believed that I was trying to produce a factual, strictly 
narrative account of proceedings and was not interested in reporting issues that 
complicated the development of UK Biobank. Hence he adapted his responses to 
represent a coherent process devoid of complication. His alterations also revealed 
uneasiness with the content of the transcript in general. It was a particularly frank 
interview and perhaps he regretted making such comments, especially after being 
confronted with them on paper in their entirety. Following further explanation of the 
nature of my research and reassurance regarding the procedures implemented to 
protect his identity he consented to use of the original transcript. These explanations 
and reassurances were not made directly from myself but were rather mediated 
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through my supervisors. We agreed that, given the seriousness of the issue and the 
concern of the interviewee, he may be more comfortable with the assurances of a 
senior researcher.    
 
The behaviour of certain interviewees also complicated the procedures adopted in a 
general sense. For example, certain interviewees, often senior, asked me who else I 
had interviewed and what they had said. They did so subtly, on and off tape, 
commonly at the beginning or the end of the interview when my guard was down. I 
found these requests surprisingly difficult to cope with when they came from senior 
figures in their homes or offices, given the power relations. The questions included 
direct requests such as ‘did you speak to X’ and indirect questions such as ‘I bet X 
had some interesting responses’ or ‘what did X say’ or ‘I heard you spoke to X, what 
did they say’. I was very careful not to be caught out as I could not reveal who I had 
interviewed and I especially could not detail their responses. Early on I realised the 
importance of developing a standard response to such queries, by politely but firmly 
stating that I could not reveal individual identities or responses but instead I could 
refer to the types of people I was approaching and that everyone was asked similar 
questions. Interviewees seemed to be unsure if there was an official line they should 
be following, reflecting the uncertainty regarding the development of UK Biobank 
and the lack of a recognised version of events for them to refer to.     
 
2.3.6 Pilot Interviews 
 
I conducted two pilot interviews in order to become familiar with the issues involved 
in interviewing elites on the origins and development of UK Biobank. I interviewed 
an academic scientist who was a member of a previous committee and a 
representative of the funding bodies. The academic scientist interviewed in the pilot 
study later agreed to take part in the main study.  
 
These interviews were useful and I gained worthwhile experience of interviewing 
elites on controversial issues. I also gained practical experience of interviewing in 
unfamiliar locations and environments and of using the appropriate equipment to 
record interviews. The pilot interviews gave me greater awareness of the complexities 
of ensuring confidentiality, as well as the opportunity to gauge the appropriateness of 
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the ethical procedures implemented to protect interviewees’ identities. I also assessed 
the usefulness of the interview schedule, which changed considerably following the 
pilot interviews. The questions became more focussed and were arranged into distinct 
phases in the development of UK Biobank. Following the pilot interviews, I amended 
the wording of some questions to avoid the misinterpretations that I encountered in 
conducting the pilot interviews.  
 
Given the sensitivity of the research, I was reluctant to carry out more pilot interviews 
as I felt that it would have been inappropriate. Also, I did not want jeopardise 
involvement in the main study by conducting extensive pilot interviews with people 
under significant time pressures, who may be unable to participate in more than one 
interview.   
 
2.3.7 Schedule 
 
I did not vary the interview schedule significantly between interviewees and only 
altered it depending on their personal experience (see appendix B6). For example, an 
interview with a member of the PDC focussed on their experience of that Committee. 
I organised the schedule chronologically into phases in the development of UK 
Biobank (such as the origins of the idea, protocol development and organisational 
structure) and separated it into particular issues (such as role of the funding bodies). I 
did not alter the order of the questions and I asked every interviewee about the same 
topics. I began a particular section with a general question, avoided leading questions, 
and used follow-up questions accordingly. These follow-up questions would be more 
specific in nature and I rarely had to refer to them as respondents were generally very 
open. This semi-structured approach allowed me to divert attention from the schedule, 
and investigate particularly interesting, unusual or strongly expressed responses. I 
followed the same principles in designing the interview schedule for the follow-up 
interviews (see appendix B7), but the questions themselves only concerned the 
organisational changes. I limited the number of questions asked as I assured 
interviewees that the interview would not last longer than half an hour. However, as I 
was familiar with respondents and they were familiar with me and my research there 
was less need for explanation and by focussing solely on the changes these follow-up 
interviews did not tend to overrun.  
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The response to the schedule was generally positive and only a few interviewees 
replied ‘no comment’ to questions. Some interviewees requested that the tape be 
turned off during parts of the interview as they responded to particular questions or 
elaborated on specific issues. Some allowed me to take notes on these comments, 
whereas others requested that I did not record them in any way and made them off the 
record. Similarly, at the end of the interview, once the tape was switched off some 
interviewees made extensive comments and elaborated on their responses, meaning I 
could not use any of the information.  
 
Two respondents requested to see the interview schedule in advance, which I allowed. 
I did not offer this procedure but felt obliged to carry out their request given their 
agreement to the interview. I was however anxious about doing so and worried that it 
would yield formulaic or rehearsed responses to the questions. In reality I feel that it 
made no difference to the nature of the interview; one of the interviewees admitted to 
having lost the schedule, and the other confessed that he had not looked at it until the 
time of the interview.   
 
2.3.8 Telephone Interviews 
 
I conducted the majority of interviews in the main study face to face (42 of the 64) 
and only 22 of the 64 were conducted over the telephone. However, I conducted the 
vast majority of the follow-up interviews over the telephone (11 of the 12). For the 
main phase of fieldwork, I offered interviewees the choice of a face to face interview 
lasting about an hour, or a telephone interview lasting about half an hour. I gave 
interviewees the choice primarily to encourage participation given the time pressures 
faced by interviewees, but stated on the invitation letter that I would prefer to conduct 
the interview in person. I conducted the follow-up interviews over the telephone due 
to my time and budget constraints. I undertook these interviews beyond my official 
period of fieldwork and hence I could not afford any further travel time and cost. One 
follow-up interview was conducted face to face as at the time I was sufficiently close 
to the individual and it was therefore more practical.  
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There were advantages and disadvantages to conducting telephone interviews in the 
main phase of fieldwork. I believe that offering telephone interviews increased 
participation in my research as interviewees had very busy schedules. Telephone 
interviews also allowed me to interview people who lived outside the UK whom it 
would not have been possible to speak to otherwise. It was however difficult to 
establish a rapport with the interviewee, which was exacerbated by the relatively short 
length of the interview. Some interviewees were distracted throughout the interview 
and it was clear that other tasks were being undertaken, such as typing. Establishing 
rapport was further complicated over the telephone as I had to complete the consent 
forms on their behalf, which meant carefully reading them out verbatim. I also 
encountered practical difficulties in conducting telephone interviews. For example, 
when the interviewee did not wish the interview to be recorded, it was difficult to hold 
the receiver in one hand and take detailed notes in the other. Despite interviewees 
opting for the telephone interview option because of their time pressures, many lasted 
well beyond the half hour allocation. It may have been the case that some 
interviewees just preferred the telephone option regardless of time pressures.  
 
2.3.9 Researching Elites  
 
The issue of power dynamics was relevant to my research in that I, a young, female 
student, conducted oral history interviewees with some of the most senior scientists in 
the country. The interviewees were predominantly male, middle-aged medical 
scientists, and included senior figures within the MRC, Wellcome Trust, DoH and the 
Scottish Executive. The fact that I occupied the position of an outsider on account of 
these differences also influenced my research. The following issues affected the 
power dynamics of the oral history interviews: age, gender, academic background, 
location and arrangements of the interviews, and the evolving nature of UK Biobank. 
I will consider the effect of each of these issues on the interview interaction, detail the 
steps I took to address the power balance, and evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of the power dynamics and my status as an outsider. 
 
Age 
I felt that my age had a considerable effect on the power dynamics of the interview. 
There was less of a power imbalance in interviews with younger participants. In the 
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few interviews with individuals of a similar age there was a greater sense of equality 
and they were more able to relate to my PhD student status. It is difficult to draw any 
conclusions from this experience as these interviewees held relatively junior positions 
within UK Biobank, and all came from the same spoke group. They were fairly new 
to UK Biobank and hence less familiar with its origins and development, and one was 
suggested as an alternative by the more senior individual originally approached. It is 
therefore difficult to say whether their age or lack of experience, and therefore stake 
in the initiative, contributed to the erosion of the power imbalance. The power 
imbalance between me and interviewees was reinforced in interviews with older 
participants. Some older interviewees remarked upon my age and seemed to take me 
and my research less seriously. Although their attitude was very friendly and 
contributed to the feeling of rapport, it allowed interviewees to control the interview. 
It was as if they viewed me as akin to a daughter and would cheerfully discuss how 
their own children were faring at university whilst carefully avoiding the questions.  
 
Gender 
Gender may have further affected the power balance of the interviews, and the vast 
majority of interviewees were male (50 of the 64 main study interviewees, 9 of the 12 
follow-up study interviewees). Interviews with women were generally more informal 
and there seemed to be less of a power imbalance. However, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions regarding the effect of gender on the power dynamics of the interviews as 
age was a significant contributory factor in these cases. For example, the power 
imbalance was more pronounced with older female interviewees and less obvious 
with younger female interviewees.  
 
Academic Background 
My academic background, specifically as a social scientist, historian, qualitative 
researcher and MRC funded student contributed to the power imbalance in the oral 
history interviews.  
 
The convergence of different academic backgrounds between me as a social scientist 
and interviewees as scientists caused misconceptions regarding the nature of my 
research. These misconceptions contributed to the power imbalance of the interview 
as they sometimes resulted in a certain animosity toward me and my research. For 
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example, some scientists conceived of my PhD as a scientific evaluation of UK 
Biobank aiming to prove or disprove its worth, as opposed to analysing the issues 
surrounding its origins and development. These interviewees therefore questioned my 
ability, or lack of, to conduct an evaluation and expressed confusion at the types of 
questions I was asking. Other interviewees would laboriously try to explain 
complicated scientific theory, which coupled with the animosity and confusion, 
reinforced the power imbalance.  
 
Similarly, my role as a contemporary historian and qualitative researcher reinforced 
the power imbalance, on account of different understandings of contemporary history 
and qualitative research. Some interviewees understood historical research as the 
construction of a chronology of events, of forming a strictly narrative account of 
proceedings. Given their perception that I was trying to gather reliable, factual data, 
they questioned the validity of conducting oral history interviews and were surprised 
at the types of questions I was asking. They were preoccupied with the specific dates 
of meetings and some interviewees even prepared such information in advance. The 
effect of such understandings on the power imbalance was exacerbated by 
interviewees doubting the merits of UK Biobank as qualifying for historical analysis 
at all, with many staunchly of the belief that it did not. Some interviewees took issue 
with the contemporary historical nature of my research and remarked on how UK 
Biobank itself had not formally begun to recruit participants. I found these opinions 
challenging, especially as they were expressed so vociferously by senior individuals, 
and they served to reinforce their authority in the interview.  
 
Interviewees’ understandings of qualitative research led to criticism of my research, 
specifically my choice of methods, which further served to reinforce the power 
imbalance. Some interviewees doubted the worth of oral history interviews, of 
seeking opinions and personal experiences. They questioned the reliability of memory 
and felt that asking for recollections was flawed. Interviewees became frustrated as 
they struggled to recall a particular date when a meeting occurred or as they described 
their feelings on a particular issue, believing that I was basing my research on factual, 
chronological information. These understandings and consequent criticisms were 
difficult to overcome, especially in the context of an interview and thereby largely 
contributed to the power imbalance.  
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Another facet of my academic background that led to hostility and therefore affected 
the power balance in the interview was that I was an MRC funded student researching 
an initiative partly funded by the MRC. Some interviewees regarded me as a secret 
investigator for the MRC reporting back their responses to the funding bodies, which 
reflected the difficult relationship between some academic scientists and the funding 
bodies. Others believed I was compiling a press release for the MRC, strongly 
endorsing UK Biobank. They therefore questioned the funding for my PhD, the 
relationship between MRC Head Office and my host Unit, and sought reassurance 
that I was not acting on behalf of the MRC. A further powerful misconception was 
that I was undertaking the role of a journalist trying to condemn UK Biobank in a 
tabloid-like style. I was therefore perceived as having a strong agenda to pursue with 
the sole motivation to expose UK Biobank negatively, for example as a waste of 
public money. These perceptions heightened my sense of powerlessness as I struggled 
to overcome them and explain my position.  
 
Location and Length of Oral History Interviews 
The procedures I adopted in arranging the oral history interviews contributed to the 
power imbalance in that control over the time, place and location of the interview lay 
entirely with interviewees. This meant that interviews took place in locations and 
offices entirely unfamiliar to me throughout the UK. Interviews took place in 
hospitals, university buildings and funding body headquarters in private offices and 
one interview was conducted in an interviewee’s home. Having been in a university 
environment for the past few years, I was less anxious about meeting in university 
buildings despite their unfamiliar location. It was however quite daunting meeting in 
hospitals, laboratories and funding bodies’ headquarters due to their unfamiliarity, and 
also because they highlighted the difference in academic background between me, as 
a historian and social scientist, and the interviewees largely with medical science 
backgrounds.   
 
Interviewees also controlled the time and length of the interview. I requested that 
interviews lasting about an hour in person and offered shorter telephone interviews 
lasting half an hour. Some interviewees, having agreed to an interview in person, 
would stress at the start of the interview that they could not afford to give me that 
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much time and would not then specify an appropriate length. This contributed to a 
feeling of powerlessness on my part as I would attempt to amend the interview 
schedule without knowing what time was actually available. Despite such assertions, 
these interviews would last about an hour and often longer. Nevertheless, I had to be 
prepared to amend the interview schedule in response to changing circumstances. For 
example, on one occasion an interviewee was forty minutes late and then could only 
give me ten minutes. These uncertainties contributed to the power imbalance between 
me and interviewees.   
 
Evolving Nature of UK Biobank  
The evolving nature of UK Biobank meant that my role and research were under 
particular scrutiny, which contributed to the power imbalance. When I began this PhD 
in October 2003 UK Biobank was supposed to have already started, with recruitment 
of participants planned for earlier that year. The ongoing scientific and organisational 
uncertainty strongly affected respondents’ reaction to and perception of my research, 
which in turn affected the interview context. For example, the response to questions 
about the organisational model was indicative of the uncertain situation, with some 
respondents considering what they should say. It was as though some interviewees 
were struggling to articulate a party line or universal message approved from the 
centre, complicated by the fact that the centre was not occupying a decisive leadership 
role. Similarly, respondents would ask what others had said, including respondents 
within particular groups asking what their colleagues had opted for on the second 
consent form. As a result of UK Biobank’s evolving nature, some interviewees were 
very suspicious of my motives. For example, all of the interviewees within a 
particular group asked me what I hoped to achieve in writing a thesis on this subject, 
aside from obtaining a PhD. It was challenging to assert myself in these 
circumstances, given the seniority of the interviewees.  
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Power Imbalance and Outsider Status  
Despite the difficulties caused by the balance of power in the interviews, at times it 
was beneficial. For example, given my age, gender and academic background I was 
not perceived as a threat. This non-threatening status was advantageous on account of 
the controversy surrounding UK Biobank. Some interviewees were encouraged by it 
and were more open on account. In the same way I felt that my academic background 
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in particular set me apart as an outsider. Interviewees did not make assumptions 
regarding my knowledge of UK Biobank and the fact that I was an outsider 
encouraged an openness that may have been difficult had I been at all involved in the 
field.  
 
Although interviewees’ control over the time, location and duration of the interviews 
contributed to the power imbalance, it reassured interviewees that I was sensitive to 
their commitments and would endeavour to cause them minimal disturbance, which 
encouraged participation. Also, discussion of my travel arrangements and impression 
of the locations and building served as a useful ice-breaker and relieved tension. My 
MRC funded status was also advantageous and, whilst it was a source of tension with 
some interviewees, it put others at ease to know that it was a legitimate research 
activity. In this way, I believe that it offered reassurance to some interviewees who 
otherwise might not have agreed to the interview.  
 
I took a number of steps to address the power imbalance in the interviews and tried to 
minimise its effect.  For example, I addressed the difference in professional status by 
dressing smartly, thereby asserting myself as a researcher rather than a student. To 
lessen the effects of conducting the interview in an unfamiliar location and building, I 
arrived early and familiarised myself fully with the building and location of the office.  
In taking such steps I avoided getting lost, arriving late and being flustered. My 
confidence and abilities grew as the period of fieldwork went on, which also 
addressed the power imbalance. I feel that the significance of power balance was 
lessened due to the formal topic and the professional status of the interviewees. They 
were familiar with the interview process albeit in different settings, such as being 
interviewed for the media or conducting interviews themselves as part of a research 
project.  
 
I addressed the power imbalance arising from misunderstandings of my research with 
full and frank discussion of the nature of my research, which lessened animosity and 
confusion and led to a more open interview. I carefully explained what I was not 
trying to do as well as exactly what I was trying to do. Regarding the effect of 
different understandings of contemporary history and criticism of the timing of my 
research, I explained why I was conducting a contemporary history at that stage and 
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that I was researching its origins and development. I also detailed the advantages of 
embarking on such a study and interviewing the key players at that particular stage. 
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2.4 Archival Research 
 
2.4.1 Access 
 
I applied to both the MRC and Wellcome Trust for access to official documents 
concerning the origins and development of UK Biobank. As the two main funding 
bodies, I felt that it was important to analyse both funding bodies’ sets of documents 
to gain a fuller understanding and to compare their involvement in UK Biobank. I 
considered applying to access the documents at the DoH but felt that there was not 
enough time.  
 
The initial request for access was made via my supervisors, through contacts in the 
MRC and the Wellcome Trust. We felt that, given the status and nature of the 
documents, it would be more appropriate and successful than a direct request from 
me. I was granted access to the MRC, but denied access to the Wellcome Trust. The 
Wellcome Trust argued that as the documents were still in use I should not be allowed 
access. The documents were also still in use at the MRC but this did not hinder 
access. The fact that I am an MRC funded student may have accounted for being 
granted access to their documents. Given the controversy surrounding UK Biobank, 
the decision of the Wellcome Trust and the live status of the documents, I was 
surprised at the level of access given to the MRC documents. The ‘live’ status meant 
the MRC were under no obligation to provide any access, although as they are a 
public body I may have been able to argue terms through the Freedom of Information 
(FOI) Act 2000 that came into full force in January 2005. Interestingly, requests by 
others to see the anonymous comments of the peer reviewers made under this Act 
were successful and as a result of this they were placed on the MRC website in May 
2005. 
 
Nature of the Documents  
The types of documents analysed at the MRC varied widely in nature and detail. They 
included official minutes of meetings of previous committees significant in the 
development of UK Biobank, such as the EWG and the PDC. These were important 
documents with considerable detail and some even attached identities to each of the 
members’ comments. Emails were a prolific and useful source given the clarity of 
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information such as sender, receivers, date and subject information. There were 
emails between committee members, representatives of the funding bodies and 
committee members, senior representatives of the funding bodies and MRC 
colleagues. Official correspondence included letters of instruction to the peer 
reviewers and notification including feedback to unsuccessful hub and spoke bidders.   
 
Coverage of the Documents   
Although the extent of coverage varied, each of the key stages in the development of 
UK Biobank was documented in this material, such as the peer review process, the 
funding decision, and the hub and spoke bidding process. Highly controversial 
episodes were also documented, such as contract negotiation and protocol 
development. Archival analysis was particularly useful for building up an accurate 
chronology of events, which was not possible through oral history interviews. These 
documents were an invaluable source in understanding the key events in the origins of 
UK Biobank, the issues behind them and the central players involved. Archival 
analysis therefore complemented understanding of the themes that emerged from the 
oral history interviews. The information accessed was not available elsewhere, 
especially regarding the role of the early committees. The documents therefore 
offered different insights into the origins and development of UK Biobank.  
 
The coverage spanned from 1998 until 2004, reflecting the increasing role of the hub 
and the diminishing role of the MRC, in taking UK Biobank forward. The last key 
episode documented was initial contract negotiation between the hub and the spokes. 
There were approximately one hundred volumes of files, which I spent about two 
months in London analysing. There were however gaps in the coverage and it was 
clear that not every episode was documented. For example, there were no minutes of 
current committee meetings, such as the Science Committee. This may be as a result 
of the timing as the documents largely concerned the origins and development of UK 
Biobank and did not really continue once the hub was established, except for the 
process of contract negotiation. Also, there was also no documentation in the material 
I analysed of any debate regarding the selection of the hub and spoke model, which is 
unfortunate as it was a significant issue.    
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2.4.2 Confidentiality  
 
The status of the documents meant that my access was not monitored by a trained 
archivist but by a member of MRC Corporate Affairs who was not fully aware of the 
content of the files, which led to difficulties. The initial procedure agreed was that I 
would signal any documents that I was interested in and the representative from 
Corporate Affairs would photocopy them. However they were daunted by the number 
and type of documents I wanted copied. This lack of understanding of my objectives 
and consequent unease regarding my interest was a particularly difficult issue given 
the special permission I had to access the material, and the lack of obligation on their 
part to let me see it. It was clear that they did not want such documents to leave the 
building and were slightly uncomfortable with me accessing them at all. In response 
to these concerns, I provided an information sheet and conduct agreement detailing 
the nature of my research, stating that anonymous material would remain so, agreeing 
not to photocopy anything, and keeping the same hours as the person monitoring my 
access (see appendix B8). This strategy led to a number of practical difficulties, such 
as finding desk space in the busy corporate affairs office leading to protracted visits 
over a number of months. Despite such difficulties this was necessary and averted the 
threat of access being jeopardised.  
 
Sensitive Information  
A recurring issue in analysing the private documents was the difficulty of handling 
sensitive information. The nature of this information meant that I could not use it, 
which was a limitation of the method. For example, there was a substantial amount of 
material, especially in email form, which documented personal conflicts between key 
figures in the development of UK Biobank. Similarly, as the documents had not been 
archived there was much duplicate filing, which although cumbersome allowed me to 
access several versions of documents, some of which included personal comments 
pencilled in the margins that were illuminating. Although it would be inappropriate 
and of limited value to air such private feuds, it was useful in gaining understanding 
of the tensions that surrounded the development of UK Biobank. Caution also had to 
be exerted in utilising practical information in the files, such as spoke membership. 
The full membership of the six spokes, including names and addresses, was available 
in the documents. However, given that such information was not publicly available 
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and the sensitivities I encountered in approaching some interviewees (many 
questioned how I obtained their name even when it was publicly available) it would 
have been inappropriate to contact individuals this way. This was a difficult decision 
as it would have saved a lot of time and allowed a more representative sample of 
spoke members to be selected.   
 
2.4.3 Approach to the Documents  
 
I catalogued every document in terms of subject, personnel and date. The depth of 
detail taken depended on the significance of the material, and often documents were 
recorded verbatim. For example, the minutes of the EWG and the PDC were more 
relevant and demanded a greater level of attention than legal information surrounding 
the set up of UK Biobank Limited, and the health and safety information in the hub 
and spoke bids. Given the ongoing development of UK Biobank, I assumed that 
everything relating to key events was significant; especially as accessing the material 
in the current form again would be difficult and it was not clear what would and 
would not continue to change. I was still in the process of defining the focus of my 
research when I visited MRC headquarters from November 2004 to July 2005. For 
example, I was aware of the controversy surrounding the hub and spoke model so I 
assumed everything pertaining to it was significant and paid particular attention to 
these documents, which is useful given the changes made to the model in 2005.  
 
Issues surrounding the timing of archival research in relation to oral history 
interviews 
A further issue in my research was the timing of archival research in relation to the 
conduct of oral history interviews. Analysis of the material relating to the 
development of UK Biobank was useful in informing my interview schedule. The 
opportunity to do this however depended on when information was gathered from the 
documents and when interviews with those involved took place. The extent to which 
analysis of the documents could inform the topic guide had to be carefully handled, to 
avoid asking leading questions.  
 
I found interviewing respondents on the same issues that had been recently analysed 
in the documents difficult at times. I had to react appropriately. For example, I could 
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not show any surprise when a response contradicted what was recorded in the files, or 
any acknowledgement when their accounts would correlate closely with the 
information in the documents. For example, one senior respondent detailed a very 
different reaction to a controversial element of protocol development in the interview 
than was stated in the files. On the other hand, when a member of the PDC referred to 
a letter he had written to the group’s chairman expressing concerns about the 
committee, his account of it corroborated almost exactly with the letter contained in 
the documents.  It was important that I examined discrepancies between what was 
recorded in the documents and what was reported in the interviews to gain an 
understanding of the meanings attached to different sentiments. Following 
examination, these contrary responses reflected the significance of present identities 
and events in recollections of previous episodes. For example, one interviewee 
reported in an interview that he did not support the proposals for a hub and spoke 
model yet his support for the same model is recorded in the minutes of a previous 
committee. Given the controversy surrounding the hub and spoke model and its 
ultimate demise, it is perhaps unsurprising that a senior figure would seek to 
disassociate himself from its origins.     
 
Limitations of Archival Research  
It is important to bear in mind the limitations of archival research. For example, it 
should be remembered that the files I accessed were not representative of all of the 
documents pertaining to the origins and development of UK Biobank, and the existing 
collection was made up of files judged worthy of retaining. The files were preserved 
because someone decided that they should be kept and it is important to appreciate the 
significance of decisions to retain some records and discard others. Similarly, it is 
important to acknowledge the involvement and influence of certain individuals in the 
content of the records. For example, the content of the minutes of a meeting are at the 
discretion of the note-taker, which is reflected in the variation regarding the detail of 
the minutes of various meetings. Furthermore, it was often clear that the documents 
were not complete; for example, an agenda for a meeting existed but no minutes. The 
fact that I only accessed the documents pertaining to the origins and development of 
UK Biobank from the perspective of the MRC was a further limitation of the method. 
Although some of the material concerned relations with other funding bodies, I was 
still viewing a one-sided perspective. For example, certain key meetings involving 
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representatives from all of the funding bodies took place at the Wellcome Trust, and 
the minutes of those meetings would be held there. Similarly, the role of the 
Wellcome Trust or the DoH in the origins and development of UK Biobank could not 
be accessed.   
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2.5 Analysis  
 
2.5.1 Thematic Approach   
 
I adopted a broad thematic approach to analysis of the interview material and archival 
research. Using coloured pens, I coded the transcripts and notes from the archival 
research into the themes pertaining to the main stages and key issues in the origins 
and development of UK Biobank. These themes were: origins (EWG), protocol 
development (PDC and Science Committee), organisational structure (hub and spoke 
model), role of the funding bodies, consultation, design, motivations for involvement, 
and development of the EGF (IAG and EGC). I then grouped material from each of 
these themes into three broad areas that formed the topics of the three findings 
chapters, which were: the establishment of UK Biobank as a departure from standard 
academic scientific practice, confusion over control of UK Biobank, and lack of trust 
between academic scientists, representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited.  
 
I adopted a broad thematic approach to my analysis as it was the most appropriate to 
my research aims and to the data gathered. As I was researching the origins and 
development of UK Biobank my enquiries focussed on key stages and issues in the 
development of the resource, which lent itself well to a broad thematic approach. 
Similarly, the data collected concerned the same stages and issues in the origins and 
development of UK Biobank; hence it was easily grouped into broad themes.  
 
I began early stages of analysis long before the process of coding the data, which 
meant that I was already familiar with the data and the potential themes before I began 
to code. For example, I made extensive field notes immediately following every 
interview in which I recorded my impressions of the interview and interviewee and 
the themes that emerged. I listened to the recordings on my return journeys if time and 
circumstances allowed. Every recorded interview was transcribed by a professional 
transcription company, Smallbiz Transcripts, who were bound by MRC ‘Good 
Research Practice’ guidelines on confidentiality. Following transcription, I read 
through every transcript carefully to check for spelling errors. I also tried to check 
every transcript with the recording but the sheer number of transcripts and time 
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consuming nature of the task complicated this process. I decided to check every 
transcript with the recording when the transcript was being returned to the 
interviewee, was particularly significant, or from an underrepresented group. In 
adopting these criteria I checked the majority of transcripts from the main study [44 of 
the 64] and all of the transcripts from the follow-up interviews with the recording. 
Also, if I heavily referred to a transcript or quoted from a transcript that had not been 
checked against the recording, I would go back and check those passages or 
quotations in the transcript against the recording.  
 
2.5.2 Summaries  
 
Once I coded the interview transcripts and took notes from archival research, I 
summarised each interview and the findings from archival research.  
 
Each interview summary began with an introduction that included my impressions of 
the interview and interviewee, any interesting information that did not fit into the 
designated themes (such as comments regarding my research or terminology), and a 
list of the themes that emerged. I then devoted a paragraph to each theme. I ended the 
summary with a very brief conclusion describing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
interview. I included many quotations in the summaries to fully illustrate the issues of 
the interview as voiced by interviewees. These summaries were detailed and the 
majority continued into four or five pages. I considered using computer assisted 
analysis packages, such as NVIVO, in managing my interview data in particular, but 
concluded that it was unnecessary in my research. The extensive number of 
transcripts (76), some in excess of twenty pages meant that it would have been a very 
labour intensive and time consuming process. Furthermore, given the nature of the 
data and my broad thematic approach to analysis, I felt that a computer assisted 
analysis package would not have been helpful. For example, as the same broad 
themes emerged in each interview it was not difficult to identify them in the 
transcripts.  
 
I produced a detailed summary of my findings from archival research of the MRC’s 
official documents relating to the origins and development of UK Biobank. I adopted 
a similar approach in summarising my archival research findings to that of the 
 116  
interview summaries and presented the data according to the aforementioned themes. 
I detailed the title, date, people involved and reference number of each document. 
Again, I included as many quotations as possible in summarising archival research, 
thereby maintaining a close link with the original material. Although summarising 
such varied and lengthy material was a challenge, my focus narrowed and my 
understanding of the issues increased sufficiently to make it a less daunting task. One 
year had passed from the point that I began to collect the material and summarise it, 
therefore I found much of the material not relevant to my research. Also, the sensitive 
nature of much of the material meant that I could not use it, which also lessened the 
process of summarising.  
 
I produced summaries of the oral history interviews and of the findings from archival 
research to familiarise myself further with the data and to manage it effectively. The 
process of summarising and initial data collection was transparent, for example a 
quotation from an interview or document was referenced with the page number of the 
transcript as well as the page number of the summary. Compiling summaries of oral 
history interviews was particularly useful considering the number and length of 
transcripts. It was much easier to refer to a summary of an interview in the first 
instance, rather than to an extensive transcript. It also considerably aided analysis, and 
I found it effective in familiarising myself with the data from every interview. 
Similarly, the summary of the findings from archival research was far more 
manageable than sifting through an abundance of material most of which was not 
relevant. It also gave me the opportunity to reacquaint myself fully with the archival 
research prior to writing-up, which was important given the time that had passed 
between archival research and writing. Summarising archival research findings was 
especially important in my research as the material itself was not archived or 
presented in any particular order. 
 
The thematic approach adopted toward analysis lent itself well to summarising oral 
history interviews and archival research and the data closely correlated with the 
themes. I will now present the findings that emerged from this analysis of interview 
and archival research data. As discussed, I grouped data from each of the themes 
pertaining to the main stages and key issues in the origins and development of UK 
Biobank into three overarching broad areas. These areas formed the topics of the 
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following three findings chapters: the establishment of UK Biobank as a departure 
from standard academic scientific practice (chapter four), confusion over control of 
UK Biobank (chapter five), and lack of trust between academic scientists, 
representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited (chapter six).  
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Chapter 3 
 
Chronology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
I now provide a detailed chronology of the origins and development of UK Biobank. I 
have separated the information into six key stages: the development of the proposal 
for UK Biobank (1998-2000), protocol development and consultation (2001-2003), 
the funding decision (2002), internal organisation in the funding bodies (2000-2003), 
implementation of the organisational structure (2003-2005) and organisational 
changes (2004-2005).
32
 Although I have presented this information in chronological 
order, many of the stages overlap. I also constructed a timeline based on this 
chronology to assist the reader (see appendix A1) as well as diagram 1 (below).  
 
This chronology is largely based on information gathered from archival research on 
the MRC documents on UK Biobank (see chapter three for discussion of archival 
research). These documents spanned the origins of UK Biobank within the MRC in 
1998 to the establishment of UK Biobank Limited in December 2003. As the 
documents did not cover implementation of the organisational structure, this 
information was gathered from the UK Biobank website as it developed from 2003-
2005.33 I researched UK Biobank from its inception in 1998 until the organisational 
changes in August 2005, this chronology will therefore cease at August 2005. I also 
applied to the Wellcome Trust to undertake archival analysis of their documents but 
as the documents were still in use I was not granted access.  
 
Where possible, I include the names of individuals and groups that were involved in 
the origins and development of UK Biobank, including former committee members 
and those that attended key meetings. Rather than provide biographical information 
on every individual identified in this chronology, I describe the extent of their 
involvement, if any, in the origins and development of UK Biobank. I have however 
                                                
32 See Appendix A3 for an organisational representation of this chronology 
33The UK Biobank website underwent significant alteration in style and content during the period of 
my research (see chapter 7 for more information).  
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included biographies from the UK Biobank website of those committee members 
formally involved in the initiative during my period of research (see appendix A2).  
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Diagram 1: Timeline 
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3.2 Development of the proposal for UK Biobank (1998-2000) 
 
3.2.1 MRC/Wellcome Trust Workshop (1998-1999) 
 
The proposal for UK Biobank, or as it was formerly known the UK Population 
Biomedical Collection, was considered by the MRC and the Wellcome Trust 
simultaneously during the final years of the HGP in the late nineteen nineties. The 
MRC included the proposal for a new large scale cohort study in their bid to the 1998 
Government Comprehensive Spending Review. The bid stressed the need for ‘large 
collections of well characterised human DNA samples for research on gene function 
and the interaction between genetic and environmental risk factors in multi-factorial 
diseases’ (S600/161 Volume 1). A MRC post-genome challenge working group on 
DNA sample collections and facilities for large scale genetic typing met on the 29 
May 1998. This working group included scientists who went on to undertake 
important roles in the origins and development of UK Biobank, such as the then head 
of the MRC George Radda, John Bell,34 Nick Day,35 Peter McGuffin,36 and David 
Porteous37 and included other senior academic figures (D Armstrong, G Cameron, S 
Povey, G Samuels, E Southern and E Wright - the document used initials rather than 
first names). It defined three types of studies that were needed, including very large 
case control studies to identify disease genes or disease modifier genes, large 
longitudinal cohorts to study gene-environment interaction using prospectively 
gathered information on exposure and lifestyle, and large well documented case series 
with non-responders and responders identified from within the series to identify genes 
affecting treatment response (S600/161 Volume 1).    
 
The first official meeting between the MRC and the Wellcome Trust regarding UK 
Biobank was on the 14 May 1999, at a jointly convened workshop (S600/161 Volume 
1). Although I did not have access to material that listed the full attendance at the 
workshop, certain documents contained such details. It was held at the Royal College 
of Physicians in London and was attended by representatives of other major UK 
                                                
34Member of the EWG and Chair of the Science Committee 
35Member of the EWG and PDC  
36Led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop 
37Member of the EWG and PDC, and led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop 
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funding bodies and charities such as Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF),
38
 Cancer 
Research Campaign (CRC), British Heart Foundation (BHF) and British Diabetic 
Association (BDA). The workshop considered the need for a new large scale 
population study for research on ‘genetic risk factors for disease, 
gene/phenotype/environment interactions and infectious diseases’ (S600/161 Volume 
1). It reviewed relevant existing cohorts in determining the need for a new one and 
considered the form a potential study would take. The workshop concluded that it 
would be worthwhile to set up a study and that the information to be gained from it 
could not be obtained from existing studies. It recommended the establishment of an 
expert working group to develop the outline for the resource (S600/161 Volume 1).  
 
The first session was chaired by John Todd39 and reviewed existing cohorts. It 
featured presentations from representatives of existing cohort studies in the UK 
including Jean Golding of the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children 
(ALSPAC), Nick Day
40
 of the European Prospective Investigation of Cancer (EPIC), 
Michael Marmot of the Whitehall II and Health Survey for England, David Barker of 
the Hertfordshire and Southampton Cohorts, Mike Wadsworth of the 1946 and other 
UK birth cohorts and Steve Humphries of the Second Northwick Park Heart Survey.  
There was open discussion of the ability of existing cohort studies to ‘meet future 
needs’ (D550/33 Volume 1). The debate included presentations by senior scientists 
Walter Bodmer, John Bell and Roy Anderson. The second session was chaired by 
George Radda and in considering ‘strategies for the future’ featured presentations by 
Martin Bobrow41, David Porteous and Peter Morgan Capner. The workshop ended 
with an open discussion, a summary and recommendations by George Radda and 
John Todd (D550/33 Volume 1).   
 
3.2.2 Expert Working Group (EWG) (1999-2000) 
 
The EWG was established in May 1999 to consider the justification for a new large 
scale cohort study and to develop the outline for the resource. It was chaired by Tom 
                                                
38 The Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF) merged with the Cancer Research Campaign (CRC) in 
2002, forming Cancer Research UK.  
39 Member of the EWG  
40 Member of the EWG, PDC and a Spoke, and led a working group at the Protocol Development 
Workshop   
41 Member of the EWG  
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Meade
42
 and the members were David Porteous, John Bell, John Todd, Valerie 
Beral,43 Martin Bobrow, Nick Day, Peter Donnelly, Trevor Gibbs, Mark McCarthy44 
and Roy Anderson. There were a number of observers in the group such as Jonathon 
Gershuny and Alison Nichols from the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), Richard Laux and Joanna Brown from the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS), Peter Greenaway,45 David Coles and Mark Salmon from the Department of 
Health, and Alison Spaull from the Scottish Executive (S600/161 Volume 1).  
 
The EWG met four times between August 1999 and January 2000. Included in its 
terms of reference was a remit to review existing UK population studies and cohorts 
to determine the extent to which they could meet the need for research on genetic, 
physiological, lifestyle and environmental risk factors for diseases of significant 
public health importance, to contemplate the opportunity for extending existing 
collections, and to develop the outline for a new population study or studies to gather 
information not available from existing cohorts (S600/161 Volume 1). At its second 
meeting on the 27 September 1999, the group evaluated current studies and members 
presented outline proposals to ‘further identify issues to be taken into account in work 
of the kind they have in mind, including duration and cost as well as type of 
population(s) needed so that we can be realistic in making recommendations’ 
(S600/161 Volume 1). These included ‘Outline of a proposed design for a large 
national cohort study – epidemiological considerations’ by Nick Day, ‘UK 
Biomedical Collections, Large Prospective Cohort’ by John Bell and Valerie Beral, 
‘MRC Working Party, Imperial College Proposal’ by Mark McCarthy, ‘A Vision of 
Epidemiology Studies of the Future’ by Trevor Gibbs, ‘UK National Resource 
Collections Research Opportunities in Scotland’ by David Porteous and ‘UK 
Population Survey (UPS): considerations for a national cohort study’ by John Todd 
(S600/161 Volume 1). The group considered issues including hypothesis 
development, sample size and age range, exposure ascertainment, organisation, public 
acceptability and ethical issues, costs, pharmacogenetics, ownership and acceptability 
and pilot work in developing an outline for the proposal (S600/161 Volume 1). 
 
                                                
42 Chair of the PDC  
43 Member of the Science Committee and Spoke Lead 
44 Member of the PDC and a Spoke, and led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop  
45 Member of the PDC 
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The EWG published their final report in March 2000. This recommended the 
establishment of two new UK Population cohort studies: an adult cohort to examine 
genetic and environmental risk factors and their interaction for common multi-
factorial diseases of adulthood; and a birth cohort ‘primarily to construct a population 
profile of exposure and immunological responses to the prevailing common infections 
in the UK’ (S600/161 Volume 2). It stressed the higher priority of the adult cohort 
because it would have more of an impact on public health in the medium term, and 
because it was at a more developed stage of planning. The report stated that the birth 
cohort would be needed to address common infectious disease, developmental disease 
or childhood antecedents of adult markers for disease risk. The group also included a 
list of recommendations in support of the conclusion that a new large prospective 
study on genetic and environmental risk factors for common adult diseases details 
should be established. It detailed the debate over the prospective cohort design as 
opposed to large case-control studies, the management and organisation of the adult 
cohort study, ownership and accessibility, ethical issues and public acceptability, and 
public consultation (S600/161 Volume 2). The report was approved by the MRC 
Council and Wellcome Trust Governors in spring 2000. It was circulated to MRC 
Research Boards, Wellcome Trust Panels and individual experts for comment prior to 
further protocol development (S600/176 Volume 1). In June 2000 the MRC and the 
Wellcome Trust agreed in principle to the proposal for UK Biobank 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/organisation.html 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).  
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3.3 Protocol Development and Consultation (2001-2003) 
 
3.3.1 Protocol Development Committee (PDC) (2001) 
 
The PDC was established in May 2001 to ‘steer and oversee’ the production of a 
detailed draft protocol for a proposed cohort study, and to endorse it in time for 
international peer review and for passing on to the funding bodies. It was asked to 
consider the financial constraints involved in UK Biobank and the consultations 
undertaken with the scientific community, the public, health professionals, industry, 
and charities that would ‘inform’ the protocol (S600/174 Volume 1).  
 
It met on five occasions between May and December 2001. It was chaired by Tom 
Meade and the members were Emily Banks (protocol writer), Paul Burton,46 Nick 
Day, Anna Dominiczak,47 Mark Duman, Mark McCarthy, David Porteous, Martin 
Prince,
48
 Anne Richardson, David Strachan,
49
 Alan Silman,
50
 Ian Purves,
51
 Ron 
Zimmern,52 Lon Cardon, and, representing the offices of the funding bodies, Alan 
Doyle (Wellcome Trust), Stephane Goldstein (MRC) and Frances Rawle (MRC). 
Following the first meeting Peter Greenaway was included as a member representing 
the Department of Health, and various alterations occurred regarding office staff from 
the funding bodies (D550/33 Volume 2). The major issues discussed by the PDC in 
achieving its aims included: the name for the resource, cohort selection and sample 
size, communication and consultation (including the protocol development 
workshop), IT strategy, development of hypotheses, proposals for additional studies, 
recruitment, baseline measures, follow up, statistical methods, pilot studies, ethical 
considerations, links with other studies, costs, Intensively Phenotyped Cohort (IPC) 53  
and the role of the spokes (D550/33 Volume 2).  
                                                
46 Member of the Science Committee, Spoke Lead and led a working group at the Protocol 
Development Workshop 
47 Spoke member and led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop  
48 Member of a Spoke  
49 Led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop  
50 Member of the Science Committee, Spoke Lead and led a working group at the Protocol 
Development Workshop  
51 Led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop 
52 Spoke member and led a working group at the Protocol Development Workshop  
53
 The IPC was a proposal put forward by the PDC for an additional study involving more intensive 
phenotyping of a 40,000 subgroup of participants aged between 45 and 54 from the main cohort 
(S600/176 Volume 1). 
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Various issues were debated within subgroups of the PDC. For example, a 
brainstorming meeting on the 21 June 2001 focussed on communication issues such as 
interaction with the scientific community, the media, interest groups and the public. It 
was attended by additional members who were largely drawn from the offices of the 
funding bodies such as Trish Evans from the Wellcome Trust and Jane Gizbert from 
the MRC (D550/33 Volume 2). A subgroup was also set up to discuss sample size and 
criteria for cohort selection. It consisted of Emily Banks, Paul Burton, Nick Day and 
David Strachan and considered power and sample size calculations, and expected 
number of events on the cohort.  It reported to the committee on the 18
 
July 2001 
(D550/33 Volume 2).  
 
A further subgroup was established to develop an IPC. It met three times between 
August and October 2001, although the initial meeting was introductory and widely 
attended by members of the committee including Tom Meade and Emily Banks. The 
membership of the two key meetings consisted of Paul Burton as chair, Lon Cardon, 
Mark McCarthy, Martin Prince, David Strachan, Alan Silman, Alan Doyle and 
Frances Rawle. The issues discussed by the subgroup included cost, benefits of the 
IPC and timing of the development of the IPC protocol in relation to the core 
protocol. At the fourth meeting of the main committee (an away day on the 19 and 20 
October 2001), it was announced that George Radda and Mike Dexter [heads of MRC 
and Wellcome Trust respectively] had decided that the IPC protocol should be 
considered separately from the core protocol (D550/33 Volume 2).  
 
The first draft of the protocol was produced by Emily Banks on the 12 October 2001, 
for discussion at the fourth meeting of the committee. The provisional proposal for the 
IPC was also produced on the 12
 
October by Paul Burton for discussion by the full 
committee. A further draft of the IPC protocol, edited following the away day 
meeting, was circulated by Mark McCarthy on the 12 November 2001. He was 
informed on the 15
 
November that it would be rewritten and shortened by Emily 
Banks and Frances Rawle, to be circulated to the peer reviewers with a covering letter 
of recommendation (S600/174 Volume 2).   
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3.3.2 International Peer Review of Draft Protocol (2001-2002) 
 
An international peer review panel was asked to comment on the November 2001 
draft of the protocol and the IPC protocol on the 5
 
December 2001. They were 
specifically asked to consider international competitiveness, timeliness, design, 
location and value for money (S600/176 Volume 1). The panel consisted of nine 
reviewers and their comments varied considerably in length and detail. One 
reviewer’s comments were half a page long, four reviewers’ commented in one and a 
half pages, three were between 3 and 5 pages, and one reviewer responded with 8 
pages of comments. The comments were largely of a technical nature but the 
following broad themes emerged: response rate, age range, exposure assessment and 
prospective design. Despite the scientific nature of the comments, one reviewer 
questioned the hub and spoke model that had been proposed. He criticised the 
proposed role of the spokes as data collectors: ‘to do this for up to 10 or more years 
and not have any control over any of the data presents a problem for even the most 
senior and enlightened of academic investigators’ (S600/176 Volume 1). Another 
non-scientific issue that emerged in reviewers’ comments was criticism of the level of 
detail contained in the protocol, and one reviewer described it as ‘very general’ 
(S600/176 Volume 1). The inclusion of timeliness of the initiative as an area to be 
considered by reviewers reflects the positioning of the UK Biobank as a response to 
the ‘post-genome’ challenge. This is reflected in a reviewer’s response to this area: 
‘with the tools of the human genome project at hand, we are running out of excuses 
not to perform detailed genetic and genetic-epidemiological analyses of common 
human diseases’ (S600/176 Volume 1).   
 
The funding bodies sought further comments from the international peer review panel 
in the form of a survey in January 2002. The document pertaining to this survey 
‘Biobank UK – International Peer Review Process Final Survey Results’ lists the 
questions asked and the reviewers’ responses. Seven of the original nine experts 
responded to this survey. The questions were general in nature and required ‘yes/no’ 
style responses. The following questions were asked: ‘On balance do you support the 
rationale for Biobank’ (all replied ‘yes’), ‘Overall, are you supportive of the proposed 
methodology for Biobank UK’ (six of the seven replied ‘yes’), ‘Over the next five to 
ten years do you believe that demand for a resource of this nature is likely to… (two 
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replied ‘stay the same’, five replied ‘increase’ ), ‘Do you believe the UK is a good 
place to establish such a cohort study’ (six replied ‘yes’ and one replied ‘not 
sure/don’t know’), ‘Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following 
assertion about the proposed Biobank UK initiative…“Biobank UK will make a 
significant contribution to the resources for genetics research worldwide” ’ (three 
replied ‘strongly agree’, three replied ‘tend to agree’, one replied ‘tend to disagree’), 
‘Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following assertion about the 
proposed Biobank UK initiative …“The Biobank UK project will represent good 
value for money” ’ (three replied ‘strongly agree’, one replied ‘tend to agree’, one 
replied ‘tend to disagree’, two replied ‘don’t know’), ‘Please indicate the degree to 
which you agree with the following assertion about the proposed Biobank UK 
initiative: “The 45-69 age group is the most appropriate to focus on” ’ (four replied 
‘strongly disagree’, one replied ‘don’t know’ and two replied ‘tend to agree’), ‘Are 
there any specific aspects of the proposed data collection that you think should be re-
examined’ (six replied ‘yes’ and one replied ‘no’), and ‘Please use this space for any 
comments, suggestions or reservations associated with these or other issues’ 
(S600/176 Volume 1).   
 
Reviewers were also given the opportunity to support their answers and these 
comments included considerable caveats. Although all respondents said ‘yes’ to ‘On 
balance do you support the rationale for Biobank’, one reviewer stated that ‘one 
limitation that should be addressed is the lack of reference to specific environmental 
pollutants’. Similarly, another added  
[B]roadly I welcome the thrust of the study as it is attempting to address key 
and vital issues. However, I believe the protocol is deficient in certain areas, 
particularly in some of the practicalities in terms of primary care support, 
recruitment and retention of volunteers and the ethical considerations of such a 
study.  
Despite replying ‘tend to agree’ to ‘Please indicate the degree to which you agree with 
the following assertion about the proposed Biobank UK initiative … “The Biobank 
UK project will represent good value for money” ’, one reviewer added ‘the study is 
not strictly necessary, because of the already existing initiatives’. In response to the 
final request for additional comments, one reviewer stated that UK Biobank was ‘an 
important initiative’ but added  
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I am afraid that the proposed research approach is too simple-minded to lead 
to any meaningful outcome. Fewer but much better phenotyped subjects of all 
ages and walks of life (including exposure to environmental pollutants) is the 
lead to be followed. These days the time and effort to code one validated 
questionnaire far exceeds the means of genotyping. It is time to shift emphasis 
from robotics to genetically manipulated animal models to research that has 
direct relevance in the clinical and preventive arena.  
The ‘yes/no’ style responses to these questions were tabulated in a further document 
‘A tabulation of reviewers’ comments incorporating preliminary and final comments, 
Biobank UK, January 2002’. This table stated that 8 of the reviewers were supportive 
of the rationale and methodology and one was supportive of rationale but not the 
methodology. This table did not contain the reviewers’ additional comments that 
supported their initial response and therefore did not fully portray the response to the 
original survey (S600/176 Volume 1).  
 
The PDC considered the peer reviewers’ initial comments on the 21 December 2001. 
Their response largely concerned the proposed age range and prospective cohort 
approach as opposed to case-control study approach (S600/174 Volume 2). The 
protocols were sent to the MRC board (the document does not specify which MRC 
Board) on the 22 February 2002, in preparation for the funding decision meeting in 
March 2002 (S600/176 Volume 1).  
 
3.3.3 Consultation (2001-2003) 
 
Consultation exercises with a variety of groups including industry, interest groups, 
scientists, health workers, general practitioners and the public were undertaken by the 
funding bodies directly, and by research groups and consultancies on their behalf 
between 2001 and 2003.  
 
The funding bodies consulted industrial groups to understand how they would use the 
resource and obtain their views on the proposed access arrangements. Such 
consultation included individual meetings, teleconferences and industry-wide 
workshops with pharmaceutical companies. For example, there was a meeting 
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organised by the Bio-Industries Association (BIA)
54
 at the request of the MRC and 
the Wellcome Trust on the 26 September 2001. It was attended by Alan Doyle, 
Frances Rawle and Peter Greenaway on behalf of the funding bodies, Alison 
Campbell from MRC Technology (MRCT)
55
 and representatives from various 
pharmaceutical companies including Oxford Biomedica and Canitech, Oxagen and 
Oxford Glycosciences (A156/12 Volume 1). Teleconferences took place with 
CARTaGENE on the 21
 
November 2001 (S600/176 Volume 1) and GlaxoSmithKline 
on the 27 November 2001 (A156/12 Volume 1). There was a meeting between 
representatives of the funding bodies and Pfizer on the 15 January 2002 (A156/12 
Volume 1).  
 
A Consultation with Industry Workshop took place on the 30 and 31 October 2002 at 
the Hinxton Hall Conference Centre. Although the full attendance was not listed on 
the documents accessed, pharmaceutical companies such as GenoMed and Calltech 
were invited. It focussed on access arrangements, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), 
management, ethics and governance and protocol development. It included 
presentations by Martin Bobrow, John Bell, Tom Meade, Alison Campbell, Frances 
Rawle and Alan Doyle (A156/12 Volume 1). Another consultation with industry 
workshop, organised by the funding bodies, took place on the 4 April 2003 at the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (APBI)56 head office in London. 
Again, the full attendance was not listed on the document accessed but it did reveal 
that Richard Tiner (head of APBI) acted as chair, an introduction was presented by 
John Newton as the newly appointed CEO of UK Biobank and representatives of the 
funding bodies such as Frances Rawle, Alan Doyle and Alison Campbell (MRCT) 
each gave presentations. It took the form of a question and answer session relating to 
the issues presented including features of UK Biobank, management structure and 
ethics and governance and IPR and access arrangements 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/consultation.html 2004)(accessed 23/04/04).  
                                                
54 The BioIndustry Association, established in 1989, is the trade association for enterprises in the UK's 
bioscience sector (http://www.bioindustry.org/cgibin/contents_view 2006) (accessed 14/02/06) 
55 MRCT is the ‘exclusive commercialisation catalyst for the UK Medical Research Council (MRC) 
working to translate cutting edge scientific discoveries into commercial products’ 
(http://www.mrctechnology.org/home.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
56 The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (APBI) is the trade association for 
approximately one hundred companies in the UK producing prescription medicine 
(http://www.abpi.org.uk 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
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Consultation with interest groups largely took the form of meetings between 
representatives of the funding bodies and the Human Genetics Commission (HGC),57 
which occurred between 2001 and 2004. The HGC considered the proposal for UK 
Biobank in its report on the storage, protection and use of personal genetic 
information in 2002 (S600/176 Volume 1). A HGC Information Gathering Meeting 
on the UK Biobank took place on the 19
 
November 2002. It was attended by members 
of the Commission, representatives from the Office of Science and Technology,58 the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee,59 the Genetics 
Interest Group,
60
 and Human Genetics Alert.
61
 The issues discussed included the draft 
protocol, the scientific rationale behind UK Biobank, oversight and governance, 
consent, confidentiality and data storage, commercial access to Biobank data and IPR 
(A156/12 Volume 1).  As UK Biobank progressed the HGC continued to be consulted 
and updated on its progress. For example, a meeting with the HGC Genetics Sub-
group on the 18
  
June 2003 included representatives from UK Biobank, such as the 
then CEO John Newton and the chair of the Interim Advisory Group (IAG), William 
Lowrance, as well as representatives of the funding bodies and members of the HGC 
Genetics sub-group. The focus of the meeting was the progress made in establishing 
UK Biobank, commercial use and impact on MRC and Wellcome Trust budgets, the 
role of the IAG and development of the Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF) 
(D550/19 Volume 1). A further update meeting with the HGC occurred on the 30
 
March 2004, which particularly concerned the Intellectual Property (IP) and access 
policy and the Ethics and Governance Council (EGC). Presentations were given by 
representatives of UK Biobank and the funding bodies. John Newton discussed 
                                                
57The HGC is the ‘Government’s advisory body on human genetics, particularly social, ethical and 
legal issues’ (http://www.hgc.gov.uk/Client/index_asp?ContentId=1 2006) (accessed 14/02/06). 
58 The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) is the ‘UK Parliament’s in-house 
source of independent, balanced and accessible analysis of public policy issues related to science and 
technology’ (http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_offices/post.cfm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
59 The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee examines ‘the expenditure, 
administration and policy of the Office of Science and Innovation and its associated public bodies’ 
(http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/science_and_technology_committee/about_the_
committee.cfm 2007) (accessed 16/02/07). 
60 The Genetics Interest Group is a ‘national alliance of patient organisations with a membership of 
over 130 charities which support children, families and individuals affected by genetics disorders’ 
(http://www.gig.org.uk 2007) (accessed 16/02/07) 
61 Human Genetics Alert is an ‘independent public interest watchdog group opposed to certain 
development in genetic research such as genetic discrimination, cloning and inheritable genetic 
engineering of human beings’ (http://hgalert.org 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
 132  
progress, Jo Sumner from the MRC spoke about the EGC and Tara Camm from the 
Wellcome Trust discussed IP and access issues (D550/19 Volume 1).   
 
The most significant consultation exercise undertaken with the scientific community 
was the Protocol Development Workshop on the 17 April 2001 at the Royal College 
of Physicians. A total of 180 delegates attended the workshop. The first session 
featured workshops on technical and practical issues. There was a workshop on Blood 
Samples: Collection, Extraction, Storage and Analysis led by David Porteous, Cohort 
Selection and Recruitment led by Paul Burton, Information Technology: Data 
Collection and Databases led by Ian Purves, Measuring diet data led by Sheila 
Bingham, and Ethics: Consent and Feedback led by Ron Zimmern. The second 
session was a series of working groups on baseline data collection and outcome 
measures. There was a working group on Cardiovascular Disease led by Anna 
Dominiczak, Diabetes and Metabolic Disorders led by Mark McCarthy, 
Respiratory/Infection led by David Strachan, Mental Health/Neurology led by Peter 
McGuffin, Cancer led by Nick Day, and Musculoskeletal led by Alan Silman. The 
majority of the workshops and working groups were led by members of the PDC. A 
report of the workshop was written by Frances Rawle and a number of responses were 
made to it in October 2001, such as responses from Valerie Beral, Sheila Bingham, 
Jean Golding (the then head of ALSPAC) and Stephen Palmer (D550/33 Volume 2).62  
 
Consultation with the public, health workers and general practitioners was undertaken 
by research groups and consultancies on behalf of the funding bodies between 2000 
and 2003.  
 
The research consultancy company, Craig Ross Dawson, was commissioned by the 
MRC and the Wellcome Trust to ‘explore public attitudes to the use of human 
biological samples and linkage of the information extracted from them to medical 
database information’ (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/perceptions.pdf 2004) 
(accessed 23/04/04). They undertook fieldwork between March and April 2000 and 
published their report ‘Public Perceptions of the Collection of Human Biological 
Samples’ in October 2000. Sixteen focus groups were undertaken with members of 
                                                
62 Member of the Science Committee and Spoke Lead  
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the general public and in-depth interviews were carried out with general practitioners, 
practice nurses, people who experienced disease or disabilities, religious and 
community leaders, and representatives of interest groups 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/perceptions.pdf 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).   
 
A consultation event with primary health care professionals from the Trent Focus 
Collaborative Research Network was undertaken by the Genetics Interest Group 
(GIG) and the Universities of Nottingham and Sheffield on behalf of the funding 
bodies in October 2000. It was undertaken to discover any potential obstacles in 
primary care to the operation of UK Biobank. It involved twenty-six individuals from 
twenty-three practices, allocated to five focus groups. The topic areas were attitudes 
to research, awareness of the proposed MRC and Wellcome Trust Research, 
recruiting subjects and obtaining consent, data collection and access to data. The 
report ‘Consultation with primary health care professionals on issues relating to the 
recruitment of patients to a DNA collection study’ was published in January 2001 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/GPreport.pdf 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).  Between 
January and April 2003 GIG, in collaboration with the North Thames GP Research 
Network (NoCTEN), also organised a consultation dinner with London based GPs, 
and a total of eighteen GPs attended (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/GPreport.pdf 
2004) (accessed 23/04/04).   
 
In 2002 People, Science and Policy (PSP) (an independent science policy 
consultancy) were commissioned by the MRC and the Wellcome Trust to undertake 
consultation with the public on the ethical and management issues surrounding UK 
Biobank. Three sessions were held in January 2002 in Hertfordshire, the West 
Midlands and Glasgow. Each session involved twenty people aged between 45 and 
69, separated into two groups of ten. Following an introductory session of one hour 
and a half, groups were reconvened at a later date for a four hour interactive workshop 
with PSP moderators and two representatives from the funding bodies. Their report, 
‘Biobank UK; A Question of Trust: A consultation exploring and addressing 
questions of public trust’ was published in March 2002 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/consultation.pdf 2004)(accessed 23/04/04).  
Between January and April 2003 PSP undertook further consultation on behalf of the 
funding bodies with individuals from social groups under-represented in the initial 
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2002 consultation. Four groups consisting of a total of twenty-seven people were 
convened for two hour sessions in Manchester, London, Newport and Northallerton 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/consultation.pdf 2004)(accessed 23/04/04).  
 
PSP were again commissioned by the MRC and the Wellcome Trust in 2003 to 
undertake consultation exercises with nurses, both in general practice and research. 
Their views were sought to inform the communications strategy and assist the 
development of UK Biobank, particularly regarding ethical and management issues. 
One and a half hour sessions were conducted with GP nurses and research nurses 
separately in February 2003 in Manchester, Glasgow, London, and Birmingham. 
Further sessions with GP nurses were also held in Worcester, Newport, York, and 
Hertfordshire. A total of seventy-three nurses were involved in twelve groups. An in-
depth interview was carried out with a representative of the Royal College of Nursing 
(RCN). The report, ‘UK Biobank: A consultation with nurses in general practice and 
research’ was published in April 2003 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/Nursesreport.pdf 2004) (accessed 23/04/04). In 
2003 PSP were commissioned by the funding bodies to establish a public panel. They 
set up a panel of sixty-four lay people aged 45-69 from individuals who had 
previously taken part in consultation sessions about UK Biobank. It was consulted by 
the IAG on the draft EGF between May and June 2003, prior to the completion of 
their report and with the support of the funding bodies. It involved two two-hour 
sessions; forty-seven members attended the first session and forty-two attended the 
second. The report ‘UK Biobank Consultation on the Ethical and Governance 
Framework’ was published in June 2003 (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/people-
science-policy.pdf 2004)(accessed 23/04/04). 
 
An Ethics Consultation Workshop was organised by the funding bodies on the 25
 
April 2002, the report of which was published in September 2002. It involved sixty 
invited individuals from various fields including biomedical scientists, clinicians, 
social scientists, ethicists, lawyers, health service professionals, patients’ groups, and 
other civil society groups. It featured five working groups which focussed on a 
specific set of ethical issues namely consent, confidentiality, security, 
commercialisation, and governance (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/ethicswork.pdf 
2004) (accessed 23/04/04).   
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Further consultation regarding the EGF was conducted on behalf of the funding 
bodies by Opinion Leader Research (a research based consultancy). They organised 
two day long workshops in May 2003.  The first involved members of the public and 
health practitioners amounting to thirty-nine people.  The second engaged a variety of 
stakeholders with previous involvement in consultation exercises including patient 
groups and other civil society group members, scientists, social scientists, ethicists, 
clinicians, lawyers, health service professionals, and those involved in the 
development of the protocol, amounting to seventeen people.  Four in-depth 
interviews with politicians were also carried out. Their report ‘Summary of the UK 
Biobank Consultation on the Ethics and Governance Framework was published in 
August 2003 (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/public-stakeholder-olr-report.doc 
2004) (accessed 23/04/04).  
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3.4 Funding Decision (2002) 
 
The decision to fund UK Biobank was taken by the MRC and the Wellcome Trust in 
March 2002. The funding decision was initially to be taken in February 2001 but it 
was postponed until the production of a full protocol and detailed costing (S600/161 
Volume 3). As this chronology is based on information gathered from MRC 
documents on the origins and development of UK Biobank, my description concerns 
the process by which the MRC came to the funding decision.  
 
3.4.1 MRC Funding Decision (2002) 
 
The MRC took the decision to fund UK Biobank at a meeting on the 27 March 2002 
of its Council, which was asked to provide enough money to cover half the projected 
costs of the initial set up and recruitment. The Council also took the decision not to 
include funds for the IPC in the core funding provided.   
 
In taking these decisions they discussed the following issues: the scientific case, the 
high national and international profile of UK Biobank and the strong level of 
government support, the medium and long term financial implications for the MRC of 
supporting it, the potential impact of the project in improving the ability to use NHS 
electronic records in future clinical, epidemiological and public health research, the 
potential implications for improving public understanding of genetics and genetics 
research, and the future Council oversight of UK Biobank. The endorsement of the 
MRC Inter Board Initiatives Group (IBIG) for the core protocol was considered, as 
was their conclusion that the IPC should not be part of the core funding for the 
resource.  Issues raised by IBIG were also considered such as their concern over the 
staffing of UK Biobank (pointing out that only the protocol writer worked full-time 
on UK Biobank and on a short term secondment basis). IBIG stressed the importance 
of appointing a CEO and senior scientific and IT staff for the hub in getting UK 
Biobank started.  
 
The Council was provided with various materials in making the decision. For 
example, this included an operational plan that detailed issues including stakeholder 
acceptability and consultation, management structure, access and IP, ethical and legal 
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issues, IT, finance, future development (such as hub and spoke selection and CEO 
appointment), and risks (non financial). A stakeholder analysis document detailed 
consultations with the public, GPs and other health care professionals, science 
community, HGC and government departments. The Council was also provided with 
the minutes of the IBIG meeting on the 4 March 2002 (S600/176 Volume 1).  
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3.5 Internal Organisation in the Funding Bodies (2000-2003) 
 
Various groups were involved in the setting up and development of UK Biobank 
within and between the funding bodies. Again, this description largely concerns 
internal organisation in the MRC.  
 
IBIG  
One such group within the MRC was the Inter Board Initiatives Group (IBIG), which 
consisted of senior figures within the MRC (Board and Council members) such as 
George Radda, John Bell, Doug Easton, Carol Dezateux, Ray Fitzpatrick, Nancy 
Rothwell, Karen Steel, Doreen Cantrell, Eve Johnstone, Ian MacLennan, and Patrick 
Sissons. Its key role in the development of UK Biobank was to advise Council on 
whether or not to fund the resource.  
 
IBIG met on the 4 March 2002 to consider the scientific case for UK Biobank and 
review the comments of the peer review panel to allow them to make a 
recommendation to Council for the funding decision meeting on the 27 March 2002. 
It recommended that UK Biobank should be funded but that the IPC should not be 
part of the core MRC funding because the ‘case was not sufficiently strong that this 
would be an essential component’ (S600/176 Volume 1). Representatives of the 
EWG, the funding bodies and the international peer review panel were invited to 
attend the meeting namely Tom Meade, Emily Banks, Alan Doyle, Isaac John (DoH) 
and three reviewers by audio link. There was a presentation of the initiative from Tom 
Meade, comments from the referees, a discussion between Tom Meade and Emily 
Banks, and confidential discussions between IBIG members. The presentation by 
Tom Meade included comments on the IPC proposal stating that it was important but 
should not be included in the core funding on account of the cost involved. The 
referees’ comments concerned the debate over the prospective cohort design as 
opposed to the case control study approach, the value of the IPC and the age range. 
The discussion between Tom Meade and Emily Banks reflected the issues raised by 
IBIG including the scale of the proposal, hub and spoke model, environmental 
exposures, and public acceptability. The issues raised in the confidential discussions 
between IBIG members included the lack of detailed costing in the proposal, 
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timescale, recruitment target, management and accountability rights, and the 
importance of giving research incentives to spokes (S600/176 Volume 1).  
 
HOPB 
Another internal MRC group involved in the development of UK Biobank was the 
Head Office Project Board (HOPB), which consisted of Nick Winterton as chair, 
Frances Rawle, Jane Lee, Stephane Goldstein, Don Brunston, Alison Campbell, Diana 
Dunston, Jane Gizbert, Kevin Moreton, and Ian Viney. The evidence suggests that the 
group met between 2000 and 2002, with records of the sixth meeting on the 25 
February 2001 and another on the 8
th
 of January 2002 (S600/176 Volume 1). It 
considered a range of issues relating to the establishment of UK Biobank including 
interaction with IBIG and Council regarding the funding decision meeting, 
consultations, ethical review, legal issues, financial issues, overall project planning 
post funding decision, planning for different potential outcomes, infrastructure issues 
such as the hub and spoke bidding process, appointment of committees and the CEO 
(S600/176 Volume 1), and the funding commitment of the Wellcome Trust (D550/15 
Volume 2).  
 
JFAT 
A further group involved in the set up of UK Biobank, the Joint Funders Action Team 
(JFAT), encompassed all the main funding bodies. It was composed of representatives 
from the offices of the three major funding bodies. Although its precise membership 
altered from meeting to meeting it generally involved Frances Rawle, Alan Doyle, 
Stephane Goldstein, Peter Greenaway, Jane Lee, and Karen Shaw. It met between 
September 2000 and March 2003. Evidence would suggest that the group was 
responsible for developing UK Biobank until the establishment of the hub in March 
2003, although the precise terms of reference were not available in the material I 
accessed. It addressed key issues including the funding decision, the development of 
the hub and spoke model including spoke incentives, the relationship between the hub 
and the spokes, (including financial relationship and the grant versus contract debate) 
(D550/13 Volume 1) and the role of the various committees including the PDC 
(D550/15 Volume 2).  
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JFAT produced a report on the 14
 
April 2003, ‘UK Biobank Project, Set-Up Stage 
Lessons Learned Report’, to assist in the future development of UK Biobank or other 
projects undertaken by the funding bodies. It addressed issues surrounding the 
establishment of UK Biobank including the organisational structure concluding that 
the ‘unique nature of the UK Biobank project being a tri-partite venture aimed at 
setting up a fourth and independent company may never be repeated’, and the 
adoption of the EU Procurement Rules in the selection of the spokes was described in 
the report as a ‘mistake’ (D550/18 Volume 1).  
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3.6 Implementation of the Organisational Structure (2003-2005) 
 
Introduction  
I will now provide a brief overview of the organisational structure of UK Biobank 
prior to detailing its chronological development. The funding bodies selected an 
organisational structure that consisted of three main committees and a hub and spoke 
model. They implemented this organisational structure over several years between 
2002 and 2005. The main committees were the Board of Directors (BoD), the Science 
Committee and the EGC. The hub was also known as UK Biobank Limited and the 
Central Co-ordinating Centre (CCC), and the spokes were also known as Regional 
Collaborating Centres (RCCs).  
 
Diagram 2: Organisational Structure 
 
 
The hub, based in Manchester, had overall responsibility for delivering UK Biobank 
including financial management and storage of the data and samples, and it co-
ordinated the activities of the six spokes: the spokes were Scotland, Wales, North 
West and Wessex, Central England, Fosse Way, and London. The spokes were 
responsible for recruitment and initial data and sample collection and a total of 22 
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universities were involved in the consortiums that formed them. These consortiums 
involved a wide range of academic scientists from various disciplines. The hub was 
responsible to the BoD, who were in turn accountable to the funding bodies. The 
scientific protocol was developed by the Science Committee, who served an advisory 
role to the Board. The EGC was responsible for the development of the EGF and 
advised the BoD on its implementation 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/organisation.html 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).  
 
I have divided this section into two parts; the first focuses on the ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ 
model and its implementation, and the second describes the establishment of the main 
committees.  
 
3.6.1 The ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ model (2002-2005)  
 
The organisational structure originally adopted for UK Biobank was the ‘hub’ and 
‘spoke’ model. Although this terminology changed in 2004 when the hub (also known 
as UK Biobank Limited) became the Central Coordinating Centre (CCC) and the 
spokes became Regional Collaborating Centres (RCCs), I will use the original terms. 
The ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ model was one of the most problematic issues in the origins 
and development of UK Biobank. I will address the issues involved in the 
implementation of this model throughout the findings chapters.    
 
3.6.1 (a) Hub and Spoke Selection (2002-2003) 
 
The first meeting regarding the hub and spoke bidding process was in July 2002 
between representatives of the funding bodies and organisations interested in 
becoming the hub or a spoke (D550/12 Volume 1). The hub was not involved in 
spoke selection. The funding bodies adopted EU Procurement Rules in the hub and 
spoke bidding process that forbade applicants from discussing bids.   
 
Hub Selection  
The bidding process for the UK Biobank hub formally began on the 28 October 2002, 
when representatives of the funding bodies, Frances Rawle, Alan Doyle and Peter 
Greenaway, sought expressions of interest by the 15 November 2002. The Pre 
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Qualifying Questionnaire (PQQ) included questions on administrative and sample 
storage location, academic host, track record, IT facilities, links with regional 
development authorities and costing for both administrative locations, and IT suite. 
Ten consortiums bid to be the hub: Cranfield, Bath, Nottingham, White Rose, 
Cambridge, Oxford, Birmingham/Warwick, Manchester, London, and the 
International Centre for Life at the University of Newcastle. The bidders were 
informed of the outcome of the first round process on the 9
 
January 2003 by Frances 
Rawle, Alan Doyle and Peter Greenaway. The following six bidders were short listed 
at this stage: Cambridge, Oxford, Birmingham/Warwick, Manchester, London, and 
the International Centre for Life.  The Cranfield, Bath, Nottingham and White Rose 
bids were unsuccessful (D550/12 Volume 1).  
 
Site visits were arranged with each of the successful bidders and they were given 
information about the presentations required (D550/12 Volume 1). Visits were 
conducted in January and February 2003. The Visit Team consisted of Alan Doyle, 
Peter Greenaway, Frances Rawle and further representatives from the offices of the 
funding bodies: Elizabeth Shaw from the Wellcome Trust and David Sonntag and 
Keith Tucker from the MRC. Following the site visits Manchester was chosen as the 
hub and the second round bidders were informed of this decision on the 17 March 
2003 by Mike Dexter, Peter Greenaway and George Radda. The unsuccessful bidders 
were given limited feedback on the grounds that further detail of how the bids 
compared was confidential (D550/12 Volume 1). Manchester was asked to confirm 
acceptance by the 28 March 2003, enter into negotiations and attend a press 
conference. They were informed that their selection was confidential until the press 
conference. The second choice for the location of the hub was Oxford, also notified 
on the 17 March 2003 (D550/12 Volume 1).  
 
Spoke Selection  
Thirteen consortiums were involved in the first round bidding process to become UK 
Biobank spokes: Cambridge, Fosse Way, North West, London, Wales, MRC General 
Practice Research Framework (GPRF), Scotland, North West/Wessex, North, Central 
England, West Midlands, Belfast, and Teddington. Ten were successful in making it 
through to the second round, with the West Midlands, Belfast and Teddington bids 
unsuccessful. Each of the first round bidders were sent a pre-qualification 
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questionnaire (PQQ) to be returned on the 13
 
November 2002. The questions 
concerned basic information about organisation, eligibility, economic and financial 
standing, technical ability, health and safety, and conflict of interest (D550/13 
Volume 1). Letters from Frances Rawle, Alan Doyle and Peter Greenaway were sent 
to the successful first round bidders on the 21 November 2002. They were also sent an 
Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) and informed that the bids were confidential, and should 
not be discussed between consortiums (D550/13 Volume 1). 
 
The Spoke Selection Panel was formed in February 2003. It consisted of a former 
Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for England Sir Kenneth Calman as chair, Mike 
Dexter, George Radda, Peter Greenaway, John Newton (as CEO designate prior to his 
formal appointment in March 2003), representatives from MRC Council Peter Fellner, 
Alan North and Nick Winterton (Executive Director), Wellcome Trust Governors Sir 
Michael Rutter and Edward Walker-Arnott and three representatives of the 
international peer review panel (D550/13 Volume 1). They considered the strength of 
consortium, local management, ability to deliver on recruitment, geographic and 
population coverage, contribution to the overall Biobank enterprise, and value for 
money. Further selection criteria included technical issues (recruitment and collection 
of biological samples), accommodation, financial issues (price of delivering the 
services per head of recruits), and legal issues (acceptance of draft contract 
proposals). Representatives of each of the ten second round bidders met with the 
panel in London for one hour on the 25 and 26 February 2003. The four unsuccessful 
second round bidders were Cambridge, North West, MRC GPRF and North, and the 
six successful spoke bidders were London, Wales, Scotland, Central England, North 
West and Wessex, and Fosse Way. The bidders were informed on the 17 March 2003 
in a letter from Mike Dexter, George Radda and Peter Greenaway. The letter to the 
successful bidders included acceptance terms and a list of non-negotiable issues on 
which their selection was conditional, including access terms such as the stipulation 
that there would be no preferential or early access to the resource for spokes (D550/13 
Volume 1). 
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3.6.1 (b) Implementation of the hub and spoke model (2003-2005) 
 
Establishment of the hub  
John Newton was appointed CEO of UK Biobank Limited by the funding bodies in 
March 2003. He came from the Unit of Health Care Epidemiology, Department of 
Public Health and Primary Care at the University of Oxford. He was a Consultant 
Epidemiologist and Director of Research and Development at the Oxford Radcliffe 
Hospitals NHS Trust. John Newton made his first appearance as CEO on the 7 April 
2003 at a Parliamentary and Scientific Committee event at Portcullis House 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/why.html 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).  
 
UK Biobank was incorporated as a private company limited by guarantee on the 28 
November 2003. The company, UK Biobank Limited, was registered as a charity with 
the charity commission on the 30 December 2003. The members of the company were 
the MRC and the Wellcome Trust. A Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was completed 
on the 29 January 2004 between the members of the company (Wellcome Limited as a 
trustee of the Wellcome Trust and the MRC) and UK Biobank Limited. The 
agreement was subject to a number of drafts, the first completed on the 13
 
December 
2002, the third on the 26 June 2003 and the fifth on the 14 October 2003. The JVA 
included the following sections: purpose of the company and project phases, financial 
matters, IP and access, obligations of the parties, costs, and conflict with articles. It 
detailed arrangements for the monitoring and assessment of the pilot phase. The 
criteria for judging the pilot phase included successful recruitment, the collection of 
high quality data from the NHS on the health outcomes of participants, the completion 
of recruitment on time and in budget, the secure and efficient collection and storage of 
data, and the members’ agreement of the revised protocol. The arrangements for the 
contribution of the DoHare detailed and the agreement was made that it would be 
given via the MRC (D550/17 Volume 1). 
 
Establishment of the hub and spoke relationship  
Representatives from the hub and the spokes met in Manchester on the 20 May 2003 
with representatives of the selection panel and the funding bodies to discuss the way 
forward, specifically regarding the contact between the hub and the spokes. The 
following issues were discussed: funding add-on studies, oversight body, function of 
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consortia in spokes, and communication. A RCC negotiating team was formed to 
discuss costs, non-negotiable issues in the letter of award and issues raised by them, 
and the evidence suggests they met on the 23 July 2003 (D550/10 Volume 1). 
Negotiation regarding the contract continued between 2003 and 2004 and UK 
Biobank released pre-contract funding for each of the spokes on the 26 March 2004, 
covering costs up to the value of £80,000 (D550/10 Volume 1). The evidence 
suggests that a draft contract formulated in December 2002 was amended following 
the issues raised by the spokes and other developments (such as the spokes becoming 
RCCs and the Oversight Body becoming the EGC) and circulated to the spoke leads 
from Tara Camm of the Wellcome Trust on the 8
 
April 2004. The description of the 
document changed and the April 2004 draft was described as a ‘Research Services 
Agreement’. The spokes responded to this draft on the 30 April 2004 and negotiation 
continued throughout 2004 but contracts were never signed during my period of 
research (D550/10 Volume 1).  
 
Implementation of the hub and spoke model in the Phase One Pilot Study  
The Phase One Pilot Study began in Nottingham on the 28 February 2005, following 
approval from the North West Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee (MREC). 
Further pilot studies ensued in Aberdeen, Manchester, Edinburgh, London, Oxford 
and Wales. These pilot studies were carried out to determine how a visit to a UK 
Biobank assessment centre would work and they recruited approximately 300 
volunteers in total. Various science committee subgroups recommended changes to 
the protocol for the phase one pilot studies, including new questions on diet, mental 
health, environmental exposures, a new heart measurement, and participants being 
offered a record of the measurements taken during the visit. Volunteers, largely from 
medical and university communities, answered lifestyle questions using a touch-
screen questionnaire and had their blood pressure, lung function, body fat, height and 
weight measured. (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 2005) (accessed 10/11/05).   
 
3.6.2 Establishment of Committees (2003-2004)  
 
IAG (2003) 
The IAG was established in February 2003 by the funding bodies to advise them on 
the development of the EGF. The members of the group were William Lowrance as 
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chair, Alastair Campbell,
63
 Erica Haimes, Graeme Laurie,
64
 Chris Mathew, Jean 
McHale, Onaora O’Neill, Helen Millar, Madeline Wang, and representatives from the 
funding bodies such as Joanne Sumner, Tara Camm, Alan Doyle, Peter Greenaway, 
Jane Lee, Nancy Lee, Elizabeth Mitchell, Frances Rawle, Keith Preece, and Martin 
Sexton (see Appendix A2 for members’ biographies). The representatives from the 
offices of the funding bodies changed over time. Representatives from UK Biobank, 
for example John Newton (the then CEO) and John Bell (Chair of the Science 
Committee), were invited to attend some of the meetings as observers.  
 
The IAG met three times between February 2003 and July 2003, with the second and 
third meeting spanning two days. In advising the funding bodies on the development 
of the EGF, the group debated a wide range of ethical, legal and social issues. These 
included consent, confidentiality and security, consultation, access to and use of data 
and samples, governance, recruitment, organisational structure, expectation of profit-
making use and IPR licensing and revenue-sharing arrangements, ongoing dialogue 
with participants, feedback, expectation of re-contact, right to withdraw, respect for 
incapacitated and deceased participants, contingency in the event of closure and 
adoption, implementation, and revision of EGF (D550/7 Volume 2). Documents were 
circulated to assist discussions. These included working drafts of the EGF, a note 
from John Newton on consent procedures and data flows for UK Biobank (25 March 
2003), a working draft on IPR and access arrangements (28
 
March 2003), a document 
on the relative merits of company and committee structure by Tara Camm from the 
Wellcome Trust (18 March 2003), and a comparison of the consent forms used by 
projects comparable to the UK Biobank (for example the consent forms used in the 
ALSPAC cohort study) (D550/7 Volume 1). The group was informed of the 
consultation exercises undertaken on behalf of the funding bodies, such as the Ethics 
Consultation Workshop in April 2002, which they took into account in advising the 
funding bodies (D550/7 Volume 2). The third meeting of the IAG was attended by 
representatives from the consultancy firms, including Opinion Leader Research and 
People, Science and Policy, acting as observers for discussion of their reports. The 
IAG prepared a document on the 10 October 2003 detailing the background to and 
explanation for key aspects of Version 1.0 of the EGF. 
                                                
63Chair of EGC  
64 Member of the EGC  
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The EGF was prepared and developed by the funding bodies with the advice of the 
IAG. William Lowrance and Jo Sumner were responsible for putting the draft 
framework together. It went through many drafts such as version 0.3 of the 7
 
May 
2003 and version 0.4 of the 25 June 2003 (D550/7 Volume 1). The final draft (version 
1.0) was completed on the 15 August 2003. It was circulated amongst the group on the 
19
 
August allowing for amendments to be made. It was published on the 24
 
September 2003 for a one month period of open public comments, following which it 
was revised, approved by the funding bodies and passed on to the BoD (D550/7 
Volume 2). The EGF was produced to ‘set standards’ for UK Biobank, and to ensure 
that the necessary safeguards were in place for the data and sample to be used for 
scientifically and ethically approved research only 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ethics.html 2004) (accessed 23/04/04).   
 
Science Committee (2003) 
The Science Committee was established in July 2003. It was partly composed of the 
six spoke leads, a representative from social science and a ‘lay’ representative. The 
members were John Bell as chair, Valerie Beral, Paul Burton, John Danesh, Paul 
Elliot, Hilary Graham, Bernard Keavney, Stephen Palmer, Catherine Peckham, Jill 
Pell, Mike Pringle (deputy chair), Alan Silman, John Todd and Madeleine Wang (see 
Appendix A2 for members’ biographies). Its role was to advise the BoD on the 
protocol, the direction and scientific goals of UK Biobank, and review the protocol 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science.html 2004)(accessed 23/04/04). The Science 
Committee was advised by an Integration Group, composed of the six spoke leads and 
the chair, on the progress and implementation of pilot studies.   
 
Six Science Committee subgroups were set up to develop the procedures for 
conducting UK Biobank and report to the Integration Group on the development of 
the scientific strategy.  The questionnaire subgroup, chaired by Rory Collins (Central 
England spoke member), was responsible for developing the participant 
questionnaire, and three short-term subgroups advised it on different measurements:  
environment (chaired by David Coggan, London spoke member), diet (chaired by 
Stephen Palmer, Welsh spoke lead) and cognition/psychological outcomes (chaired by 
John Gallacher, Welsh spoke member). The measurement subgroup, chaired by Paul 
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Elliot (London spoke member), was responsible for advising on the physical 
measurements to be undertaken, and a repeat measures subgroup, chaired by Paul 
Burton (Fosse Way spoke member), reported to it. The recruitment subgroup, chaired 
by Alan Silman (North West spoke member), advised on the recruitment models 
being tested. The ethnic minorities subgroup, chaired by Mark Caulfield (London 
spoke member), advised on the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority groups. 
The longitudinal follow-up subgroup, chaired by Mike Pringle (Fosse Way spoke 
member and deputy chair of Science Committee), advised on the longitudinal follow 
up using routine data sources and the validation of exposures and outcomes. The 
resource stewardship subgroup was not fully established during my period of research 
but it was proposed that it would be chaired by John Bell and responsible for advising 
on the management of and access to the resource. An Assessment Centre Delivery 
Team (ACDT), chaired by Anna Hansell (London spoke coordinator), planned the 
assessment centre roll-out. It reported to Tim Sprosen at the hub and implemented the 
strategy agreed by the Integration Group and Science Committee 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 2005) (accessed 10/11/05).   
 
BoD (2004) 
The BoD was established in January 2004. It was partly composed of representatives 
from the three major funding bodies, the science committee, the host of the hub and a 
lay representative. It consisted of Alan Langlands as chair, John Bell, Peter Benson, 
Jane Lee, Mike Pringle, Barbara Skene, David Gordon and Marc Taylor (see 
Appendix A2 for members’ biographies).65 The Board was accountable to the 
members of UK Biobank Limited (MRC and Wellcome Trust) and acted as company 
directors and charity trustees. It was responsible for the overall direction, management 
and control of UK Biobank Limited, and had three committees: science committee, 
audit committee and the remuneration committee. The first meeting was on the 29
 
January 2004 in which it agreed the terms upon which the MRC and the Wellcome 
Trust would provide funding for UK Biobank 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/organisation.html 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).   
 
 
                                                
65 Marc Taylor replaced Peter Greenaway who retired from the DoH in July 2004 
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EGC (2004) 
The EGC was established in November 2004. The membership was Alastair 
Campbell as chair (appointed in August 2004), Andrea Cook, Jayam Dalal, Baroness 
Finlay of Llandaff, Roger Higgs, Ian Hughes, Clara Mackay, Sheila McLean, Sally 
Smith, Sandy Thomas, and Christopher Wild (see Appendix A2 for members’ 
biographies). They were appointed by an Independent Appointments Committee made 
up of Rev John Polkinghorne (Chair), Martin Bobrow, Niall Dickson, William 
Lowrance, and Genevra Richardson. It met on four occasions between November 
2004 and August 2005 (http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/index.html 2005) (accessed 
10/11/05). 
 
The EGC was formed to serve as an ‘independent guardian’ of the EGF and to advise 
the BoD on its revision. It had an advisory capacity on the interests of participants and 
the general public regarding UK Biobank. The EGC would monitor the conformity of 
UK Biobank with the framework, reporting publicly on such conformity 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/index.html 2005) (accessed 10/11/05).  
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3.7 Organisational Change (2004-2005)  
 
The organisational structure of UK Biobank underwent significant changes in 2005, 
sparked partly by the resignation of John Newton as CEO of UK Biobank Limited on 
the 13 December 2004. Following his resignation, John Newton continued to 
represent UK Biobank at external meetings and events until March 2005. Tim 
Peakman was appointed acting CEO on the 17
 
January 2005, until a replacement was 
found (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk 2005) (accessed 10/11/05). 
 
3.7.1 Appointment of CEO and PI (2005)  
 
Rory Collins was appointed CEO and PI of UK Biobank on the 8 August 2005, taking 
up the position formally on the 1 September 2005. Rory Collins was the Professor of 
Medicine and Epidemiology at the University of Oxford, a British Heart Foundation 
Professor and Co-director of the Clinical Trial Service Unit and the Epidemiological 
Studies Unit in Oxford. He continued in these roles and committed 60% of his time to 
his new position. He provided overall scientific leadership and as PI was responsible 
for finalising the protocol and implementing UK Biobank. The acting CEO, Tim 
Peakman, was appointed Executive Director also on the 8 August 2005 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/news/pr/8aug05.php 2005) (accessed 10/11/05).    
 
3.7.2 Organisational Changes (2005) 
 
Following the appointment of Rory Collins the function of various groups and 
committees changed, the most significant being the function of the spokes. They were 
no longer responsible for recruitment and initial data and sample collection, which 
was to be managed centrally via the hub. Instead spokes were given the opportunity to 
compete for contracts to carry out various operational aspects, such as managing the 
call centre or training research nurses.  
 
The Science Committee was disbanded and responsibility for developing the scientific 
protocol was given to a newly formed Implementation Group, composed of the six 
spoke leads and Rory Collins. It was this group, led by Rory Collins as CEO and PI, 
which had overall responsibility for delivering UK Biobank. According to the press 
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release issued on his appointment Rory Collins will ‘lead and draw expert advice and 
support from a new Regional Investigators’ Group comprising senior scientists from a 
series of Regional Collaborating Centres made up of groups of universities and 
medical schools’ (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/news/pr/8aug05.php 2005) (accessed 
10/11/05).   
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3.8 Key Observations  
 
I will now present key observations from this account of the chronology of UK 
Biobank. These observations are highly relevant in the origins and development of 
UK Biobank and are explored throughout the findings chapters.   
 
UK Biobank’s timing is in itself a source of controversy as it was marred by 
considerable delays. The original organisational structure was hampered by a series of 
delays in its development such as the appointment of the BoD, the Science 
Committee, the CEO, the hub and the spokes and the pilot studies, and most 
significantly recruitment. As we can see from the following table each of these 
milestones was delayed.  
 
Table 4: Projected Targets and Actual Achievements66  
 Projected Actual 
BoD established Mid 2002 January 2004 
Science Comm. established Mid 2002 July 2003 
CEO recruitment  Mid 2002 March 2003 
Hub and Spoke selection Mid 2002 March 2003 
Pilot Studies End 2002 February 2005 
Recruitment  Mid 2003 February 2007 
 
There was a certain amount of confusion surrounding the origins of the hub and spoke 
model, which is reflected in the sequence of events by which it was established. For 
example, the hub and spokes were appointed simultaneously, which added to the 
general confusion as the relationship between the two unfolded. The overall 
governing body, the BoD, was established long after the hub that it would lead. The 
hub and spoke model was a source of controversy throughout the origins and 
development of UK Biobank. The spokes’ role in UK Biobank was never formally 
agreed and individual spoke membership was fluid. Unfortunately, there was no 
documentation in the material I analysed of any debate regarding the selection of the 
hub and spoke model. I am therefore unable to comment on who selected the model, 
why it was chosen and what alternatives were considered (see 7.3.2 for speculations 
                                                
66Projected targets are taken from the 2002 Draft Protocol ‘Protocol for the UK Biobank A study of 
genes, environment and health’  
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regarding selection of the hub and spoke model). The model was however an early 
and integral part of the origins of UK Biobank and was cited in the initial protocol in 
2001. The organisational changes exacerbated existing tensions between spoke 
members and representatives of the hub and funding bodies. A large number of 
academic scientists were involved in each of the six spokes and they included 
scientists of considerable stature. For example, the Scottish RCC included 19 senior 
academic scientists. Following two years of ongoing protocol development and 
contract negotiation, their original role ceased. The problematic nature of the original 
organisational structure is reflected in the fact that contracts between the hub and the 
spokes were never signed, participants were not recruited under that model, and 
organisational changes took place in 2005. 
 
The proposal for UK Biobank was considerably developed after internal consideration 
within and between the funding bodies and consultation with the EWG, prior to the 
establishment of the PDC. The funding bodies undertook and commissioned 
numerous consultation exercises with the public and interest groups on ethical issues. 
The former leaders of the MRC and the Wellcome Trust and senior scientists within 
the funding bodies were strong advocates and their support for the resource was 
instrumental in its establishment. Their backing was secured before many of the 
academic scientists who would develop and implement UK Biobank were even aware 
of it. For example, the first official workshop between the MRC and the Wellcome 
Trust regarding what became UK Biobank took place in May 1999 and they agreed in 
principal to fund UK Biobank proposal in June 2000. On the other hand, the PDC was 
not established until May 2001 and the hub and spokes were not selected until March 
2003. The funding bodies therefore sought to develop UK Biobank collaboratively 
only after having decided to fund it (albeit provisionally). Consultation undertaken 
with academic scientists in protocol development, for example, was limited by the 
fact that the funding bodies had decided to fund UK Biobank provisionally before the 
establishment of the PDC.   
 
Leadership was a key issue in the difficulties of the original organisational structure 
as no individual was identifiable as a leader or scientific champion of the resource. 
Those individuals so prominent in the origins of UK Biobank who were responsible 
for getting it underway did not remain involved in the resource. For example, the then 
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leaders of the MRC and Wellcome Trust, Sir George Radda and Dr Mike Dexter and 
a senior scientist who led the EWG and the PDC, Tom Meade, were all near 
retirement when they became involved in UK Biobank and retired after the funding 
decision in 2002. As John Newton emerged as CEO around the same time that the 
hub, spokes and Science Committee were set up, his appointment was made amidst 
confusion regarding their respective roles. Furthermore because the hub’s immediate 
authoritative body, the BoD, was not appointed until January 2004 John Newton did 
not have the support of an established infrastructure or funding bodies with which to 
lead UK Biobank.  
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Chapter 4 
 
‘It’s not done in the normal way’ [025, p. 36; p. 4] 
 
Emergent Issues: ‘Standard Academic Scientific Practice’ 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Academic scientists, specifically previous and current committee members and spoke 
members, criticised the establishment of UK Biobank for departing from what I have 
termed ‘standard academic scientific practice’. Representatives of the funding bodies 
or UK Biobank Limited only referred to standard academic scientific practice when 
discussing the nature and process of the organisational changes in 2005. Academic 
scientists pointed to the following events and issues that demonstrated departure: 
protocol development, funding, development of the EGF, leadership, organisational 
structure, and the organisational changes. This chapter will address these events and 
issues in analysing portrayals of the establishment of UK Biobank as departing from 
standard academic scientific practice. I will present these events and issues 
chronologically. To recap briefly, following evaluation of the initial scientific 
protocol, the funding bodies decided to fund UK Biobank in March 2002. Once the 
funding decision was taken the protocol continued to be developed in tandem with the 
EGF, the CEO was appointed and the organisational structure was set up. The 
organisational structure was changed following the appointment of Rory Collins as 
CEO and PI in August 2005. In addressing these events and issues, I will examine the 
meanings attached to standard academic scientific practice and the perceived 
consequences of departure from it. First, I will explore academic scientists’ 
definitions of standard academic scientific practice. 
 
Definitions of Standard Academic Scientific Practice 
Members of the academic scientific community rarely explicitly defined standard 
academic scientific practice. This is surprising given the extent to which they referred 
to it. There was an assumption of a shared and singular understanding of the term, as 
if it did not need definition or explanation. However, it was clear that academic 
scientists were not referring to a single model, but rather a range of models.  For 
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example, some described it as response-mode funding where scientists put forward 
proposals to funding bodies. These proposals are peer-reviewed and the funding body, 
usually a committee made up of scientific peers, decides whether to fund it. Others 
articulated standard academic scientific practice as scientists responding to a call for 
proposals on a specific area, selected by the funding bodies. ‘Commissioning’, 
whereby scientists would compete to carry out a research proposal designed by the 
funding bodies was also referred to as standard academic scientific practice.  
 
Academic scientists more commonly articulated what standard academic scientific 
practice was not. In doing so, they defined it by its difference from a ‘business 
model’, which was also not explicitly articulated and was assumed to be a single 
model. Spoke members particularly adopted the term to distinguish the establishment 
of UK Biobank from standard academic scientific practice. They associated aspects of 
the establishment of UK Biobank with which they were not familiar, such as the 
setting up of the hub as a company (UK Biobank Limited) and the recruitment of a 
CEO with the business model. Spoke members identified themselves as the academic 
scientific community and the business community as representatives of UK Biobank 
Limited (the hub). The hub and spoke model was seen to therefore reflect a 
convergence of these different groups (academic scientists and business people) and 
was therefore a major issue in academic scientists’ perception of the establishment of 
UK Biobank as departing from standard academic scientific practice.  
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4.2 Protocol Development  
‘The protocol left unresolved a whole series of issues’ [070, p. 109; p. 10]  
Academic scientists criticised initial and ongoing protocol development for 
representing a departure from standard academic scientific practice. They criticised 
the initial protocol for its lack of detail and attributed its consequent ongoing 
development to key difficulties in the origins and development of UK Biobank, 
particularly time delays and decision making. For example, a member of the BoD 
stated: ‘the protocol left unresolved a whole series of issues, not least age range, the 
nature of information that was going to be asked from patients, the method of 
recruitment’ [070, p. 109; p. 10]. He commented on the resulting difficulties in 
reaching consensus: ‘All those questions were controversial ones which people can 
argue about until the cows come home and do argue about’ [070, p. 109; p. 10]. Some 
academic scientists felt that the protocol should have been decided prior to wide-scale 
consultation amongst the various committees. This perception is contrary to that of 
the funding bodies who decided that spoke members should be involved in ongoing 
protocol development. 
  
4.2.1 The purpose of the protocol  
 
Academic scientists contrasted the purpose of the initial protocol with standard 
academic scientific practice in that a complete protocol was not required for the 
funding decision. They felt that the initial protocol was developed to secure funding 
rather than, as in standard academic scientific practice, to detail how the resource 
would be delivered and on that basis secure funding. For example, a member of the 
BoD stated:  
we ended up with a protocol which was a protocol to get the funding and 
wasn’t the science protocol that was actually going to be carried out and so 
we’ve spent the last year and a half writing the protocol for the study [070, p. 
110; p. 11].  
Academic scientists attributed this alleged deviation from standard academic 
scientific practice to the purportedly over-involved role of the funding bodies in UK 
Biobank, which they felt was unusual. They argued that traditionally scientists would 
be more involved than the funding bodies in developing the idea for an initiative. For 
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example, a spoke member said: ‘you have an idea, you apply for a grant, if they think 
it’s a good idea you get it whereas here the MRC and the Wellcome Trust decided 
they’re going to fund the project and they asked people to apply to take part in it’ 
[0502, p. 176; p. 3]. This is an articulation of standard academic scientific practice as 
response-mode funding. Academic scientists criticised the approach for representing 
the funding bodies’ commitment to the resource prior to that of the wider academic 
scientific community. For example, a member of the EWG remarked:  
you also are in a slightly different sort of situation when the funding agencies 
have expressed an interest before anyone has come up with a protocol…it’s 
not that the funding agencies thought of it, epidemiologists partly thought of it 
but nevertheless they didn’t just come in and say here is a good idea and we 
want money, they just said do you think this is a good idea and then it became 
a much more interactive thing [061, p. 96; p. 5].   
They also criticised the Biobank approach for not allowing as full an evaluation of the 
merits of the idea as there would have been if it had followed the standard approach of 
making the funding decision on the production of a complete protocol. For example a 
spoke member stated: 
it seems a little, you know, back to front in as much as that what would 
normally happen with a scientific idea for a project would be that somebody 
puts together a protocol, it’s subjected to proper peer review and then on the 
basis of that it’s decided whether or not this project is a good idea for 
somebody with money to spend their money on. In a way what happened with 
Biobank was it was decided that it was a good idea and somebody was going 
to spend on it and then we had to develop a protocol [0105, p. 141; p. 6].  
Similarly, a member of the PDC argued that committing funds in principle prior to the 
production of the initial protocol was detrimental to the process of protocol 
development:  
it was probably lacking the sort of ambitious senior input that you would have 
got had we been applying for money but the money was already there on the 
table and we were just writing the protocol for something that was there [024, 
p. 32; p. 3].  
 
However, some academic scientists defended the commitment of funds, in principle 
and actuality, prior to the development of a final protocol as indicative of standard 
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academic scientific practice, which reflects multiple understandings of the concept. 
They referred to the difficulty of setting up such a resource without the commitment 
of funds. For example a member of the EWG stated:  
I think that’s the way these things happen. I’ve been involved in discussions 
about the setting up of other big studies and to start off with you have to 
develop a proposal really and you haven’t got the funds to set up a centre to 
actually do anything in practice and that’s what the proposal is all about. It’s 
to get the funds going for all that to happen. So I don’t think there’s anything 
surprising about that [060, p. 92; p. 3]. 
 
4.2.2 Consultation undertaken in protocol development  
 
Academic scientists criticised the consultation undertaken with the academic 
scientific community, in initial protocol development prior to the funding decision, 
and ongoing protocol development following the funding decision, as departing from 
standard academic scientific practice.  It is interesting to compare the opinions of 
academic scientists involved in initial protocol development (PDC members) with 
those involved in ongoing protocol development (spoke members) on the consultation 
undertaken in protocol development. 
 
Regarding initial protocol development prior to the funding decision, members of the 
PDC felt that key decisions, such as sample size and age range, were decided prior to 
their establishment. They contrasted this with perceived standard academic scientific 
practice where a group like theirs would form and design the entire protocol 
independently without direction. For example, a member of the PDC commented on 
the didactic nature of the consultation with the Committee: ‘we were told “you will 
design a protocol. This is the study. It must be half a million. It must address A, B and 
C” so it was almost a study written by the chief executive’ [024, p. 32; p. 3]. They 
presented the ‘normal’ way in which protocols are developed as an intrinsic feature of 
the academic scientific community. Again, we see the perception that a single model 
of standard academic scientific practice exists where protocols are developed 
independently by the scientific community.  For example, 024 continued: 
That’s a very unusual way of doing things. We are normally used to the 
situation where a group of scientists would come to
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protocol, the suggestions and apply for the money. This was sort of the 
reverse, so it was difficult. When it eventually went to international reviewers 
there wasn’t a uniform agreement that all the things were right and this is 
because it was driven and organised in a slightly strange, unusual for the 
scientific community, fashion [024, p. 32; p. 3].  
Members of the PDC implicated senior figures in the funding bodies in making key 
protocol decisions prior to any consultation. For example, a member of the scientific 
community outwith UK Biobank stated: ‘it’s been set up and managed along the lines 
of something where the decision to do a study has been taken from above as it were 
and then it was fulfilling the requirements that had basically been decided’ [0700, p. 
189; p. 2].  
 
The minutes of the PDC meetings reflect the extent to which certain issues were up 
for debate, the difficulties faced by the committee in reaching consensus and the 
resulting tensions. One such issue was sample size. There was a view in the PDC that 
senior representatives of the funding bodies decided on the sample size prior to 
consultation with the Committee. For example, in the minutes of the third meeting a 
query regarding the merits of ‘fixing the sample size at this stage’ received the reply 
that ‘a great deal of work had gone in to the earlier estimates of sample size with an 
expert group led by Nick Day’ [D550/33 Volume 2]. The PDC was aware even earlier 
of the perception that the protocol was agreed prior to their establishment and 
expressed unease accordingly. This unease is evident in the minutes of the second 
meeting of the committee. Members voiced concern that the draft report of the 
Protocol Development Workshop [a consultation exercise undertaken with the wider 
academic scientific community] ‘gave the impression that outcomes were definite 
decisions instead of recommendations’. It was agreed that the preface to the report 
should  
emphasise that nothing within the recommendations arising from the 
workshop was proscriptive and the responsibility for deciding which 
recommendations could and should be implemented rested with the Protocol 
Development Committee [S600/174 Volume 1].  
The tension resulting from the perception that key aspects of the protocol were 
decided prior to the establishment of the PDC is evident, and members of the 
Committee consequently challenged the validity of the consultation undertaken with 
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them. For example, on 16 November 2001 (prior to the fifth and final meeting of the 
PDC) a PDC member wrote a letter recommending the inclusion of the following 
paragraph in the covering letter to the international peer review panel: ‘[t]he PDC has 
worked under firm guidelines from the funders that the framework should be based on 
an achieved sample of about 500,000 middle-aged adults all of whom are assessed in 
a similar manner’ [S600/174 Volume 1]. 
 
The initial protocol continued to be developed following the disbandment of the PDC, 
the funding decision and hub and spoke selection. Spoke members criticised ongoing 
protocol development for departing from standard academic scientific practice for 
different reasons. On the one hand, spoke members criticised ongoing protocol 
development, feeling that the protocol should have been agreed prior to their 
selection. On the other, they criticised ongoing development because of the perceived 
lack of consultation with them in developing a protocol that they would be 
responsible for implementing. They described feeling a lack of identity with the 
protocol as a result of insufficient consultation, for example, a spoke member said:  
it seemed to have been done remotely and distantly from the scientific 
community. It’s been done somewhere centrally by a committee and I suppose 
that is necessary because somebody has to take forward the agenda but I don’t 
have a strong sense of identity with the scientific protocol [0104, p. 139; p. 4]. 
This criticism of a lack of involvement and connection with the protocol reflects 
tensions between the hub and the spokes. For example 0104 continued:  
normally in developing a protocol you would do that in conjunction with your 
research team and there’s not that sense, I mean there’s a sense at the lowest 
level, which, you know, the RCCs are really just data collection houses rather 
than people who are in their own right senior researchers who are able to give 
specific advice to the project and I’m not sure that’s been fully capitalised on 
[0104, p. 139; p. 4].  
The first group argued that standard academic scientific practice dictates that the 
protocol would be finalised prior to spoke selection and therefore spoke members 
would not be involved in its development. The latter group argued that standard 
academic scientific practice dictates that those responsible for implementing the 
protocol would be intimately involved in developing it. Spoke members referred to 
standard academic scientific practice as a single model yet they articulated it in 
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opposing ways. This mirrors different articulations of the commitment of funds prior 
to final protocol development as representing both adherence to and departure from 
standard academic scientific practice. 
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4.3 Funding  
‘People saw it as a cuckoo in a nest competing with this supply of money 
for their bread and butter projects’ [010, p. 1; p. 2] 
The central paradigm of standard academic scientific practice as ‘good practice’ is 
evident in academic scientists’ criticisms of the funding of UK Biobank, the 
calculation of the funding figure and the role of the funding bodies as being contrary 
to standard academic scientific practice.  
 
4.3.1 The funding of UK Biobank   
 
Academic scientists and some representatives of UK Biobank Limited felt that 
funding UK Biobank at all was contrary to standard academic scientific practice 
because of its nature. They distinguished UK Biobank-type initiatives from more 
traditional research activities on account of their long-term, prospective nature, scale 
and potential to address a range of conditions. Academic scientists and some 
representatives of UK Biobank Limited articulated standard research as short-term, 
supported by a single institution, focussed on a single condition and designed with a 
specific hypothesis in mind. For example, a member of UK Biobank Limited 
commented:  
it’s always very difficult to get funding for infrastructure projects…whereas if 
you put together a small project which has a three-year cycle to it and a 
research paper at the end of it, everybody can understand it and it gets funded, 
so I think there’s a cycle of funding [010, p. 1; p. 2].  
They associated the nature and convergence of the funding bodies involved in UK 
Biobank, in terms of their scale and prestige, as a departure from standard academic 
scientific practice. For example, the member of UK Biobank Limited contrasted the 
funding of UK Biobank with the usual pattern of research funding in the UK:  
research funding in the UK has painted itself into a corner, which is a 
relatively small number of universities doing a lot of work on a small number 
of problems and they get a lot of the funding and what Biobank has done is to 
produce a resource which is of very high quality and is funded by the blue 
chip funders and yet is able to address any common disease [010, p. 1; p. 2].  
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Representatives of UK Biobank Limited and some current committee members 
attributed academic scientists’ criticism of UK Biobank to the fact that it represented 
the type of research not traditionally funded and fears that it would negatively affect 
the funding of other research. For example, 010 continued: ‘people saw it as a cuckoo 
in a nest competing with this supply of money for their bread and butter projects and 
in fact it was a misapprehension’ [010, p. 1; p. 2]. They attributed hostility toward UK 
Biobank to such lack of familiarity with UK Biobank-type initiatives. For example, a 
member of the BoD remarked: ‘these big genetic epidemiology studies are a little bit 
out of the mainstream biomedical sciences, some of the mainstream scientists 
probably would have looked on it with a bit of suspicion’ [013, p. 15; p. 1].   
 
4.3.2 Calculation of the funding figure  
 
All constituent groups of interviewees debated the purpose of the initial funding 
figure. Some academic scientists criticised it and thought it was inadequate because it 
did not include the complete costs for UK Biobank, including follow-up of 
participants and the costs of genotyping every sample. Other academic scientists 
defended the initial funding figure arguing that it should not project the entire costings 
for the resource over its existence, but should just estimate the costs of setting up the 
resource. Hence, the calculation of an accurate and complete figure was not as 
important. Proponents of the latter argument acknowledged the inadequacy of the 
funding figure in covering all costs associated with the resource in the long-term, but 
stressed that future funding would meet such costs. For example a member of the 
BoD remarked:  
the point in which to argue that is when the whole study is successfully 
underway, when we are beginning to see some early results and I think there 
will be a moment when a lot of the other big funders of science and medicine 
projects will come behind this. I don’t think we could ask any more of the 
funders than the contributions made at the moment…now is not the time to 
ask for more, the time to ask for more is when the project is in full swing [013, 
p. 16; p. 5].  
Similarly, a member of the EWG defended the funding figure by reflecting on its 
purpose:  
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It’s a perfectly adequate amount of money to see whether it is possible to set 
up and run this study. It is clearly not an adequate amount of money to follow 
that group of people for 25 or 30 years and do all the genotyping. It was never 
intended to do so [061, p. 98; p. 9]. 
Each argument was supported by reference to standard academic scientific practice. 
Academic scientists criticised the funding figure for departing from standard 
academic scientific practice as it did not include the complete costs for the resource. 
Others defended the funding figure for adhering to standard academic scientific 
practice because it did not include the complete costs for the resource. For example, 
the member of the EWG commented: ‘That is a standard model for funding any very 
long-term programme. Only a fool would make a commitment to funding it for the 
next 30 years, just not sensible’ [061, p. 98; p. 10]. This analysis illustrates confusion 
over the nature of standard academic scientific practice as the calculation of the 
funding figure is felt to represent both adherence to and departure from it for the same 
reason.  
 
A key part of this debate that further polarised opinion amongst academic scientists 
was the extent to which an accurate initial funding figure could be calculated. Some 
academic scientists who defended the funding figure argued that it was not possible to 
calculate the complete costs of UK Biobank. For example, a member of the Science 
Committee stated: ‘nobody knows what the budget of this is going to be because we 
won’t know until we do the pilots’ [012, p.13; p. 5]. Those critical of the figure 
argued it was not only possible but of utmost importance to calculate the complete 
costs of UK Biobank and they viewed the failure to do so with suspicion. For 
example, a member of the PDC argued that:  
They could have done a much better job with the overall costs but they should 
have been honest and upfront about the genotyping costs and if they had it 
would have been very clearly well over a hundred million, probably several 
hundreds of millions to complete this project [051, p. 84; p. 14].  
  
4.3.3 Role of the funding bodies  
 
Academic scientists expressed concern that the funding bodies were taking too active 
a role in UK Biobank. For example a spoke member remarked: ‘It’s a bit shady 
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because their names are there as observers but they’re clearly not’ [025, p. 34; p. 5]. 
They contrasted their role in UK Biobank with that traditionally undertaken by 
funding bodies in research activities. Academic scientists argued that by adopting a 
more involved position than usual the funding bodies, as opposed to the scientists, 
were in control of UK Biobank. They contrasted this with standard academic 
scientific practice where the scientists, particularly a PI, would be in control and 
viewed this alleged departure with suspicion. For example 025 continued:  
In normal studies the funders make an agreement to give a grant and then they 
leave the project to the scientific investigator who is then charged with the 
responsibility of delivering upon it…the funders are clearly far, far, far more 
involved than any other study of its kind and not always up front either [025, 
p. 35; p. 5].  
Academic scientists accused the funding bodies of creating confusion about 
ownership of UK Biobank by being so involved. For example a spoke member 
reflected:  
It is a strange set up as usually funding takes two forms: the idea is approved 
and people are given the money to do it or (mostly in the private sector) 
funders give people the money to manage the project but it is still their project. 
UK Biobank is trying to do both. It invited investigators to take part but the 
funders have not allowed them the authority to take care of the science [030, p. 
42; p. 3].  
This quotation also illustrates the different articulations of standard academic 
scientific practice. Usually academic scientists defined it as a single model whereas 
here the interviewee defined it in two ways, as response-mode funding and 
commissioning.  
 
Some academic scientists justified the unusual role of the funding bodies because of 
the nature of UK Biobank itself which, given its scale, profile and sensitivities 
surrounding the field was felt to deviate from standard research activity. They argued 
that the role undertaken by the funding bodies mirrored the unusual nature of the 
resource. For example, a spoke member commented:  
there was a slight amount of nervousness from the stakeholders about the 
public perception of this project… [they were] quite concerned about not 
being tarnished in any way by being associated with a project that was going 
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to be a major barrier or stir up a lot of concerns about ethics [080, p. 121; p. 
8]. 
Academic scientists further justified the role undertaken by the funding bodies on 
account of their stature and responsibilities. For example, the size of the financial 
investment was felt to warrant such a role, as a member of the EWG stated: ‘If you 
take a single investment the risk of failure is too high to have it anything other than 
under close management scrutiny’ [062, p. 102; p. 7]. They further stressed the 
funders’ social and scientific responsibilities as an explanation for their role. For 
example, a member of the BoD remarked: ‘they’ve got to be accountable…the 
funders have a responsibility to taxpayers, to their trustees, to politicians and to the 
public generally’ [070, p. 108; p. 9] and a spoke member commented on: ‘the need to 
defend what they’re doing against the possible moans or complaints from researchers 
who can’t get money from them for other projects’ [0200, p. 145; p. 4]. 
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4.4 Development of EGF  
‘It’s good that they were trying to sort of tackle all these elements 
together rather than just sort of tagging on the law, ethics and social bit at 
the end, which so often happens’ [091, p. 127; p. 2] 
The central paradigm of standard academic scientific practice as ‘good practice’ was 
complicated by perceptions of the development of the EGF. Members of the IAG and 
the EGC praised the development of the EGF in tandem with the initial scientific 
protocol for departing from standard academic scientific practice.  
 
4.4.1 Support for EGF development in tandem with protocol development  
 
Members of the IAG and EGC welcomed the development of the EGF in tandem with 
the protocol as demonstrating the appropriate message to the public and commitment 
to ethical, legal and social issues. They felt that it showed the public that ethical, legal 
and social issues were as significant as scientific issues. For example, a member of the 
IAG stated: ‘in terms of the impression that the funders are giving to the public and to 
others it’s very important to say “We are open and responsive to suggestions as to 
how we can best set up this framework’’ [091, p. 127; p. 2]. IAG and EGC members 
presented the establishment of UK Biobank as departing from standard academic 
scientific practice whereby ethical, legal and social issues would be considered 
following the resolution of scientific issues. For example 091 said: ‘it’s good that they 
were trying to sort of tackle all these elements together rather than just sort of tagging 
on the law, ethics and social bit at the end, which so often happens’ [091, p. 127; p. 
2]. They criticised standard academic scientific practice as demonstrating a lesser 
commitment to ethical, legal and social issues than to scientific ones. For example, a 
member of the EGC praised the approach adopted because it:  
accords the ethical and legal stuff a level of importance in the organisation that 
you don’t always see…they usually tack it on at the end whereas this has been 
as carefully thought out as the scientific stuff which I think is actually quite 
unusual [0400, p. 167; p. 6].  
Members of the IAG and EGC further criticised standard academic scientific practice 
with reference to the consideration of ethical, legal and social issues in the HGP, 
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which was presented as representative of the standard approach. Interviewee 0400 
went on to contrast the approaches:  
it’s not all that common for big ventures of this sort to take ethical, legal 
governance quite so seriously…although with the human genome project for 
example the Americans put all this money into ethical, social and legal issues 
but in fact it was 3% of their budget and it really didn’t produce anything very 
interesting because it was just commissioned research from various people 
[0400, p. 166; p. 7]. 
  
4.4.2 Difficulties of EGF development in tandem with protocol development 
 
IAG and EGC members did however acknowledge the difficulties of developing the 
EGF in tandem with the scientific protocol, especially to a protocol that was itself 
evolving. For example, a member of the IAG stated:  
one of the biggest problems was not being completely clear about the 
scientific basis for the project before they started looking to pull in other areas 
of expertise such as legal, social and ethical and looking at the practicalities 
[091, p. 127; p. 1].  
They felt that the problematic nature of protocol development contributed to the 
difficulties of the approach, for example the interviewee continued:   
the main driver was the science and because the science committee kept 
revisiting issues and there was lots of outside input and criticism that kept 
being revisited, which then had a necessary impact on the other areas and that 
therefore became quite difficult to coordinate [091, p. 127; p. 2].  
Members of the IAG and EGC attributed the shortcomings of the EGF, namely its 
lack of detail on particular issues, to it being developed in tandem with the scientific 
protocol. A member of the IAG reflected on this:  
That’s why the framework doesn’t give much advice on such things as the IT 
system or on anonymisation of data or things like that because we simply 
didn’t know what might be considered from a technical point of view [090, p. 
123; p. 13].  
 
Members of the IAG reflected upon how they foresaw the difficulties associated with 
developing an ethical response to a changing scientific protocol and took steps to 
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address them. For example, they invited representatives from the funding bodies and 
the Science Committee to attend their meetings. This demonstrates the importance 
given to communication between the groups in developing their respective documents 
(the EGF and the protocol), given their evolving nature. IAG members stressed the 
significance of representation from the funding bodies and the Science Committee in 
informing their deliberations. They also stressed how they had invited such 
representation to their meetings rather than it being imposed upon them. For example 
a member of the IAG stated:  
we ourselves invited the funders to send representatives to our meeting. They 
had initially said “We think this ought to be independent” we said “we are 
grown-ups and we will maintain our independence, don’t worry about that but 
we don’t believe we can operate in a vacuum because you the funders are 
barging ahead setting up Biobank you know an awful lot more about it that we 
just simply don’t know” [090, p. 123; p. 8].  
Members of the IAG did however acknowledge the difficulties of this interaction 
between them and representatives of Science Committee. They presented the 
difficulties as resulting from the differences between the IAG and the Science 
Committee in terms of academic discipline, which were exacerbated by the evolving 
nature of the protocol. For example, another member of the IAG remarked:  
I certainly felt that the science committee was this sort of amorphous body 
“over there” and the occasional person would come in and talk to us about it 
and we could ask him all the questions we wanted but it still kind of felt we 
don’t really know what is going on over there [091, p. 127; p. 14].  
 
Despite the difficulties associated with the development of the EGF in tandem with 
the scientific protocol, support for the strategy was maintained. IAG members related 
the difficulties to the fact that the approach was novel rather than any intrinsic flaws 
with it. They stressed the need to refine the approach to address these difficulties, 
given the benefits associated with it. For example, a member of the IAG reflected:  
I wholly approve of trying to deal with all these elements at the same time, I 
think for future lessons more thought is required as to how does one actually 
time these issues because we said on numerous occasions “Well from what 
you’re telling us just now this is what we recommend but if this changes, well, 
then our recommendations might change” [091, p. 127; p. 8].  
 172  
Interestingly, some members of the IAG downplayed the difficulties associated with 
the approach by minimising the extent to which it did depart from standard academic 
scientific practice, which represents an attempt to divert criticism of the approach. 
Hence we see a return to the familiar central paradigm of standard academic scientific 
practice as ‘good practice’. For example, a member of the IAG remarked:  
some people thought that the interim advisory group was set up far too early, 
we should have been established much later when the science was clear and 
the board had worked and all that. Other people said “Too bad this group’s 
been set up too late because these ethics issues and so on need to get sorted out 
before the science committee gets started”. We just said “Look this is not 
unusual in a start-up, we are where we are, we think we can do some good, so 
we will advise and we will develop the framework and will propose a 
framework to the funders”. You often in advising have to deal with 
uncertainties and we did [090, p. 124; p. 13].  
 
Although academic scientists not directly involved in the consideration of ethical, 
legal and social issues and representatives of UK Biobank Limited commented less on 
the development of the EGF in tandem with the protocol they criticised the approach. 
They felt that addressing the ethical, legal and social issues at the time they did 
delayed the development of UK Biobank generally, particularly the completion of the 
protocol and the establishment of the organisational structure. For example, a member 
of UK Biobank Limited remarked: ‘essentially what they did was to stop all work on 
the science and do the ethics and governance framework and that distracted them and 
I’m sure that was seen as the major thing to get done’ [010, p. 4; p. 13]. 
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4.5 Leadership  
‘Every other study always has a principal investigator or a team of 
principal investigators who are responsible for everything from the 
budget to design. Here it’s not even clear who is responsible for anything’ 
[025, p. 37; p. 5] 
Academic scientists criticised the leadership of UK Biobank, particularly the lack of a 
PI as contrary to standard academic scientific practice. Similar to their criticism of the 
role of the funding bodies, some academic scientists sought to rationalise the 
approach taken whilst underlining their disapproval.  
 
4.5.1 Lack of a PI 
 
Spoke members and current committee members in particular connected the lack of a 
leader equivalent to a PI with the lack of a single decision-maker responsible for 
taking UK Biobank forward. For example, a spoke member remarked: 
Every other study always has a Principal Investigator or a team of Principal 
Investigators who are responsible for everything from the budget to design. 
Here it’s not even clear who is responsible for anything. You might think the 
Science Committee is responsible for the science but you can’t actually do the 
science without the budget so if the budget’s held at the BoD then naturally 
you’ve got a mismatch, you’ve got a problem [025, p. 37; p. 5].  
They associated the organisational structure of Biobank, specifically the hub and 
spoke model, with this perceived lack of leadership. For example, a spoke member 
commented: ‘it’s not done in the normal way where we have either one or a few 
senior leaders who are wholly responsible’ [025, p. 36; p. 4]. Similarly, a member of 
the Science Committee stated: 
most of these studies are run by one group they just get on and run the 
study…this is being run by six groups plus a hub and it makes it much more 
difficult to manage…the other way to do it would have been to say “right, 
we’re going to give this guy X amount of money to do the study and let him 
get on with it” [012 p. 13; p. 8]  
He defended this departure from the norm because he felt that UK Biobank itself 
departed from standard research in terms of its scale, but stressed the difficulties 
caused by this approach, specifically of such wide-scale consultation: ‘they needed 
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this to be seen as a truly national programme. I mean there’s a good reason for it to be 
but it’s just if you’re going to do it without all the peripheral issues, you just choose 
one guy and say ‘get on and do it’’ [012, p. 14; p. 8].  
 
Spoke members criticised the hub and spoke model for representing a convergence of 
the academic scientific community and business community in contrast to standard 
academic scientific practice. They described the PI as an intrinsic feature of the 
academic scientific model as opposed to the business model. Hence, spoke members 
argued that the lack of a PI was a denial of the practices of the academic scientific 
community in favour of the business community. For example, a spoke member 
stated:  
in the scientific community we are used to studies where there is a chief 
investigator or if there is a multi-centre study a chief investigator and principal 
investigators who sign up to a collaboration and a shared ideas approach and 
this is slightly, well extremely different [0201, p. 146; p. 3].  
This reflects the tensions between the hub and the spokes in the difficult and 
ultimately unsuccessful process of contract negotiation.  
 
4.5.2 Lack of a figurehead  
 
Academic scientists, particularly previous committee members, criticised the 
organisational structure for representing a departure from standard academic scientific 
practice on account of the lack of an identifiable figure with the passion to deliver UK 
Biobank. They presented the HGP as illustrative of standard academic scientific 
practice in that there was a recognisable leader intrinsically connected with the 
endeavour. For example, a member of the EWG remarked:  
it’s very atypical…if you go back to your human genome analogy there’s no 
question who was identifiable for the UK, if it’s the human genome project it’s 
John Sulston, you don’t stop and think about it, it’s blindingly obvious and 
you can’t do that here and it’s unusual [061, p. 96; p. 7].  
Academic scientists associated high-profile leadership with the passion, personal 
commitment and effort required to drive initiatives forward. For example, a member 
of the IAG stated:  
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Biobank has not had the kind of Nobel laureate, high-level support that the 
Genome Project did…[that] succeeded to my mind, in part because some very 
well-placed people at the prime of their careers said ‘The time has come, let’s 
do it’ and they put their shoulders to it and made it happen and they were 
willing to take public stances, give speeches, meet with the US Congress and 
beg for money, go before the Parliament, defend it before the Medical 
Research Council, those kinds of things … They fought for the Human 
Genome Project, they also served as diplomats to get the Japanese and others 
involved and they made it happen and then they crunched along and finished 
ahead of time and below budget and it takes stars to make that happen…it 
(Biobank) hasn’t had the same kind of public face that the human genome 
project did, a stream of articles in a science magazine [090, p. 126; p. 4].  
 
4.5.3 Explanations for the perceived lack of leadership  
 
Academic scientists contrasted the way in which the idea for UK Biobank developed 
through the funding bodies and various workshops and groups (for example, the Joint 
MRC/Wellcome Workshop and the EWG) with the perceived standard way in which 
ideas develop from an individual. They therefore attributed the departure from 
standard academic scientific practice represented by the lack of leadership to the 
origins of UK Biobank. For example, a member of the EWG contrasted the origins of 
UK Biobank with the standard way in which ideas develop: ‘Mostly the way science 
is funded is someone has an idea that they wish to pursue and they go out and drive it 
and find the money to do it and that hasn’t gone that way’ [061, p. 97; p. 7]. This 
interviewee defined standard academic scientific practice as response-mode funding, 
which he associated with strong leadership. 
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4.6 Organisational Structure 
‘It’s a very odd sequence…they got the cart before the horse’ [070, p. 109; 
p. 5] 
Academic scientists, particularly spoke members, criticised the organisational 
structure of UK Biobank, in particular UK Biobank Limited, the selection and 
establishment of the spokes, the establishment of committees and the sequence of 
establishment as departing from standard academic scientific practice. These 
criticisms echoed those concerning the perceived lack of leadership. For example, 
academic scientists stressed how unfamiliar they were with the establishment of the 
hub as a charitable company, UK Biobank Limited.   
 
4.6.1 Establishment of UK Biobank Limited  
 
Academic scientists criticised the establishment of the hub as a charitable company, 
UK Biobank Limited, rather than just as a central organisational body, because it 
represented a departure from standard academic scientific practice. Their criticisms 
chiefly concerned the convergence of the academic scientific community in the 
spokes and the business community of the hub.  
 
Academic scientists identified the establishment of the company with the practices of 
the business community and as a process not familiar to academic scientists. The 
business model was not clearly defined; rather it was presented as a model in 
opposition to that of academic scientists. For example, a member of the PDC 
remarked: ‘this was completely alien to the majority of the people in the audience, the 
idea that you set up a company to run a study’ [051, p. 86; p. 5]. Some academic 
scientists tried to understand the rationale for establishing UK Biobank Limited. They 
acknowledged the need for an organisational structure that reflected the involvement 
of multiple, powerful funding bodies but felt that UK Biobank Limited was too much 
of a departure from standard academic scientific practice. The PDC member 
continued:  
there may be good reasons for having something unusual for an institute that’s 
funded by three major agencies…but you don’t have to have, you know, a 
public limited company running the show, you don’t have to have competitive 
tendering in what is in a sense the worst of the business environments. You 
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don’t have to have a chief executive function which was sort of more or less 
invented…the whole thing was invented by people who knew nothing about 
the way in which the scientific community works [051, p. 85; p. 11].  
This quotation illustrates the academic scientists’ differentiations between the 
academic scientific community and business community in terms of personnel. The 
interviewee distinguished between academic scientists and business people who 
‘knew nothing about the way in which the scientific community works’ [051, p. 85; p. 
11]. 
 
Much of academic scientists’ criticism of the organisational structure concerned the 
perceived power it granted to the business community in the hub over the academic 
community in the spokes. Spoke members in particular criticised this balance of 
power as departing from standard academic scientific practice whereby the academic 
scientific community would be in control. This tension between the academic 
scientific community in the spokes and the business community in the hub is evident 
in the documents relating to contract negotiation between the hub and the spokes. The 
key source of tension was the policy that spokes would not be granted any early or 
preferential access to the data or samples, which spoke members criticised for 
departing from standard academic scientific practice. Spoke access to the resource 
was a major issue in the origins and development of UK Biobank (addressed fully in 
chapter six). Spoke members presented this issue as illustrative of the difference 
between the two research communities and the tone of contract negotiations reflects 
this perceived gulf in practice. For example, in response to the draft contract on the 30 
April 2004 a spoke member commented:  
[i]t is quite usual for this intellectual input (through the involvement of senior 
expert researchers) to be provided to joint projects essentially without cost. 
This is because the pay-back is through (1) overheads recovered, (2) academic 
outputs (publications etc), (3) spin off projects and (4) the prestige and 
consequential benefits that arise from association with a quality project. 
Unfortunately at present colleagues from many of the RCCs I have spoken to 
have failed to see how this contract will provide any of these, let alone all of 
them [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 43].  
Spoke members further distinguished the academic scientific community from the 
business community with reference to the public and private sectors inhabited by 
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each. They criticised UK Biobank Limited for occupying both sectors and as such 
representing a departure from standard academic scientific practice. A spoke member 
however acknowledged the extent to which such an approach was increasingly 
common in the public sector:  
it’s very, well weird isn’t exactly right but it’s unusual for me. It’s a very New 
Labour, Third Way of doing things, it’s like a semi-public thing when you set-
up a company to run it…it’s a sort of political fashion, I don’t know, I think 
some people in Government believe that bureaucracies work if they’re based 
on privatised models and it’s a sort of semi-privatised model [052, p. 89; p. 6].  
 
This convergence of the academic scientific and business community, and the public 
and private sector associated with the establishment of UK Biobank Limited, is also 
evident in the documents relating to hub selection. This material reflects 
understandings of the different values connected with each community. The bidders 
for the hub contract were judged on wide ranging criteria including their business and 
academic case. For example, the S.W.O.T. (Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities 
Threats) analysis reports for each of the bidders for the hub contract dated the 11 of 
February 2003 state ‘lack of entrepreneurial vision’ or ‘no entrepreneurial feel’ as 
weaknesses [D550/12 Volume 1; p. 35]. The Host Selection Site Visit Report 
Conclusions dated the 6 March 2003 imply unease regarding overt academic strength. 
For example, comments included: ‘there was an impression that overwhelming 
academic influence could easily overpower the Hub’s autonomy’ [D550/12 Volume 
1; p. 35].   
 
4.6.2 Spoke selection and establishment  
 
Spoke members criticised the hub and spoke bidding process and their subsequent 
establishment as contrary to standard academic scientific practice.  
 
Spoke members criticised the bidding process because of the confusion regarding the 
nature of the contract for which they were bidding. They criticised this lack of clarity 
as contrary to standard academic scientific practice. For example a spoke member 
recalled: ‘it was a bit mysterious really… it was strange because we were kind of not 
bidding for actual money or anything, we were kind of bidding to be part of 
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something but we didn’t actually know what’ [0203, p. 153; p. 9].  He contrasted this 
situation with the perceived standard approach: ‘normally you would submit an 
application for a commissioned piece of research, you knew how much money you 
were going to get and roughly what, you know, the slot was and what the topic was 
and then you would be told ‘yes, you’ve got a certain amount’’ [0203, p. 153; p. 9]. 
The interviewee articulated standard academic scientific practice as a single model in 
which scientists apply to carry out a research project designed by the funding bodies 
in full knowledge of the costs and timescales required. He contrasted this with UK 
Biobank because of the fact that applicants were not informed of the design, costs and 
timescales involved.  
 
Spoke members also described the process that followed the bidding process as 
deviating from standard academic scientific practice. They criticised the lack of 
progress, in terms of research activity and release of funding, following selection. 
Spoke members contrasted the outcome of the bidding process for UK Biobank with 
the outcome of other competitions that they implied represented standard academic 
scientific practice. For example a spoke member reflected:  
normally after that process had gone through and you’d been told either ‘no, 
your tender has not been successful’ or ‘yes, it has been successful’ then it 
would be a case of ‘so go away and do what you said you were going to do’ 
but what’s happened with Biobank since then is that we seem to have been 
constantly revisiting the detail of exactly what the different spoke 
organisations are going to do, how is it they’re going to do it and how much 
money they’re going to have to do it [0105, p. 142; p. 7].  
They were surprised at the lack of funding following a successful result. Spoke 
members felt it was odd that they were not given what they felt they had bid for. For 
example, one spoke member remarked:  
normally when you apply for funds and you are granted your application you 
expect to get them … ‘It was completely the other way round “bid for the 
main project but we’re not going to give you any money and we’re going to 
ask you to do some pilots”, madness! [0800, p. 193; p. 6].  
Spoke members also criticised the timing of the pilot studies, (which were conducted 
following the selection of the spokes) as departing from standard academic scientific 
practice. This criticism relates to the confusion over the role of the spokes in UK 
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Biobank. Some spoke members felt that the pilot studies should have been carried out 
and evaluated, and their role should have been fully developed prior to their 
appointment.  
 
The issue of the timing of the hub and spoke bidding process and their subsequent 
establishment was evident in the documents relating to spoke selection and protocol 
development. There was debate regarding the merits of appointing the spokes at a 
time that would allow them to contribute to protocol development. Representatives of 
the funding bodies were eager to include the spokes in protocol development, whereas 
some spoke members criticised the failure to finalise the protocol prior to their 
appointment. For example, representatives of the funding bodies partly justified their 
decision not to fund the IPC alongside the main protocol on the grounds that it was 
important to gain input from the spokes. The minutes from the final meeting of the 
IPC subgroup on 7 August 2001 refer to the position of the funding bodies on the 
issue: ‘it was agreed that the additional components needed to be added once 
expressions of interest had been made by the potential spoke organisations’ [S600/174 
Volume 3; p. 16]. This therefore delayed aspects of development until the spokes 
were established.  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies justified the decision to delay protocol 
development until the spokes were selected because of the perceived importance of 
their involvement in the protocol and resource generally. They felt that the potential 
for involvement in the development of the protocol was an important issue in 
attracting bids for the spoke contracts. For example, an e-mail between senior 
representatives of the funding bodies warned that further development of the protocol, 
deemed necessary for the funding decision, would negatively affect spoke 
participation in the resource and result in ‘lack of input of spokes to protocol 
development giving little ownership of the project and therefore little incentive to 
participate’ [S600/161 Volume 3; p. 27]. Members of the PDC were reluctant to 
postpone further development of the protocol to allow for spoke involvement and 
questioned the merits of spoke involvement. The difficulties of garnering the 
involvement of the spokes in protocol development were addressed by a member of 
the PDC: ‘if issues were left to the spokes it would be difficult to co-ordinate 
afterwards’ [S600/174 Volume 3; p. 16].   
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4.6.3 Establishment of committees  
 
Members of previous and current committees criticised the way in which committees 
were established as departing from standard academic scientific practice. They 
particularly criticised the establishment of temporary predecessor groups (the Project 
Board, the PDC and the IAG) to the permanent groups (the BoD, the Science 
Committee and the EGC). They saw predecessor groups as performing the same 
function as the permanent groups and did not regard them as separate entities with 
different purposes. For example, a member of the EGC reflected upon the disbanding 
of the IAG and the formation of the EGC in such terms: ‘I think it must have been 
quite hard for them to be the start-up group and hand over to another group and that’s 
an unusual model. Usually the groups that start something off pick them up and carry 
on with them’ [0401, p. 170; p. 4].  
 
Current and former committee members and some representatives of UK Biobank 
Limited doubted the value of replacing committees with newly established groups and 
felt that doing so hindered the development of UK Biobank. For example, the BoD 
could not be established until the company, UK Biobank Limited, was set up and its 
predecessor group, the Project Board, was disbanded prior to the establishment of UK 
Biobank Limited. A representative of UK Biobank Limited commented:  
the Board were going to take over from the Project Board but the company 
wasn’t set up until December 2003…all the really big decisions had to be 
made by the Board and of course the Board were completely new [010, p. 4; p. 
14].  
The interviewee described the replacement of temporary committees (Project Board, 
PDC and IAG) with permanent committees (BoD, Science Committee and EGC) as a 
pattern in the set up of UK Biobank. He attributed the time taken to establish the 
resource, which was described as lengthy, to this approach. For example:  
people have been working away on the project and then they’ve just been 
stood down and then there’s been a gap and then they bring in a new group 
and of course what happens is the new group takes a while to gel, to 
understand the project, to take it apart put it back together and then they start 
to be functional but it’s a big delay in doing that [010, p. 4; p. 15].  
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His speculation regarding the rationale for such an approach reflected a wider theme 
regarding the funding bodies’ efforts to involve the academic scientific community 
and avert criticism of a lack of consultation. Academic scientists however questioned 
the extent to which the funding bodies sought genuine consultation and involvement. 
For example, the same interviewee distinguished between wanting to be inclusive and 
wanting to be perceived as inclusive:  
it’s in an effort to be completely fair and to some extent not, they’re obviously 
very keen that Biobank isn’t seen as one person’s pet project…but I think that 
one has to accept that this approach is debilitating and needs to die [010, p. 4; 
p. 15].  
 
4.6.4 Sequence of the establishment of UK Biobank  
 
Academic scientists criticised the sequence in which the organisational structure was 
established, namely the appointment of the CEO and the set up of UK Biobank 
Limited prior to the establishment of the BoD, as contrasting with standard academic 
scientific practice.  
 
Academic scientists discussed the effect of this sequence on control of the resource, 
protocol development and funding. They held the sequence responsible for difficulties 
surrounding control and decision making. The CEO was appointed at the same time as 
the hub and spokes were appointed, which made it difficult for him to assert his     
authority over the hub and UK Biobank generally. The ultimate authoritative body, 
the BoD, was the last to be established. This sequence meant that funds were not 
released until the BoD were appointed, which academic scientists contrasted with 
standard academic scientific practice where funds would be released prior to the 
establishment of the organisational structure. They also criticised ongoing protocol 
development following the appointment of the spokes and the science committee for 
resulting in the difficulties surrounding decision making and time delays. For example 
a member of the BoD described the sequence:  
What happened was extraordinary, the other way around…what they had done 
is appointed a Chief Executive, with no Board to be accountable to and they’d 
appointed the RCCs on the basis that that was the model they were going to 
follow without having a protocol or having appointed the people who were 
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going to have to carry it through, and then they appointed a Science 
Committee which included people from the RCCs and they started writing the 
main protocol, and then they appointed the Board and gave the Board the 
authority to spend the money. So it’s a very odd sequence…they got the cart 
before the horse [070, p. 109; p. 5].  
Some academic scientists defended the timing of the appointment of the BoD on 
account of the nature of UK Biobank itself. They justified the sequence as a departure 
from standard academic scientific practice arguing that UK Biobank was itself a 
departure from standard research activity, on account of the involvement of multiple, 
powerful funding bodies and the scale of the financial commitment. For example, the 
member of the BoD stressed the need to secure funding prior to the appointment of 
committees: ‘I can see why they did it, it was in order to sign off the funding, which 
was the key decision that drove everything, you can’t have the Board set up before the 
funding’ [070, p. 109; p. 5].  
 
As discussed in the previous sub-section, academic scientists also criticised the timing 
of hub and spoke selection in relation to protocol development. They held ongoing 
protocol development as responsible for the difficulties over leadership of UK 
Biobank. This criticism relates to the difficulties of reaching consensus amongst a 
large number of scientists both in the science committee and in the spokes, and the 
merits of such consultation in developing the protocol. A clinical academic involved 
in UK Biobank argued that the protocol should have been developed and finalised by 
a previously appointed leader as opposed to ongoing protocol development with a 
wider franchise: ‘decide what you want to do and advertise applications, decide who 
was going to actually lead it and do it and then get them actually to write the detailed 
protocol and give it to them to do’ [071, p. 113; p. 3]. Academic scientists also 
criticised the timing of hub and spoke selection in relation to the release of funds. 
They felt that funds should have been released prior to hub and spoke selection, which 
was described as standard academic scientific practice. For example, the same clinical 
academic involved in UK Biobank described the timing of hub and spoke selection as 
‘a little bit back to front, it would have been much better to have the grant agreed 
before things like the home for the hub and the chief executive’ [071, p. 113; p. 9].  
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The funding bodies’ decision to involve spokes in protocol development meant that 
the protocol could not be completed until the hub and spokes were selected. Some 
representatives of the funding bodies were frustrated regarding the delaying of the 
funding decision because it delayed hub and spoke selection, which in turn delayed 
the development of a final protocol. For example a letter from a senior representative 
of a funding body on 29 November 2000 stated:  
[u]nfortunately, until we have a formal decision on funding…we cannot go 
ahead with identifying either the hub, the chief executive, or the spokes so this 
will inevitably result in some delay to the implementation of the project…I 
agree that there would be benefit in identifying the spokes in time to allow 
them to contribute to the development of the detailed protocol [S600/161 
Volume 3; p. 26].   
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4.7 Organisational Changes  
‘More like a sort of standard large research project in that it has a 
principal investigator’ [E2009, p. 28; p. 1]  
Given the extent of academic scientists’ criticism of the original organisational 
structure for departing from standard academic scientific practice, it is not surprising 
that representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited justified the 
organisational changes in August 2005 because they represented standard practice. 
Academic scientists, particularly spoke members, also acknowledged the nature of the 
changes as representative of standard academic scientific practice but did not reflect 
upon their merits. They criticised the process of change as contrary to standard 
academic scientific practice, arguing that it was not usual for considerable 
organisational changes to take place following years of effort into implementing an 
original organisational structure.  
 
4.7.1 Organisational changes indicative of standard academic scientific practice  
 
All constituent groups of interviewees described the organisational changes as 
representing a move back to standard academic scientific practice, which was 
articulated in terms of control of UK Biobank. The most significant change concerned 
the role of Rory Collins as the new CEO and PI. All constituent groups perceived the 
development of the PI role as representing standard academic scientific practice in 
that it facilitated decision making by an individual rather than by groups. For 
example, a spoke member described how: ‘the Board has gone for a single PI 
structure, a more conventional structure where the PI has really all the power that he 
or she needs in order to get things done’ [E2004, p. 14; p. 1]. The term ‘PI’ alone was 
significant in demonstrating a shift from the business approach to that of the academic 
scientific approach. Academic scientists used the term, PI, prior to the changes and its 
official use following the changes was therefore widely accepted by that community 
as representing standard academic scientific practice (reflected in title quotation in 
chapter five). For example a spoke member described the changes as making UK 
Biobank 
more like a sort of standard large research project in that it has a principal 
investigator …the rest of us are essentially collaborators on the project, I 
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guess, as opposed to the more sort of quasi-corporate structure that the project 
had before [E2009, p. 28; p. 1].  
Spoke members described this shift from a business approach to an academic 
scientific approach as one which would benefit UK Biobank. He continued: ‘now it 
does seem to be being organised more as a scientific project and I think that that’s 
probably a better way for it to be organised and as I say hopefully we’ll make more 
progress’ [E2009, p. 28; p. 3].  
 
4.7.2 Comparison of the funding bodies’ and UK Biobank Limited’s perception of the 
changes with that of spokes  
 
Interviewees’ opinions of the changes and the process of change were however 
polarised. Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited 
characterised the process of change itself as indicative of standard academic scientific 
practice and described the development of any scientific resource as subject to 
change. Despite portraying the process of change as embodying standard academic 
scientific practice, they tended to minimise its extent. For example, a representative of 
the funding bodies remarked: ‘I think any scientific project evolves as it goes on’ 
[E2008, p. 27; p. 3]. They also took care to underplay any criticism of the previous 
model, thereby further minimising the extent of change. For example, another 
representative of the funding bodies stated: ‘it’s a change of emphasis and it’s not 
really to criticise the way things were done before’ [E2003, p. 12; p. 1]. He continued: 
‘it wasn’t revolution, it was evolution’ [E2003, p. 12; p. 3]. Representatives of the 
funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited were positive regarding the process of 
change and focussed their analysis on their value whilst minimising its extent.  
 
Some spoke members tended to view the organisational changes negatively because 
of the difficulties caused by the process of change rather than its merits. They 
criticised the way in which significant changes were made to an organisational 
structure that academic scientists had invested considerable effort trying to 
implement, and portrayed this process of change as departing from standard academic 
scientific practice. Some spoke members avoided consideration of the changes’ 
merits, and portrayed such discussion as irrelevant. Instead their analysis focussed on 
the difficulties caused by the process of change, which is understandable given the 
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effect of the changes on their role. Spoke members clearly distinguished the issue of 
whether or not the changes were valid from the effects of the process of change. For 
example, a spoke member remarked how there were: ‘lots of reasons to feel miffed 
irrespective of whether the trial configuration now is appropriate or not’ [E2005, p. 
18; p. 1] and said 
that may be a legitimate model but it should have been thought of much earlier 
on and I think, as I said before, that it was very unhelpful to engage us all in 
this lengthy process only to tell us at the end of it all “well actually we don’t 
need you” [E2005, p. 18; p. 2]. 
There was however a deviant case in the sample, which did not follow this pattern. In 
this case, a spoke member was entirely positive regarding the process of change and 
discussed the changes' merits. Unlike representatives of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited who also analysed the validity of the changes and defended the 
process of change, this spoke member did not attempt to minimise the changes' extent. 
For example, he described the process as ‘a bloodless coup’ and the hub and spoke 
model as ‘that’s a token now, it’s a convenient fiction’ [E2004, p. 14; p. 1]. He 
portrayed the severity of the changes as a strength and focussed on the positive effect 
on UK Biobank of an allegedly complete reversal of approach. For example, in 
describing reaction to the changes he emphasised their extent:  
I think everybody was partly stunned and partly relieved…relieved that we 
knew what the way forward would be and we knew what the lie of the land 
would be and partly stunned that the change was so complete [E2004, p. 15; p. 
4].  
Such lack of consistency with the wider sample was evident in the original interview 
with this interviewee also articulating expectations of spoke membership differently.  
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4.8 Conclusion  
 
Although academic scientists did not explicitly define standard academic scientific 
practice, a loose model of what it did and did not entail emerged from their criticisms 
of the establishment of UK Biobank for deviating from it. They presented a standard 
academic scientific approach to the establishment of UK Biobank as one that would 
involve the funding decision being based on the production of a finalised protocol 
rather than on an initial protocol. They argued that academic scientists should have 
been more involved in initial and ongoing protocol development, as opposed to 
consultation once key decisions had already been taken. Appointment of a PI, rather 
than a CEO, was a major part of academic scientists’ interpretation of standard 
academic scientific practice.  Their articulation of a standard model also involved a 
funding figure that included the complete costs for the resource and not just initial set-
up costs, and the funding bodies undertaking a secondary role rather than being 
closely involved in the establishment of UK Biobank. Spoke members in particular 
cited the establishment of the hub as a company as contrary to standard academic 
scientific practice. Although spoke members perceived the nature of the 
organisational changes, particularly the appointment of a PI, as indicative of standard 
academic scientific practice they argued that the process of such changes was a 
deviation.   
 
Academic scientists’ criticism of the establishment of UK Biobank as departing from 
standard academic scientific practice is complicated by different understandings of the 
term. As discussed, they cited a range of models including response-mode funding, a 
call for proposals and commissioning. There was therefore confusion regarding the 
nature of standard academic scientific practice, and different academic scientists 
respectively criticised and praised the same issues for departing and adhering to 
standard academic scientific practice. Often such different understandings emerged 
from within the same groups of academic scientists, such as spoke members. For 
example, some spoke members felt that they were not consulted sufficiently in 
ongoing protocol development whereas others argued that the protocol should have 
been finalised prior to their selection; both criticised each position for departing from 
standard academic scientific practice. Similarly, academic scientists did not define the 
nature of business practice, with which they associated the appointment of a CEO, 
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rather than a PI, and establishment of the hub as a company. They associated these 
aspects with ‘business practice’ and as such stressed their opposition to standard 
academic scientific practice but did not explain the association. In doing so, academic 
scientists perceived the establishment of UK Biobank not only as a departure from 
standard academic scientific practice, but also as a rejection of the academic scientific 
community in favour of the business community.  
 
Criticism of the establishment of UK Biobank for departing from standard academic 
scientific practice was a potent feature in academic scientists’ objections to the 
resource. This criticism encompassed many issues that pervaded the origins and 
development of UK Biobank, such as consultation, role of the funding bodies, 
leadership and the organisational structure (particularly the hub and spoke model).  
These issues recur throughout the remaining findings chapters.  
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Chapter 5 
 
‘The local PI’s feel that it is their study and Biobank feel that it is theirs so a 
tension is still there’ [035; p. 56; p. 8]. 
 
Emergent Issues: Control 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
All constituent groups of interviewees, including those involved in each stage of its 
history, described confusion regarding who was in control of UK Biobank. Given the 
scale of UK Biobank, all constituent groups stressed the importance of an appropriate 
level of control over the resource. This chapter will address the explanations of 
academic scientists, representative of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited for 
the alleged confusion and their opinions of where control lay.  It will also explore 
their perceptions of the type of control most appropriate for UK Biobank. In doing so, 
it will focus on the following events and issues in a chronological order: protocol 
development, role of the funding bodies, leadership, organisational structure and 
organisational changes.  
 
The issue of confusion over control of UK Biobank was responsible for much of the 
tension between academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies. 
Representatives of the funding bodies and academic scientists accused each other of 
trying to exercise too much control. This chapter will address these accusations and 
reveal the meanings behind them. All constituent groups articulated the organisational 
changes as resolving the confusion over control in that they perceived the new CEO 
and PI, Rory Collins, to be the leader of UK Biobank. However, academic scientists 
and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited interpreted the 
reasons for the organisational changes differently. I will explore these different 
explanations for the changes and thereby analyse the issue of control more fully. 
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5.2 Protocol Development   
‘There was a series of key discussion points that we wanted to discuss and 
basically we were largely prevented from discussing them’ [033; p. 49; p. 
7] 
Academic scientists argued that the funding bodies’ role in the protocol development 
was indicative of their control over it and UK Biobank generally. Members of the 
PDC criticised the funding bodies for restricting their debate. Some members accused 
a select group of epidemiologists and representatives of the funding bodies of 
developing a ‘pre-protocol’ in which key decisions were taken prior to the 
establishment of the PDC.  
 
5.2.1 Criticism of the consultation undertaken with the PDC  
 
PDC members felt constrained by the funding bodies regarding what they could and 
could not consider. For example a member of the PDC remarked:  
There were issues where it was clear that Tom Meade was being driven by 
George Radda because basically they were very, very cautious, they didn’t 
want the study to stall because of discussions round and round particular 
scientific points [033; p. 49; p. 7].  
They described being prevented from discussing particular issues such as sample size 
and age range. For example, the PDC member continued:  
There was a series of key discussion points that we wanted to discuss and 
basically we were largely prevented from discussing them … one person on 
the committee was arguing for, well several of us were supporting them 
including me, that one should be doing an options appraisal … this was 
forbidden to be discussed [033; p. 50; p. 8].  
Similarly, another member of the PDC discussed the lack of debate on the costs of 
UK Biobank: ‘there had been explicit non-consideration, I would say, of costing 
different options for doing the study’ [051; p. 81; p. 9]. They accused the funding 
bodies of prohibiting their discussions, which reflects criticism of their role in UK 
Biobank generally. PDC members also cited their experience of the Protocol 
Development Workshop as evidence of the funding bodies’ control of the consultation 
process. They felt that discussion was limited by the extent to which key issues had 
already been decided. For example, the PDC member stated: ‘even at that stage there 
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was a fair amount of, I use the term ‘didactic’ thinking, about this is the way it’s 
going to be, there’s going to be a hub and there’s going to be some spokes’ [051; p. 
82; p. 5].  
 
Members of the PDC argued that particular issues, such as sample size and age range, 
were decided prior to their establishment, and thus accused the funding bodies and a 
select group of epidemiologists of developing a ‘pre-protocol’ prior to their 
establishment, which limited their deliberations. For example, a member of the PDC 
described how their discussions were: ‘based upon an outline which had already 
passed through some form of approval process…what I don’t know is who approved 
it and on what basis’ [051; p. 81; p. 2]. They felt that the sample size and age range 
was decided in this ‘pre-protocol’ as 051 continued:  
Those who have developed Biobank as a concept were determined that the 
concept would prevail regardless of scientific input, so the one size fits all, 
half a million adults, middle-aged throughout the country through primary 
care [051; p. 81; p. 6].  
Some members of the PDC associated the ‘pre-protocol’ with a select group of 
influential epidemiologists, namely Nick Day, Valerie Beral and Tom Meade. They 
did not identify the document but given the perception of its authors it is likely they 
are referring to the Final Report of the EWG. For example, the member of the PDC 
felt that the ‘pre-protocol’ reflected: ‘a certain amount of opportunism or lobbying or 
whatever by the three leading epidemiologists’ [051; p. 81; p. 2]. They stressed its 
influence by referring to the role played by its alleged authors in UK Biobank. For 
example, the PDC member continued:  
It was driven, I am quite sure, from the top through Tom Meade as chairman 
of the Protocol Development Committee, he was fully compliant with the top-
down approach and had a lot of personal investment in seeing the original 
proposal go forward, I think, because he was part of the team and I suspect he 
was strongly supported, well I know he was strongly supported by Nick Day 
because Nick was a member of the Protocol Development Committee and I 
suspect he was strongly supported by Val Beral when she wasn’t a member 
but there was this funny arrangement with the secondment of staff…so the 
original proponents were still really in the driving seat [051; p. 82; p. 9].  
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He reflected upon the influence of Valerie Beral in terms of the appointment of Emily 
Banks as protocol writer:  
Emily worked for Val Beral in CRUK unit; she was seconded to Tom Meade’s 
unit, to write the protocol…a slightly strange arrangement for someone who’s 
supposed to be an independent person responding to Protocol Committee 
discussions [051; p. 82; p. 7]. 
 
5.2.2 Documentary evidence of criticism of the consultation undertaken with the PDC  
 
Documentary evidence of PDC members’ criticism of the consultation undertaken 
with them, specifically that the funding bodies and a select group of epidemiologists 
decided key aspects of the protocol prior to their establishment, reflects speculation 
that the funding bodies controlled UK Biobank.  
 
PDC members’ accusation that a select group of epidemiologists developed a ‘pre-
protocol’ in which the sample size and age range were decided is reflected in the 
membership of the ‘MRC Post-Genome Challenge Working Group on DNA sample 
collections and facilities for large-scale genetic typing’ (May 29, 1998). This 
workshop included various influential figures in the origins and development of UK 
Biobank including George Radda, John Bell and Nick Day [S600/161, Volume 1; p. 
2]. Their influence is also reflected in their involvement in the working group. For 
example, in the second meeting of the group outline proposals were presented by 
members including Nick Day, John Bell and Valerie Beral. [S600/161, Volume 1; p. 
5]. Documentary evidence of PDC members’ criticism also includes the minutes of 
the meetings of the EWG. These minutes demonstrate the extent to which sample 
size, age range and organisational structure were decided. For example, the notes 
from the second meeting state how UK Biobank ‘should involve several centres 
around the country (around 5-7) to give efficient coverage of regional variation and to 
allow inclusion of a wide range of epidemiological expertise’ [S600/161, Volume 1; 
p. 7]. Similarly, in the Final Report of the EWG the proposed age range is very 
similar to what it became ‘[t]he cohort for studying diseases of adult life should be 
aged between about 40 or 45 and 64 years old at recruitment’ and the proposed 
sample size of 500,000 is exactly the same [S600/161 Volume 2; p. 6].  
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The anonymous comments of twenty-eight reviewers of the EWG Final Report, 
contained in a document titled ‘Comments received on the Final Report of the Expert 
Working Group’, also reflect allegations that representatives of the funding bodies 
and a select group of epidemiologists resolved key aspects regarding the protocol 
prior to consultation. For example, one reviewer regretted that ‘such an ambitious 
proposal has been developed to this point without wider consultation with the British 
epidemiological community, who will be expected to contribute substantially to the 
establishment of the cohort’ [S600/161 Volume 2; p. 9]. Similarly, the reviewers 
accused the funding bodies of failing to consider different options regarding the 
design. For example, one reviewer commented that: ‘[t]he author(s) of the report seem 
unwilling to discuss other options, save to dismiss them with sweeping 
generalisations’ [S600/161 Volume 2; p. 9]. Similarly, another remarked: ‘I would 
have preferred a wider discussion of the strategic scientific issues BEFORE 
committing such a huge effort in one particular direction’ [S600/161 Volume 2; p. 
10].  
 
Consideration of the IPC was a particularly controversial episode in the PDC, which 
reflected criticism of the control exercised by the funding bodies over the Committee. 
For example, the minutes of the fourth meeting of the committee in October 2001 
refer to the role of the funding bodies in the decision that the IPC would be considered 
separately from the main protocol stated:  
Sir George had strongly recommended that the committee focus primarily on 
producing a protocol and a sound, well-argued case for the core data collection 
on the whole large cohort. The Committee could recommend the inclusion of 
an IPC but the proposal should be clearly separate … Dr Doyle reported that 
Dr Dexter was of the same view: any proposal for an IPC should be separate 
from the proposal for the large cohort [D550/33 Volume 2; p. 17]. 
PDC members’ reaction to the decision reveals the tension in the Committee 
regarding control. For example, in response to the circulation of the decision to 
consider the protocols separately prior to the Committee’s next meeting, a member of 
the IPC sub-group wrote in an email to the chair of the Committee:  
I think this demonstrates your commitment to ensuring that the Protocol 
Development Committee is actually a meaningful body with a real purpose 
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rather than just a rubber stamping mechanism for decisions that are really 
being taken elsewhere [S600/174 Volume 2; p. 17]. 
He continued by asserting his belief that the IPC should be presented to reviewers ‘as 
one potential component WHICH IS ON AN EQUAL POTENTIAL FUNDING 
FOOTING to any other potential component of the study [his emphasis]’ [S600/174 
Volume 2; p. 17]. The funding bodies’ decision not to send the IPC protocol to peer 
reviewers in the form prepared by the IPC sub-group, but to have it re-written and 
shortened by Emily Banks, Frances Rawle and other funding body representatives and 
sent with a letter of recommendation also reflected the funding bodies control. PDC 
members expressed support for the decision itself. For example a member stated: ‘I 
am prepared to accept that this decision may be defended in terms of overall strategy’. 
However they were offended by the implication that they prepared the IPC protocol as 
a threat to the main protocol. For example, a member commented: ‘I am personally 
saddened by the implication that our protocol was in any sense written in a manner 
that deliberately undermined the main protocol’ [S600/174 Volume 2; p. 18]. 
 196  
5.3 Funding bodies 
‘Very broadly you do better if you actually give support to good and 
entrepreneurial and creative scientists than if you say ‘I’ve hired these 
good, creative, entrepreneurial scientists-will you please now do this, this 
and this?’ [071; p. 116; p. 6].  
Academic scientists attributed the alleged confusion over control of UK Biobank to 
the role undertaken by the funding bodies, which they criticised as controlling. They 
differentiated between the relative influences of the two main funding bodies. Some 
felt that the Wellcome Trust was in control whereas other argued that the MRC held 
the dominant position. Representatives of the funding bodies denied exerting such 
control.  
 
5.3.1 Criticism of the funding bodies’ role  
 
Academic scientists criticised the funding bodies for being too much in control of UK 
Biobank and argued that funders were too involved in its origins and development. 
They felt the inspiration for the resource lay with the funding bodies rather than 
academic scientists. For example, a spoke member remarked: ‘There is a risk in 
running a study that is not hypothesis driven or not coming from the ranks of 
scientists but is driven from the top’ [024; p. 32; p. 3]. Academic scientists attributed 
the tension between representatives of the funding bodies and academic scientists to 
the degree of control exerted by the former in the origins of the idea. For example, a 
member of the EWG commented:  
It’s [science] driven by passion and ideas and there’s clearly a great idea, UK 
Biobank is in principle a great idea but it needs to be driven by scientific 
passion and curiosity. You haven’t had a sense of ownership and how you 
achieve that is not trivial…so I think that it’s not surprising that there has been 
a considerable amount of tension generated by the responsibility of the funders 
on the one hand to set something up in a very transparent, a financially 
transparent, mechanistically transparent way and yet find a way in which the 
scientists can be engaged with that [062; p. 102; p. 7].  
They argued that the funding bodies, rather than the hub, were really in control of UK 
Biobank. For example, a spoke member reflected:  
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Whenever we’ve raised something that we think should be questioned and we 
are given back the message the funders won’t countenance it, it gives us the 
impression that the funders are keeping a very tight rein on the project [0102; 
p. 134; p. 6].  
Similarly, another spoke member remarked: ‘they’ve been far too intrusive and I think 
the degree of control has been frankly lamentable. It’s very counter productive’ 
[0800; p. 194; p. 4]. Academic scientists criticised the funding bodies’ influence over 
the hub and specifically over the former CEO, John Newton. For example, a member 
of the PDC commented:  
The CEO was constantly being put under pressure to make sure that particular 
deadlines, timelines were being met that scientifically were clearly not 
sensible, and basically if the funders had just stood back and said “alright, we 
accept the advice from the scientists that these are unreasonable we’re 
therefore not going to put pressure on the CEO to make sure that they meet 
them” that would have made things go a lot easier [033; p. 52; p. 6].  
Spoke members suggested the optimal role of funding bodies to be one that did not 
interfere with the scientists’ role. For example, one spoke member stated that the 
funding bodies ‘should stand back and let the scientists get on with it’ [0800; p. 194; 
p. 3]. Similarly, a clinical academic involved in UK Biobank reflected:  
Funding agencies do their best work when they have good, novel, original 
ideas of things that might be worth supporting but then once they’ve decided 
to do it, they’ve decided to do this piece of work or pieces of work, whichever 
pieces they’re going to support, adopt a very hands-off approach because 
research does not do well with a heavy hands-on approach [071; p. 115; p. 6].  
Academic scientists emphasised the preferred role of support, as opposed to control, 
by funders of academic scientists. For example, 071 continued:  
Very broadly you do better if you actually give support to good and 
entrepreneurial and creative scientists than if you say “I’ve hired these good, 
creative, entrepreneurial scientists-will you please now do this, this and this?” 
[071; p. 116; p. 6].  
 
Academic scientists accused the funding bodies of taking key decisions regarding the 
scientific design of UK Biobank, such as the sample size. For example, a spoke 
member commented:  
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The funders are particularly concerned with scale and in discussions of having 
fewer participants and more detailed information the funders have always 
stuck to the scale of the project…the project is not scientifically driven, it is 
driven from a marketing point of view, political with a small p. They do not 
want a better study with smaller numbers, they want to be the ‘largest’, they 
are just not interested in anything smaller [030; p. 42; p. 2]. 
He went on to stress the power of the funding bodies to set the agenda regarding 
discussions of the design:  
The funders always made it clear that the scale of the study would not 
change…large numbers offset poor quality in studies, you can get away with 
more if there are larger numbers…it ruins the quality but does not stop you 
publishing [030; p. 43; p. 2]. 
Similarly, a member of the scientific community outwith UK Biobank commented:  
My understanding is that this is off-limits, half a million was decided in the 
original work on purely political grounds, so now the people who are trying to 
get together the protocol…they have their hands tied by history because 
there’s been press releases, because we’ve had George Radda on the radio 
saying it’s going to be half a million people…that is set in stone, nobody can 
change it and that’s a pity because there are good scientists out there who 
might have come up with  a better solution [0900; p. 198; p. 14]. 
As discussed in the previous section, PDC members accused the funding bodies of 
exerting control over their deliberations. For example, a member of the PDC 
remarked:  
Several times it emerged in discussions that he [Tom Meade] has received this 
message very firmly on high…the implication is that there was still very firm 
direction centrally from George Radda, Mike Dexter and possibly others 
who’d been involved with the original proposal [051; p. 83; p. 6].  
 
Academic scientists also accused the funding bodies of taking organisational 
decisions, such as those regarding the hub and spoke model and the BoD. They 
argued that the funding bodies, rather than the scientists, were responsible for the hub 
and spoke model. For example, a member of the EWG remarked:  
In terms of the way the project was set up, I can’t really comment except that 
it went into the offices of the Wellcome Trust and the MRC and to my 
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knowledge, the model for how it was to be set-up did not arrive out of a 
consensus view offered by the study proponents but by the organisers and the 
funders, so it was driven by the funders, not by the scientists [062; p. 102; p. 
6].  
Academic scientists argued that the funding bodies controlled the appointment of 
committees within the organisational structure. For example, a spoke member accused 
the funding bodies of refusing to allow an Implementation Group composed of the 
spoke leads to form:  
The RCC leads are not actually funded and not given the remit, not given 
permission to do it. They volunteered their time to have more meetings but the 
funders did not want them to do that and wanted one of their own, which was 
fine but it took ages [030; p. 44; p. 4].   
They also criticised the role of the funding bodies within the organisational structure, 
specifically in the BoD. Given the involvement of representatives of the funding 
bodies, academic scientists questioned the independence of the Board. For example, a 
clinical academic involved in UK Biobank commented:  
It’s not a truly independent company because there are three directors who 
come from the funding agencies, of course, very properly, their interest in 
coming from the funding agencies is declared but it means that the Board is 
looking over its shoulder all the time, what the funding agencies would want 
[071; p. 116; p. 8].  
Similarly, a spoke member remarked: ‘the Board is largely, not necessarily governed, 
but largely influenced by the views of the funders’ [0102; p. 134; p. 6]. Members of 
the BoD, whilst acknowledging the role of the funding bodies on the Board, explained 
how it diminished as the Board developed. For example, a member of the BoD 
commented:  
The Board has to be aware of the need to meet the requirements of the funders 
at all times. However the funders are beginning to have more trust…I think the 
funders are beginning to focus elsewhere and leave Biobank to get on with 
business [070; p. 108; p. 8].  
 
Some academic scientists justified the alleged control exerted by the funding bodies 
over UK Biobank because of their financial obligations and their importance in 
getting the idea up and running. They referred to the large sums of money involved in 
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UK Biobank as an explanation for such an active role. For example, a member of the 
EWG commented: ‘If you take a single investment the risk of failure is too high to 
have it anything other than under close management scrutiny’ [062; p. 102; p. 9]. 
Academic scientists also referred to the funding bodies’ requirement to justify the 
investment to their senior groups. For example, a clinical academic involved in UK 
Biobank stated:  
It’s an awful lot of money and it is their money, they’re responsible publicly 
for it…they’ve got to retain a delicate, light touch but very clear understanding 
of what’s going on so that they’re guarding their money but not slowing things 
down [071; p. 116; p. 6]. 
They acknowledged the importance of the funding bodies’ involvement in allowing 
UK Biobank to happen. For example, a member of the PDC remarked: ‘from George 
Radda’s point of view first of all he was correct to be concerned that if he hadn’t had 
a strong drive from the top it might have got nowhere’ [033; p. 52; p. 6]. Academic 
scientists acknowledged the importance of support for the idea from the scientific 
community but stressed the significance of the role undertaken by the funding bodies 
in making UK Biobank happen. For example, the clinical academic quoted above 
continued:  
The funders wanted it done and there were a number of people in the scientific 
community who also felt, yes, it was worth doing, the scientific community 
might have thought it would be a good idea but if the Wellcome or the MRC 
hadn’t said “we’re starting to think this might be a good idea” they’d have 
thought they would have missed their chance for funding [071; p. 115; p. 4].  
 
5.3.2 Relative influence of the two main funding bodies  
 
Academic scientists speculated as to the relative influence of the two main funding 
bodies, the MRC and the Wellcome Trust, on UK Biobank. Some felt that the MRC 
was the most influential funding body whilst others argued that the Wellcome Trust 
exercised greater control.  
 
Those who identified the Wellcome Trust as the dominant funding body referred to its 
role in the development of the resource. For example, a member of the BoD 
commented: ‘my understanding is and was that it was very much driven by Wellcome 
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and it is still the main kind of driving force behind it’ [070; p. 107; p. 1]. He felt that 
the Wellcome Trust was responsible for major decisions surrounding UK Biobank:  
The joint funding agreement between the Board and the funders was drawn up 
by the lawyers in the Wellcome Trust…I would imagine the final decision on 
the name is taken by the Wellcome Trust, the final policy on the structures for 
instance, the letters inviting me to be on the main Board came from the 
Wellcome…if you wanted to know where the key decisions were made I’d go 
to the top of the Wellcome [070; p. 107; p. 14]. 
In describing the greater influence of one funding body over the other, some academic 
scientists criticised the more influential body. For example, a clinical academic 
involved in UK Biobank remarked:  
If there’s any one reason why it was set up that way it’s because, my 
perception is that the dominant voice in deciding the structure and how it was 
done was the Wellcome rather than the MRC and the Wellcome Trust sadly is 
characterised by having quite a lot of staff who’ve never run anything large 
scale [071; p. 114; p. 4].  
Others argued that the MRC were more influential on account of their involvement in 
the origins of the idea. For example, a member of the scientific community outwith 
UK Biobank remarked how 
one got the feeling with the MRC that it wasn’t a question of they were 
wanting to find out whether this should be done or not, they had decided this 
was going to be done, as I say they’d released press releases, they’d decided 
this was going to be done [0900; p. 195; p. 2]. 
He contrasted the influence of the MRC with that of the Wellcome Trust whom he felt 
were ‘sort of backed into a corner by then because, you know, they’d agreed the 
funding in principle without their normal process of peer review’ [0900; p. 195; p. 2]. 
 
5.3.3 Funding bodies’ perceptions of their role 
 
Representatives of the funding bodies downplayed the significance of their role in the 
origins and development of UK Biobank. They argued that following the 
establishment of UK Biobank Limited their role was minimal, and reflected upon the 
problems of being too involved. For example, a representative of the funding bodies 
remarked: ‘The staff of the funders can take it only so far but eventually you’ve got to 
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pass it onto people who are going to take the project forward’ [040; p. 59; p. 15]. 
Similarly, another representative of the funding bodies commented: ‘having handed 
over independence, having got a governance board with very competent and powerful 
people on it I think most of us have wanted to take a relatively back seat’ [E2011; p. 
33; p. 3]. He continued by stressing the dangers of the funding bodies taking an active 
role:  
It would be double jeopardy in the management structure, I mean you can’t 
expect people to take on jobs that normally assign to them governance and 
managing responsibilities only to have other organisations and other people, 
particularly people with the purse strings coming in and meddling when they 
want to [E2011; p. 33; p. 4].  
They did however acknowledge the necessity of some level of involvement whilst not 
exerting too much influence. Representatives of the funding bodies referred to the 
difficulty of adapting their role to the changing requirements of the resource and 
argued that prior to the establishment of the hub they needed to be significantly 
involved. For example, a representative of the funding bodies remarked:  
Our role leading up to the establishment of the company and all that was a 
much more hands-on, much more directive role. I think if you are going to set 
up a company to do it and ensure it’s got the right governance structures then 
you don’t sit on its neck all the time. I feel that we have to learn on both sides 
how quite to deal with it at arm’s length and that’s been a learning curve for 
all of us [043; p. 71; p. 12]. 
They also defended their involvement following the set up of UK Biobank Limited 
and argued that they were still required. For example, the representative of the 
funding bodies continued:   
There is still some need I think for us to be involved in stakeholder 
engagement, ensuring that we are getting the best value for money from 
Biobank and that Biobank’s providing what the scientific community wants 
and that can’t be solely down to Biobank and its objectives [043; p. 71; p. 12].  
 
In defending their involvement, representatives of the funding bodies discussed how 
academic scientists, as opposed to themselves, drove the idea for the resource. For 
example, a representative of the funding bodies remarked:  
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Although this required a lot of work from the top actually this was what the 
scientific community wanted…this project, by people who didn’t understand 
it, was seen as, if you like, a project driven by the two organisations as 
opposed to by the scientific community. We responded to the scientific 
community wishing to do something like this and was very clear early on 
that’s where the motivation came from [044; p. 75; p. 8].  
He continued: ‘Yeah we had to implement it but the motivations came from the 
scientists’ [044; p. 75; p. 9]. They also stressed their importance in channelling the 
activities of the academic scientific community and making UK Biobank happen. For 
example, the representative of the funding bodies commented:  
It’s not been plain sailing all along but I think it tells us that one can do this 
kind of science given the will and you do need people who are going to drive 
it and usually I think it has to be driven by the scientists themselves wanting 
to, the scientific community is not well organised so that the funders can 
organise them or have to organise them and unless there is a real driving force 
within the funding organisations these things won’t happen [044; p. 76; p. 11]. 
 
Representatives of the funding bodies further justified their role on account of their 
obligations to their organisations to ensure the security of the financial investment. 
For example, a representative of the funding bodies commented:  
It’s not something that the Medical Research Council or even the Wellcome 
would probably feel comfortable simply delegating to a group of scientific 
champions… in the after analysis the Wellcome has its trustees, the MRC has 
its council and government to whom they are accountable [041; p. 61; p. 6]. 
They also referred to their legal obligations as members of the company itself, UK 
Biobank Limited, in maintaining a role in UK Biobank. For example, a representative 
of the funding bodies remarked:  
Biobank is not a body that’s completely at arm’s length, legally it’s a company 
limited by guarantee with members and the members are the Wellcome Trust 
and the MRC and the structure of it, the corporate structure of it means that 
they are required to agree to all sorts of major decisions [072; p. 118; p. 4].  
It could be argued however that these arguments contrast with their presentations of 
the company, UK Biobank Limited, as a separate entity, independent of the funding 
bodies. For example, representatives of the funding bodies referred to the importance 
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of creating an entity not under the control of any particular individual or group 
(including the funding bodies) in justifying their decision to establish the hub as a 
charitable company, UK Biobank Limited. 
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5.4 Leadership  
‘I can’t take the decision, somebody at Biobank or on one of the 
committees and I’m not quite sure who the hell it is, would take that 
decision, so it’s a power thing really, I’m powered to make decisions but 
not to take decisions [his emphasis]’ [0202; p. 150; p. 7].  
All constituent groups of interviewees attributed the alleged confusion over control of 
UK Biobank to a lack of leadership but they articulated it differently. Academic 
scientists articulated the lack of leadership as a lack of an individual (as opposed to 
committee) and academic scientific leadership, whereas representatives of the funding 
bodies and UK Biobank Limited articulated it as a lack of managerial leadership.  
  
5.4.1 Lack of a leader  
 
Academic scientists struggled to identify a leader of UK Biobank and attributed the 
confusion over control to this difficulty. For example, a spoke member commented: 
‘I’m not sure it has got a clear driver… I’m not clear who is the leader on it’ [023; p. 
29; p. 3] and another spoke member remarked that ‘it’s difficult to know exactly who 
is behind certain things that happen within UK Biobank’ [0105; p. 141; p. 5]. Some 
academic scientists acknowledged leadership positions, such as the CEO or Chair of 
the Science Committee, but did not identify them as leaders. For example, a spoke 
member stated: ‘I know John Newton was the CEO but we didn’t have a sort of 
complete, I think feeling that there was someone at the helm’ [0203; p. 153; p. 5]. 
Academic scientists were surprised that an endeavour of the scale of UK Biobank not 
only lacked a leader wholly responsible for delivering the resource but also lacked a 
product champion. For example, a member of the EWG remarked: ‘what this has not 
had is a very vocal, charismatic, single product champion who can get, you know, 
universal respect’ [061; p. 96; p. 7] and a spoke member stated: ‘it’s the kind of 
project that you think might well have a name behind it, someone who you could say 
this person is really the figurehead of this’ [0103; p. 136; p. 5]. Some academic 
scientists strongly connected the position of leader responsible for delivering the 
resource with that of scientific champion acting as the public face. For example, a 
member of the EWG commented:  
I think also probably what was difficult for the project was that when it was 
formalised there was actually no real leader…John Newton had no history of 
 206  
attachment to the project. He was never a champion. John Bell was never 
going to champion it because it was always something that he felt strongly 
about but it was secondary to his role as Regius Professor of Medicine. No 
other person was so clearly the outstanding leader of the project that they 
could justifiably stand up and say “This is what we’re going to do, and this is 
my team of people that will do it with me” [062; p. 101; p. 17].  
 
Academic scientists criticised the lack of a leader as it complicated decision making, 
and thereby contributed toward the confusion over control. They were frustrated over 
the anonymity of decision takers and felt powerless as a result. For example, a spoke 
member remarked:  
There is no clear process if something is felt to be not up to scratch. It is not 
clear who to go to or who is making the final decision…you find yourself in a 
difficult position as you have no control and everything has to be agreed so 
you can only strongly recommend something and you can’t make the final 
decision [035; p. 56; p. 8].  
Spoke members in particular were frustrated that they were involved in evaluating 
decisions but were not given the authority to take decisions, exacerbated by not 
knowing who was taking these decisions. For example, a spoke member distinguished 
between decision making that involved spoke members and decision taking that did 
not involve spoke members: ‘I wonder, not sometimes wonder, constantly wonder, 
who are, we know who the decision makers are in this organisation but who are the 
decision takers?’ [0202; p. 150; p. 6]. He continued  
I can’t take the decision, somebody at Biobank or on one of the committees 
and I’m not quite sure who the hell it is, would take that decision, so it’s a 
power thing really, I’m powered to make decisions but not to take decisions 
[0202; p. 150; p. 7].  
They did not know who was in control of UK Biobank because they did not know 
who was responsible for decision making.  
 
5.4.2 Leadership by committee rather than by an individual  
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All constituent groups of interviewees differentiated between leadership by committee 
and leadership by an individual, and associated UK Biobank with the former on 
account of the consultation involved in its origins and development.  
 
Academic scientists criticised leadership by committee and held it responsible for the   
confusion over control of UK Biobank. They associated it with the difficulty of 
decision making and the consequent delay in implementing the resource. For 
example, a spoke member commented: 
Whilst there needs to be a lot of consultation, there still needs to be a very 
small body or maybe an individual at the end who makes the sort of final 
decision about what direction the project’s heading in, otherwise it tends to go 
backwards and forwards [E2000; p. 1; p. 1].  
Similarly, another spoke member stated:  
The development of a research proposal needs an element of leadership by 
definition and I think it’s very, very difficult for what Biobank is trying to do 
at the moment and that goes at every single level, really. I know that there 
have been very robust methodological debates around what kind of approach 
should be taken, and there is a lot of discussion around what measures should 
be included in the questionnaire and it’s difficult to resolve those sorts of 
arguments by committee [0201; p. 146; p. 4].  
Even those spoke members who supported the leadership by committee approach in 
theory were sceptical. For example, a spoke member stated:  
It lets all the scientists have a say and it would not work if it was just one 
scientist at the top dictating but there is a danger of it being too democratic, 
with the revisiting of decisions there is a danger of just going round and round 
[027; p. 40; p. 3].  
 
Academic scientists pointed to the difficulty of managing multiple and vested 
interests in the leadership by committee approach. They associated this difficulty with 
the confusion over control of UK Biobank, arguing that leadership by committee 
allowed different groups to exert undue influence. For example, a spoke member 
commented:  
In one sense the Executive Officers are driving it and in another sense the 
Board regard themselves as the drivers, so there are multiple major 
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stakeholder groups both within Biobank and I think outside, I think the MRC 
and Wellcome would say they’re driving it and the Department of Health … 
they’re doing it at different levels rather than there’s one person or one group 
of people who does it at all levels [0102; p. 133; p. 5].  
He continued reflecting upon the need for such a person:  
If that person had the weight and the trust of the various major groupings that I 
described then inevitably that person could then make what would be seen to 
be appropriate decisions and respectable decisions to the various groups 
[0102; p. 133; p. 5].  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies largely supported the leadership by committee 
approach and stressed the importance of the collaboration it fostered. For example, a 
representative of the funding bodies remarked:  
The ethos at the time and I don’t think we’ve moved away from this is to 
achieve an integration of Biobank across all of the relevant interests in UK 
academia and to get the best UK departments and the most appropriate 
involved with Biobank [043; p. 69; p. 10]. 
They feared that leadership by an individual would result in one person wielding too 
much control over UK Biobank. Although representatives of the funding bodies 
acknowledged the difficulties involved in not having an identifiable leader they 
remained cautious of such a figure. For example, a representative of the funding 
bodies commented: ‘it’s suffered through lack of scientific champions along the way 
or really people identifiable as scientific champions’ [043; p. 70; p. 17]. Yet he 
warned of the dangers of leadership by an individual:  
I’m not quite sure mechanistically how you would try in that kind of context to 
achieve scientific champions because with scientific champions comes vested 
interest, with scientific champions comes a lot of other baggage with regard to 
“I will design it this way and I’ll do it my way” rather than trying to create a 
resource that has an impact and relevance right across a bigger sphere of 
people [043; p. 70; p. 17].  
The funding bodies’ caution reflects academic scientists’ criticism of their role in UK 
Biobank. Academic scientists felt that the funding bodies exerted too much influence 
over the resource to prevent an individual or another single group taking control.  
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Representatives of UK Biobank Limited associated leadership by committee with the 
academic scientific community and leadership by an individual as representing 
business practice. They therefore attributed the confusion over control of UK Biobank 
to the adoption of academic scientific practice in the form of leadership by committee. 
For example, a representative of UK Biobank Limited commented: ‘I have had a lot 
to learn about the academic environment and the way in which things are done, which 
is very different to the places that I’ve come from’ [0600; p. 180; p. 1]. He explained 
how he came from ‘a background of strong project management that is not an 
approach that academics and scientists necessarily take’ and how  
the environment that we’ve worked in is fundamentally based on things like 
contracts and out-sourcing arrangements whereas this environment is much 
more about collaborative working, which is less easy to express within the sort 
of contracts and planning arrangements that we’ve been used to working in 
[0600; p. 180; p. 2].  
 
5.4.3 Academic scientific and managerial leadership  
 
Academic scientists criticised UK Biobank for representing managerial leadership and 
associated this with the confusion regarding control of the resource, whereas 
representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited criticised UK Biobank 
for representing scientific leadership and as such contributing to the confusion over 
control. These different articulations of the type of leadership involved in UK 
Biobank reflect the confusion over understandings of standard academic scientific 
practice and business practice explored in chapter four.  
 
Academic scientists identified the leadership involved in UK Biobank as managerial 
on account of the professional background of those employed at the hub in that they 
were not academic scientists. They argued that managerial leadership was 
inappropriate for a scientific endeavour and responsible for some of the difficulties 
involved in decision making. For example, a spoke member remarked: ‘[a 
representative of UK Biobank Limited] background is not sort of scientific 
epidemiological background so it was more leadership from the point of view I think 
of management’ [E2000; p. 1; p. 1]. He continued by asserting the importance of 
scientific rather than managerial leadership:  
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It’s very difficult for someone who doesn’t have a scientific or an 
epidemiological background to lead the project because decisions need to be 
made on some scientific issues as well that have a very large impact on the 
overall management, the viability of the project from a financial point of view 
as well and obviously the feasibility of this study … it wasn’t the sort of 
leadership that I think it needed [E2000; p. 2; p. 2].  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited criticised the 
leadership involved in UK Biobank as scientific rather than managerial. They 
identified scientific leadership with extensive consultation and the existence of 
multiple, vested interests. For example, a representative of the funding bodies 
commented: ‘there was a corporate spirit that was missing, the idea of collecting this 
data for the common good slowly disappeared and so you’ve got people’s vested 
interests coming along’ [042; p. 67; p. 16]. They identified managerial leadership as 
leadership by an individual and associated it with strong organisational skills. The 
representative of the funding bodies continued:  
We needed someone with a good organisational background who was able to 
adopt a can-do mentality that was able to organise people, able to actually put 
people in place to go out, do recruitment to answer questions, just kind of, not 
agonise on ‘am I collecting the right data or something?’ … The key thing that 
was missing right from the word go was a strong manager, right from the word 
go, and a manager that had respect from the academic community, from the 
funders, a manager that was able to make executive decisions from the word 
go and that didn’t happen. It was all this horrible management by committee, 
never works [042; p. 67; p. 17]. 
Interestingly, this interviewee’s criticism of scientific leadership interpreted as 
consultative contradicts representatives of the funding bodies’ support for leadership 
by committee and wariness of individual leadership. 
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5.5 Organisational Structure 
‘They choose it [the establishment of a hub as a charitable company] to 
sort of remove from them [the funding bodies] the power of control of it 
[UK Biobank], so it’s separate, it’s not the MRC’s project, it’s not 
Wellcome’s project, it’s not the Department of Health’s–it’s Biobank’s 
project’ [0503; p. 178; p. 9] 
Academic scientists attributed the alleged confusion over control of UK Biobank to 
the organisational structure, particularly the hub and spoke model. They argued that 
the role and responsibilities of the hub and spokes were not clear. Representatives of 
the funding bodies established the hub as a company to ensure that it was free from 
any particular individual or group’s control.  
 
5.5.1 Establishment of the hub as a company  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies argued that the hub should be established as an 
entity separate from the funding bodies, the Government and any single organisation 
(such as a university) to ensure its independence. They felt that establishing the hub as 
a charitable company would ensure such independence, prevent any university or 
existing organisation exerting undue influence, and grant it a strong separate identity. 
For example, a representative of funding bodies commented:  
we believe it [establishment of the hub as a company] gives, especially with 
this type of database, patients who consent to be part of the study reassurance 
that this is not a company that’s going to make profit out of it, it’s not a 
Government, a solely Government sponsored organisation that they might 
begin to feel a little bit, in the future anyway, not happy with, some kind of 
Government sponsored thing for patients is a fear that they are not giving it to 
a truly independent body and use it in the best interests, not simply to them but 
of the other people in the UK [040; p. 60; p. 11].  
Similarly, another representative of the funding bodies remarked:  
It wasn’t easy to see how you could create the kind of resource that you 
wanted while simply giving a grant to one of the organisations in the field. 
You’d have ended up with something that belonged more to a university than 
it did to the national research enterprise but then also we needed a model 
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through which a set of funders could operate and feel comfortable with [072; 
p. 119; p. 6]. 
A further representative of the funding bodies stated that ‘it was important … to have 
an independent organisation that would gain a life of its own’ [043; p. 69; p. 9].  
 
The funding bodies’ arguments were evident in the documents relating to Site Visit 
Reports for the hub bidding process. For example, bids were criticised for not 
appreciating the proposed independence of the hub and praised for acknowledging 
such independence: ‘there was an impression that overwhelming academic influence 
could easily overpower the Hub’s autonomy’ and ‘no clear idea of Hub-Spoke 
separation’ [D550/12 Volume 1; p. 35]. On the other hand, bids were praised for 
‘clear vision of the Hub-Spoke separation’ and ‘clear vision of Hub 
independence/autonomy’ [D550/12 Volume 1; p. 35].  
 
Spoke members acknowledged the funding bodies’ wish to establish the hub as an 
independent entity to prevent another group controlling UK Biobank. For example, a 
spoke member commented: ‘they choose it to sort of remove from them the power of 
control of it, so it’s separate, it’s not the MRC’s project, it’s not Wellcome’s project, 
it’s not the Department of Health’s – it’s Biobank’s project’ [0503; p. 178; p. 9].  
 
5.5.2 The ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ model  
 
Academic scientists and some representatives of UK Biobank Limited criticised the 
hub and spoke model for creating confusion over control of UK Biobank. They 
argued that the number and size of the spokes meant that too many people were 
involved in the resource and attributed difficulties faced in decision making to such 
involvement. For example, a representative of UK Biobank Limited commented:  
We’ve got too many people…it should have been given to a small group of 
scientists…we’ve got 23 universities involved, how many professors do you 
need to change a light bulb? The answer is one person does it well, 23 people 
discuss how to do it and never do it…you have a large number of people not 
properly involved in the project, chipping in bits and pieces from time to time 
and it’s desperately inefficient and very unsatisfying [010; p. 4; p. 6]. 
Similarly, a clinical academic involved in UK Biobank remarked:  
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You’ve now got this big structure, a spider’s web of hub and spokes with a lot 
of people involved …it’s much more difficult if you’ve got a very large group 
coming up with their idea. This is the kind of research that is perhaps better 
done by very small groups [071; p. 115; p. 5]. 
Given the involvement of numerous and large groups, academic scientists described 
the difficulty of appeasing multiple and vested interests in making decisions. For 
example, a spoke member commented: ‘It’s a bureaucrat’s nightmare this study, 
decision making is very diffused, it’s not clear…the same material was being 
examined repeatedly and usually always leading to the same conclusion’ [025; p. 36; 
p. 4].  
 
Academic scientists argued that the committees were too large and described the 
difficulty of reaching consensus amongst the Science Committee and BoD 
particularly. For example, 025 continued: ‘it’s too bureaucratic, you have funders, you 
have Biobank Board of Directors, then you have the Science Committee, then you 
have an Implementation Committee and you have numerous sub-committees’ [025; p. 
36; p. 4]. Similarly, another spoke member commented ‘The delays were also because 
of the science committee being too big and unwieldy’ [030; p. 43; p. 4]. Academic 
scientists also cited the difficulty of appeasing multiple and vested interests on 
account of the involvement of numerous and large committees. For example, a 
member of the BoD remarked:  
The science committee is still and will always be I think a group of people 
who have a large interest in making the project work but also their own 
personal hobby-horses to ride and their reputations to protect [070; p. 111; p. 
13]. 
Unlike other academic scientists, he argued that the BoD did not suffer the problems 
of multiple and vested interests associated with the Science Committee in particular as 
it adopted a ‘corporate approach’. His comments thereby resonate with the funding 
bodies’ arguments that managerial leadership was more appropriate than scientific 
leadership. For example, he praised the BoD for adopting a corporate approach and 
criticised the Science Committee for not adopting that approach:  
there are still people there [in the Science Committee] who will be very 
corporate at times and very un-corporate at other times when their particular 
interests come to the surface … it [the BoD] was corporate right from the start 
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because people weren’t appointed because they had hobby-horses but they 
were appointed because they had to do business [070; p. 111; p. 13].  
 
Academic scientists, in particular spoke members, referred to the pressure placed on 
the former CEO, John Newton, in handling the multiple and vested interests of the 
committees and funding bodies: ‘I know John Newton is chief exec but I’m not sure I 
think he’s being pulled in lots of different directions. There are lots of people with 
their own agendas here’ [023; p. 29; p. 3]. Given the organisational structure, he 
spoke of the difficulties faced by John Newton in asserting his authority:  
John I think has had an incredibly difficult time just establishing his offices, 
his infrastructure etc…I’m not sure that John either feels able to or it’s his 
remit to actually say “this is what we’re going to do”. So it’s I think it is 
struggling a bit because of that [023; p. 29; p. 4].  
Academic scientists identified the funding bodies as a further group asserting a vested 
interest in UK Biobank. For example, a spoke member implicated them in the 
pressures placed on John Newton:  
I felt John Newton, I thought, did a very good job. My impression was that as 
Chief Executive he was likely to be being pulled in all sorts of directions and 
didn’t have the freedom possibly to make the decisions, there were other, you 
know, powerful figures within Biobank who were perhaps controlling the 
purse strings and perhaps he didn’t have the authority or the freedom to make 
the decisions that needed to be made for Biobank [0104; p. 139; p. 3].  
They argued that the alleged confusion over control allowed these multiple and vested 
interests to exert their control over UK Biobank.  
 
Academic scientists implicated the hub and spoke model itself in the tensions between 
the hub and the spokes. Given the extent to which spokes were involved in protocol 
development and the importance of their function in delivery of the resource, 
academic scientists argued that regulating their role was problematic. For example, a 
clinical academic involved in UK Biobank commented:  
If you define something as a spoke, you know, an essential part of the overall 
structure then it becomes very difficult to use a spoke just as a sample and 
patient subject collection entity, it becomes a body that really wants to get 
involved as part of the research [071; p. 115; p. 7]. 
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Some academic scientists argued that the hub encountered difficulties in asserting its 
control over the resource on account of the funding bodies involvement, which 
contributed to the tension in the model. For example, 071 continued:  
You create a structure whereby the chief executive and the company have to 
go back and get approval from the funders for any number of relatively small 
amounts of decisions…you’ve created an entity which should be able to move 
fast and be responsive and independent and then you slow it down by making 
it financially utterly dependent [071; p. 114; p. 3]. 
 
5.5.3 Role of the hub and spokes 
 
All constituent groups of interviewees associated the ambiguity over control of UK 
Biobank with the confusion regarding the role of the hub and spokes. They articulated 
this confusion largely in terms of the authority that the hub held over the spokes and 
the resource generally. This perceived authority accounted for much of the tension 
between the hub and spokes. Academic scientists contested the hub’s authority over 
the spokes whereas representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited 
argued that the hub should have had more authority over them. Academic scientists 
were however divided on this occasion as members of the BoD felt that the hub 
should have held a dominant position over the spokes whereas spoke members 
criticised such a role.  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies, UK Biobank Limited and the BoD argued that 
the hub experienced difficulties in asserting its control over UK Biobank because of 
the allegedly controlling role undertaken by spokes, which they criticised. For 
example, a representative of the funding bodies claimed that the academic scientific 
community  
didn’t like the idea of the central unit collecting all the data and coordinating 
its collection and just these units out in the periphery … so you begin to 
subvert this purist hub and spoke model into sorts of centres that were located 
around the regions that were actually heavily involved in the utilisation of the 
data and doing their own little research projects [042; p. 66; p. 11].  
Similarly, a member of the BoD remarked:  
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The academic community are only one of the stakeholders and in some ways I 
suspect they’ve been given too much of a stake and that’s one of the errors 
around the RCC concept. It put too much concentrated depth of influence in 
the hands of the RCCs [070; p. 111; p. 12].  
Representatives of the funding bodies, UK Biobank Limited and the BoD praised the 
development of the hub and spoke relationship as the hub increased its control over 
UK Biobank whilst the spokes’ influence diminished. For example, the member of the 
BoD continued:   
Originally there was going to be a lot of regional flavour …gradually it’s 
coming up that everybody will follow the same protocol and do a very similar 
thing…there will be some flexibility but it’s going to be based not on the 
whim of the people locally but on what is actually going to work to get the 
people in [070; p. 110; p. 6]. 
They interpreted this development as representing the adoption of a centralised model, 
which they defended. For example, another member of the BoD remarked:  
There is a bit of a power struggle there and I think that one of the things that 
has changed in my mind is that it has to be quite strongly managed and we 
have to have a centralised approach to things, now that’s against my normal 
way of thinking but I think in this case to ensure authenticity and to achieve 
the economies of scale [013; p. 17; p. 5].  
 
Representatives of funding bodies, UK Biobank Limited and members of the BoD 
also associated the difficulties of asserting the hub’s control with the way in which it 
was established. They cited the practical difficulties of establishing the hub and the 
problematic sequence of events by which it was set up. For example, a representative 
of UK Biobank Limited commented: ‘we had no infrastructure at all, absolutely no 
infrastructure, nothing, not even a secretary or an email account’ [010; p. 6; p. 7]. 
They felt that the hub should have been established and developed prior to the 
appointment of the CEO and spokes. For example, a clinical academic involved in 
UK Biobank remarked:  
You’ve appointed the person to run it before he knows exactly what he’s 
going to run and it has the fault that you’ve appointed both the hub and spokes 
who are told that they’ve got to work together but it’s not clear who is 
responsible for what and it doesn’t give an exclusive centre for the person or 
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the group who will actually make the final decision for what the scientific 
protocol is going to be and the nuts and bolts of ethics and so on [071; p. 113; 
p. 3]. 
They also associated the appointment of the BoD, the main authoritative body, 
following the establishment of the other committees and spokes with the difficulty of 
asserting the hub’s control. For example, 071 continued: ‘you’ve got a company 
which is parachuted in somewhere around the end of the process, without them as a 
board having been involved in developing it to this stage’ [071; p. 113; p. 3].  
 
Spoke members criticised the control exercised by the hub over the spokes, and the 
resource generally, as inappropriate. They stressed the power of the hub over the 
spokes and conceived of the model very much as centralised; for example, a spoke 
member remarked:  
They are being very strongly dictated to by the centre and really not being 
allowed to contribute in a meaningful way to the science and that means the 
whole thing becomes untenable for university organisations [0800; p. 194; p. 
5]. 
Another spoke member commented: ‘we’re not being allowed, the spokes, to really 
drive the agenda, the agenda is coming from the centre and it seems to be getting 
increasingly centralised, which is a little bit worrying’ [023; p. 30; p. 3]. They 
described feeling disenfranchised through a lack of genuine consultation in decision 
making. For example, a spoke member commented:  
The decisions around how it is done and the strategy and the protocol they 
took it to be the Executive Officer’s domain and not to do with the RCCs, so 
they would advise and then the Executive Officers could equally ignore them 
and then the UK Biobank Officers would contract to the RCCs to deliver 
whatever they want to deliver, so it’s a supplier customer role, which is 
completely foreign and in fact for the academics it was to them insulting 
[0102; p. 132; p. 3]. 
Spoke members described the hub as seeking consultation with the spokes but not 
heeding it; they therefore questioned the validity of seeking consultation and 
involving spokes at all in decision making. For example, a spoke member remarked: 
‘you can’t have it both ways, so you can’t want to run it through the universities and 
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then say ‘but we’re not going to listen to what you’ve got to say’ that simply doesn’t 
make any sense’ [0800; p. 193; p. 2].  
 
Spoke members’ criticisms of the centralised model are strongly reflected in the 
documents pertaining to the process of contract negotiation, specifically in the spokes’ 
responses to the draft contract, emailed to representatives of the funding bodies on the 
30 April 2004 [D550/10 Volume 1]. The responses detail the spokes’ discomfort at 
the control of the hub over the spokes in the draft contract; one response stated:  
‘[t]he current draft reflects a project that is driven from the centre … some 
aspects of Biobank should be centralised (centralised IT, centralised 
biorepository, etc), the RCCs cannot play their full role in Biobank if they are 
put in the position of having aspects of the project imposed upon them during 
the course of the project’ [their emphasis] [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41]. 
Similarly, a further response referred to the ‘feel’ of the document and challenged the 
funders to ‘[c]ount up how many clauses are there to pin the RCCs down and then 
count the number that act in the opposite direction’ [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41]. There 
is also evidence in the documents of the increasing awareness on the part of the 
funding bodies of the spokes’ criticism regarding the power granted to the hub. For 
example, a memo from a representative of the funding bodies to other representatives 
of the funding bodies on the 2 April 2004 explained the changes made to the 
terminology of the contract. For example, ‘[t]he document is now described as a 
Research Services Agreement and refers to the collaborative nature of the relationship 
between UK Biobank Limited and the RCCs’ [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41].  
 
Spoke members’ criticism of the role undertaken by the hub reflected their 
disapproval of the hub and spoke model as representing an attempted compromise 
between the academic scientific model and the business model. They felt the hub’s 
control over the spokes represented control by the business community over the 
academic scientific community. For example, a spoke member commented:  
The culture that was with UK Biobank by having a Chief Executive Officer 
and Executive Officers is they took the view that they were running the whole 
project basically because it’s in their job descriptions and they were therefore 
looking at the RCCs … in two roles: one is advisory and the second in a role 
of contractors or suppliers [0102; p. 132; p. 3].  
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Similarly, a spoke member referred to ‘far too much central control all along from a 
group of people who I think probably could not be expected to fully understand the 
scientific and university perspective’ [0800; p. 193; p. 2].  
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5.6 Organisational Changes  
‘It’s one person at Oxford that does the job’ [E2001; p. 6; p. 3] 
All constituent groups of interviewees interpreted the organisational changes as 
resolving the confusion over control of UK Biobank but they viewed it differently. 
For example, although academic scientists felt that the changes resolved the confusion 
they argued that as they were orchestrated by the funding bodies they reinforced their 
control over UK Biobank.   
 
5.6.1 Organisational changes as resolution to confusion over control 
 
All constituent groups of interviewees supported the move towards leadership by an 
individual, the new CEO and PI Rory Collins, from leadership by committee but 
supported it differently.  
 
Academic scientists, particularly spoke members, stressed the powerful position 
adopted by Rory Collins, whereas representatives of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited refrained from such descriptions. For example, a spoke member 
commented: ‘Rory told the scientific leads this is how it’s going to be … Rory 
decides the scientific issues and how they’re implemented and the scientific leads of 
RCCs support or don’t support them but he has the final say’ [E2001; p. 4; p. 8]. He 
continued: ‘it’s one person at Oxford that does the job’ [E2001; p. 6; p. 3]. Similarly 
another spoke member stated: ‘He is taking the control away from the PIs, the six 
coordinators and anyone involved in the study to Oxford’ [E2002; p. 8; p. 1]. Spoke 
members’ support for the institution of a leader was tempered by their criticism of the 
process of change. They were frustrated by how their role had suddenly transformed 
following years of effort to implement their former role. Despite these frustrations, 
some spoke members continued to support leadership by an individual. For example, 
a spoke member commented:  
Perhaps the CEO taking responsibility, control, charge, whatever you want to 
call it is no bad thing as previously decisions were taking far too long. His new 
approach is ‘there is a job to do and he is the man to do it’ whereas previously 
there was much debate and revisiting of issues now there is much more 
control, sometimes decisions are taken with the involvement of the RCCs and 
sometimes not [E2002; p. 9; p. 2]. 
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Their experience of the ‘leadership by committee’ approach, particularly the difficulty 
of appeasing committee members’ multiple and vested interests, strengthened their 
belief in the institution of a leader:  
I am coming round to it as previously there was so much petty politics 
involved in some universities and some people were squabbling like children 
so I suppose if we can’t make up our minds and act appropriately then perhaps 
we need someone with a bit of authority and responsibility to do it for us 
[E2002; p. 9; p. 2]. 
 
Despite asserting their support for leadership by an individual in the organisational 
changes, representatives of the funding bodies cautiously criticised the former 
leadership by committee approach. For example, a representative of the funding 
bodies commented: 
We’ve gone from a situation where we had a very consensual kind of 
committee approach which in a sense there was a bit of a leadership vacuum if 
I can even put it that way without being pejorative compared to having a 
Principal Investigator approach with somebody with very strong ideas on 
directing and leading the project [E2003; p. 11; p. 1].  
This caution reflects their former defence of the leadership by committee approach 
and criticism of leadership by an individual in the original interviews. He continued:  
I’m always a great believer and I think most people are in strong leadership … 
I suppose you could say equally strong leaders can create waves but in my 
estimation what has happened over the last sort of six months there haven’t 
been waves created and all of the stakeholder involvement and buy-in is all 
there and there’s a great sense of confidence around the project [E2003; p. 11; 
p. 3]. 
Representatives of UK Biobank Limited articulated the changes as the adoption of a 
centralised approach. However, they cautiously associated a centralised approach with 
resolution to the confusion over control, which is indicative of the tension in the 
former hub and spoke model. For example, a representative of UK Biobank Limited 
commented: 
We have a structure which allows us to better deliver the project in terms of 
cost and quality, I don’t want to give you the impression that I’m some kind of 
Stalinist, centralist kind of person, everything must be run from the centre but 
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there are certain types of operation which are best run in a centralised, 
standardised way and those kinds of operation are those which are generally 
repeated processes, which is what we’re doing that require a high degree of 
quality control and generate a lot of data which needs to be captured and 
processed and stored in a standardised way [E2006; p. 23; p. 2].  
 
5.6.2 Motivation for the organisational changes  
 
Academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited also gave different accounts of the motivations behind the changes. Academic 
scientists implicated the funding bodies in the changes by holding them accountable 
for the failure of the hub and spoke model, prompting the need for change. They 
argued that the funding bodies’ control of UK Biobank in the original structure was 
reflected in the difficulty of influencing the set up. For example, a clinical academic 
involved in UK Biobank associated the Wellcome Trust particularly in the failings of 
the original structure:  
It was run, driven very heavily from within the Wellcome Trust, where there is 
not a good culture of thinking through the best way of doing something like 
this…the Wellcome Trust’s a huge and very rich organisation and it’s a very 
brave person who says “dear Wellcome Trust, you lay beautiful golden eggs 
but the goose that lays the golden eggs may actually not be laying them all in 
exactly the right places” or “the eggs are the wrong shape” and so on. It’s very 
difficult for anyone to be critical of an organisation of the nature of the 
Wellcome Trust [E2010; p. 30; p. 3].  
Similarly, a spoke member explained why he thought the hub and spoke model failed: 
‘most importantly a combination of not allowing sufficient autonomy within the 
regional collaborating centres and changing the rules’ [E2005; p. 19; p. 2]. He pointed 
to the control exercised by the hub over the spokes: 
Instead of asking for the principal investigators to contribute to the model for 
managing the trial…they [the funding bodies] imposed a model of 
management which actually was not going to work and they refused to allow 
us to modify that or to take ownership of it [E2005; p. 19; p. 2].  
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Academic scientists further interpreted the changes as representing the funding 
bodies’ control over UK Biobank by arguing that the funding bodies appointed Rory 
Collins fully aware of the changes that he would implement. For example, a spoke 
member reflected: ‘they knew that this is how Rory would do things…I would suspect 
it’s the funders that drove the desire to have something done about the project’ 
[E2001; p. 4; p. 9].  
 
In contrast, representatives of funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited cited the 
changing requirements of the resource as motivating the need for change, specifically 
a greater control over UK Biobank by an individual. They argued that the 
implementation stage of UK Biobank required greater control of the hub over UK 
Biobank, whereas the earlier, developmental stage required consultation. In doing so, 
they justified their former support for the leadership by committee approach 
associated with the original organisational structure. For example, a representative of 
the funding bodies commented:  
One was the phase of development of Biobank, I mean it was changing from 
the development of the protocol to piloting the study, so it was moving from a 
period of preparation, if you like, both sort of structural preparation and 
scientific preparation into the beginning of implementation. So the real 
changes were triggered by the needs of the project and that included the need 
to appoint a new CEO with John stepping down [E2011; p. 34; p. 5] 
Similarly, a representative of UK Biobank Limited remarked:  
In the early phases you do need a consultative approach, where you consult 
with the scientists across a very broad range of expertise to get their views on 
what could be done … and then you try and boil that down into what should 
be done [E2006; p. 24; p. 3]. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
All constituent groups cited the following factors as being responsible for the alleged 
confusion over control of UK Biobank: lack of a leader, adoption of ‘leadership by 
committee’ as opposed to leadership by an individual, adoption of managerial 
leadership, adoption of scientific leadership, organisational structure, and lack of 
clarity regarding the role of the hub and spokes. Academic scientists speculated that 
control over UK Biobank lay with the funding bodies, which the funding bodies 
denied, which exacerbated the issue of confusion over control as academic scientists 
perceived such an active funding body role as contrary to standard academic scientific 
practice. Academic scientists further stressed the funding bodies’ control over UK 
Biobank by holding them responsible for orchestrating the organisational changes.  
 
Academic scientists argued that the involvement of influential scientists and 
representatives of the funding bodies in the EWG, PDC, Science Committee and 
spokes resulted in confusion over control as representatives from each of these groups 
vied for position. They pointed to the difficulty of decision making as these groups 
advocated for their own scientific interests or that of their respective organisations, be 
it a university or a funding body. Representatives of the funding bodies argued that 
they had to involve numerous and large committees and groups as UK Biobank was a 
national initiative that would recruit across the UK. Some academic scientists accused 
the funding bodies of consulting so widely in order to be seen to be fair and avert 
criticism rather than any actual wish to consult them, which echoes PDC members’ 
criticism of consultation as not genuine. Some academic scientists felt that the 
multiple and vested interests arose out of the scientific design of UK Biobank. They 
argued that the lack of hypotheses meant that academic scientists competed to design 
the protocol in such a way to address their specific interests.  
 
All constituent groups of interviewees interpreted the organisational changes, 
specifically the appointment of Rory Collins as PI and CEO, as resolving the 
confusion over control. They associated control of UK Biobank with leadership by an 
individual but they did so differently. Representatives of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited interpreted the organisational changes as resolving the confusion 
over control as they represented adoption of a centralised approach. They defined a 
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centralised approach as strong leadership and a powerful hub and associated it with 
business practice. Academic scientists did not interpret the adoption of a centralised 
approach as resolving confusion over control. This reflects the tension in the former 
hub and spoke model as spoke members resented the hub’s control over the spokes, 
which they interpreted as rejection of academic scientific practice in favour of 
business practice.  
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Chapter 6 
 
‘The funders developed a ‘them and us’ [academic scientists]mentality’ [030; p. 
43; p. 4] 
 
Emergent Issues: Trust 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Issues of trust, or lack of it, arose throughout the origins and development of UK 
Biobank. All constituent groups described a lack of trust between academic scientists 
on the one hand, and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited 
on the other. Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited did not 
trust academic scientists to develop UK Biobank as they questioned their motivations 
for becoming involved. Academic scientists felt that the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited did not trust them to develop the resource citing the consultation 
process and organisational structure as evidence. In turn, they could not then trust the 
funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. Whatever trust had existed between 
academic scientists and the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited was tested by 
initial protocol development and gradually eroded through ongoing protocol 
development, the hub and spoke bidding process, contract negotiation, and 
implementation of the organisational changes. 
 
This chapter will explore explanations for the lack of trust between academic 
scientists and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. In 
doing so, it will focus on the following events and issues chronologically: protocol 
development, spoke members’ motivations for involvement, organisational structure 
and organisational changes. First, it will address academic scientists’ perceptions of 
the consultation undertaken in protocol development as evidence of the funding 
bodies and UK Biobank Limited’s lack of trust in them. Second, this chapter will 
examine spoke members’ motivations for becoming involved in UK Biobank, which 
partly accounted for the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited’s lack of trust 
toward them. Third, it will analyse the influence of confusion within the 
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organisational structure as a source of mistrust and last, perceptions of the 
implementation of the organisational structure as responsible for a lack of trust.  
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6.2 Protocol Development  
‘whatever consultation there was, was basically justifying the decision 
post hoc’ [0900; p. 196; p. 2] 
Academic scientists argued that the funding bodies did not trust them with initial 
protocol development prior to the funding decision and ongoing protocol development 
following the funding decision. They cited an alleged lack of genuine consultation 
with academic scientists in protocol development as evidence of the lack of trust.   
 
6.2.1 Initial and Ongoing protocol development  
 
Academic scientists criticised the consultation undertaken with the PDC in initial 
protocol development. They argued that the Committee was not adequately consulted 
partly because of the projected timing of the funding decision. For example, a 
member of the PDC remarked:  
because a decision has to be taken by April to, I mean, the idea that the whole 
thing was going to go live from April 2003 basically there was no time to 
change anything…you can talk about institutional sleepwalking or you can 
talk about railroading and you can talk about whatever you like but this was 
not in my mind the right way to develop a proposal which is probably going to 
cost over [£] 100 million in the end [051; p. 83; p. 8].  
As discussed in previous chapters, academic scientists accused the funding bodies of 
having a pre-protocol in place prior to the establishment of the PDC. PDC members 
referred to the funding bodies’ role in the Committee as evidence of an alleged lack of 
genuine consultation. For example, the PDC member continued:  
[we were] being told actually what the protocol should be because it was the 
same as the outline, and being told that any embellishment, even if it was cost-
neutral in favour of an IPC was out of court or at least had to be justified as 
separate [051; p. 82; p. 8].  
Some academic scientists referred to the Parliamentary Select Committee Report to 
support their criticism of the consultation process, specifically that the decision to go 
ahead with Biobank was made prior to consultation. For example, a member of the 
scientific community outwith UK Biobank commented:  
The parliamentary select committee put it very well when they said that they 
got the impression that essentially they’d [the funding bodies] decided to do it 
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and whatever consultation there was, was basically justifying the decision post 
hoc [0900; p. 196; p. 2].  
Academic scientists associated the alleged way in which the funding decision was 
taken, regardless of input from them, with their perception that the funding bodies did 
not trust them. For example, the scientist outwith UK Biobank continued:  
There was a proposal put up behind closed doors, a decision made and then 
everybody basically saying “you do think this is a good idea don’t you?” … 
nobody that was in the country dared say no because they all want funding 
from the MRC’ [0900; p. 196; p. 12].  
They accused the funding bodies’ of wanting to be seen to involve academic 
scientists, rather than actually involving them. For example, 0900 commented: 
You have to appear to be collegiate. If you’re putting that amount of money 
into medical research basically you have to give everybody their shout and I 
guess that was what that process was about, more about sort of making people 
feel they had some sort of shout in it [his emphasis] [0900; p. 196; p. 8].  
 
Academic scientists argued that the wider academic scientific community outwith the 
PDC were not properly consulted. They accused the funding bodies of failing to heed 
critical academic scientists’ concerns. For example, a member of the PDC 
commented:  
The Protocol Development Committee should have gone out of its way to 
attempt to reassure the people who were totally against it that their views were 
being taken into account…even if they’re not able to dissuade them they 
should have been doing all they possibly could to take on board the various 
comments of the people in the middle group, so the people with mixed views 
were listened to and frankly that didn’t happen [033; p. 51; p. 5]. 
Academic scientists criticised the Protocol Development Workshop and felt that it did 
not constitute genuine consultation. For example, the PDC member continued: ‘it 
allowed people to vent temporarily…it never really started a proper consultative 
process’ [033; p. 51; p. 5]. He reflected on the consequences of lack of consultation: 
‘quite a lot of people have maintained that their views are being ignored and of course 
now it’s very hard to include people’s views because it’s so far down the design 
process’ [033; p. 51; p. 5]. 
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Spoke members in particular cited what they felt to be a lack of genuine consultation 
with them in ongoing protocol development as evidence of the funding bodies’ 
alleged lack of trust in academic scientists. For example, one spoke member 
remarked:   
We’ve put together fairly detailed proposals for recruitment or for data 
collection or for questionnaire design or whatever…a lot of these proposals 
have largely been ignored … the central people or what do you call them, 
Biobank Central or whatever, I think that my impression is that they have 
tended to go their own way despite the arguments that have been put to them 
and discussions that have been available [021; p. 21; p. 3-4].  
They felt that their opinions were not acknowledged by UK Biobank Limited. For 
example, another spoke member commented that 
having sought it [university involvement] very scant attention was paid to the 
views of really quite highly qualified individuals who knew both about the 
science and about how to manage large research projects, and who were well 
aware of what would be needed in order to make involvement in such an 
enterprise worthwhile for the universities [0800; p. 193; p. 2].  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies dismissed academic scientists’ criticism of the 
consultation process as indicative of the academic scientists’ suspicions of them.  For 
example, a representative of the funding bodies commented:  
Biobank has always been open…that’s not necessarily the perspective given 
by some of the opponents to Biobank and it’s biased from one perspective, 
they’ve always been sort of Machiavellian in their thinking assuming that 
there’s been a lot of things going on behind closed doors to make decisions 
and that has never been the case…people do like to lift the curtain and try to 
find something there that isn’t necessarily there [042; p. 64; p. 2].  
Representatives of UK Biobank Limited distinguished between initial and ongoing 
protocol development. They were sympathetic to academic scientists’ criticisms of the 
consultation involved in initial protocol development. For example, a representative 
of UK Biobank Limited reflected:  
They discussed them [main issues] and I think ultimately Tom Meade just 
decided and that’s okay but it wasn’t ideal because we’ve been left with a 
legacy of people feeling that they never had that really proper evaluation, so to 
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some extent they were fudged in that the original protocol doesn’t reject the 
interests of the intensively phenotyped cohort [010; p. 3; p. 5].  
In relation to ongoing protocol development, representatives of UK Biobank Limited 
did however dismiss academic scientists’ criticisms of the consultation process. They 
accused academic scientists of trying to change aspects of the protocol that had 
already been agreed. For example, the representative of UK Biobank Limited 
continued:  
They’re [spoke members] still trying to introduce that in by the back door 
(lower age range) which is very irritating and one of the problems we have is 
that people are still … there’s still a lot of entropy in the system, people have 
not fully signed up to the protocol, they’ve signed with their fingers crossed 
behind their back hoping that they can change it and it’s not great [010; p. 3; p. 
5].  
 
6.2.2 Development of IPC Protocol 
 
Members of the PDC described the development of the IPC protocol as illustrative of 
the funding bodies’ lack of trust in them. The IPC was a highly controversial issue 
and a PDC member said the funding bodies’ decision not to include the IPC in the 
main protocol was ‘from a scientific perspective I personally think this is the biggest 
single error that Biobank has made’ [033; p. 50; p. 7]. Members of the PDC accused 
the funding bodies of not allowing them to genuinely consider the IPC. For example, 
the member of the PDC continued: 
Discussion took place on that but it was very much…, it was never allowed to 
get to the point where it was seriously going to become part of the project so 
they allowed us to discuss it but in a fairly safe manner which wasn’t going to 
allow us to get what we wanted [033; p. 50; p. 7]. 
They argued that the funding bodies’ negative reaction to the IPC proposal reflected a 
lack of trust in the PDC, rather than any particular objections to the IPC. For example, 
another member of the PDC felt that the IPC was ‘inevitably perceived as a threat, by 
whom? Difficult to say at this stage, but clearly the chairman, Tom Meade, saw this as 
something which should be set on one side’ [051; p. 83; p. 6]. He continued by 
describing the effect of such lack of trust on the Committee:  
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A lot of ideas that came from the Protocol Development Committee actually 
went into the IPC proposal rather than into the main protocol because that was 
where we perceived efficiency and scientific gain … it did emancipate the 
Protocol Development Committee to basically say, well, its allegiance lay 
more with the IPC idea than with a hand-me-down Biobank protocol [051; p. 
83; p. 9]. 
 
Documentary evidence of the funding bodies’ alleged lack of trust of the PDC in 
developing the IPC protocol includes correspondence between members. PDC 
members described efforts taken to present the IPC protocol as non-threatening to the 
main protocol, which is indicative of the tension between them and representatives of 
the funding bodies. For example, a member of the PDC, in an email to the Committee 
on the 17 November 2001, refuted accusations made by the funding bodies that the 
IPC sub-group ‘have some vested interest’ in the main protocol failing as ‘frankly 
ridiculous’ [S600/174; Volume 2; p. 19]. He criticised the funding bodies’ lack of 
trust of the IPC sub-group by describing how the IPC relied on the success of the 
main protocol. He pointed out that members of the sub-group were involved in spoke 
bids despite expecting that the IPC would not be funded as part of the main initiative, 
arguing ‘these hardly sound like the rational actions of a group of subversives hell 
bent on the downfall of the main initiative’ [S600/174; Volume 2; p. 19]. Lack of trust 
between PDC members and the funding bodies is further evident in an email from 
another member of the PDC. In a letter to Tom Meade, copied to members of the 
Committee, on the 16 November 2001, he questioned the basis of the decision that the 
IPC protocol would be sent to the peer review panel in a revised form:  
Who was present at the meeting which took this decision? …who will take the 
decision about whether this revised document is ‘suitable’ for peer review? 
…whom did this group represent (the PDC, all funders, MRC only, or none of 
these? …what steps have been taken to elicit views of those not represented at 
this meeting? …will the fuller IPC protocol be made available to peer 
reviewers on request? [S600/174; Volume 2; p. 20].  
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6.3 Spoke members’ motivations for involvement  
‘There was a bit of “what’s in it for me?” mantra sitting behind a number 
of people’ [043; p. 70; p. 15]  
Academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited had different understandings of spokes members’ motivations for 
involvement in UK Biobank. On the one hand, academic scientists pointed to their 
professional obligations to their universities in taking part in research activities in 
terms of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). On the other hand, representatives 
of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited criticised such ‘non-scientific’ 
motivations. These different understandings regarding the validity of ‘non-scientific’ 
motivations for involvement contributed to a lack of trust between academic scientists 
and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited.  
 
6.3.1 Spoke members’ motivations for involvement  
 
Spoke members articulated their motivations for involvement in the following terms: 
the desire simply to be involved in a large scale, national initiative; the professional 
and financial risks of not being involved; and the potential for collaboration with 
other universities. Generally, they did not describe scientific interest or belief in the 
value of UK Biobank as a significant motivating factor.  
 
Spoke members felt that they should be involved in UK Biobank and described such 
pressure as a significant motivating factor in applying to be a spoke. For example, a 
spoke member stated: ‘we were better having a spoke than not having a spoke, we’re 
better contributing intellectually than not, we’re better in the party than out, than 
writing from the sidelines’ [026; p. 38; p. 3]. Similarly, another spoke member 
reflected on the fear of being left out of ‘one of the largest epidemiological projects 
happening in the UK over the next ten years’ and a certain ‘anxiety of being in some 
way left out of the biggest show in town’ [0105; p. 140; p. 3].  
 
Spoke members feared being professionally and financially isolated if they were not 
involved in UK Biobank. For example, a spoke member commented: ‘there was an 
opportunity cost if we weren’t involved would we be a player or not?...we set 
ourselves up to be one of the top departments…if we weren’t involved in this how 
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might we be perceived?’ [023; p. 28; p. 2]. They feared that their university 
departments would face financial difficulties in the future if they were not involved in 
UK Biobank. For example, a spoke member remarked:  
A large amount of biomedical research funding might essentially be tied up in 
Biobank over the next few years because it was such an expensive project…if 
you wanted to access biomedical research funding it was probably 
strategically sensible to in some way be part of Biobank [0105; p. 140; p. 3].  
Spoke members argued that the funding of UK Biobank would negatively affect the 
available funding for other medical research activities and thus felt that it was crucial 
to be involved in order to access the available funds. For example, a spoke member 
reflected:  
There is a finite amount of money in the UK for medical research of the 
epidemiological type so there is a fear that all the money is going to one 
project there won’t be much for other projects, so you’d better apply for the 
money that’s available … people don’t want to not be in it if it’s going to be 
the major medical research in Britain for the next fifteen years, it’s nice to be 
in it, not out of it [0501; p. 174; p. 2].  
Similarly, a scientist outwith UK Biobank [0302] remarked:  
It was a major epidemiological study that would be consuming a lot of 
resources, the sort of things that ideally one needed to be on the inside rather 
than the outside in order to get access to both the resources and ultimately to 
the scientific spin-off [0302; p. 163; p. 4].  
Despite doubts over the issue of payback for involvement (addressed in the next 
section), spoke members maintained their wish to stay involved in UK Biobank, such 
was their fear of the professional and financial consequences of not being a part of it. 
For example, a spoke member stated: ‘you might benefit from it and in the long term 
if there is an increased investment in this and that you’ll certainly be out in the cold if 
you’re not in at the beginning’ [052; p. 89; p. 7].  
 
Spoke members cited the potential for collaboration between universities as a further 
motivating factor, which was also irrespective of their belief in the initiative. For 
example, a spoke member remarked that ‘it would cement some of the earlier 
initiatives that we’d set up on research in primary care … it’s a way of interacting and 
working with secondary care colleagues as well’ [023; p. 28; p. 3]. Similarly, another 
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spoke member described involvement in UK Biobank as ‘a nice catalyst for 
developing that collaboration’ [0201; p. 148; p. 6]. Spoke members acknowledged the 
‘non-scientific’ nature of these motivations. They argued that ‘non-scientific’ 
motivators were typical of standard academic scientific practice. For example, a spoke 
member reflected:  
Our interest was always ulterior. It wasn’t in the study in itself, it was in the 
potential acquisition of research infrastructure which would have value for 
other things…it was also recognised as being an opportunity to collaborate 
more effectively with hospital colleagues … if there weren’t ulterior purposes 
then why would anybody get involved in a study, never mind the uncertainties 
as to the resourcing of it [022; p. 26; p. 4]. 
 
There was, however, an exception; one spoke member voiced the motivations for 
involvement in distinctly different terms. He did not consider the professional 
advantages of involvement important and focused on the value of a contractual 
relationship as that of a service provider. He distinguished between involvement in 
UK Biobank and designing and implementing personal research activities. For 
example, he commented: ‘this is like contracting. This isn’t like what we do for our 
research research…this isn’t a study I designed, this is a study someone wants to do 
and we are professionals at getting people through the doors [his emphasis]’ [0204; p. 
156; p. 4]. However he appeared to be expecting a financial payback for involvement 
as a spoke whereas other spoke members did not envisage such a return, which may 
partly account for the different perspective. For example, he continued: 
It’s forty million pounds, better to be in than out...given that someone’s 
throwing forty million at it … I’ve got hungry mouths to feed...I’ve got a big 
research unit here and if it keeps us here and in work that’s great, good 
contract research [0204; p. 156; p. 2]. 
 
6.3.2 Criticisms of spokes members’ motivations for involvement  
 
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited doubted academic 
scientists’ commitment to UK Biobank feeling that spokes had ‘non-scientific’ 
motivations, which fuelled mistrust. For example, a representative of UK Biobank 
Limited remarked:  
 236  
The problem with Biobank is it’s such a big project that people don’t want to 
say “well, it isn’t quite what I wanted it to be therefore I’m not going to be 
involved”. They (academic scientists) felt they had to be involved, they had to 
try to get involved anyway because it was such a big project, so they’ve been 
brought into it against their will, with a sort of feeling “well, I’m going to have 
to do this” which is unfortunate [010; p. 3; p, 6].  
They felt that spoke members were less interested in the success of the resource and 
more interested in the value of involvement to their respective universities. For 
example, despite acknowledging the pressures on the academic scientific community 
(‘it’s in this modern age of RAE’s and all the rest of it and the kind of pressures that 
universities are under, having to go back to their own universities and justify their 
participation’ [043; p. 70; p. 15]) a representative of the funding bodies stated:  
There was a bit of “what’s in it for me?” mantra sitting behind a number of 
people…I think that led to some confusion in people’s minds as to if they did 
participate in Biobank, what did it mean to them individually rather than 
thinking that they’re just contributing to a national resource [043; p. 70; p. 15].  
Similarly, another representative of the funding bodies commented: ‘the scientific 
community did not want it established that way, I mean, they wanted, some of them 
wanted little playgrounds that they could go and do their own little projects in’ [063; 
p. 67; p. 15]. Academic scientists criticised the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited for failing to understand spoke members’ professional responsibilities to their 
universities in taking part in UK Biobank. 
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6.4 Organisational Structure 
‘we were getting conflicting messages “we want your scientists and you 
driving the research agenda but we don’t really want you doing that 
because you’ve got to work to a central protocol that you can’t add to”’ 
[023; p. 30; p. 4] 
The policy that spokes would not get any preferential access to the data or samples 
contributed to academic scientists’ lack of trust towards the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited. Academic scientists criticised the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited for the lack of understanding the policy showed of their professional 
obligations in becoming involved in UK Biobank. The issue of preferential access for 
academic scientists involved in UK Biobank is part of a wider debate regarding open 
access to datasets. The two main funding bodies, the MRC and the Wellcome Trust, 
have worked in parallel towards open access for all datasets for a number of years. 
For example, both funding bodies were involved in securing open access to the human 
genome sequence in the HGP. Confusion surrounding the policy on spoke access 
further contributed to the lack of trust between academic scientists and representatives 
of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. Academic scientists were also 
confused about the following aspects of the organisational structure: the bidding 
process, the role of the spokes and the nature of UK Biobank Limited. They attributed 
their lack of trust of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited to an alleged lack of 
clarity surrounding these organisational issues.  
 
6.4.1 Lack of spoke payback  
 
Academic scientists argued that some form of payback, financial or intellectual 
through preferential access to the resource, was a condition of their involvement in 
UK Biobank as spoke members. They described how they had to justify their 
participation to the academic institutions they were employed by and that without any 
reward, financial or intellectual, their position was untenable. For example, a spoke 
member stated that ‘two kinds of payback are either financial for the universities or 
institutions and academic access to the data so that we can get publications and 
research benefits ourselves’ [021; p. 21; p. 2]. Spoke members felt that the lack of 
preferential access was unfair, as it meant that academic scientists who were not 
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involved in developing the protocol or recruitment would have the same rights of 
access as academic scientists who were involved. For example, a spoke member 
complained that they would have to  
compete with others, possibly in the United States, who have not been 
involved and so there are tensions…it is difficult for academics as they think 
in publications and they put in a lot of time and thought on it and then you 
may have some Harvard person getting access and you would be very 
frustrated I think [035; p. 56; p. 9]. 
They argued that the lack of preferential access would mean that they would be 
contributing to other academic scientists’ publication records and other universities’ 
inputs to the RAEs, rather than their own. For example, another spoke member 
reflected:  
It (UK Biobank) would be a great deal better if it involved academics who 
were investigators, drawing on the data and getting publications out of it as it 
would then justify the time, so that instead of doing the work for other 
people’s publications we were working on our own [0101; p. 130; p. 3]. 
Academic scientists further criticised the policy in terms of its effect on spokes’ role 
in UK Biobank. For example, a member of the EWG continued: ‘it [lack of spoke 
payback] really turns the regional coordinating centres into sort of stamp collectors’ 
[060; p. 91; p. 3]. Spoke members’ frustration regarding the funding bodies’ apparent 
lack of understanding of their requirements fuelled their mistrust. They resented their 
involvement in the resource given the lack of payback. For example, a spoke member 
commented:  
We are taking a day out when we could be writing our own research 
proposals, writing another paper, and papers from this project will not be 
coming out for at least five years. In the meantime there is that opportunity 
cost to us of intellectual and physical energy being directed into a project that 
might actually have minimal output for an individual or an individual’s 
institution [023; p. 30; p. 6].  
 
Spoke members explained how the policy had made them question the worth of 
continued involvement in UK Biobank. For example, a spoke member remarked:  
From their [spokes] perspective they’re subsidising UK Biobank and the only 
other thing that universities want is academic kudos, and because of the 
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intellectual property rights and access policy the stance of the funders has been 
“this is open access” so I know that many universities are questioning “well, 
why take part” [0102; p. 133; p. 3]. 
Similarly, another spoke member stated: ‘the model depends on academics like 
myself and we have to justify the time, given that we are not gaining anything towards 
the RAE so there is a risk of people pulling out, which is a high risk’ [0101; p. 130; p. 
2]. Spoke members strongly associated the policy with the potential withdrawal of 
universities from the resource. For example, another spoke member commented:   
There’s a lot of suspicion from the universities, you know, very, very high 
level suspicion as to whether it’s still worth being involved in a UK Biobank. I 
think it’s true as to now because it’s not clear what the research credits to the 
universities are…frankly, it’s high risk [0104; p. 138; p. 2]. 
A further spoke member concurred:  
If you’re going to do some science, you want to actually get something out of 
it and publish some papers and so on but if it’s something that you in 
particular aren’t going to benefit from then you think “well, why am I getting 
involved with it?” [052; p. 89; p. 7]. 
 
Academic scientists further attributed their lack of trust of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited to the policy as it rendered involvement in UK Biobank a risk. They 
pointed to the direct financial costs of being a spoke and the potential cost of missed 
research opportunities because of involvement in UK Biobank. For example, a 
member of the PDC commented:  
There’s very, very mixed feelings about whether this is really of any benefit to 
the people who are taking it on, and of course it’s a substantial opportunity 
cost if you want to do it properly…those people who got Biobank spokes must 
be thinking three times over about “is this going to cover full economic 
costs?” ’ [051; p. 86; p. 12].  
Given the apparent lack of any payback, academic scientists felt that any potential 
benefits of being a spoke were not proportional to the risk involved. For example, a 
member of the EWG remarked:  
If by doing it, you don’t have time to do much else but you don’t actually get 
to analyse the data and test your hypothesis, then there’s no carrot … if the 
academic leadership doesn’t get any rewards, then the way that the universities 
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are judged and academic success is judged is that you can’t commit to. It’d be 
academic suicide’ [062; p. 103; p. 14].  
Spoke members, in particular, interpreted the signing of a contract with the hub as 
financially riskier than receiving a grant. They also criticised the idea of a contract as 
they felt it represented an unequal relationship between the spokes and the hub, 
whereby control lay with the hub. For example, a spoke member stated:  
UK Biobank would like to have one formal contract but I think the universities 
are still saying “You don’t give us enough money to take risks therefore we 
want a grant” … you give it [a grant] to the university on the basis that they 
will deliver the project they’ve just said they will deliver. It’s a different 
relationship because it means that you have a more equal relationship between 
the grant provider and the grant receiver, in that there will be a more equal 
negotiation if the project doesn’t deliver what it’s initially thought they could 
negotiate as to what direction it could take as an alternative but the grant 
doesn’t suddenly get pulled away, it has been given [0102; p. 133; p. 4].  
This criticism reflects academic scientists’ perceptions of the establishment of the hub 
as a company as representing business, as opposed to academic scientific, practice.  
 
Some academic scientists criticised the necessity for financial or intellectual reward 
for their involvement in research activities. They lamented that scientific interest 
alone was not enough motivation for academic scientists to become involved in 
research, yet conceded that this was the reality. For example, a member of the EWG 
commented:  
It’s unfortunate, these days one of the motivations for taking part in a study 
almost regardless of whether it attracts you or not is money. It’s so important 
for people now to be seen to be raising funds for their departments and 
universities that the sort of scientific interest sometimes seems to take second, 
back seat [060; p. 91; p. 3].  
   
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited acknowledged 
academic scientists’ arguments regarding the importance of financial or intellectual 
payback, but downplayed them. Given that they perceived the spokes’ role solely in 
terms of recruitment, they questioned the extent to which spokes deserved payback, 
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particularly intellectually through preferential access. For example, a representative of 
UK Biobank Limited reflected:  
The deal on offer to the RCCs is essentially unattractive to them and I’m sure 
people have said that and I agree … they are not the only people who could do 
Biobank, we could manage without them. It’d be a public relations problem if 
everyone dropped out but essentially what we need the RCC’s for is to set up 
clinics and help us recruit people but that isn’t difficult [010; p. 7; p. 17]. 
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited rejected spoke 
members’ assertions that their role also involved protocol development, and hence 
reiterated that spokes did not warrant preferential access to the resource. For example, 
the representative of UK Biobank Limited continued:  
They are arguing that they are putting in their intellectual input into Biobank 
and they need intellectual pay-off but the fact is they’re not putting intellectual 
input into it because they’re not delivering … most of the intellectual input 
was already in the protocol…lots of people are contributing, not just the RCCs 
and I don’t think they have a very strong argument that they should have 
access to the data [010; p. 7; p. 17]. 
 
6.4.2 Confusion regarding spoke payback policy 
 
Academic scientists partly attributed their lack of trust of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited to a lack of consistency regarding the policy on spoke payback. 
They argued that it was not clear whether or not spoke members would be granted 
preferential access. For example, a spoke member commented: ‘there was a lot of 
dilly-dallying and people not really wanting to say either way whether there would be 
access’ [0203; p. 152; p. 3]. Similarly, another spoke member remarked how there 
was no ‘explicit statement saying you will not be able to see data in advance or 
exclusive’ [0102; p. 134; p. 8].  
 
On the one hand, some academic scientists argued that it was generally understood 
that access would be granted. They acknowledged the lack of formal documentation 
regarding the policy yet maintained how, prior to hub and spoke selection, it was 
generally accepted. For example, a member of the EWG stated:  
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It was always very clearly understood and nobody ever contradicted this that 
the spokes…would have a certain amount of opportunity to do their own 
thing, you know, follow their own particular interests and I think that 
involved, obviously, and would have involved retaining some of the data that 
they had collected’ [060; p. 91; p. 2].  
The EWG member continued:  
There’s no doubt that whether it was recorded or not it was firmly understood 
beforehand that there would be this degree of freedom over enabling regional 
coordinating centres to collect additional samples, for example, of the things 
they might want to do and to have some of the data [060; p. 92; p. 3].  
Academic scientists argued that a lack of clarity surrounding spoke payback was 
indicative of confusion regarding the development of UK Biobank generally. They 
associated this confusion with an alleged lack of control of the resource. For example, 
a member of the EWG commented: ‘They’ve not been able to resolve exactly who 
was running this project and who was benefiting, who was going to get what out of it’ 
[061; p. 96; p. 9]. On the other hand, representatives of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited argued that it was explicit that preferential access would not be 
granted. For example, a representative of UK Biobank Limited remarked: 
They’ve always known that the funders set up Biobank as a resource with 
open access, that was always the idea. It was absolutely blindingly obvious to 
them that this is how it was done and they just didn’t accept it…signing it with 
their fingers crossed [010; p. 7; p. 17].  
 
Documentary evidence of a lack of consistency concerning spoke payback, and the 
issue of preferential access in particular, includes the minutes of the EWG meetings 
and the Final Report of the EWG. These documents suggest that spokes would be 
granted preferential access. For example, the notes from the second meeting of the 
EWG stated that each spoke ‘could add supplementary components to the core 
according to their own interests’ [S600/161 Volume 1; p. 7], a stance justified in the 
third meeting as allowing: ‘increased richness of dataset, and greater involvement of 
local centres’ [S600/161 Volume 1; p. 7]. These terms are further developed in the 
Final Report of the EWG which stated that ‘researchers generating data could have an 
agreed period of preferential access before being required to place their data in the 
common dataset’ [S600/161 Volume 2; p. 7]. 
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6.4.3 Confusion over the bidding process  
 
Spoke members criticised the allegedly confusing bidding process and suggested it 
led to their lack of trust in the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. They argued 
that the funding bodies did not make their requirements to the bidders clear, 
specifically whether or not it was necessary to detail scientific opinion or interest in 
the area. Spoke members remarked on how they were not required to detail their 
scientific opinion or interest. For example, a spoke member remarked:  
The aspect that was most surprising when we did it [put in the spoke bid] was 
that actually there was no focus on their scientific interests, it was all about 
your experience of collecting DNA samples for epidemiological information 
but actually nothing about your perspective on the science [0103; p. 137; p. 
11].  
He continued: ‘there had been nowhere on the application form to talk about your 
science’ [0103; p. 137; p.13]. Spoke members identified this issue as a further source 
of confusion and one spoke member recalled how his spoke was criticised for having 
not detailed their scientific opinion or interest in the initiative. He commented:   
One of the comments we got at our submission from George Radda was “there 
doesn’t seem to be much science in this”…we were getting conflicting 
messages “we want your scientists and you driving the research agenda but we 
don’t really want you doing that because you’ve got to work to a central 
protocol that you can’t add to” [023; p. 30; p. 4].   
They also described confusion regarding the outcome of the bidding process, 
particularly regarding the role of the spokes and the financial arrangements between 
them and the hub. For example, a spoke member referred to a  
lack of consistency and the moving of goalposts…you thought that you were 
doing one thing and then you discovered that you weren’t, we thought that you 
bid for a project and then you just get the “well actually, you’ve been 
selected” but it didn’t really mean that you’d got the funds or that you were 
being asked to do what you’d bid to do, so it has been very confusing [0800; p. 
192; p. 3]. 
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Academic scientists criticised the competitive and confidential nature of the bidding 
process and thought it contributed to the lack of trust between them and the funding 
bodies and UK Biobank Limited. They argued that such confidentiality was 
particularly unnecessary and unusual in the academic scientific community. For 
example, a member of the PDC reflected:  
You would have got a better portfolio of spokes if people had discussed more 
openly with each other what they were proposing…the whole thing was 
channelled into a highly competitive mode from the very earliest declaration 
of interest stage and it got worse as you moved through the short listing to the 
detailed tender stage [051; p. 86; p. 10].  
Academic scientists further criticised the competitive bidding process for reflecting 
business, rather than the academic scientific, practice. For example, the member of the 
PDC continued: ‘from an early stage in the proceedings those people who were 
compiling the bids were instructed not to discuss with other bidders, as if this was 
some sort of commercial contract with industrial espionage’ [051; p. 86; p. 10]. 
Similarly, a spoke member commented: ‘it was a New Labour thing, it’s almost like 
Trusts within the healthcare systems, you want to actually be very cooperative and yet 
they were setting it up that the Trusts compete with each other’ [0103; p. 137; p. 7]. 
Some spoke members argued that the secretive bidding process reflected a wider 
confusion over whether UK Biobank was an academic scientific or business 
endeavour. For example, a spoke member criticised the  
excessive amount of bureaucracy and straitjacketing…we weren’t allowed to 
talk to others, which frankly in a developmental process is not very helpful…a 
lack of clarity it seemed to me about whether we were involved in a scientific 
endeavour or a commercial endeavour [0800; p. 192; p. 6]. 
 
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited attributed the lack of 
clarity and confidential bidding process to the EU Procurement Rules process that it 
followed. For example, a representative of the funding bodies remarked:  
There was a lot of feeling outside that it had been very longwinded, the 
bidding process had involved a lot of work and it seemed very bureaucratic 
but we were kind of stuck with it because of the EU procurement rules, we had 
legal advice to say that we should follow that particular path, so that’s what 
made our lives a lot more difficult [043; p.70; p. 13].  
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They felt that misunderstanding of this process accounted for a lack of trust as 
academic scientists did not realise that the process had to be confidential on account 
of these rules, rather than because the funding bodies wanted it that way. For 
example, another representative of the funding bodies stated:  
There was an enormous rift I guess between the funders and the people that 
were bidding in to that whole process, be it the spokes or the hub in why you 
had to go through this hideous process of satisfying the European procurement 
rules  [042; p. 66; p. 12].  
Some academic scientists did however understand the process and nevertheless 
criticised the funding bodies for following EU Procurement Rules:  
They went through a process of, enforced by things that are greater than any of 
us, to go through a process of contracting by European law which led them 
into a position where the funding model left the universities in a position 
where they could not claim this activity as a research activity, so it didn’t 
count for RAE purposes’ [061; p. 96; p. 9].  
 
6.4.4 Confusion over the role of spokes  
 
All constituent groups attributed misunderstandings about the spokes’ role in UK 
Biobank to the lack of trust between academic scientists (particularly spoke members) 
and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. These 
misunderstandings concerned the extent to which spoke members would be involved 
in designing the protocol, specifically in forming the Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) from which participants would join the resource. There were also differences 
in understandings of the extent to which spoke members could alter the SOPs to suit 
local populations. All constituent groups felt that if the proposed role of the spokes 
had been clear then there would not have been such a lack of trust. For example, a 
representative of the funding bodies remarked: 
When the spokes had been selected there had been a very clear mandate that 
the object of the spoke is to go out and recruit 10,000 individuals in your 
particular geographical area, and you’re going to do it in this way and collect 
that data, and you’re going to collect it over this time period. If that mandate 
had been made totally clear you would have ended up with a different set of 
players now to what you’ve got and end up with something, an infrastructure, 
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that would be up and running today when we’re still mucking around [063; p. 
67; p. 15]. 
 
Spoke members criticised the implication that their role lay solely in recruiting 
individuals according to a protocol designed by UK Biobank Limited and the funding 
bodies. They felt that their involvement in initial and ongoing protocol development 
merited a more equal partnership with the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. 
For example, a spoke member stated:  
We were going into this as research partners, to a certain extent since then it 
seems that the attempt has been made to reclass us as basically service 
providers … if it’s essentially just a simple service relationship whereby we 
get paid to provide x thousand participants and at the end of the day we’re just 
told “thanks for providing those participants” then that’s basically the 
relationship that primary care had in the old days with a lot of drug companies 
in terms of its involvement in the sort of research that they were involved in, 
that is not now the relationship that we’re interested in having with the funders 
[0105; p. 142; p. 8].  
They argued that a recruitment role was ‘unacademic’ and therefore inappropriate for 
academic scientists to undertake. For example, another spoke member commented: 
‘because we’re academics, we do things for academic payoff…we’re not recruitment 
organisations, we’re not just recruiting for other people’s work’ [0200; p. 145; p. 11]. 
Similarly, a scientist outwith UK Biobank commented on how there was  
very little of any academic interest in it for them…they’re essentially running 
themselves as sort of commercial survey organisations and given you’ve got to 
do it like that, you might as well privatise the whole thing it seems to me 
[0900; p. 199; p. 13]. 
Spoke members’ criticism of the proposed recruitment only role was exacerbated by 
the lack of any payback, particularly through preferential access to the resource, for 
their involvement. They stressed how this lack of payback was contrary to standard 
academic scientific practice. For example, a spoke member reflected:  
We would service the hub by giving them 100,000 people and that’s it – 
thanks very much for your help, which is not the way science generically in 
this country ever really works. It’s always been collaborative, that you get 
something in return for delivering 100,000 people [0503; p. 178; p. 10].  
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Spoke members criticised the funding bodies for hindering their role and argued that 
the funding bodies treated spoke members’ attempts to increase their involvement 
with suspicion. For example, a spoke member remarked:  
The funders would not pass over the decision making, they were untrusting 
and felt that the RCCs had a hidden agenda when they set up the 
Implementation Group, which was a shame as the group was important. It was 
hindered because of their lack of trust and fears that we had a hidden agenda, 
the funders developed a ‘them and us’ mentality [030; p. 43; p. 4]. 
 
One spoke member adopted a highly unusual position regarding the role of spokes. He 
was not critical of the role and rather welcomed the opportunity to act as a service 
provider to UK Biobank Limited. For example, the spoke member explained: ‘they’re 
paying you money and you do a study for them, you know, it’s that sort of thing. They 
want a hundred thousand people led and questioned, well, we can do it’ [0204; p. 156; 
p. 2]. This spoke member was however referring to financial payback, which may 
explain his unusual stance as other spoke members were not expecting to receive any 
such return. Nevertheless he did not object to the role as being not being appropriate 
to academic scientists.  
 
Documentary evidence of a lack of trust due to confusion surrounding spokes’ role 
includes the process of contract negotiation following spoke selection. In their 
response to the draft contract between them and UK Biobank Limited (contained in 
emails from spoke representatives to funding body representatives on 30 April 2004), 
spoke members criticised the funding bodies for not providing enough information on 
the proposed role of spokes. For example, a response stated:  
The current structure of the document leaves the RCCs exposed to a set of 
unquantifiable risks. For instance the RCCs are being asked to enter into a 
legally-binding obligation to deliver a set of deliverables that are not 
adequately defined [their emphasis] [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 40].  
This alleged lack of clarity in the draft contract fuelled spoke members’ suspicions of 
the funding bodies. For example, a response expressed concern that ‘policies will be 
imposed upon us but we won’t know their content at the time of signature of this 
agreement’ [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 42]. A further response echoed this sentiment 
pertaining to ‘concern that we won’t know how much we will be paid until after the 
 248  
contract is signed’ [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 42]. Spoke members felt that the draft 
contract only recognised their role in recruitment and not their involvement in 
protocol development. For example, one response complained how 
the wording of the draft contract gives the very clear impression that, rather 
than it being a mechanism for formally recognising the academic contribution 
made to the project by the RCCs…it is a hard-nosed tool for pinning the RCCs 
down to deliver a set of deliverables and which hardly recognise the other 
things that the RCCs are contributing…mainly because these are not being 
costed or paid for [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 42].  
Similarly another response stressed that  
the contribution of the RCCs to both the science behind Biobank and the 
delivery of the fieldwork must be recognised, as does the fact that the RCCs 
are an integral part of Biobank without which the overall project could not be 
delivered [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41].  
 
Spoke members criticised the proposed relationship between the hub and the spokes 
in the draft contract. For example, one response called for the contract to  
‘reflect a rather different relationship between the RCCs and UK Biobank than 
is implied in the current document’ and called for them to be seen ‘more as 
partners (in the general sense of the word)…taking joint responsibility in 
delivering the project and sharing in its success’ [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 40].  
Spoke members distanced themselves from the type of role they believed to be 
offered by the funding bodies. For example, a response pointed out:    
This is still a contract for services (albeit called ‘research services’) and ‘the 
RCCs are not simply supplying a set of Research Services akin to those that 
could be purchased from a contract research house for example. They feel they 
can and are offering far more [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41].  
A further response described  
a slight mismatch between the role the RCCs feel they are taking in the project 
and the role that appears to be being offered by Biobank. Quite naturally this 
mismatch has found its way into the draft contract and has therefore become a 
matter for attention [D550/10 Volume 1; p. 41].  
This ‘mismatch’ in understanding of the role of spokes between spoke members and 
representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited fuelled mistrust.  
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6.4.5 Confusion over the nature of UK Biobank Limited  
 
Spoke members also attributed the lack of trust between them and representatives of 
the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited to confusion regarding the nature of UK 
Biobank Limited. They felt that the funding bodies did not make the nature of the hub 
clear, particularly the proposed relationship between it and the spokes. Spoke 
members argued that the funding bodies had ulterior motives in involving universities 
as spokes that did not concern recruitment. They pointed to the importance of 
securing future university involvement in UK Biobank, through accessing the 
database, to the success of the company. For example, a spoke member commented:  
The first structure was a confusion of what is the UK Biobank Limited…the 
funders saw it as a company tasked with delivering a project and its survival 
and funding was a part of a business plan, so that they had to deliver a project 
and then had to find ways of generating income from that project to survive as 
an organisation, as a company, and the subtext of it would be that in order to 
do that it had to engage with universities across the country, so that the 
universities have a vested interest in making sure that funding is given to UK 
Biobank via other routes by the universities wanting to use the resource 
[E2001; p. 7; p. 7]. 
Spoke members argued that the funding bodies did not make the extent of their 
intentions clear when canvassing academic scientists' support, which they felt 
contributed to the confusion regarding the nature of UK Biobank Limited. They felt 
that the funding bodies involved universities in a business sense to enable the success 
of the company rather than in an academic sense to contribute to the success of the 
resource. For example, the spoke member continued:  
The involvement of the other universities was partly required by the funders 
but also as part of a, as it were from my thinking, a longer term plan in 
engaging the academic community so that UK Biobank was sustainable in 
business terms, and so the role of the RCCs then became a business 
relationship, which upset the academics who thought that they were having a 
scientific relationship…you had parallel sets of communities working on both 
levels and neither being able to do much without the other, but neither culture 
 250  
was willing to necessarily recognise that there was a need for compromise 
between the two [E2001; p. 7; p. 7]. 
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6.5 Organisational Changes 
‘we [a spoke] felt very let down by the whole thing’ [E2007; p. 26; p. 6] 
Academic scientists attributed the lack of trust between themselves and 
representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited to the way in which 
the organisational changes were implemented. They criticised the alleged lack of 
consultation regarding the changes, their timing and effect on spokes generally.    
 
6.5.1 Implementation of organisational changes  
 
Spoke members criticised the alleged lack of consultation regarding both the nature 
and implementation of the changes. For example, a spoke member remarked: ‘It was 
discussed at a Steering Group but it was a fait accompli and would have got the go-
ahead regardless of what anyone else thought’ [E2002; p. 8; p. 1]. They felt that 
confusion regarding the nature of the changes contributed to their lack of trust of the 
funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. For example, another spoke member 
commented:  
It’s been a bit of a shambles…we’ve been given a small budget to run things 
and start things off the ground and that’s finished and we had recruited 
someone to help get this study running and their job went effectively, it was 
all terribly insecure … one minute you’re being told one direction and the next 
minute you’re told to sort of do a u-turn and then do another u-turn after that, 
so for us it’s been I think quite unsettling…we felt very let down by the whole 
thing [E2007; p. 26; p. 6] 
 
Spoke members argued that the changes were implemented too suddenly, which 
exacerbated the problems caused by an alleged lack of consultation regarding them.  
For example, E2002 continued: 
There is a lack of consultation about the decisions being made. For example, 
we had a call centre contract about to be commissioned just days away from 
being completed and it was cancelled by Rory Collins, and the call centre 
function is now going to Oxford for the pilot and for the main study it is going 
to be the Welsh RCC…there was no consultation, no rationale why the 
development of a professional call centre was stopped and no explanation why 
it was moved to a university with no professional experience. It was all of a 
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sudden stopped and no reason was given…this example typifies the problem 
of a lack of consultation [E2002; p. 8; p. 3].  
They felt that this timing hampered UK Biobank’s reputation as a credible initiative, 
as the changes were made amidst planning for a forthcoming pilot study. For 
example, E2002 said:  
Before he [Rory Collins] was appointed we were working towards an MREC 
submission at the end of October/beginning of November for a pilot and he 
came and it was halted. Now it may be no bad thing that it was delayed but it 
is damaging to the reputation of UK Biobank as it is one delay after another 
and we are losing good will with those liaising with the PCT’s, service 
providers, areas where we were holding clinics, one RCC had even booked in 
time to run a pilot and it had to be cancelled which meant that Biobank lost 
face and did not come out of it too well [E2002; p. 10; p. 3].  
 
Spoke members also attributed their lack of trust in the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited to the nature of the changes, specifically their effect on the role of 
spokes in the initiative. They felt frustrated that their involvement was suddenly 
ended, having invested their efforts in the initiative for a number of years. For 
example, another spoke member reflected:  
My services as an academic have been essentially no longer required … my 
ability to input and obtain benefit from the research programme has been 
effectively stopped, and there is no resource despite having been a member of 
a successful bidding consortium for a sum of money which was originally 
envisaged at around 9 million pounds … I think the way in which they have, 
seems to me, disregarded the university organisations who’ve engaged with 
the project until now is really very, very unhelpful [E2005; p. 17-18; p. 1-3].  
Similarly, E2007 commented:  
We were meant to be working on setting up the pilot, we put in quite a lot of 
work over the years thinking about how things would go ahead and it was all 
essentially guillotined and told we wouldn’t really be involved in any of 
it…people felt very let down [E2007; p. 26; p. 4].  
 
In criticising the implementation of the changes, some spoke members felt that the 
changes had a detrimental effect on the collaborations achieved between academic 
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scientists from different institutions in spoke formation. They argued that their 
negative experience of being a spoke for UK Biobank would make academic 
scientists less willing to collaborate in future scientific enterprises. For example, 
E2005 continued: ‘we had to make quite a lot of decisions on the basis of trust and for 
Biobank then to withdraw that basis really jeopardises the relationships that have been 
so precariously balanced and that I think is unhelpful’ [E2005; p. 17; p. 1].  
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6.6 Conclusion  
 
The origins and development of UK Biobank were marked by a gradual erosion of 
trust between academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies and UK 
Biobank Limited. The lack of trust manifested in protocol development and steadily 
diminished through the spoke bidding process to contract negotiation and 
organisational changes. Various reasons for the erosion of trust included criticism of 
the consultation process, criticism of academic scientists’ motivations for 
involvement, lack of spoke payback via access to the resource, lack of clarity in the 
organisational structure, and the implementation of the organisational changes.  
 
Academic scientists felt that the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited did not trust 
them to develop UK Biobank as the funders and representatives of UK Biobank 
Limited allegedly did not undertake a genuine consultation process regarding protocol 
development, provide sufficient clarity surrounding the organisational structure or 
implement the organisational changes appropriately. Academic scientists’ consequent 
lack of trust of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited was exacerbated by the 
latter’s policy on spoke access. Academic scientists interpreted the implementation of 
the changes as the culmination of their experience of the origins and development of 
UK Biobank. They argued that the allegedly abrupt announcement and lack of 
consultation regarding the changes confirmed their suspicions of the funding bodies 
and UK Biobank Limited. Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited defended the consultation process and organisational structure. They accused 
academic scientists of being unnecessarily suspicious and overplaying their role. Any 
trust that the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited placed with academic scientists 
to develop UK Biobank was shaken by their perceptions of academic scientists’, 
particularly spoke members’, motivations for involvement during the spoke bidding 
process, ongoing protocol development and contract negotiation.   
 
An overarching explanation for mistrust between academic scientists and 
representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited was different 
understandings of standard academic scientific practice. Academic scientists’ 
criticism of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited largely concerned their 
alleged failure to understand standard academic scientific practice. They argued that 
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the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited did not understand academic scientists’ 
requirements to justify involvement in research activities to their employers in terms 
of the RAE. Similarly, the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited did not seem to 
appreciate the alleged inappropriateness of academic scientists acting as service 
providers to UK Biobank Limited especially without financial or intellectual payback. 
This issue was complicated by academic scientists’ different understandings of the 
appropriate role for academic scientists in research activities. Mistrust between 
academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank 
Limited could however be attributed to different understandings of UK Biobank 
rather than standard academic scientific practice. It could be argued that tension 
between the groups on the issue of spoke payback for example reflects the funding 
bodies’ and UK Biobank Limited’s failure to make clear to academic scientists how 
UK Biobank was different from other scientific enterprises.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I first summarise the thesis to remind the reader of the key points and 
aid understanding of the forthcoming discussion and conclusions. Second, I discuss 
my findings in the context of Big Science. I examine how UK Biobank could be 
regarded as a Big Science initiative and compare its origins and development to that 
of other Big Science projects. I also speculate as to the undocumented rationale 
behind selection of some of the most controversial aspects of the organisational 
structure. Third, I present my conclusions regarding the organisational issues that 
shaped the configuration of UK Biobank: leadership, the hub and spoke model and 
ambiguities within the organisational structure as a whole. Fourth, I reflect upon the 
strengths and limitations of my research, before finally considering potential future 
directions of this research.   
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7.2 Thesis Summary 
 
UK Biobank, a resource set up in 2002, emerged amidst the promise associated with 
the completion of the HGP. Its aim was to gather genetic and lifestyle information 
from half a million participants aged 40-69 years old in the UK and monitor their 
health for up to thirty years in order to improve prevention, diagnosis and treatment of 
major diseases. The publication of a working draft of the human genome sequence in 
February 2001 challenged scientists to translate the abstract knowledge collected in 
the Project into practical benefits for human health. UK Biobank represented one such 
response to this ‘post-genome challenge’. National genetic databases were a 
significant feature of international responses to the 'post-genome challenge'; projects 
were set up or proposed in Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Singapore, Tonga, 
Spain, and the United States. Like UK Biobank, these international endeavours were 
established to improve human health through improved drug treatments and 
personalised medicine. The Icelandic project was the most controversial because of its 
commercial nature and opt-out consent policy. This controversy fostered a concern 
amongst proponents of other national genetic databases to implement thorough ethical 
procedures to distinguish themselves from the Icelandic project. Ethical concerns, 
specifically over access to the sequence, also marked the development of the HGP. 
Hence, UK Biobank emerged in the context of two scientific enterprises, the HGP and 
the Icelandic database, that raised considerable ethical issues and consequently shaped 
its development.   
 
In undertaking a contemporary history of the origins and development of UK 
Biobank, I charted its genesis from the first official meetings within the MRC in 1998, 
to the funding decision in 2002, through implementation of the organisational 
structure in 2003 and 2004, until the organisational changes in 2005. I have explored 
how and why UK Biobank was initially configured in the way it was, and focussed on 
the organisational aspects of its establishment.  In the course of my study, the aim of 
my thesis changed in the light of interviewees' responses and the development of UK 
Biobank itself. I initially intended to analyse how, when and from whom the idea for 
UK Biobank emerged in the UK but interviewees largely ignored these issues and 
instead concentrated on the practical set up of UK Biobank. Also, the considerable 
time delays that accompanied UK Biobank (see table 2.8) meant that I could not 
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analyse its implementation, prompting my change of focus to UK Biobank's origins 
and development.  
 
I enriched my understanding of the origins and development of UK Biobank by 
analysing the development of the history of contemporary science as an academic 
field. By exploring the contested nature of the history of contemporary science and 
scientists' expectations of its legitimising function in particular, I obtained a greater 
knowledge of the methodological issues associated with my study. Given UK 
Biobank's association with Big Science, analysis of the phenomenon proved useful.  
Reviewing characteristics and criticisms of Big Science and the origins and 
development of similar projects increased my understanding of the wider context 
surrounding UK Biobank and allowed me to determine the extent to which UK 
Biobank represented Big Science. Analysis of the organisational issues (such as 
leadership) characteristic of the development of Big Science projects proved 
especially relevant in my research.   
 
The first official workshop between the MRC and the Wellcome Trust regarding what 
became UK Biobank took place on the 14 May 1999. It concluded that a new cohort 
should be established and recommended the establishment of the EWG to develop its 
outline. The EWG met between August 1999 and January 2000 and consisted of 
senior academic scientists. Their Final Report (published in March 2000) 
recommended the establishment of two new UK Population cohorts: an adult cohort 
to examine genetic and environmental risk factors and their interaction for common 
multi-factorial diseases of adulthood; and a birth cohort, but stressed the higher 
priority of the former. MRC Council and Wellcome Trust Governors approved the 
report in spring 2000 and agreed in principle to fund the proposal for UK Biobank 
whilst rejecting the birth cohort proposal in June 2000. The funding bodies set up the 
PDC in May 2001 to produce a draft protocol for UK Biobank for international peer 
review. The PDC met on five occasions between May and December 2001. The first 
draft of the protocol was produced on the 12 October 2001 and following discussion 
was sent for peer review in December 2001. Consultation exercises with a variety of 
groups including industry, interest groups, scientists, health workers, general 
practitioners, and the public were undertaken by the funding bodies directly, and by 
research groups and consultancies on their behalf between 2001 and 2003. The MRC 
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and the Wellcome Trust made the decision to fund UK Biobank in March 2002. The 
hub and spoke model that formed the basis of UK Biobank’s organisational structure 
was established in March 2003. The main committees related to this model (the BoD, 
the Science Committee and the EGC) were set up between 2003 and 2004. The hub 
(also known as UK Biobank Limited) and its CEO were appointed at the same time as 
the spokes. This organisational structure changed in 2005 when significant alterations 
were made to the hub and spoke model.  
 
UK Biobank's development was subject to considerable delays. For example, the 
appointment of the BoD, the Science Committee, the CEO, and the hub and spokes as 
well as the  implementation of the pilot studies and recruitment were delayed. The 
proposal for UK Biobank was considerably developed after internal consideration 
within and between the funding bodies and consultation with the EWG, prior to the 
establishment of the PDC. The funding bodies' and EWG members' backing was 
secured before many of the academic scientists who would develop and implement 
UK Biobank were even aware of it. The funding bodies therefore sought to develop 
UK Biobank collaboratively only after having decided to fund it (albeit provisionally), 
which caused academic scientists to question the value of the consultation undertaken 
with them in protocol development. The simultaneous appointment of the hub and 
spokes caused a great deal of confusion as the relationship between the two unfolded. 
The spokes’ role in UK Biobank was never formally agreed and contracts between the 
hub and the spokes were never signed, which contributed toward the lack of 
recruitment of participants under that model. Tension between spoke members and 
representatives of the hub and funding bodies was exacerbated by the organisational 
changes in 2005. I was surprised not to find any documentation nor interviewees' 
recollections regarding the origins of the hub and spoke model and this made it 
difficult to explore the rationale behind the selection of such an important feature of 
the initiative. 
 
I conducted 76 oral history interviews; 64 were part of my main study and 12 were 
follow-up interviews. I approached and interviewed academic scientists directly and 
indirectly involved in UK Biobank, representatives of all four funding bodies and 
representatives of UK Biobank Limited (the hub). Interviews with academic scientists 
directly involved included spoke and committee members (from existing and former 
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committees). Academic scientists indirectly involved in UK Biobank included 
unsuccessful spoke bidders and members of the academic scientific community 
outside UK Biobank (critics and former spoke members). I conducted follow-up 
interviews with a sub-sample of the original participants in response to organisational 
changes in 2005, specifically spoke and committees members, and representatives of 
the funding bodies and UK Biobank. I adopted considerable confidentiality 
procedures to protect interviewees’ identities, such as the use of descriptors, adoption 
of the generic ‘he’ pronoun throughout the thesis, and returning transcripts to 
respondents.  
 
I conducted archival analysis of the MRC’s official documents concerning the origins 
and development of UK Biobank. I applied to the Wellcome Trust for access to their 
official documents, but this was not granted. The MRC documents included official 
minutes of meetings of previous committees significant in the development of UK 
Biobank (such as the EWG and PDC), emails between committee members, 
representatives of the funding bodies and committee members, senior representatives 
of the funding bodies and MRC colleagues, and official correspondence (such as 
feedback to unsuccessful hub and spoke bidders). The coverage spanned from 1998 
until 2004, reflecting the increasing role of the hub and the diminishing role of the 
MRC in taking UK Biobank forward.  
 
I adopted a broad thematic approach to analysis of the interview material and archival 
research. Once I had coded the interview transcripts and took notes from archival 
research pertaining to key themes (such as the organisational model), I summarised 
every interview and the archival findings. I then grouped material from each of these 
themes into three broad areas that formed the topics of the three findings chapters: 
standard academic scientific practice, control and trust.    
 
Academic scientists, who were previous and current committee members and spoke 
members, criticised the establishment of UK Biobank for departing from what I have 
called ‘standard academic scientific practice’. Representatives of the funding bodies 
or UK Biobank Limited only referred to standard academic scientific practice when 
discussing the organisational changes. Academic scientists argued that UK Biobank 
represented such a departure for the following reasons: the funding decision was not 
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based on the production of a finalised protocol; the funding bodies took key protocol 
decisions prior to consultation with academic scientists, hence consultation was not 
genuine; the funding figure did not include the complete costs for UK Biobank; the 
funding bodies were too actively involved; the EGF was developed in tandem with 
the scientific protocol; there was no PI or product champion; the hub was established 
as a charitable company (UK Biobank Limited); the hub and spoke bidding process 
was confusing and secretive; temporary committees were established as predecessors 
to permanent committees; the hub, spokes and CEO were appointed prior to the BoD; 
and lastly, considerable organisational changes were made suddenly and following a 
number of years of effort to develop the original organisational structure. Academic 
scientists’ criticism of the establishment of UK Biobank as departing from standard 
academic scientific practice is however complicated by different understandings of 
the term.   
 
All constituent groups of interviewees described lack of clarity regarding who was in 
control of UK Biobank. Academic scientists and representatives of the funding bodies 
and UK Biobank Limited cited different explanations for the alleged confusion and 
held different opinions of where control lay. Academic scientists argued that the 
funding bodies held an unjust position of control and were too involved (citing the 
funding bodies' role in protocol development as evidence) and associated this with the 
ambiguity. Representatives of the funding bodies downplayed the extent of their role 
and argued that their own involvement diminished following the set up of the hub. 
Given their financial obligations, the funding bodies did however argue that some 
level of involvement was necessary. Academic scientists and representatives of the 
funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited attributed the confusion over control to a 
lack of leadership but in different ways; the former cited a lack of academic 
leadership in the form of a PI and the latter to a lack of managerial leadership. 
Academic scientists were used to control lying with a PI and felt that the adoption of a 
hub and spoke model contributed to the confusion over control as the role and 
responsibilities of the hub and spokes were not clear. Representatives of the funding 
bodies established the hub as a charitable company to ensure that it was free from any 
particular individual’s or group’s control. All constituent groups interpreted the 
organisational changes in 2005 as resolving the confusion over control but they 
viewed it differently. Academic scientists argued that as the funding bodies 
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orchestrated the changes, the changes reinforced their control whereas the funding 
bodies argued that UK Biobank's changing requirements meant that greater control 
over UK Biobank by an individual was necessary.   
  
The origins and development of UK Biobank were marked by a lack of trust. 
Representatives of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited did not appear to trust 
academic scientists to develop UK Biobank, as they questioned the scientists' 
motivations for becoming involved. Academic scientists felt that the funding bodies 
and UK Biobank Limited did not trust them to develop the resource, citing the 
consultation process and organisational structure as evidence. In turn, they could not 
then trust the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited. Academic scientists gave the 
following explanations for the erosion of trust between them and the funding bodies 
and UK Biobank Limited: lack of genuine consultation in protocol development; lack 
of understanding of spoke members’ professional and financial obligations in 
becoming involved in research activities; lack of spoke payback; confusion over 
whether spokes would be granted payback; lack of clarity in the bidding process; 
confusion over the role of spokes; confusion over the nature of UK Biobank Limited; 
and implementation of the organisational changes. Representatives of the funding 
bodies and UK Biobank Limited defended the consultation process and organisational 
structure. They accused academic scientists of being overly suspicious and 
overplaying their role. The trust that the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited had 
in academic scientists was shaken by their belief that spoke members’ had ‘non-
scientific’ motivations for involvement in UK Biobank, namely professional and 
financial obligations to host institutions.  
 
The legacy left by the configuration of UK Biobank was one of considerable 
difficulty for academic scientists and representatives of both the funding bodies and 
UK Biobank Limited alike. Organisational issues, typical of those confronting Big 
Science initiatives, were largely responsible for this difficult legacy. Although the 
exact origins of the most controversial aspect of the organisational structure, the hub 
and spoke model, were not documented, I argue that it was borne out of the ethical 
concerns surrounding the HGP and the Icelandic database, namely a desire  to be 
inclusive of a range of academic scientists. Leadership, the hub and spoke model and 
ambiguities within the organisational structure as a whole were the most significant 
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issues in the origins and development of UK Biobank as the organisational changes in 
2005 testify.  
 
Conducting a contemporary history of an evolving initiative presented opportunities 
and challenges that the historian of earlier periods or of more completely implemented 
initiatives would not face. For example, although undertaking a contemporary history 
meant that I overcame some of the problems associated with memory and viewed 
documents that might not be available to future historians, I had to protect 
interviewees' identities and analyse non-archived documents. As UK Biobank was an 
evolving initiative, I had the opportunity to probe further into the changing 
environment whilst managing the uncertainty associated with it. The positive response 
rate to interview requests and access to archival research were key strengths of my 
study design whilst the low number of follow-up interviews compared with the main 
study and archival research in only one funding body were limitations. Given the 
evolving nature of UK Biobank, there are many opportunities for extending this 
research.  
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7.3 Wider Context  
 
The thesis summary above pointed to a number of key issues that permeated the set 
up of UK Biobank, such as leadership and lack of communication, which largely 
concerned the organisational structure. Academic scientists, the funding bodies and 
UK Biobank Limited invested a considerable amount of effort over a number of years 
to fully implement the hub and spoke model and recruit a half-million participants. 
Yet much of this effort was somewhat unproductive and all groups faced considerable 
difficulties and delays because fundamental issues were not resolved. For example, 
the relationship between the hub and the spokes, and the latter's role in UK Biobank, 
were not formally agreed prior to hub and spoke selection. Hence, once the hub and 
spokes were appointed a lot of time and energy was spent on attempting to resolve 
these issues rather than on recruitment. Ultimately, these issues were not resolved 
within the original organisational model, which prompted the organisational changes 
and underlines the extent of misdirected effort. Crucial decisions regarding the choice 
of organisational structure were taken at an early stage in the origins of UK Biobank: 
for example, selection of the hub and spoke model, observance of EU Procurement 
Rules in the hub and spoke bidding process, and timing of hub and spoke 
appointments. These decisions were responsible for many of the difficulties in the 
original organisational structure that contributed to the considerable time delays and 
sparked organisational change. In this way, UK Biobank's configuration left a difficult 
legacy for implementation of the resource. 
 
Many of these organisational issues that shaped UK Biobank's origins and 
development are typical of those confronting Big Science initiatives. I will therefore 
discuss the origins and development of UK Biobank in the wider context of Big 
Science. First, I consider how UK Biobank could be regarded as a Big Science project 
before exploring how its origins and development compared with that of other Big 
Science projects. I will end this discussion with some speculations regarding broader 
explanations for the configuration of UK Biobank.   
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7.3.1 UK Biobank and 'Big Science' 
 
UK Biobank – a Big Science initiative?  
Each of the characteristics of Big Science explored in the literature review in 1.5.2 
(scale, social and political context, sponsorship and organisational issues) can be 
applied to the origins and development of UK Biobank, which could therefore be 
regarded as a Big Science initiative. Scale was a significant issue and the half-million 
sample was important scientifically and politically. Much of the enthusiasm 
surrounding the origins of UK Biobank focused on it being the ‘world’s largest’ 
genetic database. The social and political context surrounding UK Biobank was also 
characteristic of Big Science. The funding bodies stressed the political approval for 
UK Biobank, and supportive comments from politicians accompanied the 2002 press 
release announcing the commitment of funds. UK Biobank raised a number of ethical 
issues regarding the use of genetic information, and this ethical dimension underlined 
the social context of UK Biobank. Furthermore, the significant costs involved in the 
initial phases of UK Biobank, approximately £62 million, justifies its description as a 
Big Science project. Scientists’ fears that funding UK Biobank would be detrimental 
to the funding of other smaller scale projects because of the costs involved is also 
typical of concerns surrounding Big Science. Moreover, government sponsorship of 
UK Biobank, indirectly via the MRC and directly through the Department of Health, 
is also characteristic of Big Science. Finally, organisational issues that characterise 
Big Science projects were also evident in the set up of UK Biobank. Tension over 
issues such as centralisation, leadership, control and organisational styles marked the 
origins and development of UK Biobank.  
 
There were some aspects of UK Biobank that were not indicative of Big Science: for 
example, given the social and political context, the role of product champion is 
crucially important in Big Science initiatives yet there was no such figure who 
advocated for UK Biobank throughout its origins and development. Industrial 
sponsorship is a further area where UK Biobank could be said to depart from Big 
Science initiatives. Although industrial groups were consulted, they were not involved 
in developing the resource via protocol development nor did they sponsor UK 
Biobank. Nonetheless, there is enough common ground to describe UK Biobank as 
Big Science.  
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How does the origins and development of UK Biobank compare with that of other Big 
Science projects?  
Before I address this question, I should point out the difficulty involved in comparing 
Big Science projects. As Big Science projects tend to differ quite considerably in 
nature and context, drawing comparisons between them is difficult. Given the 
resources involved, the origins and development of Big Science projects are 
considerably shaped by the social and political environment at the time. Pestre and 
Krige, for example, have stressed the difficulty of presenting the development of 
CERN as a model to be emulated due to its individuality and position as the first 
postwar European collaborative scientific endeavour: ‘the specificity of the case, the 
circumstances surrounding its birth, and the unique nature of its research facility in 
Europe indicate that the species could not  - and would not – be reproduced easily’ 
(Pestre and Krige 1992) (p. 87). Furthermore the considerable scientific differences 
between Big Science projects can limit the extent to which valid comparisons can be 
made. David Edge and Michael Mulkay point to the difficulties of assessing the 
influence of scientific differences in making direct comparisons: 
direct comparisons between our study [on the emergence of radio astronomy 
in Britain] and sociological studies of other scientific specialities that do not 
share similar technical characteristics are likely to be unproductive, unless the 
effects of such technical differences can be adequately assessed and 
discounted (Edge and Mulkay 1976) (p. 346).  
Bearing this in mind the following comparison of the origins and development of UK 
Biobank with the Big Science projects described in 1.5 (MRC AIDS Directed 
Programme, CERN, The Space Telescope and the HGP) can only be made at quite a 
general level.  
 
UK Biobank lacked a product champion who advocated for the resource throughout 
its birth and development. There was no single figure identifiable with UK Biobank 
who drove the resource forward or undertook a leading role in its development. It was 
initially driven by the leaders of the two main funding bodies, the MRC and the 
Wellcome Trust, who were approaching retirement at the time. This is in contrast to 
other Big Science projects. For example, Sir James Gowans was instrumental in 
gaining funding and support for the MRC AIDS Directed Programme and was its first 
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Director. Raoul Dautry and Pierre Auger played significant roles in the establishment 
of CERN and continued to be influential as Council members in their position as the 
‘founding fathers’ of the project. Indeed the leading role taken by scientists in 
CERN’s origins and development through the Council have been associated with its 
success. Lyman Spitzer united ground and space based astronomers around the idea of 
the Space Telescope and garnered political support for the project that secured its 
establishment. The HGP was championed by high profile figures, such as James 
Watson and John Sulston, who not only played important roles in getting the initiative 
underway by securing funding, but also guided it through a difficult development that 
included a threat from industry.  
 
UK Biobank has many potential endpoints and no clear marker of success. For 
example, the beginning or ending of recruitment or the beginning or ending of follow-
up could all be regarded as a successful outcome of the endeavour. Partly because it 
represented ‘resource science’, its overall purpose, other than to set up a database, was 
relatively ambiguous. Even the establishment of another resource, a nuclear physics 
laboratory, in the case of CERN was set up with a clear initial aim to build a particle 
accelerator. The Space Telescope Project aimed to build and launch a telescope into 
orbit and although, like UK Biobank, it did not represent research in itself, this clear 
aim lent it focus. The mapping and sequencing of the human genome was the clear 
outcome and ‘big’ question of the HGP. An overarching aim of the MRC AIDS 
Directed Programme was to find an AIDS vaccine and although this was not realised 
it focussed the project. These projects therefore had clearer markers of success than 
UK Biobank.  
 
Although UK Biobank was a response to the ‘post-genome challenge’ to justify the 
abstract knowledge gained in the HGP it lacked a sense of urgency, which is reflected 
in the time delays that marked it. Early on in its origins funds were committed in 
principle and the funding decision itself did not follow the production of a final 
protocol. Therefore much of its development came after funds were committed, which 
perhaps contributed to a lack of urgency. The emergence of the AIDS Directed 
Programme amidst the 1986-87 policy period of  ‘national war-time emergency’ 
coupled with the possibility of finding a vaccine lent the Programme considerable 
potency (Berridge 1994) (p. 135). The struggle to gain Congressional funding for the 
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Space Telescope united astronomers into securing funding. Competition with the US 
accompanied the origins of CERN and their initial aim of constructing the biggest 
accelerator in the world. This element of a ‘race’ also drove the HGP as scientists in 
the publicly funded international effort competed with those of private industry 
(Celera) to map and sequence the human genome.  
 
Collaboration between spoke members in recruitment and ongoing protocol 
development was an important part of UK Biobank’s original organisational structure. 
The funding bodies brought academic scientists from all over the UK who represented 
a range of professional backgrounds (including general practice, epidemiology and 
psychiatry) and opinions together to set up UK Biobank. This collaboration resonates 
with the development of the Space Telescope whereby product champions brought 
sceptical ground-based astronomers together with space astronomers and united them 
in the common goal of securing funds. International collaboration was a feature of 
both CERN and the HGP.  
 
UK Biobank was not a hypothesis driven research endeavour, which in itself is not 
particularly uncommon in Big Science. For example, the Space Telescope and the 
HGP were not developed with specific hypotheses in mind. However the effect of a 
lack of hypotheses combined with confusion in the original organisational model 
caused considerable difficulties in the development of UK Biobank. As academic 
scientists were unsure of the purpose of UK Biobank and their role within it, they 
endeavoured to impose hypotheses that would address what they saw as research 
priorities. The funders saw these efforts as attempts to take control of UK Biobank, 
which contributed toward the breakdown of trust between the funding bodies and 
academic scientists. Although the HGP was criticised for its lack of hypothesis, there 
was a ‘big question’ that guided it, which, it could be argued, helped to prevent such 
major complications. In the development of the Space Telescope, astronomers utilised 
its lack of hypotheses to widen participation in the initiative and thereby increase 
political support. The involvement of astronomers, rather than funding bodies, in 
determining its nature and uniting to secure funds for the project could explain why its 
lack of hypothesis was not damaging.  
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Academic scientists argued that the funding bodies had already decided on key 
aspects of UK Biobank’s design before consulting them. For example, they argued 
that the half-million sample size was a political decision that was heavily publicised 
early on and therefore non-negotiable. It could then be argued that the parameters of 
UK Biobank were firmly set at an early stage in its development. This resonates with 
the origins of the Space Telescope, whereby astronomers made a number of 
significant changes to the project to secure political and financial support. For 
example, the reduction in the size of the primary mirror determined and had 
considerable ramifications on its future development and meant that the Space 
Telescope was ‘trapped by its own history’(Smith 1989) (p. 186). Consideration of 
this issue begs a crucial but as yet unanswerable question: can UK Biobank escape its 
history, and can a useful resource that will benefit human health be successfully 
established?  
 
7.3.2 Broad speculative explanations for the configuration of UK Biobank 
 
Given the significance of the hub and spoke model in the origins and development of 
UK Biobank and the lack of documentation regarding its selection (see 7.4), it is 
necessary to make informed speculation as to why it was chosen. Based on comments   
from all groups of interviewees, I believe that senior representatives of the funding 
bodies selected a hub and spoke model primarily to involve a wide range of academic 
scientists in the resource as well as to foster regional recruitment. In selecting this 
model, the funding bodies ensured that academic scientists throughout the UK from 
various professional backgrounds were represented, and thereby avoided any potential 
criticism that would arise if academic participation was restricted to a single group. I 
argue that this concern for fairness was partly borne out of the ethical concerns that 
surrounded the issue of access to the human genome sequence and the controversy 
that accompanied the Icelandic database.  
 
It could be argued that many of the difficulties surrounding the hub and spoke model 
were caused by the way in which it was implemented rather than any intrinsic flaws in 
the model itself. For example, much of the tension between the funding bodies and 
academic scientists in the hub and spoke bidding process could have been avoided if 
EU Procurement Rules had not been observed. These rules made the bidding process 
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far more complicated and the secrecy that they demanded aroused considerable 
controversy. Like the hub and spoke model, there was confusion regarding why the 
rules were observed. Some funding body representatives claimed that they were 
legally obliged to follow them whilst others claimed that this was not the case. 
Perhaps a determination to make the bidding process fair and transparent motivated 
the funding bodies to observe EU Procurement Rules. Ironically, these rules resulted 
in a confusing bidding process that fostered a sense of suspicion on the part of 
academic scientists who were unfamiliar with them.  
 
UK Biobank's emergence amidst the ethical concerns wrought by the HGP and the 
Icelandic database therefore had considerable consequences for its configuration. This 
context not only accounted for the extensive consultation exercises with the public 
and professional groups and early development of the EGF in tandem with the 
scientific protocol, but it may also have resulted in key organisational decisions, such 
as the selection of the hub and spoke model or following EU Procurement Rules.  
 
Given the costs and political context of Big Science, particularly in the case of 
government sponsorship then perhaps such organisational difficulties and tensions 
between academic scientists and funding bodies are intrinsic to Big Science. 
Certainly, the comparison above points to a number of common issues such as 
collaboration and the importance of leadership (illustrated in the case of UK Biobank 
in the problems caused by a lack of leadership). Furthermore issues of trust between 
funding bodies and academic scientists are indicative of all science, big and small. 
However, the way in which these difficulties manifest varies considerably between 
Big Science projects, which coupled with the problems involved in making direct 
comparisons between Big Science initiatives renders analysis of the particular 
configuration of UK Biobank in its own terms very important. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
 
These conclusions concern the organisational issues that influenced the set up of UK 
Biobank. I conclude that leadership, the hub and spoke model and ambiguities within 
the organisational structure as a whole were the most significant issues in the origins 
and development of UK Biobank. Such was their importance that each of these issues 
was addressed in the organisational changes of 2005; Rory Collins was appointed as 
PI and CEO, the hub and spoke model was substantially altered and much of the 
confusion that surrounded the organisational structure was removed as a result. Given 
that the ultimate success or failure of UK Biobank’s establishment cannot be assessed 
for many years, and the difficulty involved in selecting adequate criteria with which to 
judge its set up, these conclusions are however preliminary.  
 
Leadership  
The lack of product champion or leader was one of the most significant aspects of the 
original organisational structure that impacted on the development of UK Biobank. 
The resource suffered from a lack of identity as there was no single figure active 
within the academic scientific, political or industrial community who advocated for 
UK Biobank. The then leaders of the MRC and the Wellcome Trust, Sir George 
Radda and Dr Mike Dexter, who initially drove the idea for UK Biobank, were near 
retirement at the time and retired very soon after the funding decision in 2002. Some 
senior academic scientists heavily involved in the origins of UK Biobank, such as 
Tom Meade who chaired the EWG, were also near retirement during their 
involvement. This lack of identity contributed to UK Biobank’s low profile and lack 
of urgency. Unlike the development of the Space Telescope there was no figure 
equivalent to Lyman Spitzer to unite academic scientists, and particularly critics, 
around the idea.  
 
Decision making, particularly in ongoing protocol development following the funding 
decision, was diffused. Large groups of academic scientists were involved in the 
Science Committee and its various sub-groups, and the difficulty of reaching 
consensus was a major factor in the delays that affected set up of UK Biobank. The 
lack of a leader responsible for making decisions had a substantial influence. A 
further implication of such lack of leadership was confusion over who was in control 
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of UK Biobank, and consequent tension between academic scientists and the funding 
bodies.  Several academic scientists pointed to alleged difficulties that the former 
CEO, John Newton, faced in asserting his authority over UK Biobank because of the 
funding bodies' control over his appointment and the resource generally. For example, 
some stated that even once he was appointed, albeit unofficially, the funding bodies 
did not inform him of the location of the hub that he would manage. Hub bidders were 
not required to nominate a CEO from their host institution, rather the funding bodies 
choose a CEO from Oxford rather than Manchester (the location of the hub), which 
further hampered his control of the resource. There was therefore no central authority 
figure easily recognisable as taking control of UK Biobank such as there was in the 
case of CERN with its powerful Council and Director General.  
 
Hub and spoke model 
The hub and spoke model was responsible for most of the difficulties in the original 
organisational structure as its removal following the organisational changes in August 
2005 testifies. It is perhaps telling of the ambiguity that surrounded the organisational 
structure that the rationale for the selection of this controversial model was not 
documented. There was no record of any debate surrounding the choice of model in 
the documents I analysed. It is therefore difficult to say how it came to be adopted. It 
was however an integral part of the origins of UK Biobank and was referred to in the 
EWG Report of March 2000 and the Draft Protocol of October 2001. With regard to 
the origins of the hub and spoke model, all constituent groups of interviewees pointed 
to the national nature of UK Biobank in terms of the model facilitating regional 
recruitment and inclusion of a wide range of academic scientists (see 7.3 for informed 
speculation regarding its selection). They could not however articulate where exactly 
the idea for it came from in terms of there being any precedents for it or how it came 
to be adopted.  
 
Lack of spoke ‘payback’ for spoke members’ role in recruitment and ongoing 
protocol development was the overriding problem with the model. Confusion over 
whether or not spokes would get payback and criticism of the policy itself set a tense 
tone that accompanied the development of UK Biobank. Spoke payback was an 
unresolved issue and an unremitting source of tension between academic scientists on 
the one hand and the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited on the other. Academic 
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scientists were particularly frustrated at the apparent misunderstanding that the policy 
showed of their professional and financial obligations to host institutions. They 
stressed the significance of these obligations in terms of how their merit as academic 
scientists is measured in terms of performance indicators such as publications and 
grant income. Tension over the issue manifested in academic scientists’ criticism of 
UK Biobank as departing from standard academic scientific practice and in the lack of 
trust between them and the funding bodies in particular.  
 
The manner by which the hub and spoke model was set up was another source of 
difficulty, which had far-reaching consequences. The hub, spokes and CEO were 
appointed simultaneously in March 2003. Given that the CEO would manage the hub, 
and the hub would direct the spokes, simultaneous establishment meant that the CEO 
and the hub could not function in their intended role. Initially, the CEO and the hub 
did not have an infrastructure or sufficient resources with which to direct the spokes 
and were unable to do so for some time after their appointment. The CEO experienced 
further difficulties in establishing his authority as he was not involved in selecting the 
hub that he would direct, which exacerbated the problems involved in simultaneous 
appointment. Considerable time delays as the CEO and hub became established and 
difficulties in the relationship between the hub and the spokes as the former struggled 
to assert authority were the key implications of the manner by which the model was 
set up.  
 
The hub and spoke bidding process left a damaging legacy and contributed toward the 
breakdown of trust between academic scientists and the funding bodies. The funding 
bodies’ decision to adopt EU Procurement Rules for the bidding process was the key 
difficulty as it rendered the process secretive. Academic scientists were not used to 
this type of secretive environment and were generally not familiar with EU 
Procurement Rules. This meant that they did not understand why the process was so 
complicated and assumed that the funding bodies were directly responsible for the 
secrecy. This confusion illustrates the difficulties caused by a lack of communication 
between the funding bodies and academic scientists over EU Procurement Rules. 
Adoption of EU Procurement Rules compromised the collaborative process that the 
funding bodies encouraged between spokes after selection as it followed a 
complicated, highly competitive and secretive tendering process in which discussion 
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between different hub and spoke applicants was expressly forbidden. Like the origins 
of the hub and spoke model, it is not clear exactly why the funding bodies followed 
EU Procurement Rules. The archival documents I accessed did not contain details of 
any debate surrounding their adoption. The funding bodies argued that they were 
legally obliged to undergo EU Procurement Rules, but some senior academic 
scientists who were aware of the Rules disagreed and stated that they did not know 
why the funding bodies adopted them. In other large scale areas of funding the MRC 
and the Wellcome Trust have not used EU Procurement Rules (for example UK 
Clinical Research Collaboration’s (UKCRC’s) call for centres of excellence in public 
health research in 2007 and the ESRC and MRC have annual competitions for centres 
without adopting this EU process).  
 
Ambiguity in the organisational structure 
Ambiguity within the organisational structure and the hub and spoke model in 
particular complicated the development of UK Biobank. As academic scientists did 
not know who was responsible for decision making within the resource (particularly 
with regard to protocol development and the hub and spoke model) they felt 
powerless to influence its development. The lack of clarity regarding the role of 
spokes and whether this role extended beyond recruitment to undertaking regional 
sub-studies frustrated spoke members who found that their interpretation of their role 
did not correspond with that of the funding bodies and UK Biobank Limited, which 
contributed toward the reduction in trust between them. The implications of these 
confusions were difficult to overcome, and in the case of the hub and spoke model 
proved insurmountable, which contributed to the considerable time delays in the set 
up of UK Biobank.  
 
Ambiguities regarding the hub and spoke model were symptomatic of poor 
communication between the funding bodies and academic scientists. They reflected 
confusion on the part of academic scientists regarding the nature of UK Biobank 
itself, and the funding bodies’ inability to articulate to academic scientists how it 
differed from a standard hypothesis driven research project.    
 
Indeed, this analysis can be broadened out to the origins and development of UK 
Biobank in general.  Poor communication, confusion and an organisational model that 
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was not sufficiently transparent led to the gradual erosion of trust between academic 
scientists and representatives of the funders. These problems instigated major change 
in the organisational structure at the highest levels, and removal of much of what was 
seen as controversial in the original hub and spoke model.  Whether these changes 
will have the desired affect will become apparent as UK Biobank gets underway in 
earnest over the coming years. 
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7.5 Strengths and Limitations 
 
The strengths and limitations of my research both mainly related to its contemporary 
historical nature and UK Biobank's status as an evolving initiative.  There were also a 
number of advantages and disadvantages to the way in which I designed my study. In 
retrospect I believe the strengths of my research overcame the limitations and that the 
study design selected was the most appropriate option.  
 
7.5.1 Contemporary history  
 
In conducting a contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank 
I encountered opportunities and challenges that the historian of earlier periods would 
not face. 
 
Conducting a contemporary history allowed me to overcome some of the problems 
associated with memory. I interviewed respondents on their experience and opinion of 
events that took place within five to six years of the interview, along with events 
taking place at the time of the interview. The origins and development of UK Biobank 
were still fresh in interviewees’ minds, especially those aspects of the development of 
UK Biobank unfolding at the time of the interview, such as contract negotiation 
between the hub and the spokes and ongoing protocol development. Conducting a 
contemporary history therefore gave me the opportunity to seek an understanding of 
the origins and development of UK Biobank that would not be available at a later 
stage. Future opinions and recollections might alter depending on the ultimate success 
or failure of UK Biobank, so I was able to capitalise on understandings that might not 
be available to later historians. I conducted oral history interviews with respondents 
when they did not know if UK Biobank would be a success or failure. This relates to 
the issue of ‘composure’ as discussed in chapter three. It was therefore difficult for 
interviewees to construct an account of the origins and development that 
corresponded with their present identities given the evolving nature of UK Biobank. I 
also conducted oral history interviews with senior players approaching retirement or 
already retired who may not be accessible to future oral historians.  
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The immediacy of UK Biobank meant that interviewees held and expressed strong 
opinions. The majority of interviewees were actively involved in the initiative at the 
time of the interview, carrying out some of the tasks that they commented upon and 
intimately involved in UK Biobank. This resulted in passionate responses to questions 
and some interviewees sought to clarify issues more fully. The advantage of 
conducting oral history interviews on events recently or currently experienced by 
respondents was reflected in the difficulty of engaging respondents who were no 
longer involved in UK Biobank. Oral history interviews conducted with those 
indirectly involved were generally less informative than those conducted with 
respondents directly involved. Interviewees who had not been actively involved for 
three to four years struggled to respond to questions, and could not muster much 
enthusiasm for the interview. Surprisingly, this also applied to unsuccessful spoke 
bidders who found it difficult to reflect on their experiences as their professional 
interests had developed, and they had no further contact with the initiative. As they 
were removed from the resource and had been for a number of years, their personal 
accounts were tightly constructed and corresponded strongly with their present 
identities. Those indirectly involved were also the most contented as they had moved 
on personally and professionally whereas accounts of those directly involved were 
dominated by their current experiences and UK Biobank’s lack of progress.    
 
Conducting a contemporary history gave me the opportunity to view documents to 
which future historians might not have access. As a contemporary historian, I had to 
negotiate access to documents that were not publicly available because of their ‘live’ 
status, and therefore not yet archived. As discussed in chapter three, this material 
contained duplicate and misfiled documents that often contained illuminating 
comments pencilled in the margins.  It is unlikely that such documents would be 
preserved once the material is archived and therefore will not be available to future 
historians. The contemporary historian can therefore access information that once 
archived may not be available to future researchers. Smith reflected upon these 
advantages and disadvantages of analysing ‘live’ documents:  
I have spent a considerable amount of time acting as my own archivist. 
However, the complications have their pluses as well as their minuses, 
because of the chance to study materials that might be destroyed shortly or 
thrown in the trash can (Smith 1989) (p. 419) 
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The challenges involved in conducting a contemporary history were often closely 
related to the opportunities it presented. Interviewees’ enthusiasm on account of the 
contemporary nature of my research represented a challenge as well as an opportunity 
and managing strong emotions was difficult. Some interviews were difficult to control 
because of respondents’ enthusiasm and eagerness to share their experience. Their 
zeal would manifest in attempts to drive the agenda of the interview, which could be 
problematic. Interviewees’ attitudes toward UK Biobank often coloured their 
perceptions of the interview itself, and their frustration regarding UK Biobank 
manifested itself in aggravation toward my study. Although I was reassured by 
interviewees’ explanations for such frustration, and understood them better as I 
conducted more interviews, these sentiments remained challenging.  
 
It was also challenging to undertake research on the origins and development of an 
initiative that was not accompanied by a body of literature, which is attributable to the 
contemporary nature of my study. Lack of literature defined the nature of my 
research, and my study was exploratory on account of the lack of hypothesis. The 
potential for hypothesis testing in researching Big Science is further limited by the 
variation between different types of Big Science projects. Other accounts of Big 
Science projects are also exploratory; Edge and Mulkay commented in their history of 
the emergence of radio astronomy in Britain that ‘we decided that we would not 
define in advance the detailed questions to be answered nor the precise research 
procedures to be adopted’ (Edge and Mulkay 1976) (p. 5). They described the 
available hypotheses as ‘few’ and ‘questionable’ and pointed to the lack of relevant 
literature on the topic (Edge and Mulkay 1976) (p. 5).  
 
Conducting a contemporary history of the origins and development of UK Biobank 
involved considerable responsibility to respondents and, given the controversy 
surrounding the resource, the ramifications of participation in my study could be 
significant. In light of such responsibility, I had to adopt procedures to protect 
interviewees' identities. These procedures are discussed fully in chapter three but 
suffice to say they proved challenging to implement as the vast majority of 
interviewees were actively involved in UK Biobank at the time of the interview.  
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Analysing non-archived documents was a further challenge and made archival 
analysis time-consuming on account of duplicate and misfiled documents. These 
issues are also addressed fully in chapter three but I will reiterate one of the 
difficulties involved here. Although documents were categorised in files with distinct 
reference numbers, such as ‘D550/10, Hub and Spoke Relationship, Biobank, Volume 
1’, some of the categories were similar and referred to the same episodes, which 
resulted in misfiled documents.  
 
7.5.2 Researching an evolving initiative   
 
I encountered opportunities and challenges in my study on account of the evolving 
nature of UK Biobank, which underwent significant changes throughout my research. 
Significant modifications took place even prior to the organisational changes in 
August 2005. For example, the CEO of UK Biobank Limited, John Newton, resigned, 
groups were established and then disbanded particularly in ongoing protocol 
development, and new positions were created such as Spoke Coordinator. UK 
Biobank's evolving nature was underlined by the organisational changes in 2005. As 
discussed in the preface, the title of my PhD was originally ‘Lay and professionals’ 
experiences and views of the MRC/Wellcome Biobank Project’ but once I took up the 
studentship it changed to ‘A contemporary history of the origins and development of 
UK Biobank’ for the following reasons. It was envisaged that UK Biobank would 
have begun recruitment prior to commencement of my studentship, which would have 
allowed interviews to take place with participants. However, UK Biobank had not 
developed to that extent when my research began in October 2003. It was therefore 
agreed that I should not interview members of the public, not only because they had 
not begun to be recruited, but also on account of UK Biobank’s lack of public profile. 
These changes reinforce the flexibility required to undertake research on an evolving 
initiative.  
 
Organisational changes were accompanied by significant alterations to the UK 
Biobank website in 2006. For example, archived press releases, the chronology, 
information regarding protocol development, and certain documents such as the draft 
protocol were removed. If UK Biobank had not been evolving, I would not have had 
the opportunity to access these documents and witness such changes. Furthermore, 
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future historians would be unaware of these alterations to the presentation of the 
resource, which indicates the opportunities involved in researching an evolving 
initiative and undertaking a contemporary history.  
 
Conducting oral history interviews on an evolving initiative in some ways fostered a 
richer understanding of the origins and development of UK Biobank. As interviewees 
did not expect me to be familiar with the changing environment they felt compelled to 
explain it fully, which made interviews more informative. The changing environment 
thus rendered my study more important to interviewees who were keen to articulate 
the changes clearly for their benefit as well as mine. For example, following a long 
explanation regarding the development of the organisational structure, one 
interviewee remarked how it was the first time that he was able to articulate his 
thoughts clearly on a changing issue, and stated that he found it very useful. He 
commented: ‘Well, that’s the first time I’ve actually talked myself through that and I 
think that was pretty persuasive, I think I’ve persuaded myself’ [070; p. 1; p. 7]. 
Interviewees felt that the changing environment justified my research and their 
enthusiasm to explain the changes overcame hostility over the contemporary nature of 
my research and allowed me to probe deeper into the nature of the changes without 
incurring frustration. The changing environment thus gave me the opportunity to 
obtain a fuller understanding of the origins and development of UK Biobank than if 
the environment was static.  
 
Historians of contemporary science face particular challenges in researching evolving 
scientific initiatives. These challenges offset some of the opportunities discussed. I 
found it difficult to keep up with the changing environment and remain informed 
regarding evolving circumstances, such as the formation of new groups of scientists. 
The difficulty of maintaining up to date knowledge on the development of the 
resource was exacerbated by some respondents’ uncertainties regarding the changing 
environment and interviewees’ accounts would conflict. Often, interviewees informed 
me of forthcoming changes before they were public, which meant that I had to react 
appropriately and handle the information suitably. For example, I had to maintain my 
composure and stay focussed on the interview schedule during an interview in which 
a respondent reported how John Newton (the former CEO) had just resigned, days 
before this information was released.  
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Uncertainty regarding the development of UK Biobank affected both archival 
research and oral history interviews. It meant that I could not focus my research too 
early and I had to assume that every document was potentially significant to my 
research. I also had to remain flexible regarding my interview schedule and update it 
according to changing circumstances. Interviewees’ confusion regarding the changing 
environment represented a further challenge as it dominated some interviews. Some 
interviewees focussed on clearly articulating recent changes and speculating about 
future developments rather than concentrating on the questions in hand. It was 
difficult to change the focus of the interview from unfolding developments to past 
events. Often questions were interpreted in terms of the current situation at the time of 
the interview, rather than in terms of their background. For example, questions 
regarding the origins of the hub and spoke model were interpreted in terms of its 
current manifestations. Confusion regarding the changing environment was 
responsible for interviewees’ frustrations toward UK Biobank, which manifested in 
hostility toward my study.  
 
Uncertainty surrounding the development of UK Biobank was problematic as it 
subverted the roles of interviewer and interviewee. Some interviewees questioned my 
knowledge of the changing environment and implied that I was more aware then they 
were of developments. This reflected confusion regarding the nature of my research, 
and a perception that I was acting on behalf of the MRC. It also demonstrated the 
extent of the confusion and the desire of some interviewees to find out exactly what 
was going on. Such confusion was particularly challenging following the 
organisational changes and it was difficult to overcome these questions and focus on 
the interview itself. The evolving nature of UK Biobank also allowed interviewees to 
evade questions, and some, particularly senior, interviewees would avoid giving full 
answers on account of the changing environment. They argued that it was difficult to 
answer certain questions as UK Biobank was still developing. My interview schedule 
was however sensitive to the evolving nature of UK Biobank, and such reaction was 
indicative of misunderstanding regarding the role of my research as evaluating the 
scientific merit of UK Biobank. Reluctance to answer certain questions because of the 
evolving nature of UK Biobank was also attributable to unwillingness to comment on 
past events that remained unresolved. For example, some interviewees were not 
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prepared to discuss their experience and opinion of protocol development as the 
protocol was not finalised during the period of my research.  
 
The evolving nature of UK Biobank renders any conclusions regarding its origins and 
development preliminary and I had to be aware of the impact of unfolding events on 
my research. As the future success or failure of UK Biobank is unknown and it will be 
many years before such as analysis could be made, I had to be careful. Smith 
encountered such difficulties in researching the development of the Space Telescope, 
and stressed the incompleteness of his account because of its evolving nature. Given 
that the Space Telescope was still in the observation phase when his book was 
published in 1989 he commented: 
Certainly at this stage in the telescope’s development, one cannot claim to 
have written a definitive account. Not only has the telescope’s observing life 
to end, but its technology links to military spacecraft mean that a full analysis 
of its design heritage must await the lapse of many years (Smith 1989) (p. 4). 
 
7.5.3 Study Design 
 
The positive response to my requests for oral history interviews was a significant 
strength of my study. For example, in the main study 69 of the 89 approached agreed 
to an interview and 64 interviews took place, and all 12 of those approached for a 
follow-up interview agreed (totalling 76 interviews). It meant that my sample was 
composed of several representatives from each of the committees and groups involved 
in the origins and development of UK Biobank (see table 3.1). There were several 
advantages of this response and representation. I accessed a wide range of experience 
and opinion, which increased my understanding of the issues involved. I gained 
access to a range of individuals with varying degrees of involvement and different 
experiences of the initiative. For example, I interviewed people who had only been 
involved in the initiative for one or two years, as well as individuals who had been 
involved since the origins of UK Biobank in the late nineties. The large number of 
interviews (76 in total) itself encouraged participation in my study. The controversy 
surrounding the origins and development of UK Biobank meant that some 
respondents were unsure whether or not they should participate and many potential 
interviewees asked how many interviews I had carried out. I was able to reassure 
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these people by detailing the number of interviews carried out, and the type of people 
that I was contacting. The ability to protect individuals’ identities was a key factor in 
a positive response rate. In carrying out a substantial number of interviews, and 
conducting interviews with several representatives of each committee and group, I 
could safely use material from most interviews without identifying any respondent.  
 
Access to archival research was a further strength, which served as an advantage in its 
own right and complemented oral history interviews. In analysing archival 
documents, I gained insight into different understandings of UK Biobank’s origins 
and development that were not available elsewhere. For example, some of the 
documents contained material that presented the opinions of senior individuals within 
UK Biobank who did not agree to an interview. These included letters to 
representatives of the funding bodies and personal contributions to meetings 
contained in the minutes. Although these documents did not allow as rich an 
understanding of experiences and opinions as may have been achieved in an oral 
history interview, they were helpful. As these documents were preserved by 
representatives of the MRC, analysis of them allowed insight into the inner workings 
of one of the main funding bodies of UK Biobank. This served to supplement 
understandings gained from oral history interviews with representatives of the MRC. 
Archival research complemented data from oral history interviews in a wider sense 
and it partly informed my topic guide. This was advantageous as it increased my 
knowledge of the issues involved in the configuration of UK Biobank, which made 
me a more informed interviewer. This increased understanding gained through 
archival research thus allowed me to probe more effectively. A further strength of 
archival research was the ability to compile an accurate chronology of the origins and 
development of UK Biobank. Access to clearly dated and presented documents meant 
that my chronology was not subject to the problems associated with memory.  
 
The procedures adopted to protect interviewees’ identities were advantageous. As 
discussed in chapter three, the most significant of these steps was the policy of not 
naming any interviewee and instead referring to respondents’ general position in 
relation to UK Biobank such as ‘member of the PDC’. Although this level of 
anonymisation is standard in sociological studies, it is unusual in historical projects. 
Giving respondents the opportunity to see a copy of the transcript and passages from 
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the thesis that quote extensively from their transcript was an asset. Interviewees were 
not only comforted by these procedures themselves, but were reassured by the 
consideration shown for their circumstances. These steps therefore encouraged 
participation and fostered a more open interview by allowing interviewees to speak 
frankly, which is reflected in the comments of a senior respondent. He explained if 
identifying him was more important than the content of the interview then he would 
agree to being identified, but would not be in a position to give an honest, full and 
frank account of his experience and opinion. I explained how the content of the 
interview was more important than being able to attribute the comments and a 
discussion of my procedures followed. This interview was one of the most important 
undertaken and demonstrated the advantages of the procedures adopted. If such steps 
had not been taken, the participation rate would have been lower and accounts less 
honest.  
 
The decision to produce a conduct agreement regarding archival research at MRC 
Headquarters was beneficial. I agreed not to photocopy any documents, to return any 
files needed by staff, and to maintain the same hours as the individual responsible for 
the documents and my access to them. This agreement reassured staff at the MRC that 
I would handle the documents responsibly, which meant that I was not viewed as a 
threat. Such reassurance ensured that access to the documents was maintained and 
made the difficult process of arranging desk space in a busy corporate affairs office 
easier. The conduct agreement thereby facilitated access to the documents and was an 
important aspect of my study design.  
 
Despite the positive response to my study, my understanding of the origins and 
development of UK Biobank could have been enriched by further interviews. The 
lack of response and refusal of some interviewees to my request for an interview was 
thus a limitation of my study design. For example, two of those who did not consent 
were key figures in the origins of UK Biobank whom other interviewees had 
recommended I interview. Two further individuals who did not agree to an interview 
played a significant role in the development of UK Biobank, specifically in 
organisational issues.  
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My sample was heavily weighted toward those directly involved in UK Biobank (59 
of the 64 in the main study) and this imbalance was limiting. I conducted far fewer 
interviews with those indirectly involved in UK Biobank (unsuccessful spoke bidders, 
scientists not involved in UK Biobank). Interviewing equal numbers of those directly 
and indirectly involved might have resulted in a more balanced and informed study 
and would have addressed potential accusations of bias. This was not however 
possible due to the time constraints discussed and would have involved conducting a 
far greater number of interviews (approximately 120). It was imperative that I 
conducted such a large number of interviews with those directly involved to protect 
respondents’ identities, and it would therefore have been very difficult to conduct 
fewer interviews with those directly involved to allow equal number of interviews 
with those indirectly and not involved to take place. The quality of interviews 
conducted with those indirectly involved further justified the decision not to approach 
equal numbers of individuals from both groups. I found that awareness, not to 
mention knowledge, of the initiative was heavily restricted to those directly involved. 
 
I conducted a low number of follow-up interviews compared with the main study, 12 
compared to 64, which limited my study. I could have gained a richer and more varied 
understanding of the nature of the organisational changes by conducting follow-up 
interviews with every respondent who took part in the main study. In doing so, I 
would have overcome some of the bias associated with selection of interviewees from 
the main study to approach for the follow-up interviews. Again however, the time 
pressures involved in PhD study would have made this very difficult. Furthermore, 
conducting follow-up interviews was not part of my original study design but was in 
response to considerable and unanticipated organisational changes that took place in 
the latter stages of my fieldwork. Although I only conducted 12 follow-up interviews 
there was a high degree of consensus amongst respondents, which suggests that 
interviewing every respondent from the main study again would not have been 
particularly informative.   
 
Although the procedures adopted to protect interviewees’ identities were 
advantageous and, I would argue, necessary in securing participation and open 
interviews, they were also limiting. Identifying respondents would have perhaps 
increased the potency and significance of my analysis, especially when attributing 
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comments to senior figures within the funding bodies or witnesses to the more 
controversial aspects of the origins and development of UK Biobank, such as protocol 
development. Protecting interviewees’ identities was certainly a difficult task and led 
to the exclusion of some material from the thesis. In retrospect I believe that the 
advantages of the confidentiality procedures far outweighed the disadvantages. I 
argue that far from rendering my account more significant, identifying respondents 
would have resulted in a less powerful thesis as interviewees would have been 
prevented from giving an honest and full account of their experiences and opinions. 
Furthermore, I found that referring to interviewees by their involvement in UK 
Biobank was adequate.  
 
Archival research was restricted to only one of the funding bodies and I was only able 
to access those documents relating to the origins and development of UK Biobank at 
the MRC. I was denied access to the Wellcome Trust’s documents and did not pursue 
access to those of the DoH and the Scottish Executive. The archival research 
conducted was therefore biased toward the perspective of just one of the funding 
bodies. Access to the documents of the other funding bodies would not only have 
entailed analysing material not contained at the MRC, such as the minutes of meetings 
held at the other funding bodies’ headquarters, but it would have given me the 
opportunity to view the configuration of UK Biobank from other perspectives. 
Archival research based solely on MRC documents could perhaps grant the MRC a 
level of significance that was unrepresentative of their actual role.  
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7.6 Future Directions 
 
The limitations of my study design present opportunities for taking this research 
forward. For example, archival analysis of the other main funding bodies' documents 
regarding the origins and development of UK Biobank would not only be useful in 
gaining a wider understanding but it would counter the potential bias associated with 
analysing the MRC's documents only. It would be helpful to approach the Wellcome 
Trust, as the other main funding body, to seek permission again to access their 
material. By seeking access to the Department of Health’s documents, one would also 
have the opportunity to analyse the role and involvement of government in the origins 
and development of UK Biobank, which would be a particularly useful extension of 
this research. Conducting follow-up interviews about the organisational changes with 
all interviewees in the main study would be a useful next step. If that could be done 
we would gain a greater understanding of the organisational changes and their effect.  
 
As UK Biobank moves forward and recruitment nears completion, the opportunities 
for extending this research increase. For example, UK Biobank's greater public profile 
would allow an analysis of how it was presented in the media, be it the printed press 
or television. Detailed analysis of the format, headline, type of correspondent, 
language, tone, images and content would be particularly interesting. One could also 
undertake media analysis of in-house funding body publications (such as Wellcome 
News) and compare how the funding bodies portray UK Biobank, react to key events 
and how their approach to publicising UK Biobank compares to how they have 
previously published research initiatives. This analysis could be supplemented by 
interviews with the editors of in-house publications regarding their strategy in 
promoting UK Biobank. Widespread recruitment would also increase UK Biobank's 
profile amongst the wider academic scientific community considerably, which would 
foster awareness of the resource amongst academic scientists not involved in UK 
Biobank. One could therefore conduct further interviews with academic scientists 
indirectly involved as well as with those not involved in UK Biobank to balance the 
sample and access different perspectives. As UK Biobank continues to develop over 
the coming years it would also be useful to conduct follow-up interviews to monitor 
how perceptions of the resource change depending on its potential success or failure.  
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In conclusion, having originally intended to study lay and professional understandings 
and experiences of an ambitious large scale study of genetic and environmental 
influences on human health, I ended up studying the way in which this endeavour was 
initiated and originally organised. There were a number of delays in the 
implementation of UK Biobank which at least in part can be attributed to the 
organisational model (particularly hub and spokes) chosen. The simultaneous 
appointment of the hub, the spokes, and the CEO, and later appointment of the BoD; 
uncertainties about whether spokes would receive any privileged access to data and in 
what other ways they might benefit; the retirement of the original proponents early in 
the process; and the determining of the age range and sample size before the scientists 
who were to conduct the initiative were appointed; all contributed to initial difficulties 
in pushing UK Biobank forward. Data collection has just started as this thesis is 
submitted. It is to be hoped that the newer organisational arrangements will prove 
more effective than the earlier ones and that some lessons will have been learned 
about how to set up such large scale initiatives.  
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Appendix A: Chronology  
 
A1: Timeline 
1998 
29 May     MRC post-genome challenge working group on DNA sample 
collections and facilities for large scale genetic typing  
July 1998   MRC include proposal for a new large scale cohort study in 
their bid to the 1998 Government Comprehensive Spending 
Review  
1999 
14 May   MRC/Wellcome Trust Workshop on UK Biobank 
May   EWG Established  
4 August   First Meeting of EWG 
27 September   Second Meeting of EWG  
23 November  Third Meeting of EWG 
4 December  Fourth Meeting of EWG  
2000 
March    EWG Final Report published 
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June  MRC and Wellcome Trust agreed in principal to fund UK 
Biobank proposal  
October  ‘Public Perceptions of the Collection of Human Biological 
Samples’ report published by CraigRossDawson 
2001 
January ‘Consultation with primary health care professionals on issues 
relating to the recruitment of patients to a DNA collection 
study’ report published by Genetics Interest Group and the 
Universities of Nottingham and Sheffield 
17 April  Protocol Development Workshop 
May  PDC Established 
18 May First Meeting of PDC 
21 June Second Meeting of PDC 
25 July Third Meeting of PDC 
26 September Consultation with Bio-Industries Association 
19/20 October Fourth Meeting of PDC 
October   Draft Protocol and IPC Protocol completed 
21 November Teleconference with CARTaGENE 
27 November  Teleconference with GlaxoSmithKline 
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17 December Fifth Meeting of PDC 
December Draft protocol and IPC protocol sent to International Peer 
Review Panel and Ethical Review Panel 
2002 
15 January  Meeting with Pfizer 
22 February  Draft protocol and IPC protocol sent to MRC Council 
27 March MRC Council Funding Decision Meeting   
March  MRC and Wellcome Trust decide to fund UK Biobank 
 ‘Biobank UK; A Question of Trust: A consultation exploring 
and addressing questions of public trust’ report published by 
People, Science and Policy (PSP) 
25 April Ethics Consultation Workshop 
July First meeting regarding the hub and spoke bidding process 
between representatives of the funding bodies and 
organisations interested in becoming the hub or a spoke 
28 October Expressions of interest sought for hub contract  
30/31 October Consultation with Industry Workshop at Hinxton Hall 
Conference Centre 
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13 November First round spoke bidders sent Pre-Qualification Questionnaire 
(PQQ) 
19 November  HGC Information Gathering Meeting 
21 November  Successful first-round spoke bidders notified 
2003 
9 January  Successful first-round hub bidders notified 
January-February Site Visits for successful first-round hub bidders 
14 February First Meeting of IAG  
 Spoke Selection Panel formed 
25/26 February Second round spoke bidders met with funding bodies  
17 March Successful spoke bidders notified 
 Successful hub bidder notified 
March John Newton appointed as CEO of UK Biobank Limited 
2/3 April Second Meeting of IAG 
4 April  Consultation with Industry Workshop at the Association of the 
British Pharmaceutical Industry (APBI) 
7 April  John Newton made his first appearance as CEO at a 
Parliamentary event 
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April  ‘UK Biobank: A consultation with nurses in general practice 
and research’ report published by People, Science and Policy 
(PSP) 
20 May Meeting between representatives from the hub and spokes and 
representatives of the selection panel and the funding bodies 
18 June  HGC Genetics sub-group Meeting 
June ‘UK Biobank Consultation on the Ethical and Governance 
Framework’ report published by People, Science and Policy 
(PSP) 
30 June/1 July Third Meeting of IAG  
23 July Spoke Negotiating Team Meeting 
July Science Committee Established 
August ‘Summary of the UK Biobank Consultation on the Ethics and 
Governance Framework’ report published by Opinion Leader 
Research 
24 September  Draft of EGF published 
10 October  Background document to EGF produced 
28 November UK Biobank incorporated as a private company limited by 
guarantee, UK Biobank Limited 
30 December UK Biobank Limited registered as a charity  
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2004 
January BoD Established 
29 January  First meeting of BoD 
 Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) completed between members 
of the company (Wellcome Trust as a trustee of the Wellcome 
Trust and the MRC) and UK Biobank Limited 
26 March Hub released pre-contract funding for the spokes 
30 March HGC Update Meeting 
8 April Draft hub and spoke contract circulated to spokes 
30 April Spokes responded to draft contract 
November EGC established 
13 December  John Newton resigned as CEO of UK Biobank Limited 
2005 
17 January  Tim Peakman appointed as acting CEO 
28 February Phase One Pilot Study Commenced  
8 August Rory Collins appointed as CEO and PI 
 Tim Peakman appointed Executive Director  
August Organisational Changes Commenced 
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A2: Committee members’ biographies 
EGC 
Professor Alastair Campbell (Chair)  
Alastair Campbell is the inaugural Professor of Ethics and the Director of the Centre 
for the Ethics in Medicine at the University of Bristol. He is a member of the Medical 
Ethics Committee of the British Medical Association and a member of the Wellcome 
Trust’s Biomedical Ethics Funding Committee. Formerly, he was a member of the 
Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group on Cloning and Chairman of the Wellcome 
Trust's Standing Advisory Group on Ethics. He was also a member of the UK 
Biobank Interim Advisory Group 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Ms Andrea Cook OBE  
Andrea Cook is Chair of Water Voice Northumbria, which represents consumer 
interests in the water and sewerage industry. Formerly, she served as Chief Executive 
of the National Energy Action, a charity which promotes energy efficiency to address 
the problems of low-income consumers, a member of the UK Round Table on 
Sustainable Development and a member of the government’s Advisory Group to the 
New Deal Task Force (http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 
2006)(accessed 14/02/06).  
Ms Jayam Dalal  
Jayam Dalal is a freelance marketing consultant. She is a lay member on the 
Residential Property Tribunal Service (Public Appointment within the Office of the 
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Deputy Prime Minister), an Independent Assessor for Public Appointments within the 
Department of Culture, Media & Sport, a Partner within the Women's National 
Commission, a member of the Sussex Police’s Independent Advisory Group and 
Domestic Violence Working Group 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006)(accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor the Baroness Finlay of Llandaff  
Ilora Finlay is a consultant in palliative medicine and chronic pain at the Velindre 
NHS Trust, Cardiff. She is an Honorary Professor and Vice Dean of the University of 
Wales, College of Medicine and Director of the Institute of Medical Ethics. Formerly 
she served on many committees and advisory panels such as the Science Committee 
of Cancer Research UK and the Home Office Advisory Council on Misuse of Drugs 
Act. She was appointed a people’s peer in 2001 in the first open contest for 
membership of the House of Lords 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006)(accessed 14/02/06).   
Professor Roger Higgs MBE  
Roger Higgs is Professor Emeritus and former Deputy Head of division at GKT 
School of Medicine, King's College, London. In 2004 he retired from the Department 
of General Practice and Primary Care at King's. He chairs the Steering (Editorial) 
Committee of the Journal of Medical Ethics and sits on various committees for 
bioethics and healthcare organisations 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006)(accessed 14/02/06).   
Professor Ian Hughes  
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Ian Hughes is a Professor of Pharmacology at the School of Biomedical Sciences, 
University of Leeds. He is Chair of Leeds Mental Health NHS Teaching Trust and 
Vice-President (Academic Development) of the British Pharmacological Society and 
serves as a lay member of the General Osteopathic Council. Formerly, he held non-
executive Director appointments in the NHS 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
 Ms Clara Mackay  
Clara Mackay is Director for Policy and Research at Breast Cancer Care. She is 
Commissioner for the Patient and Public Involvement in Health Commission and 
Chair of the MRC/ESRC Innovative Health Technologies Research Programme 
Advisory Group. Formerly, she was Principal Policy Adviser (Health) for the 
Consumers' Association and a member of the Public Advisory Group to the NHS 
National IT Programme - Electronic Records 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).   
Professor Sheila McLean  
Sheila McLean is the first holder of the International Bar Association Chair of Law 
and Ethics in Medicine at Glasgow University and Director of the Institute of Law 
and Ethics in Medicine at Glasgow University. She is a member of the Wellcome 
Trust's Biomedical Ethics Funding Committee. Formerly, she was a consultant to the 
World Health Organisation and the Council of Europe, and to individual States, 
chaired the Scottish Independent Review Group on Retention of Organs at Post-
Mortem, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, and the Scottish Office 
Steering Group on Female Offending. She was appointed by the Department of 
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Health to review the Consent Provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 
14/02/06).   
Ms Sally Smith QC  
Sally Smith is a practising Barrister and was appointed Queen's Counsel in 1997, 
specialising in medical law. She is a member of the Royal College of Physicians 
Ethics Committee and the MRC ethics committee. Formerly, she was a member of the 
St Thomas’ Hospital Research Ethics Committee. She has represented the NHS in 
major litigation including the Benzodiazapine Litigation, the Breast Radiation 
Litigation and the Nationwide Organ Retention Litigation 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).   
Professor Sandy Thomas  
Sandy Thomas is the Director of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and a Professor 
within the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex. She is a 
member of the Royal Society's Science and Society Committee, the Genetics Society, 
the Editorial Board for Science and Public Affairs and the Academy of Medical 
Sciences Working Group: Impediments to Medical Research 
(http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).   
Professor Christopher Wild  
Chris Wild is Professor of Molecular Epidemiology and Head of the Centre for 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics at the University of Leeds. He serves as Chair of the 
UK Molecular Epidemiology Group and is Senior Editor on the Cancer 
 299  
Epidemiology, Biomarkers and Prevention journal. Formerly he was Chief of the Unit 
of Environmental carcinogenesis at the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
in Lyon, France (http://www.egcukbiobank/org.uk/members/index.html 2006) 
(accessed 14/02/06).   
Science Committee  
Professor John Bell (chair) 
John Bell is Regius Professor of Clinical Medicine at the University of Oxford. He is 
a Member of Council of the University of Oxford and a Trustee of The Rhodes Trust. 
Formerly, he served as Nuffield professor of clinical medicine, University of Oxford, 
held a clinical fellowship at Stanford University, California and co-founded the 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Genetics in Oxford 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Valerie Beral 
Valerie Beral is Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Oxford and Director 
of the Cancer Research UK epidemiology unit, Oxford. She is the Principal 
Investigator of the Million Women Study, fellow of the Royal College of Physicians 
and an honorary fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences, the Faculty of Public 
Health Medicine and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. She is 
Chair of the Department of Health’s Advisory Committee on Breast Cancer 
Screening. Formerly, she was a member of the Health Services and Public Health 
Board and the Physiological and Infections Board of the Medical Research Council 
and served on international committees for the World Health Organisation and the 
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National Academy of Sciences, USA 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Paul Burton 
Paul Burton is Professor of Genetic Epidemiology and Head of the Genetic 
Epidemiology Unit at the University of Leicester. He is a chartered statistician (Royal 
Statistical Society), a member of the Royal College of Physicians (UK), and of the 
Faculties of Public Health Medicine both in the UK and Australia. Previously, he was 
senior biostatistician and head of the division of biostatistics at the Institute for Child 
Health Research, Perth, Western Australia 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor John Danesh 
John Danesh is Professor of Epidemiology and Medicine and Head of the Department 
of Public Health and Primary Care and Honorary Co-Director of the Strangeways 
Research Laboratory at the University of Cambridge 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06). 
Professor Paul Elliott 
Paul Elliott is Professor of Epidemiology and Public Health Medicine and Head of the 
Division of Primary Care and Population Health Sciences in Imperial College 
London. He is a fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences. Formerly, he was Head 
of the Environmental Epidemiology Unit at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine and Head of the WHO Collaborating Centre in Environmental 
Epidemiology. He was a specialist adviser to the House of Lords Science and 
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Technology Sub-Committee on Human Genetic Databases (2000-2001) 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Hilary Graham 
Hilary Graham is Professor of Social Policy at Lancaster University. She is a member 
of the NHS Advisory Committee on Research Allocation (ACRA) and of the new 
Department of Health Inequalities Scientific Research Group. Formerly, she directed 
the ESRC Health Variations Programme, was a member of the Independent Inquiry 
into Inequalities in Health (Acheson Report) and served on the MRC Health Services 
and Public Health Research Board 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Bernard Keavney 
Bernard Keavney is Professor of Cardiology at the University of Newcastle and 
consultant cardiologist to the Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust. Formerly, 
he was an MRC Training Fellow at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Genetics 
and clinical lecturer in cardiology at Oxford 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor John Newton  
John Newton was the CEO of UK Biobank from April 2003 until December 2004. 
Formerly, he was consultant epidemiologist for the Unit of Health Care 
Epidemiology, Department of Public Health and Primary Care at the University of 
Oxford and the Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS Trust. He was also Director of 
Research and Development at the Oxford Radcliffe NHS Trust and Head of a research 
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team supporting the Government's national Clinical Standards Advisory Group 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Stephen Palmer 
Stephen Palmer is the Mansel Talbot Professor of Epidemiology and Public Health at 
the University of Wales College of Medicine and Director of the Health Protection 
Agency's division of chemical hazards and poisons. Formerly, he was Head of the 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (Wales), served on the MRC Health 
Services and Public Health Research Board and was a member of the Advisory 
Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Catherine Peckham 
Catherine Peckham is Professor of Paediatric Epidemiology, Institute of Child Health, 
University College London. She chairs the Medical Research Council/Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Working Group on assisted reproduction, the 
MRC/MoD Military Health Advisory Group, the Confidential Enquiries Advisory 
Committee, National Institute for Clinical Excellence and vice-chair of the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics. She is a member of the Wellcome Trust Biological Collections 
Advisory Committee and Board of Management of the Centre for Longitudinal 
Studies, Institute of Education. Formerly, she founded and was head of the Centre for 
Paediatric Epidemiology and Biostatistics at the Institute of Child Health, established 
the Department of Community Medicine and General Practice, Charing Cross 
Hospital Medical School. She was also founder fellow of the Academy of Medical 
Sciences, non-executive Director of the Advertising Standards Authority and a 
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Fulbright Commissioner (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) 
(accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Jill Pell  
Jill Pell is a consultant in Public Health at Greater Glasgow NHS Board and an 
honorary reader in the Division of Cardiovascular Medicine and Sciences at the 
University of Glasgow. She is a member of the Royal College of Physicians 
(Edinburgh) Audit and Research Committee, the Chief Scientist Office Biomedical 
and Therapeutic Research Committee and she is the lead of the Scottish RCC. 
Formerly, she sat on committees and working groups established by Quality 
Improvement Scotland and the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network and 
established a Scotland-wide register of adult cardiac surgery and a Scotland-wide 
register of percutaneous coronary interventions 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor Mike Pringle  
Mike Pringle is the Professor of General Practice and Head of the School of 
Community Health Sciences in the University of Nottingham. He is Strategic director 
of PRIMIS, which is a service contracted by the NHS Information Authority to 
improve the use of computers and data in primary care. He was elected to the General 
Medical Council for 3 years from July 2003 and sits on the Council of the Medical 
Defence Union. Previously, he was Chairman of the Council of the Royal College of 
General Practitioners and co-chair of the External Reference Group and the 
Implementation Group for the National Service Framework for diabetes 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
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Professor Alan Silman 
Alan Silman is Director of the UK Arthritis Research Campaign Epidemiology Unit, 
University of Manchester Medical School, Professor of Rheumatic Diseases 
Epidemiology and Consultant in Rheumatology in Manchester. He is the senior author 
of Epidemiology of the Rheumatic Diseases and one of the five new editors of the 
third edition of the rheumatology textbook Rheumatology 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Professor John Todd 
John Todd is Professor of Medical Genetics at Cambridge University in the 
Cambridge Institute for Medical Research. He is director of the Diabetes and 
Inflammation Laboratory at Cambridge University. He is scientific adviser for several 
companies including Amersham and Unilever. Previously, he was Professor of 
Human genetics at Oxford University and Wellcome Trust Principal Research Fellow 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 14/02/06).  
Madeline Wang  
Madeline Wang is a board member of the Northern and Yorkshire Clinical Trials Unit 
and lay-member of the General Optical Council, the MRC/Wellcome Trust Joint 
Steering Committee on Human Developmental Biological Resources, the Northern 
and Yorkshire Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee and the Royal College of 
Anaesthetists. Formerly, she was an NHS Trust Chair and Trustee of the National 
Childbirth Trust and a member of the MRC Working Group on Personal Information 
in Medical Research and worked as a nursing auxiliary and as a student nurse in a 
wide variety of NHS hospital settings, both acute and chronic, and with a range of 
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patient groups (http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/science/sciencecomm 2006) (accessed 
14/02/06).  
BoD 
 
Sir Alan Langlands (Chair) 
Alan Langlands is the Principal and Vice Chancellor of the University of Dundee and 
Chairman of the Scottish Institute for Enterprise. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society 
of Edinburgh and an Honorary Professor at the University of Warwick Business 
School. He is a member of advisory boards at INSEAD, the Johns Hopkins University 
Bioethics Institute, chairs the development board of IVIMEDS (the International 
Virtual Medical School) and Convener of the Universities Scotland Funding Policy 
Group. He was awarded honorary fellowships by four medical Royal Colleges and the 
Institute of Actuaries and received a knighthood in the Queen's Birthday Honours List 
(1998) for services to the NHS. Formerly, he was the Chief Executive of the NHS in 
England and accountable to Parliament for a £42bn revenue budget 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).  
 
Professor John Bell-see above  
 
The Hon Peter Benson LVO 
The Hon Peter Benson LVO is a non-executive Director for a number of commercial 
and charitable concerns. He was a senior partner in PricewaterhouseCoopers retiring 
in 2001 and had a significant role in the privatisation of British Telecom, specialising 
in this area and lecturing in various parts of the world on privatisation and other 
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financial topics, frequently on Government and Ministerial Missions 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).  
 
Professor David Gordon 
David Gordon studied at Cambridge and the Westminster Medical School, qualifying 
in 1970. His early professional training was in Cambridge and in Leicester, and he 
then worked in research and academic posts at St. Mary’s Hospital Medical School 
from 1972 to 1983. In 1983 he moved to the Wellcome Trust, while maintaining a 
clinical commitment at St Mary’s Hospital. Professor Gordon’s work at the Wellcome 
Trust involved him in a wide range of activities concerned with the funding of 
science. Professor Gordon took up his appointment as Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine, Dentistry, Nursing and Pharmacy, and Professor of Medicine, in the 
University of Manchester, on 1 September, 1999. He is Fellow of the Academy of 
Medical Sciences, Chair of the Council of Heads of Medical Schools, Vice-President 
of the Association of Medical Schools in Europe, and a member of a number of 
national scientific and professional advisory bodies 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).     
 
Ms Jane Lee  
Jane Lee is Director of Corporate Affairs at the Medical Research Council. She is one 
of the UK members of the Board of Trustees for the Human Frontier Science Program 
in Strasbourg and a non-executive member of the Board of MVM Limited (which 
creates finances and builds life science companies from MRC and other academic 
research). Formerly, she managed the initial introduction of formal performance 
appraisal for scientific staff in human resources group, the MRC’s earliest ventures in 
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working with the biotech industry in technology transfer and the Council's global 
health portfolio in research management group 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).  
 
Professor Mike Pringle-see above  
 
Dr Barbara Skene 
Barbara Skene is Head of Department Ventures and Initiatives at the Wellcome Trust. 
She is also a Director on the Board of the Structural Genomics Consortium. Formerly, 
she was a scientific administrative officer at the MRC. She was appointed to the 
scientific staff of the Wellcome Trust in 1993 as secretary to the genetics Advisory 
Group and became deputy chairman of the group in 1996 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).  
 
Mr Marc Taylor 
Marc Taylor is Head of Research Policy in the Research and Development Directorate 
of the Department of Health. Formerly, he was head of NHS R&D Policy when his 
responsibilities included management of the £550m national NHS R&D Budget. He 
was head of estate policy and director of finance at NHS Estates, served in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and was Head of the development section at the 
British High Commission in India. Marc Taylor replaced Dr Peter Greenaway who 
retired from the Department of Health in 2004 
(http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/board 2004) (accessed 14/09/04).  
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Appendix B: Methods 
 
B1: Invitation Letter 
 
[MRC logo] 
         
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
Dear …, 
 
I am undertaking a PhD on the contemporary history of the UK Biobank and I am 
writing to ask whether you would be willing to be interviewed. I began this MRC 
funded studentship in October 2003 and am supervised by Sally Macintyre and Kate 
Hunt from the MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit. The aim of my project is 
to document the origins, implementation and evolution of the UK Biobank in its 
historical and international context, primarily using oral history techniques. The 
overall research question is: how and why has UK Biobank been set up at this 
particular time and in this particular way? 
 
I am approaching a range of people both directly and indirectly involved in the UK 
Biobank. I enclose an information sheet about the project and a consent form, which I 
would invite you to sign should you agree to be interviewed. If you agree to take part, 
the interview will be conducted in a place of your choosing, such as your office, at a 
time that best suits you. It should last about an hour. I would ask you about your 
involvement, experiences and opinions of the UK Biobank. Although I would prefer 
to conduct interviews face to face, if you are unable to do so I could carry out 
telephone interviews lasting half an hour. Ideally I would record the interview so that 
I can concentrate on our conversation and have an accurate record of it, but if you 
would prefer it not to be recorded I would take notes.  
 
I appreciate that you are a very busy person, but I would very much value the 
opportunity to speak with you, since I believe you would make an important 
contribution to this project.  
 
Please let me know by email, phone, fax or post whether or not you would consider 
being interviewed.  
Thank you for your time. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Mairi Langan 
Direct Line: 0141 357 7545 
E-mail: mairi@msoc.mrc.gla.ac.uk  
 
[MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit Contact Information]
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B2: Information Sheet 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
PhD research project 
 
Information Sheet 
  
 
Introduction 
As the world’s largest genetics database, examining the role of genetic, lifestyle and 
medical factors in disease, the UK Biobank promises to be a high profile and 
influential research endeavour. The international context of this type of research adds 
a further dimension to its significance.  
 
Nature of the research project 
This research project is a contemporary history and will primarily use in-depth face to 
face or telephone interviews to elicit the experiences and opinions of scientists and 
interest groups regarding the evolution of the UK Biobank. It will also involve 
analysis of archival material on UK Biobank.  
 
Aims 
The main aims of this research project are to understand: 
 The origins, implementation and evolution of the UK Biobank in its historical 
and international context. 
 How and why was UK Biobank set up when it was and how it was?  
 
Why is your participation important? 
This project offers an opportunity to understand how such an important scientific 
study developed from conception into operation. To achieve these aims I will speak to 
leading scientists, funders and interest groups directly and indirectly involved in the 
UK Biobank. Such first-hand accounts are crucial in gaining an understanding of the 
origins of the UK Biobank.  
 
What would taking part involve? 
Participation in this study involves an interview lasting about an hour.  The interview 
will be held at a time and place of your choosing and it will be arranged so as to cause 
you the least inconvenience. If you are unable to be interviewed face to face, a 
telephone interview lasting around half an hour can be arranged instead. If you agree 
to be interviewed, please contact me and I will make the arrangements. 
 
What topics will be discussed? 
During the interview you will be asked about your involvement, experiences and 
opinions regarding the origins, implementation and evolution of the UK Biobank.  
 
Ethical issues  
This research project has received the approval of the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Glasgow’s Faculties of Law and Financial Studies and Social Sciences. 
Two key ethical issues are consent and confidentiality.  
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Consent 
Your consent will be obtained for the interview to be carried out, for it to be tape-
recorded with permission, and for the use of the transcript. You will be able to 
withdraw from the study at any point during the interview, or to decline to answer any 
questions that you are uncomfortable with. If you have any questions regarding the 
study I would be happy to try to answer them. It would be very useful to me if I could 
tape record the interview but if you are uncomfortable with this then I can simply take 
notes.    
 
Confidentiality 
Only my supervisors and myself will have full access to the recordings and transcripts 
generated during this study. If the recording is transcribed by a professional typist 
she/he will be bound by the MRC ‘Good Research Practice’ guidelines, and I will 
remove any identifying information. In order to protect your confidentiality your 
name, contact details and job title will be stored in hard copy only and will be kept in 
a locked cabinet separate from recordings and transcripts. The data would be suitably 
anonymised by mutual agreement; a general descriptor would be used e.g. ‘member of 
a spoke’, ‘member of a funding organisation’ and a general professional descriptor 
would also be used e.g. ‘general practitioner’, ‘geneticist’ ‘epidemiologist’.   
 
Please contact me by post, phone, fax or email:  
 
Write to: Mairi Langan, MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of 
Glasgow, 4 Lilybank Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RZ. 
 
Telephone: 0141 357 7545 
 
Fax: 0141 337 2389 
 
Email: mairi@msoc.mrc.gla.ac.uk 
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B3: Consent Form 1 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank  
 
PhD research project 
 
Consent Form – Part One 
 
 
 
Section A 
 
• I understand the nature of the research project as described in the 
information sheet and I am willing to be interviewed. 
 
 
• I understand that I can decline to answer any question and that I can 
withdraw from the interview at any point. 
 
 
Name 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
Date 
 
 
 
Section B 
 
Please select one of the following options: 
 
• I agree that this interview can be tape recorded 
 
 
• I do not wish this interview to be tape recorded 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
Date
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B4: Consent Form 2 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
PhD research project 
 
Consent Form – Part Two  
 
In concordance with copyright laws, you are the owner of the copyright in the words 
and the MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit is the owner of the copyright in 
the recording. In order to consult the interview and to use the transcript in research, 
the copyright in the words must be transferred from you to me by signing this form.   
 
Section A 
 
Please choose one of the following options:  
• I hereby grant the researcher permission to use extracts or quotations from the 
transcript for the purposes of the PhD thesis or any subsequent publications in 
suitably anonymised form by a general descriptor e.g. ‘member of the protocol 
development committee’, ‘member of a spoke’. Also, to distinguish the 
discipline I grant the researcher permission to refer to my speciality e.g. 
‘sociologist’, ‘primary care’, ‘epidemiologist’.  
 
• I hereby grant the researcher permission to use extracts or quotations from the 
transcript for the purposes of the PhD thesis or any subsequent publications in 
identifiable form e.g. by name (if wished) and I also grant the researcher 
permission to refer to my speciality e.g. ‘sociologist’, ‘primary care’, 
‘epidemiologist’. 
 
Name 
 
Signature 
 
Date 
 
Section B 
 
You may wish to check the transcript for any factual errors or to make any further 
observations.  
 
Please choose one of the following options 
 
• I would like to see the transcript 
 
• I would not like to see the transcript 
 
 
Signature  
 
Date 
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B5: Transcript Return Letter 
[MRC Logo] 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
Dear …, 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you once again for the interview. I 
appreciate how busy you must be and I am very grateful for the time that you gave 
me. I have enclosed a copy of the transcript and would invite you to check it for any 
factual errors and misspellings and also, if you wish, to make any additions or 
clarifications. If you would like to make any corrections or amendments to the 
transcript I would be very thankful if you would return it to me within three months. I 
would also like to take this opportunity to explain the changes that I have made to the 
transcript and provide some clarification on how I may use the information.  
 
I have put any identifying information in square brackets. If I were to use the 
quotation surrounding the bracketed information then I would change the contents of 
the square brackets into something less identifiable, for example ‘place of work’. 
Therefore, the information in the square brackets is data that I would have to change if 
I were to use the quotation.  
 
If I were to use any quotations from the transcript then I would refer to your position 
as ‘member of a Spoke’ / ‘member of the Science Committee’ / ‘member of the Ethics 
and Governance Council’ / ‘member of the Board of Directors’ / ‘member of the 
Protocol Development Committee’ and where appropriate as an ‘general practitioner’ 
/ ‘epidemiologist’ / ‘sociologist’ as it might be useful to make the distinction in 
discipline between individuals (whether or not directly involved in the UK Biobank). 
I will not make any distinction between members of and leads or chairs of 
spokes/committees/boards. I am trying to interview several members of each spoke 
and multiple members of each committee (as well as a lot of people who are not 
members of spokes or committees); this will further serve to protect your identity. 
 
If I were to use quotations from your interview then it would be to illustrate a general 
point and usually as part of several quotations from different people to support that 
point. For example, a theme might be the funding of the project and a finding might 
be that some people thought that the figure was not high enough, whereas others 
thought it was adequate. In this case I would perhaps write, ‘several people involved 
with UK Biobank thought that the figure was not high enough whereas others 
involved thought it was fine, and comments included…’ I would then use several 
quotations from each perspective as illustrative of this point.  
 
Thanks again for your help and do not hesitate to contact me should you have any 
questions or queries, 
 
Mairi Langan 
Direct Line: 0141 357 7545 
E-mail: mairi@msoc.mrc.gla.ac.uk  
 
[MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit Contact Information] 
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B6: Interview Schedule 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
Topic Guide 
 
Key Objectives 
 
To document the origins, development and implementation of UK Biobank in its 
historical and international context 
How and why was UK Biobank set up when it was and how it was? 
 
 
Origins 
 
Experience 
How did you first become aware of the initial idea for UK Biobank? 
When did you first become aware of the idea? 
 
How did you first become involved in it? 
Are you still involved in UK Biobank? 
 
What did you think about the initial idea for UK Biobank at the time? 
 
Initial Idea 
Where did the initial idea for UK Biobank come from? 
When was the idea first put about? 
Why do you think it emerged then? 
Who or what groups first thought of it? 
 
What were the initial reactions to it from the scientific community? 
 
Implementation 
 
Establishment  
What do you think about the way that the project has been set-up and managed?  
Why do you think it has been established the way it has?  
 
Key players 
Who and what drove the study? 
 
Timing  
Why do you think it came about when it did? 
What were the factors that allowed the UK Biobank to emerge when it did? 
 
What do you think about the project’s timescale? 
 
Funding  
What do you think about the involvement of the funding bodies? 
When did each of the organisations become involved? 
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How did they become involved? 
How do you view the relationship between them? 
 
What do you think about the amount of money committed to funding the study? 
 
Evolution 
 
Funder’s role 
Other than to provide the financial support for the project, what do you see as the role 
of the funders in the project generally? 
What do you think about the role that the funders have had?  
 
Scientific Protocol 
What do you think about the way in which the initial protocol was formed? 
 
What did you think about the initial scientific protocol? 
What did you think about the key decisions taken? 
Do you feel that all the opportunities were taken or do you feel that some 
opportunities were missed in regard to the protocol? 
 
Organisational Structure  
What did you think about the organisational structure for UK Biobank? (‘hub/spoke’ 
model, national/collaborative effort, the decision to set up Biobank Limited) 
 
Why do you think these organisational structures were chosen? (‘hub/spoke’ model, 
setting up of Biobank Limited) 
  
As a spoke member 
What motivated you to apply to be a spoke? 
 
What was your experience of the bidding process for the spoke contracts? 
How did you feel when you were selected to be a spoke?  
 
What has been your experience of being a spoke? 
What has been the key issues in your experience of being a spoke?  
 
Upon becoming a spoke, how do you feel your group has influenced the development 
of UK Biobank in this capacity? 
In your capacity as spoke member, how do you feel you have influenced the 
development of UK Biobank? 
 
Personal Involvement 
What motivated you to becoming involved in UK Biobank? 
 
Future Interviewees 
With regard to the origins and development of the study, who or what types of people 
would you recommend that I interview in the future? 
 
International Context 
What do you think about the international context of similar concepts?  
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How do you think the UK Biobank compares to international studies and proposals? 
 
Why do you think that this study was set up in the UK? 
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B7: Follow-up Interview Schedule 
 
Follow-up Interview Topic Guide 
 
 
Changes to the Organisational Structure of UK Biobank 
 
 
What is your understanding of the new organisational structure? 
When was this new model introduced? 
How was it introduced?  
 
 
What do you think about the new organisational structure?  
What are its pros and cons? 
What has been your experience, thus far, of working within it? 
What are the implications for UK Biobank of implementing of this new organisational 
structure? 
Are there any issues that it might solve or bring?  
 
 
Why was the organisational structure changed? 
Who or what groups were responsible for the changes? 
Why was the new approach adopted for as opposed to other options?  
 
 
How does the new structure compare with the previous ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’  model? 
What were the pros and cons of the previous ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’  model?  
 
 
What do you think about the way in which the structure has developed?  
What has been your experience of the process of implementing a different structure?  
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B8: Archival Research Information Sheet and Conduct Agreement  
 
 
A contemporary history of UK Biobank 
 
PhD Research Project 
 
 
The following is a document that outlines the nature of my research project and 
details how I plan to use the MRC documents on the UK Biobank. 
 
 
Nature of the research project 
 
This research project is a contemporary history and will primarily use in-depth face to 
face or telephone interviews to elicit the experiences and opinions of scientists and 
interest groups regarding the evolution of the UK Biobank. It will also include 
analysis of archival material on UK Biobank. I aim to interview a range of scientists, 
funders and interest groups directly involved in the UK Biobank (such as key 
stakeholders, committee members) and indirectly involved (such as unsuccessful 
bidders, critics).   
 
The main aims of this research project are to understand: 
• The origins, implementation and evolution of the UK Biobank in its historical and 
international context. 
• How and why UK Biobank was set up when it was and how it was.  
 
 
Purpose of archival analysis  
 
I hope to use the material available in the MRC documents to build up a clear picture 
of what took place during the early stages of the project, the main issues faced and the 
key people involved. I do not intend to use the material to report personal issues or 
opinions. I am fully aware of the sensitivity of the material and the importance of 
protecting people’s identities.  
 
 
Handling of the material  
 
• I intend to use my laptop computer to log the general content of the documents 
such as reference number, name, date, topic area, name of the people involved and 
any further information regarding its contents if necessary.   
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• Although I will record the names of the people involved in my notes they will not 
appear in any written work and will instead be referred to by a suitably 
anonymous general descriptor.  
 
• Similarly, the anonymity of all reviewers will be preserved. I will not report 
directly on who said what but will instead use the comments for my own 
understanding and interpretation of the information. 
 
• Due to the sensitive nature of the material I will not photocopy any of the 
documents but will instead take notes from them at the MRC Headquarters thus 
ensuring that the documents are not removed from the building in any form 
whatsoever.  
 
• I agree to maintain the same working hours as the individual responsible for the 
documents.   
 
 
I am very grateful for the access I have been given to these important documents and 
the help I have been given in accessing them. I undertake to use the documents in a 
responsible manner and behave in an appropriate way regarding them as detailed 
above.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries regarding my research. 
 
 
Mairi Langan 
 
MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit 
University of Glasgow 
4 Lilybank Gardens 
Glasgow 
G12 8RZ 
Telephone: 0141 357 7545 
Email: mairi@msoc.mrc.ac.uk     
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B9: List of Transcripts  
 
 
Members of the IAG 
090 
091 
 
Members of the PDC 
024 
033 
051 
 
Members of the EWG 
060 
061 
062 
 
Members of the EGC 
090 
0400 
0401 
 
Members of the Science Committee 
012 
 
Members of the BoD 
013 
070 
 
Spoke Members 
021 
022 
023 
025 
026 
027 
030 
035 
052 
080 
0101 
0102 
0103 
0104 
0105 
0200 
0201 
0202 
0203 
0204 
 322  
0302 
0501 
0502 
0503 
0800 
 
Clinical academic involved in UK Biobank 
071 
 
Members of the scientific community outwith UK Biobank 
0700 
0900 
 
Representatives of the Funding Bodies 
040 
041 
042 
043 
044 
063 
072 
 
Representatives of UK Biobank Limited 
010 
0600 
0602 
 
 
Follow-Up Interview Transcripts 
 
Spoke Members 
E2000 
E2001 
E2002 
E2004 
E2005 
E2007 
E2009 
 
Clinical academic involved in UK Biobank 
E2010
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Representatives of the Funding Bodies 
E2003 
E2008 
E2011 
 
Representatives of UK Biobank Limited 
E2006 
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